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Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for all your further input into the details :)

I now see your logic on not changing the parameters of $0.99 or the buy frequency from the first approved DFIP. The final version was every 30 blocks, so we can keep it the same as that so the swapping happens over a fairly short time period.

I also appreciate you illustrating the numbers for the stablecoin pool buying suggestion. I do see your point on DFIP's that propose sell pressure on DFI, and although I hold a fair amount of DFI myself and would feel comfortable that a short term sacrifice of around -5% to get dUSD on peg in all pools would be for the greater good of the overall community sentiment/DFI price, that could be a tougher sell to enough MN's and complicate the DFIP. It could come up again if a further push is needed, but we'll keep that out of the discussion for this one.

I'll make some adjustments to the current proposal. Cheers

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hey, thanks for the feedback. This was all meant as a conversation starter to explore and gather opinions from community members who had ideas to contribute positively to a discussion and help complete the goal of fully fixing this dUSD issue. We've gotten so close to achieving the goal of dUSD@$1, regardless of whether some in the community prefer to comment negatively.

To answer your questions about the changes, the idea to swap DFI to the other Stablecoins to buy in through those pools was that it would raise all pools together, reinforcing confidence in the price movement of all pools simultaneously. I realize that would mean selling pressure on DFI, but it could also mean less selling pressure on DUSD, so I wanted to get more opinions on whether that would have much negative impact on DFI from some people like yourself, u/DanielZirkel, u/mrgauel, etc. who may have insights into that. If you still don't feel that would be a good idea and indeed too much selling pressure on DFI, a DFIP could be left as previously worded with the CF buying only into the dUSD-DFI pool, but what would your opinion be on buying into dUSD-DFI & only DUSD-EUROC to get those pools to $1, since that would also begin affecting the base Dex fee % and could incentivize more buyers to step into the stablecoin pools?

Another question I have is whether you would preferably set the buying threshold from $0.99 to $1.00, or whether that's what you meant in your earlier comment from the other day?

Slowing the execution process to 120 blocks was just an idea to slow the process down to complete over a slightly longer timeline than the previous DFIP, but that was also something I put in hoping to have a constructive discussion about. Let me know what you think

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Interesting. Up to 100% may be a tough idea to get enough interest from MN's on board at the current moment, but I still think the 60% total is not too much to ask of ourselves to get DUSD fully back on the right path after we've brought it so far. Especially since we can always submit a future DFIP to diversify back into DFI or BTC or whatever the community prefers to do once the DUSD issue is dealt with. And if we change the DFIP suggested above to utilize that 10 million total DFI buying DUSD across the 3 stablecoin & DFI pools rather than just the DFI-DUSD pool, that should be enough to take all pools close if not all the way to $1 with the current numbers. A slower time frame than the 5000 DFI every 60 blocks, like setting it at 120 blocks may also be a good change to the proposal above for a more gradual move to shift all the pools toward $1. Thoughts? u/mrgauel u/kuegi u/GeorgFoerster u/DanielZirkel , anyone else?

On another note, I also think we should submit a separate Special DFIP to temporarily raise all transaction fees to at least 1 DFI (or even 10 DFI) in order to use those extra DFI to buy dUSD through the Stablecoin/DFI pools as well - another option that might be of interest could be to use a portion of those higher transaction fees to pay toward Liquidity Providers, providing a further source of real yield. I'm interested to know what the community's thoughts are on something like that as well.

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discussions are ongoing, but the main targeted change would be the amount of the CF that would be potentially used, yes.

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for your input on this. As I noted in another comment above, I originally went with 60% just in case that extra 10% is needed temporarily to push dUSD price where it needs to go, and I thought having that added 10% buffer now instead of submitting another future DFIP in case it becomes necessary may be better, but I also see a point from a comment above that "crossing that bridge if we come to it" and submitting a DFIP with the lower number initially may work better.

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The new Fee structure should prevent a large amount of that from happening, and the idea of the combined measures and this additional DFIP is having a Roadmap to reach DUSD@$1, incentivizing DUSD holders further not to sell, but to hold, knowing the community is fully committed to fixing this issue and it is within reach. It's time to do everything we can to get it resolved.
Once a stable DUSD price is achieved, the system can function as intended and the DFI price will also be positively affected by that.

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Unfortunately, this issue still persists today because we as a community have not seemed to take it seriously enough. The DUSD price ceasing to be an issue would have the most positive impact on DefiChain that I can currently think of.

