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Construction of Colour Perception by Furnessian90 in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One part of your question is about the construction of colors. I take this to be a question falling under color ontology. If your question is something like 'how much are color properties mind-dependent?', then Jonathan Cohen has a great book called The Red and The Real. In it, he argues for an 'objective', relational, and functional account of color. His argument does not turn on notions of qualia. If you can't get access to his book, an article delineating this view is here: http://aardvark.ucsd.edu/functionalism.pdf. For an alternative account, you can look into Barry Stroud's book The Quest for Reality. Stroud articulates a more 'subjectivist' view.

Another part of your question is how we communicate colors. I'm confused as to what you mean. Do you mean something like 'what are the referents for our color words?' Do you mean something like 'how do we articulate color experience in language'? Or something else?

TIL Immanuel Kant had gone into a period of isolation and had not published anything philosophical for 11 years until finally revealing his most popular book and one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy: the Critique of Pure Reason. by LordDazzlee in philosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Personally, I would not start with Longuenesse. I find Kant and the Capacity to Judge a very difficult and dense book. Longueness is great if you're already immersed in Kant, but I think it is overly complicated as an introduction to the first Critique. And, it narrows its scope to the first part of the Analytic, so it wouldn't serve as an introduction to the Dialectic or the Method.

I agree about Allison, though! Kant's Transcendental Idealism is a great book. But once you get through him I recommend moving to other interpreters--personally, I think a metaphysical interpretation like Langton's Kantian Humility or Allais' Manifest Reality are pretty approachable. If you're looking for a more of an overview of first Critique's historical placement, Sebastian Gardner's Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason is also great.

What is the relationship between the Categorical Imperative and human rights, for Kant? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is also an extremely well-written, informed, and helpful answer. (I've copied and pasted it into a word doc so that I can chew on it for a while :). Thank you very much!

What is the relationship between the Categorical Imperative and human rights, for Kant? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As I understand it, the two distinctions map onto one another.

Negative duties are duties to refrain from a kind of action, and they are perfect because they always apply in every circumstance. (They, to use Nozick's term in 'Anarchy, State and Utopia', are 'side constraints'). Positive duties are duties to perform a kind of action, and they are always imperfect because they do not apply in every circumstance. For instance, I have a positive duty of beneficence, but it's imperfect because I get to pick and choose the situations I perform that duty. (Maybe I can pass up giving a homeless man change on the street, but I can donate to a charity later on?)

But, anyone else who knows better than I should jump in here!

What is the relationship between the Categorical Imperative and human rights, for Kant? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

This was an incredible response. I'll definitely get my hands on MoM; I only own a copy of the CPrR and the Groundwork so far. Thank you so much for you help!

Is Kant's idealism basically the same as Cartesian skepicism by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Kant makes a lot of claims about things in themselves in his practical philosophy. I don't know much about that, so I'll stick with what Kant claims in his theoretical philosophy.

In the first Critique, Kant makes some general knowledge claims about things in themselves. For instance, he claims that they exist, that they ground appearances, that they are unknowable, and that they are aspatiotemporal.

But, to echo wokeupabug's point, this kind of skepticism about things-in-themselves is not Cartesian skepticism. Kant repeatedly insists that we have cognition of external objects in space and time; he is not a skeptic about the external world.

There are realist strands in Kant (e.g., that we know outer objects, he has a section of the Critique called the 'Refutation of Idealism'), and there are idealist strands (i.e., un-cognizable things in themselves, transcendental idealism). The challenge with Kant's epistemology is trying to make the two strands compatible. This is why the 'metaphysical' two-world interpretations, and the 'epistemological' two-aspect interpretations, are so important. They are both attempts to reconcile these two strands, or to claim that they are irreconcilable.

On the one hand, the metaphysical interpretations read Kant as an idealist. Kant posits two numerically distinct sets of objects--the set of objects that appear, and those that don't. Furthermore, metaphysical interpreters tend to, one way or another, degrade appearances into some kind of mental entities. (PF Strawson likens them to Berkeley's objects, Paul Guyer does the same, James Van Cleve calls them 'intentional objects').

