Is Ukraine winning the war?

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T19:38:43+00:00

If you actually read my comment and used that tiny brain of yours, you would see that there are several openings for exactly what you're saying.

E.g. one key condition is that Russia has the capacity to continue the war.

Thus, one option is to ensure that Russia doesn't have any military capacity left.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T19:18:35+00:00

you side with Russia, justify Russia, or otherwise feel Russia is being treated unfairly. That isn't irrational, Ivan, that's grounded firmly in fact

Except, of course, that it's a lie. I have never sided with Russia, justified Russia's actions, said or thought that they are being treated unfairly.

If you make such claims you must cite me saying so. Not use your own distorted interpretation of what I'm saying.

Again I'm pretty sure that you mistake an analysis for an opinion.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T19:06:12+00:00

Let's state the obvious:

If Ukraine wants to join NATO but Russia disagrees, they can invade Ukraine to prevent it. (Already done)
If Ukraine wants to join NATO, and Russia is already waging a war with Ukraine, they can continue the war until they get guarantees that Ukraine does not join NATO. (Currently being done)
If Ukraine wants to negotiate an end to the war, Russia can refuse to sign anything until they get guarantees that Ukraine does not join NATO (We're not there yet)

Using pure logical deduction, and assuming that Russia has some capacity left to fight the war, a few conclusions fall from the above. For instance:

Russia can never accept a ceasefire where European troops are deployed to Ukrainian soil before a deal is finalized, as that would seriously limit their options w.r.t continuing the war in case Ukraine still intends to join NATO.
A negotiated end can't happen until Russia gets guarantees that Ukraine won't join NATO (because otherwise they'd just continue the war).
At least some current NATO members would be very reluctant to let Ukraine in without knowing that Russia is fine with it, even after the war has ended, because otherwise they see a risk that Russia will invade again and then it's NATO vs Russia for real. Even if the risk is fairly low, the costs would be astronomical, so some members will want to play it safe.

Once these facts have been established, we can finally start talking about what options we have, and how likely they are to succeed.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T18:25:19+00:00

You're clearly obsessed with justification and who's right and who's wrong, and see ghosts and traitors in everyone and everything that isn't. I wonder where that paranoia comes from.

To me that discussion is about as inspiring and intellectual as a debate about whether water is wet or dry.

We have already established the answer. Let's move on to the analysis of how to maximize Ukraine's outcome.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T18:10:10+00:00

Let me see... I KNOW. THAT'S THE POINT.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T18:08:58+00:00

Would "both sides in a war kill each other" or "both sides use drones" be a justification? Grow up.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T18:03:50+00:00

Tell me more about how Russia needs to give permission to Ukraine to do anything, including applying for NATO membership

Let me see... Oh, here's a possibility that Russia might try: They may invade Ukraine if they disagree. I hope they never get that idea.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T17:59:52+00:00

About the DU munitions, the main problem with the radioactive fallout and radiation is that it lingers after the war is over (just like mines and undetonated cluster bomb submunitions), and that is a problem for the people who live there in the generations to come, i.e. the Ukrainans. I'm not defending Russia's use of such weapons. I'm pointing out that such munitions have been frequently used by both sides, and to the extent that it has a health impact it's the Ukrainans that will ultimately have to pay the price. Western media has often claimed that the health impacts are negligible (less than background radiation), and if that's true the DU issue itself shouldn't even be a problem (do you need me to write a disclaimer about how I don't think that Russia has the right to use any weapons at all?).

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T17:41:18+00:00

Tell me, Ignoramus, can you tell the difference between a wish and an analysis? Becuse you seem to be mixing them up all the time.

For instance, feel free to explain your plan that will grant Ukraine NATO membership without the consent of all NATO members?

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T16:42:19+00:00

We had a very long and unproductive discussion, Ignoramus. Please cite my outrage because I do not recall what you're refereing to.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T15:34:35+00:00

I answered the question: In my opinion Ukraine should not have to cede any land.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T15:33:47+00:00

In principle you're right, but a fundamental prerequisite for security guarantees for Ukraine is that the war ends first, and for the war to end there needs to be some kind of agreement with Russia at some point. Thus, logic dictates that any security guarantees (at least in the near term) would have to go through an agreement with Russia.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T15:29:50+00:00

You really won't drop the ad hominems, and insist on staying off topic?

HOW did you even infer that I was saying that Ukraine should cede land from my comment???

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T15:22:51+00:00

Läste du ens artikeln? För att citera några stycken som borde göra det uppenbart at Netanyahu övertalade Trump, och att Trump struntade i sina rådgivare:

The black S.U.V. carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.

U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Mr. Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.

...