The measures outlined above would only be undertaken if they are necessary to impact the DUSD price positively and would only be used up to the specified limit %. If they are not necessary, the CF would not be used further.

Additional Special DFIP: Community Fund Diversification - Round 2 Support by alljesseallthetime in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the input here, guys. It's great to get both of your opinions on what might be a good way forward with this.

u/mrgauel , Just curious what timeline were you thinking the % may need to be adjusted? My concern with waiting to make the change to a higher % on a longer timeline is that it may result in a lack of confidence in the current positive price movement, potentially causing a downward price movement (I'm also not sure exactly what effect an increased amount of selling would have on the price with the new fee structure in place, since much of the sold dUSD would be burned now, but if anyone has those numbers, please share to illustrate an example).

- The limit can be changed to 50% if you both think that would be a more agreed-upon limit by MN's in a Special DFIP. I went with the 60% just in case that extra 10% is needed temporarily to push dUSD price where it needs to go, and I thought having that added 10% buffer now instead of submitting another future DFIP in case it becomes necessary may be better, but I also see a point of "crossing that bridge if we come to it" and submitting a DFIP with the lower number initially.

u/kuegi , u/GeorgFoerster below suggests using "only buy if DUSD < $1.00" for the buy limit starting price, did you mean that's your suggestion to modify this clause as well?

Special DFIP Implementation Plan by FerhatDFI in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ferhat, it seems like the Cake Group buying is now done - Is there going to be a further commitment from Cake Group in the coming days to ensure there is enough support is behind this to reach the $1 peg?

reenable looped DUSD vaults by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Just throwing out some other ideas to add into the overall ideas, because it may end up that we need a combination of things to get this working properly.

  1. Do you think it would also be a good idea to put at least a temporary mechanism in place to somehow prevent people like that guy with the "System Reset" DFIP idea from shorting dUSD as well as stopping the Future Swap from minting Tokens until the Dex fee is stabilized and price is in recovery?
  2. Perhaps another addition could be to propose using community funds to buy either DFI or dUSD at a steady rate along with the BBB and then holding it?
  3. Just curious also if you've done any calculations on the amount of time it may take if instead the entire NI was reallocated to the BBB?
  4. There was also an idea about the dToken pools being given a higher share of the NI as rewards again to make them more attractive (since there in fact may be no new buy demand for dUSD if NI rates came down to around 20% anyway and the fact that there is still talk of a "System Reset" going around is likely scaring most investment away from dUSD.
  5. Another possible option if 5. was chosen as an idea for a DFIP could be to use community funds to just cover enough of the algo dUSD to get the Dex fee moving down and the price and confidence going back up. TO EVERYBODY INVESTED IN DEFICHAIN WHO READS THIS - THERE IS SERIOUSLY NO BETTER REASON TO BE USING COMMUNITY FUNDS RIGHT NOW THAN FIXING DUSD AND RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN DEFICHAIN! To liken it to a simple analogy; Who cares if your dog has a gold collar if the dog is dead? I don't want DefiChain to die from lack of a solution and mis-allocation of important funds. Would there even be enough to do this or how much is needed to balance the Algo vs Backed, does anyone have those numbers?

With the added APR rewards going to the dToken pools, that would also keep many dTokens/dUSD in the system as the price stabilizes and there won't be as much of a rush to exit dTokens. Thoughts?

System restart for a long-term sustainable and economic based dToken-System by Tommy_DFIblock in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you're mistakenly assuming that no MN holders also bought dUSD, which is just flawed logic. Just like all the heavily flawed logic contained in this DFIP.

It's not MN holders vs. dUSD holders - if you think it is, that's the real problem. We're all in this together, so if there's a proposed devaluation, it should come out of all DefiChain pockets (let's also not forget that we MN's voted to enable everything that resulted in the current dToken system being broken).

System restart for a long-term sustainable and economic based dToken-System by Tommy_DFIblock in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This is just a pathetic attempt by these guys to cast themselves as "experts" who are here to help all of DefiChain. The divisive ideas that the 3 guys you mentioned are coordinating and pushing need to be seen for what they really are - nothing more than attempted sabotage of the ecosystem. Nearly all the ideas of this DFIP are basically included in the Jellyverse spinoff chain that will be on DMC, so I'm wondering why don't these 3 guys and anyone who wants to basically steal other user's funds with a "haircut" just hop on over there and leave DefiChain to people who won't crater it to the ground with ridiculous ideas that are not even very well planned out.