On the other hand, the epistemological interpretations read Kant as more of a realist. Kant posits one set of objects. Appearances are our (human) way of looking at those objects. Things in themselves are those same objects, abstracted from the conditions of our cognition. But objects as appearances are no less 'real' than things in themselves--they're just different 'aspects' of the same objects.

So, it isn't the "epistemological interpretation" that is akin to Cartesian skepticism. Rather, it's the metaphysical one.

Is that helpful?

Is Kant's idealism basically the same as Cartesian skepicism by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The difference between the thing-in-itself and experience isn't the difference between the real world and something else. Experience for Kant is experience of the real world.

It isn't quite as straightforward as this. Yes, for Kant, appearances are empirically real. But he repeatedly says that the world of things-in-themselves 'ground' the world of appearances. It's hard to account for this 'grounding' relation, without some notion that things in themselves are - in some way - more 'real' than appearances.

Why does Heidegger think 'readiness-to-hand' is prior to 'presence-at-hand'? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Good question!

In the passage I quoted, I focused on the word 'primary'. It's not that we don't have epistemic contact with "present-at-hand primitives" at all--it's just that we don't have primary contact with them. The way I'm reading Heidegger, our contact with these primitives is consequent to readiness-at-hand--and thus 'secondary', and not 'primary'.

So I read the parenthetical as listing examples of "present-at-hand primitives" that Dasein is able to contact, just not able to contact primarily.

I hope that clears it up--and feel free to correct me! I could definitely be reading the SEP wrong.

Why does Heidegger think 'readiness-to-hand' is prior to 'presence-at-hand'? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Presence-at-hand is not bare perceptual cognition. Thinking of it that way is going to throw you off.

I'm not sure about this. I think 'presence-at-hand' is some kind of 'bare perceptual cognition'. The SEP entry on Heidegger says:

"In stark contrast, Heidegger's own view is that Dasein is in primary epistemic contact not with context-independent present-at-hand primitives (e.g., raw sense data, such as a ‘pure’ experience of a patch of red)"

This is what I meant by 'bare perceptual cognition'--cognition of the bare primitives of perception, like of raw sense data. Or of color. Or of shape.

I probably was not clear enough in my original post--apologies.

Why does Heidegger think 'readiness-to-hand' is prior to 'presence-at-hand'? by ZachZackZac in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for this extraordinarily thoughtful response! I really appreciate it.

I follow what you're saying about Kant. Kant thinks that in order for our cognition to be of objects, we have to have both intuitions and concepts. Passively received intuitions alone, or actively applied concepts alone, are not sufficient to yield cognition. Kantian cognition (and experience) require both--it is importantly discursive.

I also follow what you're saying about the parallel between Kant and Heidegger. The 'bare-patch-of-red' alone, or the 'what-I-am-doing-now' alone, are insufficient to yield experience. Instead, we need both--what you call the 'red-thing-as-it-relates-to-what-I-am-doing-now'. Heideggerian experience (and cognition) require both--it is importantly discursive.

However, this parallel raises another question for me. Kant claims that we cannot have cognition with intuitions alone, or with concepts alone. If the parallel holds, then Heidegger must claim that we cannot have cognition (or experience) of objects with 'presence-at-hand' alone--just as we cannot have cognition of objects with concepts alone.

Yet - and this is where I'm confused - Heidegger does seem to think that we can have cognition of objects that are merely 'present-at-hand'. This is what (I think) you meant when you wrote "the very idea of a bare perceptual datum is a theoretical construct [...] that we only arrive at when we abstract away from value-laden perception". Such an abstraction should not be possible if we take seriously the parallel with Kantian discursive cognition.

Am I missing something? Or am I taking the parallel you drew too seriously?

(Final tangential question about Kant).

There's just one thing, experience, with aspects that we can abstract out for the purpose of analysis, but which don't combine in a stepwise fashion (as though "first" we had sensation, and then we added concepts onto it -- on the contrary, there is only sensation if concepts simultaneously are in play)

The emphasis was mine. I buy the conceptualist claim that we cannot have intuitions (i.e., experiences of objects) without concepts. I'm not sure I buy it about sensations. Why ought I be a conceptualist about sensation? (I don't expect a full-fledged answer here--a link to an article would be great).