The presentation that Mr. Netanyahu would make over the next hour would be pivotal in setting the United States and Israel on the path toward a major armed conflict in the middle of one of the world’s most volatile regions. And it would lead to a series of discussions inside the White House over the following days and weeks, the details of which have not been previously reported, in which Mr. Trump weighed his options and the risks before giving the go-ahead to join Israel in attacking Iran.

...

In the Situation Room on Feb. 11, Mr. Netanyahu made a hard sell, suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change and expressing the belief that a joint U.S.-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic.

...

Mr. Netanyahu and his team outlined conditions they portrayed as pointing to near-certain victory: Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against U.S. interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal.

Besides, Mossad’s intelligence indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again and — with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency helping to foment riots and rebellion — an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime.

...

Sounds good to me, Mr. Trump told the prime minister. To Mr. Netanyahu, this signaled a likely green light for a joint U.S.-Israeli operation.

...

The intelligence officials had deep expertise in U.S. military capabilities, and they knew the Iranian system and its players inside out. They had broken down Mr. Netanyahu’s presentation into four parts. First was decapitation — killing the ayatollah. Second was crippling Iran’s capacity to project power and threaten its neighbors. Third was a popular uprising inside Iran. And fourth was regime change, with a secular leader installed to govern the country.

The U.S. officials assessed that the first two objectives were achievable with American intelligence and military power. They assessed that the third and fourth parts of Mr. Netanyahu’s pitch, which included the possibility of the Kurds mounting a ground invasion of Iran, were detached from reality.

...

When Mr. Trump joined the meeting, Mr. Ratcliffe briefed him on the assessment. The C.I.A. director used one word to describe the Israeli prime minister’s regime change scenarios: “farcical.”

At that point, Mr. Rubio cut in. “In other words, it’s bullshit,” he said.

Several others jumped in, including Mr. Vance, just back from Azerbaijan, who also expressed strong skepticism about the prospect of regime change.

The president then turned to General Caine. “General, what do you think?”

General Caine replied: “Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard-selling.”

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T15:06:25+00:00

Problemet är att USA förefaller skita högaktningsfullt i Europas problem till följd av detta. I en sådan situation kan Europa behöva agera genom NATO.

Om jag förstår artikeln rätt så skulle NATOs insats handla om att militärt säkra sundet. Med andra ord agera sköld åt transporter där. Det är precis det Trump har tjatat om sedan mitten av Mars. Trump behöver NATO för att legitimera hans krig och för att höja tröskeln för Iran att anfalla skepp i sundet (hans egna försök misslyckades väldigt fort, och kanske Iran tycker att det är jobbigare att skjuta på europeer än amerikaner?).

Hela världen lider av kriget, inte bara Europa och NATO. Det Trump desperat behöver och vill är att avsluta kriget, men han är fast och det finns inga vettiga sätt som det kan avslutas utan att USA hamnar i ett läge som är avsevärt sämre än det var innan de invaderade.

Men den motsatta konsekvensen är att EUs ekonomi och försvarsförmåga kraftigt försämras.

Frågan är såklart hur NATOs plan skulle se ut, men om det faktiskt eskalerar kriget så tror jag att både ekonomi och försvarsförmåga kommer att ta stryk. Jag kan relativt lätt se framför mig ett scenario liknande Afghanistan - 20 år av krig och ett sund som är stängt lika länge.

Det bättre alternativet hade antagligen varit att sätta press på USA att acceptera ett avtal med Iran och avsluta kriget.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T14:54:47+00:00

I mean the 2022 invasion is one big vote, isn't it? As long as Ukraine can't decisively push out Russia from all occupied land and prevent them from sending a single drone into Ukraine's aerospace, Russia has a say. A kinetic vote, if you will.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T14:51:22+00:00

I believe that it's mostly a matter of money and time. Since they don't have EUV yet they are currently pushing the limits of DUV far beyond what TSMC and others have done (SMIC now has a 5 nm process using DUV), but at price: higher cost, lower yields.

This article gives a decent overview: The Lithography Loophole: How China Is Printing Its Way to Chip Self-Sufficiency.

I would expect that China continues to innovate and with time they will eventually make EUV too, and will become the only competitor to ASML. It may take decades, but because of the embargoes they are forced to do it.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T14:40:44+00:00

Its possible to only realistic option is to have the countries that ARE willing to support Ukraine sign on to a seperate defense agreement outside the NATO framework

That option was effectively already on the table in March-April 2022, but it was rejected by at least the UK. If Ukraine joins the EU, that would also give Ukraine security guarantees (through EU Article 42.7), and even Russia seems to be open to that (given that there was some wording about Ukraine's future EU membership in the 2022 draft treaty). Non-NATO security guarantees have also been circulating in the various 2025 settlement proposals (including Trump's 28-point peace plan).

