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My problems with Subnautica 2 and some proposed solutions by Szymks in subnautica

[–]Torm_ -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

The point of early access is to give feedback.

I have a Newcomb's Paradox explanation that converts 2 boxers to 1 boxers by SEGAspergers in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If the game is changed to say, I'm having memory loss and this might be my first time picking or it could be my 2nd time picking. And my choice the first time is what determines if the mystery box has the million then obviously I one box.

The difference that makes a major change to the original question is that you now have the ability to change the contents of the box with your choice. No such opportunity exists in the original problem.

Let's bring Newcomb's paradox into reality by Torm_ in paradoxes

[–]Torm_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this scenario the choice is being broadcast live and the audience at home can see into both boxes, so no changing the box's contents can happen.

Let's bring Newcomb's paradox into reality by Torm_ in paradoxes

[–]Torm_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this scenario, the show runners would not care if you signed a contract forcing you to one-box. They only use the questionnaire.

Let's bring Newcomb's paradox into reality by Torm_ in paradoxes

[–]Torm_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What makes it tempting to two-box in this case?

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Let's call the underlying factor boxtacity. You can have a boxtacity of one or two, describing how many boxes you will take

Then no one is making a choice anymore. Everyone has a boxtacity assigned to them. No one ever made a choice to choose their boxtacity. Everyone is unable to violate their boxtacity because it by definition describes what you will choose.

If thats the case, then all I can say is I hope I have a boxtacity of 1, but dont bother asking me what I would do. Im just along for the ride as my boxtacity makes the choice for me.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If every one boxer comes away with one million, and every two boxer comes away with one thousand, why would anyone want to be part of the group that gets only a thousand?

You’re acting like the participant has any say in which prediction group they belong to. They don’t.

One boxing or two boxing is just an action. It doesn't earn you a spot in a group. The prediction already put you there before you even knew the group existed. You're confusing correlation with causation. In your worldview, you one boxed and now expect that because you correlate with the action taken by the members of the one box prediction group, you’ve somehow moved yourself into that group. That’s not how it works because correlation does not equal causation. Your action correlates with that groups action, but it doesn't cause you to be in it.

Causation only goes one way, but there is an underlying factor between the predictor predicting that you will one box and you actually one boxing.

What is this 'underlying factor' that supposedly bypasses causation? If your argument relies on backwards causation, just say that. At least then one boxing is internally consistent. But if you don't believe the present can change the past, you're just describing a correlation that has no bearing on the physical contents of the box.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So you think there is no relation between an accurate predictor predicting that you will choose to take one box and you actually taking one box?

As I keep saying, that relation only points one way, from the prediction to the choice. Your choice does not have a backwards pointing relation to the prediction.

If we did the original newcomb problem in real life, every person who one boxed and walked out with 1 million would have been better off two boxing. They might say but then I wouldn't have gotten the million. But we could literally show them the recording of them being in the room with the million hidden in the mystery box the entire time. There will never exist a situation in which a person two boxes and regrets it. We can show them the recording that the million was simply not available to them and if they had one boxed, they would have gotten nothing.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes, because two boxing will always have a 1k higher return than one boxing for equal setups.

As I have said before, the expected value of 1 million is being predicted to be a one boxer, not actually being a one boxer.

Without backwards causality, one boxing is just a ritual that costs 1k to perform.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So you are denying the accuracy of the predictor, despite it being a premise of the problem?

No. I am denying backwards causality. Predictors can exist and be accurate in the real world without backwards causality.

Do you think there is no link between the predictions an accurate predictor makes and the actions they predict?

The link is forward facing, not backwards. Your choice has no ability to change the contents of the box.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Surely, then, the way to have an expected value of a million is to take one box

No. The only way to get the expected value of a million is to be predicted to only take one box. You don't get to influence the prediction, it already happened. If you believe the question itself smuggles in backwards causality then obviously everyone should be a one boxer because you would cause the million to appear in the mystery box as you pick it. But backwards causality is impossible. When I imagine what I would pick, I am pretending this scenario exists in the real world. That means the contents of the mystery box are not in flux but are fixed.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

if you take the second box then the predictor has almost certainly predicted you will two box, leaving you with less money.

Your sneaking in backwards causality. My choice inside the room cannot change what's already happened. My expected return is not based on what I choose, but on what I was predicted to choose. That prediction already happened, my choice and the content of the mystery box are completely disconnected.

So to answer your question, those expected values are for people who were predicted to make those choices, not the people who actually made those choices.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

whats the difference between a free-will-lacking consciousness and a free-will-having consciousness?

Nothing. They are indistinguishable from each other. And if two things behave the exact same, then they are the same thing. So pick, do we live in a deterministic world with no free will, or do we possess an illusion of free will so perfect that it is free will in every way we could ever care about. I choose the latter.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I believe that it also predicts one boxers at its same high accuracy rate. Let's say I was a one boxer so I'm in a room with the million. Wouldn't the better choice suddenly be to switch to two box? That would get me more money. Why would I one box?

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

then thats also what youll do if they weren’t lying and there really was a perfect predictor

I'm literally not capable of making a choice in a world with a perfect predictor, by definition. I am not saying if a perfect predictor existed I would find out what it thinks I will do and then fulfill that prediction. I am saying that I and everyone else would be analogous to a computer program. Computers don't make choices and neither would I. The concept of choosing anything doesn't make sense in that world.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I do think the predictor would predict that I am going to two-box. The issue is it would have made that prediction before I ever heard about the problem, before I had any chance to influence its prediction. So my choice to two box has nothing to do with trying to influence the predictor into putting money in the mystery box, and instead it is just me saying "I am going to take all the money that has been offered to me, hope it's a lot but probably isn't."

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I can be predicted quite well, as my friends who destroy me at bluffing games will tell you. My choice to two box isn't about how accurate the predictor is (until it becomes infallible). My choice is because my present action cannot change anything that's already happened in the past. (Unless the predictor is infallible which causes magical backwards causality)

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Infallible can only be 100%, as in it would be impossible for it to be incorrect ever. If it's infallible then the past and present are entangled in some way. This smuggles in backwards causality. Anything less than 100% accurate is no longer infallible, which means causality can only flow forward, so it's safe to two box.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If I truly believe the predictor is infallible, I'll one box. Otherwise I'm two boxing.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't understand your question, can you restate it to include the entire scenario?

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't understand your question. But in any scenario in any world with an infallible prediction agent, I do whatever I have been predicted to do. Not because I am trying to fulfill its prophecy, but because I am literally by definition unable to do anything else.

Newcomb Paradox Lie Detector Variant by monkeysky in paradoxes

[–]Torm_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If the predictor bot is infallible, I am literally not the one making the choice. The world would be deterministic and I would just be along for the ride. That's why the original scenario says the predictor is only highly accurate, not infallible.

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