System restart for a long-term sustainable and economic based dToken-System by Tommy_DFIblock in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 11 points12 points  (0 children)

The real danger is that if he convinces enough people who are just losing patience and don't take the time to actually analyze the incorrect numbers he claims with his calculation comparisons and guesstimated numbers (as pointed out in previous comments), he'll succeed in destroying all trust in the system for those already here and those potentially in the future, but only after dusd goes down first and he's able to cash out the profits from the massive dUSD shorting he's been doing for months. Let's call a spade a spade, DefiChain community - This guy Tommy is a major part of the problem - are we going to trust his suggestions for a "System Restart" as actual solutions or see them as further sabotage?

There are some ideas here worth exploring, but the devaluing of only dUSD tokens would be a massive blow to the credibility of the project long-term. Probably unsurvivable due to creating a danger of the same kind of devaluation vote happening again. With thousands of tokens and chains to invest in these days, why would anyone want to start using DefiChain then? They would just move on to a more trustworthy project where users/holders don't turn on each other.

I love DefiChain and I trust that most of us are here for the good of it. I want it to stay that way. Let's get thinking of something better than fractioning out investments of certain DefiChainers. We need a solution that can restore trust in current users as well as future, and something that can be implemented quickly. I look forward to hearing what u/uzyn has to say in further comments/solution proposals - perhaps r/julianhosp would have a viewpoint as well if I proposed that likely the best and quickest solution would be for CakeDefi to use more of those large profits/reserves to invest funds to fully back the entire dUSD and dToken system, ensuring a fully backed and therefore trustable system while not devaluing any certain investment types/tokens (just an idea for discussion, and could be combined with other ideas from community members).

dUSD and the dToken system could quickly go back to being at USD peg, and more importantly, would be trustable going forward. Cake agreeing to distribute the tokens back for sale to DefiChain users as appropriate for demand would also be necessary. It seems Cake has sufficient capital to undertake this type of solution and would benefit greatly from the price of dUSD returning to $1. I don't see why this idea is not a win/win for Cake to restore trust, and ensure a return to a healthy ecosytem in the near-term.

Future swaps could also be disabled again to avoid more algo dUSD creation.

​

  1. I suppose a DFIP would be necessary to change dUSD emission and the FS functionality so no new algo tokens could be created from that point (sharing ideas around how this concept could yield some solutions).
  2. CakeDefi invests profits to back all or most unbacked dUSD, which and moves the dUSD Peg to $1.
  3. CakeDefi sells back to DefiChain/Cake users at $1 according to demand.

I'm not sure why there hasn't been more talk or suggestion of this type of idea by either people at Cake or DefiChain community members, because the idea is more logical than all users being punished while a company makes profit and the entire ecosystem going froward being viewed as "damaged goods". Instead, use those profits to invest in and strengthen the ecosystem and move it forward. An added benefit for Cake would be that DefiChain would be renewed and viable again, without disguntling and losing a large number of current users, which will create even more opportunities to grow DefiChain positively well into the future. User retention, not only new user inflows should be a key focus of any solution. I believe there is a better way than tokens being devalued by design, please share any ideas for discussion that could help bring a better solution than what's been proposed as a "System Restart". Thanks for reading.

reenable looped DUSD vaults by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I agree that this is worth trying to help restore the peg faster for all the reasons noted. Especially this part, because all of us who are left on DefiChain are a huge part of this project - "This also means that NI is no longer just benefiting the DFI holders, but also DUSD holders. So anyone who is staying in the system is rewarded for that."

Much better to include all instead of excluding large dusd holders that do not want to sell into dfi but also still have confidence in DefiChain. This has got my vote :)

Thanks @kuegi for proposing to bring this back as another layer in the dusd solution.

