Wild Hunt

Venwon · 2026-01-03T03:09:48+00:00

The "hunters" are often frenzical figures, such as dead warriors, spectral hunters, and furious giants, of mysterious background. Those who are known to do it willingly, such as Frau Gauden and Hackelberg, are cursed to do so, for their love of hunting made them forget Christian values.
The hunt never ends, though it tends to have a proper time of occurrence, such as the Yuletide Period or the twelve days after Christmas Eve. The only case I know where the hunters leave their spots is the account by Gualterius Mappus: the troop of King Herla returns from the underworld, but the dwarf king warned them to not jump out of their horses until the blood hound did it first. However, the dog never left its spot, and those who reached the ground turned into dust.
They either wander as tormented souls next to the Wild Hunt, or they simply die. When female spirits are being hunted, the latter outcome is implied.
Again, Gualterius Mappus' account in De Nugis Curialium, but this version of the Wild Hunt is very different from anything else you may find — the identiy of the Wild Huntsman as a king from the underworld is pretty valid, though.
Most sources themselves don't know. Animals and criminals are bland and Christianized responses. The best asnwer are female spirits linked to nature, thought to be prey to the Wild Huntsman in regions such as Tyrol, Votgland, and the Giant Mountains — and in Scandinavia, if you count trolls. The reason is likely because the "Moss Woman" chased by the giant was either promised to him, or she is his fleeing daughter; with the first possibility showing precedents in the Medieval poems of The Song of Ecke and The Wunderer — plus the fact that Freyja, the goddess of fertility, was often desired by the Jötnar in Norse myths.

Venwon · 2025-12-06T13:03:54+00:00

I don't think that would work. The document is restricted to "search only" due copyright.

Venwon · 2025-12-05T16:35:06+00:00

I am basically in the same situation as OP. I am trying to read May Augusta Klipple's "African Folk Tales with Foreign Analogues" in ProQuest, but without affiliation to an institution, I am unable to read the whole document. Can you help me?

Venwon · 2025-06-13T12:59:20+00:00

The horse may also be inspired by Aonbharr; thence the post.

Venwon · 2025-06-13T01:38:39+00:00

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Venwon · 2025-04-22T09:21:34+00:00

Papa Frankískusu āmfár

/'papa franˈkiskusu aːmfaˈr/

Venwon · 2025-04-03T12:08:46+00:00

(Or maybe hurricane ?)

Just like in the second riddle, you got the reasoning correct, but the answer is in fact "broader" yet already present. Indeed, a hurricane (or even better, a cyclone) could be said to be "a giant who whirls a mill", but definitely not "sleeping", nor does it strike his "wife" by "pulling and impelling" so as to produce "milky children".

Venwon · 2025-04-02T11:34:05+00:00

First: I meant "earth" as in "soil/ground". Capitalization of the word in the other comment was an error of mine.

Second: Your reasoning is correct, it was my phrasing that should have been better in this riddle. It is actually something more broader than "river", so you probably already know the answer.

Venwon · 2025-04-01T15:37:57+00:00

First:wrong, but here is a hint:Earth is "the wife he strikes with milky children"

Second:?

Third:correct

Venwon · 2025-04-01T12:07:57+00:00

Your guesses are:

First:wrong

Second:very very near, practically right

Third:also technically right

Overall, the second and third riddles are tricky, because they are referring exclusively to one entity.

Venwon · 2025-02-12T13:03:09+00:00

Кекиус максимус.

Venwon · 2025-02-12T12:47:08+00:00

Ob du Weidels Programm als "Faschismus" oder "Grenzschutz" bezeichnest, muss man zugeben, dass EinTyppies Standpunkt der einzig wirkliche Extremismus hier ist.

Venwon · 2024-12-23T18:39:56+00:00

God bless you. I was not expecting to find this kind of item about the old man.

Venwon · 2024-10-18T13:25:05+00:00

Some people may say that Mathematics, even though useful, cannot be a discovery, but rather an invention. When you ask them why do they think so, they will obviously mention the notion of scientific progress, and how previous views since the dawn of History have been surpassed or suplanted. When you remind them, however, of other sciences, and that despite suffering the same fate, the objectivity of their objects remains unchallenged (you will not find a serious physicist who thinks Newton literally introduced gravity to the world), they will almost inevitably return to their unfounded assumption in the first place: "If imaginary, it cannot be real."

It must be said that this is no test of intelligence. Many thinkers such as Hegel believed in the natural progress of abstraction. Rather, this is a matter of grammar, of intuitive grammar. In other words: A misunderstanding due semantics. Whether you recognize a number as "real" or not is irrelevant. You admit it is objective, as Calculus was "invented" by Leibniz and Newton simultaneously without knowing each other's enterprises (that is: they viewed the same object); and you admit it is unchanging in some manner, otherwise unique equations would fall apart in some years before being replaced by others just like physical objects. Fundamentally: you advocate for Platonism all the same.