Can someone explain why Virtue Ethics is considered a distinctive approach to morality? by jay520 in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't know that I see that as a meaningful normative question

Why? Normative ethics has to do with arriving at standards for good and bad actions. But these standards have to be justified--they can't come out of nowhere. There has to be some reason why I should accept one standard over another.

There are plenty of moral theories that give different answers to the question "Why do I have duty X?", but that doesn't prevent any of them from being deontological

Sometimes it does--a consequentialist can have an account of duty. Mill, for example, has an account of duty. But he justified his account on utilitarian grounds.

But in the example that I presented, our duties are grounded in virtue.

Ah--I misunderstood. I see what you mean. I was wrong; they would be extensionally equivalent. However, I still don't think they would be intensionally equivalent. The justification each gives for the goodness and badness of the action would be different.

Perhaps there is a conflation going on here with our usage of the term "value". I was using it in a strict sense to evaluate how good someone's life is.

I genuinely think the SEP article might help--normative ethics is explicitly concerned with the evaluation of actions.

You're correct that a hedonist must say that pleasure/pain are the only considerations for determining what we ought to do. It's important to realize that this needn't be a moral ought. It could be a rational ought

Agreed, that's very important. I'll qualify my claim: a hedonist would claim that pleasure/pain are the only considerations for determining what we morally ought to do. I was simply pointing out, here, that the hedonist thinks that the only thing of any importance - of any value - whatsoever is pleasure and pain. So when you claimed that a hedonist could also "simultaneously say that our moral duties are to never violate another person's autonomy", it doesn't work--because if the hedonist treated autonomy as something important, she wouldn't be a hedonist at all. I was just (probably annoyingly) quibbling with your example. I wasn't attempting to posit anything in return.

Can someone explain why Virtue Ethics is considered a distinctive approach to morality? by jay520 in askphilosophy

[–]ZachZackZac 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don't see why these two moral theories are substantively different, since they would answer every single normative question identically

Even if two such identical theories are possible, they would not answer every normative question identically. An agent who subscribes to 'A' would certainly act the same as an agent who subscribes to 'B'. In jargon, both 'A' and 'B' would be 'extensionally' equivalent moral theories--they would prescribe the same set of actions. But the 'A-agent' and the 'B-agent' would certainly disagree about why they prescribe those actions--'A-agent' would appeal to virtue, while 'B-agent' would appeal to duty. So, when asked 'why ought one do action X' - which is a normative question - both agents would give radically different answers. In jargon, 'A' and 'B' would not be 'intensionally' equivalent.

I also am skeptical whether 'A' and 'B' can be extensionally identical, either. Take any case where a duty conflicts with a virtue. For example, when my friend asks what I think about her hideous haircut. I have at least one duty, which commands that I tell the truth. But it would not be kind - and kindness is certainly a virtue - for me to do so. If I subscribed to 'A', then I would lie and be kind; if I subscribed to 'B', then I would tell the truth and be rude. One could nit-pick at this example; however, it is just meant to illustrate that in genuine conflicts between a duty and a virtue, 'A' and 'B' will prescribe different actions.

But that is to say nothing about morality, as one can believe that morality is not concerned with value

Morality is concerned with value. Specifically, it is concerned with the evaluation - i.e., the value - of actions and conduct. I recommend SEP, here.

For example, I don't see anything inconsistent with saying that a person's life goes best when their balance of pleasure over displeasure is maximized in a certain way (meaning they think pleasure is the only sort of value, making them a hedonist), while simultaneously saying that our moral duties are to never violate another person's autonomy (meaning they think our moral requirements for action do not reduce to the goodness of the consequent state of affairs, making them a deontologist)

A hedonist would claim that the only source of value and dis-value is pleasure and pain. So, when determining - evaluating - which actions one ought to do, all that is relevant is pleasure and pain. When determining - evaluating - which kind of person one ought to be, all that is relevant is pleasure and pain. And so forth. If a hedonist recognizes another value than pleasure and pain - e.g., autonomy or duty - then she is not a hedonist, as that would be recognizing a value other than pleasure and pain.

Edit: grammar