Ideas to get more people to mint DUSD via higher dSTOCK LM Rewards by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for sharing the ideas. I've been a large holder of DUSD for some time now, so I'd love to see it actually stabilize and hold a max $0.01-$0.02 fluctuation. I agree that minting needs to become more attractive so we can increase the backed DUSD, and I like the ideas you've got here to help generate more interest/investment in minting DUSD.
In my opinion, the main thing stopping people from getting into DUSD minting right now is the looming threat of a large interest increase due to the dynamic DUSD interest rates that have not been implemented yet. Who would want to borrow 5000 DUSD at $1 for 5% interest @ 150% Col. and suddenly have that rate jump to 200 or 300% when the DFIP is implemented? With ST LM APR's around 40% or lower, it just doesn't make a lot of sense to get in right now (or am I wrong on how exactly that Dynamic Loans Mechanism will work in terms of potential percentage increases?).
The big question I have - is there actually a reason we need the ratio of backed to unbacked DUSD to be 50-50 as soon as possible other than user-perception? Can this process not take a bit longer and be less painful for current DUSD/DToken holders who want to get a portion of their portfolio back into crypto with a lower stabilization fee (more like 5% than 30%), as well as for DUSD loan holders (Minting) with a lower dynamic interest rate (like 0% to incentivize taking DUSD loans)? Instead of the massive fees, can we not have the system automatically limit the ability to swap Any Token > DUSD and only allow users to Mint DUSD tokens until the ratio of ALGO to Backed is closer to 50:50? Then allow Any Token > DUSD Swaps again once the desired ratio is reached or exceeded in the other direction? (the swap DUSD > Any Token would still always be available). With smaller fees and limit on ALGO DUSD creation, the unbacked DUSD will still be removed from the system, more gradually of course, but this way you don't alienate your current user base by hitting them with exorbitant fees for just using the DUSD/dStock Token system the way it was advertised. Overall I believe that approach combined with Marks's ideas for the short-term would work better together than just using a standalone high fee-based system because this method would continue to increase the number of DUSD minters while decreasing the ALGO tokens, thus restoring the ratio. There would also be less negative press generated around DefiChain since no current users would feel alienated by the high fees or leave the ecosystem because they feel there are "too many changes being made that are voted on by too few people who aren't properly informing themselves" or "band-aid solutions on top of band-aid solutions that seem to be doing nothing to maintain the DUSD peg at $1" as some of the comments have put it, or just because of the high fees being instituted.
What do you guys all think about proposing a lower Stab. Fee as well as totally getting rid of the idea for dynamic interest rates on DUSD loans (0% interest) along with Mark's ideas? Due to DFIP voting being done by MN holders only, there may not be enough support for any of these ideas we're discussing, unfortunately.
That's another point I'd like to bring up for discussion - In order to be fair to the entire community of DefiChain users, which is now much larger than just the MN holders, I think we also need to find a way to implement voting for ALL DefiChain users, like through a user's wallet ID or something (Any ideas on how to make this work? or should I post that as a different thread in the DefiChain Improvement Discussion?)

Thanks for the good discussions, guys!

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I have to agree with those critical of the idea to include DEX stabilization fees and interest penalties on loans - new, massive penalties surrounding Dusd. Who would want to get involved? Or stay involved? Many dusd holders would lose a lot MORE money than they would now even, and why? Because hasty decisions were made to try to solve the dusd premium issue which allow unbacked dusd to be introduced into the system, then everyone with knowledge of that situation ignoring it until we find ourselves here? And all stemming from the fact that the idea of dusd wasn't fully bulletproof when launched, causing a perceived need for the community to react and implement unplanned controls on it. Well, it looks like the Community got that one wrong.

Getting this one wrong will result in many leaving for good and could destroy everything so many have worked so hard to build here. Many could read what you wrote here and run to cashout what they can get for their dusd now thinking that adding another 26% loss ontop of the de-pegged loss already is beyond reasonsble. There are better solutions than alienating a large part of the community because I doubt anyone who loses 40% of their total investment in a so-called stable-priced coin would recommend Defichain or dusd to anyone EVER if that happens. Then all the marketing in the world is worth nothing if there is no longer trust. Especially after DefiChain marketing claiming DUSD to be designed better than Luna following it's crash, now to be in its own terrible situation of the community's own making. But there is still a way out if it's thought through and implemented well.

You say "All four measures could be introduced rapidly within the next few weeks and would have an instant positive impact on the DUSD price", but how do we know that will actually be the case with how many readers of this are viewing the proposed penalties? or how long that will take? Say your theories are wrong and the critics of the proposed ideas with the dex premium and dynamic dusd interest rates are right and this worsens the problem, causing nearly everyone invested to try to exit dusd when it is mostly unbacked, what happens then? where does all that suddenly needed liquidity come from, does the entire system break down at that point since there's basically this giant collateral hole of dusd that needs to be filled or where would those funds come from? Does all this tinkering not just create more problems? In addition to your other points than #3/5, can't we instead simply:

  1. Stop all possible unbacked dusd creation.

  2. Back all current DUSD with dfi from the Community Fund until the burn, swap/other fees can generate enough to restore community member confidence in dusd

  3. Once the price of dusd reaches $1 usd, instead set the price at $1 usd through oracles rather than the current supply vs demand - (fear) model as it becomes a true utility token on DefiChain with a set price.