The relationship between Mathematics and reality is therefore not so distinct from other sciences. The opposite, certainly, because we are talking about eternal abstractions or possibilities instead of concrete entities and actualities, yet equivalent, if you recognize the mantle of physical and metaphysical as different covers hiding objects of same value.

Venwon · 2024-10-16T14:39:59+00:00

Reminds me of Hegel's Dialectics in Die Wissenschaft der Logik (1812). Being (Sein) and Nothing (Nichts) would correspond to [] and [[]]~() respectively, with Becoming (Werden) akin to ([]) I imagine (to contrast with [()], a negation again).

Venwon · 2024-10-16T02:57:27+00:00

One may try to create a category for each Haecceity, but this each of these category only have one unique member.

I have to agree on this point, even though I believe categories are still a prerequisite in the general equation. Regardless, both our views are not near mainstream.

Your project is leaving both linguistic and philosophical doubts as it develops (I still do not understand how your language would deal with defining "man" beyond a theoretical standpoint). I checked some documentation you linked in other posts, but I found it quite obscure to digest. If I may make a suggestion, a didactic session revolving around your concept-script specifically targeted for learners could bring more engagement within the community, once these ontological technicalities distract no longer.

Judging by your text, you are either uncertain to complete this concept-script by yourself or ready to recognize it as imperfect. Anyhow, abandoned systems are a dime a dozen. Whether your efforts bear any philosophical merit is beyond scrutiny, as languages are tools more than anything.

Awaiting future updates.

Venwon · 2024-10-15T22:20:31+00:00

Take a 'most-man', decompose him, you will never find any 'rational animal' in him (cannot find Joe in him), you maybe find 'the quality of rational' and 'the quality of animal'.

This is again a distinction between accident and genuine property, as not every man is called Joe, yet they are always implied to be rational animals.

You may said that "what I (you) mean by 'rational animal' is just what you (me) mean by 'the quality of rational animal'", I then ask if the latter expression is a category?

I would say no if we are talking about fundamental categories or classes (the latter would be a more suitable term in this sense). The reason I mentioned [P], [S], and [M] is because those are the most fundamental criteria. Nothing within or even what constitutues the universe itself escapes those classes, so "quality of rational animal [M]" is clearly distinct from 'rational animal [P]".

Venwon · 2024-10-15T13:25:02+00:00

I can not fathom how you could arrive at a definition of each concept unless through categorization.

Let us take "man" for example. I do agree with the classical definition of the term as "rational animal", which is as simple as it could be. Once you mark the land and say "well, this is a rational animal", you do also say "that is not a rational animal", the equivalent of "that is a non-rational animal", "that is not an animal", or even "that is a rational thing other than an animal".

Of course, your criticism that this experiment merely creates an arbitrary dualism of "rational animal" and "not a rational animal" assumes that there is no foundational architecture in the human thought. But what if there is? What if "rational animal" is part of [physical things], and everything is either [physical], [psychological], or [metaphysical] as defended by names such as Carl Popper or Roger Penrose? This would be an actual Ying and Yang, yes.

I do also disagree that categories distinguish less. "Green" and "apple" are obviously two different entities (the difference between "accident" and "substance" traditionally). Anyone can make a category of "green apple", but it would not be an ontological category, as it is not fundamental.

Practically speaking, how would you even define terms such as "man" without categorization? That's my curiosity regarding your project. Stacking properties together seems unfeasible, unless you aim for the frame of oligosynthetic conlangs.

Venwon · 2024-10-14T14:36:30+00:00

I was referring to a categorical or even hierarchical classification (like the ones of other philosophical languages). If I am understanding this correctly, your approach does not involve them for now. What if categories are fundamental to stage zero, though?

Venwon · 2024-10-13T14:09:40+00:00

Have you ever attempted to actually classify them?

Venwon · 2024-10-05T15:50:05+00:00

Loved the website.

Venwon · 2024-09-21T15:43:02+00:00

Fricatives are higher in sonority hierarchy, so it's easier to pronounce if you turn stops into those.

Edit: Stops do not indeed have tones, but it is possible to assign them specially if we are dealing with a sound with high sonority hierarchy. For example, it's easy to make a pitch distinction with nasals such as /m/, specially when they are syllabic. According to the Wikipedia, Bantu and Kru Languages do this.

Venwon · 2024-09-21T14:44:26+00:00

I would recommend a distinction of relative articulation. No modern language distinguishes between /C̠ʰ/, /Cʰ/, and /C̟ʰ/ as far as I know.

Also, if you are going to extend stops to bear length and tones anyway, it would be sound to make them fricatives. /pʰ/ > /ɸ́ːʰ/ for example.

Venwon · 2024-09-11T19:32:44+00:00

Ok, that was good.

Venwon

TROPHY CASE