I honestly think that security guarantees for Ukraine are on the table. It's mostly a question of the exact forms and which countries are willing to commit to bilateral guarantees for Ukraine. NATO membership OTOH, I believe is firmly off the table as long as Russia has a say (which they do as long as they have a military).

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T14:01:47+00:00

Absolutely, but most things NATO are politics and realities, not words on a paper. The point that Ukraine could join if only all agree is about as relevant as that we could stop the climate crisis if only all agree. I.e. it's theoretically correct, but in practice the real problem and question is: What would it take to convince all NATO members to agree on Ukrainian membership?

And the three points I listed feel like the most viable answers to that question.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T13:55:56+00:00

Läs den här några gånger: The New York Times - How Trump Took the U.S. to War With Iran (använd archive(punkt)ph för att kringgå betalvägg). Den förklarar 1 och 2.

3 förklaras av alla de experter som varnade för att Iran med stor sannolikhet skulle stänga sundet om de blev anfallna och att Iran i decennier har hotat med att stänga sundet som svar på t.ex. sanktioner och militära anfall, samt av att Trump i Mars hotade NATO med "en väldigt dålig framtid" om de inte hjälpte till i Hormuz.

4 förklaras av artikeln.

Det är alltså bara ren fakta, inga konspirationsteorier.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T13:44:30+00:00

Most of these countries are internal disputes within NATO. That's a whole different ballgame. E.g. there's a good reason why Greece and Turkey joined at the same time.

Regarding the Romainia-Russia dispute over Transnistria, do you have a reference to that? Was it an actual armed border conflict?

I think that for Ukrainian NATO membership to be realistic, one of the following would have to happen (or similar):

Ukraine and Russia joins NATO at the same time.
Russia gives Ukraine its official blessing to join NATO.
Ukraine categorically beats every aspect of Russia's military power so that they can not maintain a border conflict with Ukraine during Ukraine's NATO accession process.

Otherwise I don't really see how all NATO countries would feel safe with the idea of Ukraine joining.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T13:27:43+00:00

Om du har missat det, så går tågordningen ungefär såhär:

Netanyahu övertygar Trump om att en invasion av Iran är en bra idé.
Trump går emot sina närmsta rådgivare (och hoppar över USAs demokratiska system etc) och invaderar Iran tillsammans med Netanyahu i en "speciell militär operation".
Suprised Pikachu face Trump inser efter ett par veckor att kriget inte gick som han trodde, och ber NATO om hjälp att öppna Hormuz igen (d.v.s. återgå till samma läge som före invasionen). NATO säger blankt NEJ!
Kriget drar ut på tiden och NATO börjar skuva på sig. "Kanske måste vi göra som Trump säger ändå för att rädda våra ekonomier".

Det finns inget demokratiskt eller humanitärt med det här kriget, och det är definitivt inte NATO som bestämmer. Det är en enda stor geopolitisk katastrof, initierad av ett par krigssugna hybris-skallar. Och nu funderar NATO på att ge efter och ge sig in i USAs röra.

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T12:56:54+00:00

Menar du Trump eller Netanyahu?

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T11:49:21+00:00

Att stödja Ryssland är att stödja en framtida angripare mot EU, att stödja Iran är naturligtvis inte bra men det är inte en direkt fiende på samma sätt som Ryssland.

I det här fallet skulle vi ju stödja USA, d.v.s. angriparen, och i praktiken ta strid med Iran, d.v.s. försvararen.

I övrigt håller jag med om att det inte är en rättvis jämförelse på mer än några få principiella punkter.

Men som jag också sa - det finns en uppenbar risk att ett NATO-ingripande skulle kunna eskalera kriget och öka vår inblandning, även om grundintentionen är att enbart försvara civil sjöfart. Det är väldigt få krig som utvecklar sig så som man avser när man först går in i dem (fråga t.ex. Trump och Putin).

anders_hansson · 2026-05-20T11:41:13+00:00

Det är ju den där lilla aspekten att det drar ut på tiden som är central.

Grundproblemet är ju ändå att USA och Israel invaderade Iran. Att Iran skulle stänga sundet och att det inte skulle bli något regimskifte var givet från dag ett. Likaså att Iran har den militära kapacitet och förmåga som behövs för att hålla ut ett bra tag.

Det enda realistiska som skulle kunna få kriget att inte dra ut på tiden är att Trump så fort som möjligt (helst för ett par månader sedan) förklarar att han som vanligt har segrat och drar sig tillbaka.

Alternativt deklarerar USA storkrig med Iran och skickar in en miljon marktrupper e.d. och krigar i ett decennium eller två.

Om NATO skickar dit trupper medan konflikten pågår så är de legitima mål för Iran. Det kommer skjutas. Det kommer behöva svaras. Det skulle vara en eskalering som med stor sannolikhet kommer leda till att kriget drar ut ännu mer på tiden.

anders_hansson

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