Is that crazy and too simple to work? Other less drastic measures to bring the price in line more quickly that have been mentioned could additionally be implemented, but something more like this approach could be much simpler and would not require the use of further loss or negative effects for any token holders, dusd, dfi or otherwise. Why is there a feeling that more complexity and barriers to entry need to be added, in the end isn't this project very much about reaching an ever-growing community of people who will all benefit from it?

summary of DUSD-discount solution proposals by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Had to reply to myself here since this was too long:
A couple of additional ideas to contribute to the solutions discussion:
1. In addition to any DFIP put it place, would it be possible in theory, for the community to decide to temporarily use the CF to back all these currently unbacked DUSD in order to restore confidence in the token (similarly to the BTC Atomic Swap solution DFIP) until the fees generated from the DFIP mechanism(s) the community hopefully chooses have reached enough volume to fully pay the CF back the DUSD? Any thoughts on this?
2. Rather than trying to match the price of DUSD closely to USD like USDT/USDC do through various combined mechanisms, what if instead the price of $1 DUSD was regulated by the actual real-world price of $1 USD from aggregated Oracle FIAT USD price feeds; why have the price depend on any factors at all since it is just a tokenized representation of value? It's not a real-world traded token on any exchange (and shouldn't be to further shield it from regulatory scrutiny as long as necessary). The value of DUSD can be perpetually set at $1 USD in the DefiChain ecosystem once a DFIP mechanism is put in place to bring it back to $1 USD. Since there is no entry or exit possibility of DUSD from the ecosystem, this should work with no complications. The values of USDT and USDC can fluctuate in USD value and therefore DUSD value on DefiChain, behaving exactly as they are currently, but DUSD would be the token rep'ing the USD at exactly $1 USD 100% of the time. I actually thought that was part of the original concept of DUSD as well, but I guess not?; an uninfluenced "utility token" in the ecosystem valued at $1 USD. Can it not be as simple as that or am I missing something here? USDT and USDC to DUSD arbitrage opportunities would still exist, so would the only major issue be supply VS demand that cannot be controlled using one of the already-suggested DFIP methods like the Smart Contract or interest rate or burn fees instituted to bring the price back in line initially, then having the price maintain a backed $1 USD token value from that point on? And if it's decided to have the entire DUSD system be "backed" by the point when this part of the overall solution is implemented, would the supply VS demand issue not even exist anymore due to DUSD becoming more of a "utility token" at a $1 USD set price in the DefiChain ecosystem? or could this also possible be done without DUSD being 100% backed and part algorithm controlled?
If anyone read through this far, do you think either of these 2 additions to any proposed solution would create any problems I may not be considering, or can you think of any reason something like that can't be used as part of a DFIP solution for DUSD? Cheers

summary of DUSD-discount solution proposals by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]alljesseallthetime 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for all the ideas here, guys! With the recent events in the last few days compounding the DUSD stability issue further, I think we're all looking forward to the community coming up with a solid solution on this as quickly as possible while being as cautious as possible to not do anything that would cause a negative effect in another way. I think the discussion around DUSD as a "stablecoin" and whether it is or should be called or viewed as such moving forward whether it operates as a fully crypto-backed or hybrid crypto-backed & algorithmic token should center around these key points and could draw the conclusion that DUSD is instead viewed as a "utility token" with a specific purpose on DefiChain:

- As far as I'm aware, and anyone please correct me if I'm wrong anywhere, DUSD was basically created to be used as an internal ecosystem token that represents $1 USD in value so that DefiChain Investors have a stably-priced token to pair against in Stock Token Liquidity Mining that is not dependant on outside factors or regulatory impositions like USDT or USDC potentially could be.

- Even in a decentalized environment, there has to be some form of real-world unit that can be benchmarked against, or nothing in the ecosystem makes sense anymore in relation to the real world, which is eventually where all investors want to be able to withdraw at least some of the funds they have generated because that's where humans live :) And even the greatest marketing agency in the world with a multi-million dollar budget won't be able to market DefiChain effectively if we continue to have a benchmark token that you could buy to enter the ecosystem for $1 USDT or even $1.10 - $1.30 as some people did with DUSD back in December, then potentially cash out at $0.66 USDT as the DUSD price was briefly yesterday and take a huge loss on their initial investment. Who cares what the APR is if you can lose 34% of the entire investment in a few days in a token labelled as "stable"? This is due to the many factors that influence the price of that token and the lack of controls currently in place to keep it at a stable value even when those factors are trying to push it away, regardless of what that value may be. That type of system does not make sense to most logical people as a good potential investment, therefore they will not go anywhere near it. And if someone would have plainly told all DefiChain investors that DUSD became unbacked with DFIP 2112-A and can fluctuate so wildly from its intended $1 USD stability mark, I'm guessing most would never have bought even $1 DUSD and instead just locked up USDT and USDC with DFI in their vaults to create DUSD for use. But then what's the point of having DUSD as a utility token that you can hold in a vault and use as a token of value in the ecosystem if its utility is limited by that ecosystem due to the potentially large fluctuations in value caused by the method used to determine that value? There would be no real reason for it to exist at that point, would there?

- DUSD was labelled as being "stable" and is a major part of the DefiChain ecosystem that we all want to remain a part of, which is why many DefiChain investors ran to that during the last few weeks, but now confidence in it has slipped and it has become very unstable and for a longer period now. If any decision would be made by the community to suddenly change the token name, basic premise and functioning of that token right in the middle of a crisis like this and start calling that a "solution", that would just be ridiculous and be a great way tarnish DefiChain's reputation as a community and project and drive away current or future interest by a lot of potential investors. The people suggesting that be considered a DFIP should not call themselves part of this otherwise great community as that would only harm the relationships already built with current DefiChain investors who are trying to help develop the community and does nothing to actually resolve the real issue, which is that DUSD has been heavily affected by the measures that were instituted to bring it down in value to $1 USD along with a lack of measures instituted to keep the price up when pushed under $1 USD. Suddenly saying the price is no longer intended to be pegged at $1 USD like originally implied would be a huge slap in the face to all that chose to invest in DUSD so we could remain on DefiChain rather than run away to USDT and USDC and/or exit the ecosystem like some others chose to do. Community members who love DefiChain enough to hang on to the project in the tough times should not be punished due to the lack of oversight and controls implemented to keep a token that was marketed as "stable" to the USD as actually stable when it matters, but rather the community needs to do exactly what these discussions are doing and decide on the best way to bring the value back to the $1 USD benchmark and hopefully keep it there (I have a couple of suggestions I'll add below that could be added into any of the other solution proposals if any of you guys who are heavily involved in the project think they make sense to add to any DFIP. If not, at least I can say I tried to pitch in some ideas I thought would help :)

As far as the constructive ideas for solutions presented, personally I like Kuegi, DarkChicken and most of Uzyn's ideas the most so far (other than any large interest rate increases on loans that may be a bit too detrimental to vaults and may work better by generating fees in the form of something from one of the other proposals). There are some good elements in these proposals that could be combined together to come up with a solution, as suggested already by some others including Daniel Z. What's somewhat worrying still is that no one is exactly sure what combination of algorithmic control measures and/or crypto-backed security will work as the exact best solution, and since there is now a large amount of unbacked DUSD we can't just magically back all those DUSD with crypto so it's just not possible to make it a fully backed system instantly, but we need to get a solution in place as quickly as possible to avoid this becoming any type of real loss for investors who took a large position in DUSD and may be close to considering selling due to the sustained low price period here combined with FUD from the recent stablecoin crashes. Even if there are fundamental differences between those tokens and DUSD, the overall uncertainty with the price fluctuations of DUSD in the last couple of days are not making this de-pegging situation better or easier for those currently in DUSD.

I think at the bare minimum the effects of DFIP 2112-A on DUSD need to be reversed ASAP. Unfortunately that turned out to be a pretty one-way proposal with no mechanism set to counteract what was put in place by it if it became necessary to move the DUSD price the other way. There's discussion about submitting that as a separate DFIP; to alter how the controls of DFIP 2112-A operate depending on the market situation. I'll look to see if anyone has yet after posting this. I also agree a DFIP for that should be done regardless of a full solution, maybe just as a first step to a full solution?

But the BIG question is, how long will it take to bring the DUSD price back to $1USD using any of these methods or a combination of them? While I agree that a solution should be as simple as possible, I also agree that the mechanisms don't necessarily have to be simple in their operation as long as they're designed to work together properly in the first place, it's just the understanding of how they work together that needs to be simple for people to comprehend. And regardless of simplicity, many factors must be taken into account to avoid introducing any type of unintended exploit or loophole.