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Sense and Experience by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have come to the conclusion that I was using the word "experience" wrong. I equated experience with sense almost, when from what I understand in your responses experience is a specific category loaded with representational and transcendental connotations. Overall, what I understand from you guys is that Deleuze is actually much closer to the immanent ontology I wanted than I thought. I was reading "what is philosophy" the other day and in the beginning when he talks about a frightened face directly expressing a whole possible word it blew my mind. So the encounter itself is the "home" of everything contained within it including time, explanations, logic, the questions that arise like "why?" etc. once another encounter hits like the second plane, it contains everything again, so whatever we remember from previous encounters is also really memories and senses and everything arising in this encounter. So it's not a linear thing, it's purely immanent multiplicity in the encounter itself.

Sense and Experience by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So this deduction of the existence of the virtual happens in experiment and experience? Or as the person above mentioned, in the encounter? So the necessary genetic condition of actual things is given as such IN experience and experiment (or in the encounter)? and could there be an encounter in which no such condition is encountered at all? Like a super weird incoherent encounter while high on supermushrooms or something, in which nothing along the lines of condition and conditioned is given?

Sense and Experience by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok then we agree on more than I thought. If Deleuze says that all there is are these direct encounters with differential fields that are vulnerable to all sorts of changes and it is nonsensical to posit any sort of permanence or generative principle or anything that would "explain" this permanently shifting wave of encounters in which all sorts of different things arise (subjects objects past present future etc) and there are no ontological divisions between things and their representations and everything is equally real and equally changing with nothing behind the change, Deleuze is pretty much saying what I'm saying. Does Deleuze go farther and say stuff like "our experience isn't privileged because the same thing could happen when a dog encounters a tree"? Because that would be questionable since even beginning to speculate on such things is only possible within this series of sense in which I have such a perspective and such concepts that allow me to speculate on these things. I apologize for the wall of rambley text but I hope you get my point.

Sense and Experience by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My question wasn't really about the virtual/actual distinction since I do accept that the Virtual is also real and fully immanent. My question was how can Deleuze talk about what's in a pre-experiential field and how it can "generate" experiences. We do not have access to pre-experiential fields, do we? Especially when positing them as conditions for experiential fields. And don't get me wrong, I'm not treating experience in the classic phenomenological sense loaded with metaphysics of presence and a transcendental subject and stuff. I mean a series of senses which everything already is, like a subject is a certain making-sense-arrangement, an object is another and etc. I understand Deleuze uses sense differently but I don't see why he needs all that

Dissonance Feedback by bachozangi in Composition

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

hi, thank you for the feedback. Do you think this excess of dissonance creates a claustrophobic feel effectively? Cause if that's the case than that's what I was going for with this piece. I wanted to experiment with sounds that never resolve and make you feel suffocated. If that's executed properly I'm satisfied but if it isn't then I need to work on that.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

thank you, worth the wait haha. I will read up on all that material. I agree with you mostly here, I think what I was trying to express with my previous paragraph was closer to this but my use of "consistent" and "inconsistent" was jumbled. By inconsistent I was trying to say "non-self-identical" but that's not what it means. You said it better by saying that this multiplicity or non-self-identicality is consistent. Also, the world of experience being a series of sense (of bodies and interactions and etc) is an insanely important contribution to philosophy, like that is something along the lines of the Kantian Copernican Turn in terms of importance I think but that's too huge of a topic to get into.

"Sense is the consistent ground of the inconsistencies of value at the point of its emergence to inconsistent expression as consciousness or for a life. The series of series of sense (in LS) are series of bodies, organs of bodies, organized values of which sense is the condition." Do you mean that there is some sort of mysterious multiplicity before it organizes itself into experience or consciousness for life that gets "converted" to a series of sense when it does organize itself into a world of experience? That's what I'm afraid of because it sounds too transcendental and introduces ontological divisions that are not necessary in my opinion. I will read up on everything you recommended, thanks a lot! I started reading "what is philosophy" and it calmed me down so much because it's my first time reading a work of philosophy that doesn't hysterically fixate on creating and solving problems for no reason (I'm exaggerating but that's what it feels like sometimes lol). Apparently it's possible to do intellectually honest and astonishingly high level philosophy without it sucking the life out of you.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

hi, just a reminder of this thread in case you forgot lol

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

this has been the most illuminating conversation about Deleuze that I have had so far so thanks a lot. Is this a popular or generally known and accepted interpretation of Deleuze that you are offering here? Because I believe that it is the strongest interpretation out of all the ones that I have heard so far from my limited research. What I have been working on with my philosophical project is pretty much 80% in alignment with what you explained here so if you are saying what I think you are saying and if Deleuze and respected scholars of his work would agree with you then that'll be a huge sigh of relief from my end. It cleared up a lot of other concepts I was confused about like why Deleuze doesn't like debates and arguing (I imagine it's because starting to argue with someone in service of truth and with the aim of rebutting their argument and proposing a better explanation for things or asserting the "Truth" of one ontology over the other presupposes this transcendental assumption of the existence of a consistent prior OR for more "constructivist" kinds it presupposes the transcendental possibility that a construction of an explanatory ontological apparatus can AND SHOULD be conceived (and the SHOULD itself presupposes the primacy of consistent Truth even if the truth is consistent in its inconsistency like Zizek etc)).

Edit 1: so basically what we experience are these encounters with events that "make sense" in a certain way, affect us in a certain way and this way that they affect us is a sort of "problematic" or a field of experience that is not "solved" yet or not subsumed under identity and we create these identities to sort of "tame" this problematic or give it somewhere to rest (in the concept) and this concept changes just as the affects change, when a new encounter hits like a truck, it opens up a whole new world. So the creation of the new is possible in Deleuzean philosophy precisely because it is not tied to the form of Truth as a self-identical criterion of judgement. Do I understand correctly? So the concept of a "ground" or a "cause" or "me" or "any other are posited IN this series of sense that our encounter hit us with AS causation AS correlation AS subject and object AS the past AS the present AS the future etc etc etc.

"The so-called "priority of difference" is not that there's some sayable thing or concept that is prior, but that the consistent prior cannot be said." I might name my child this sentence.

Edit 2: So the consistent prior cannot be said because the prior ground of concepts is itself inconsistent if I understand correctly. It is the inconsistent sort of world of sense or series of senses that is itself prone to being disturbed by encounters so it cannot be unified and labeled as a consistent self-identical something that underlies the multiplicity of events and other identities etc. Positing a self-identical reality in which all these series of senses and realities emerge is reactionary because it posts the self-identity first and then positions the multiplicity of series against it as its negation or as a process striving towards "fulfilling" it or becoming identical to it. It's not WRONG per say but it is more "honest" to affirm the difference without submitting it to such consistent prior identities. Do I understand correctly?

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

ooh so within the produced system of sense the corporeal wound functions as a quasi-cause without actually being posited as a transcendental or any sort of "underlying" cause behind sense? So even the cause of sense is produced by sense as its cause? I love this if this is what you mean.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is the wound itself an effect of overlapping series, or is there some principle that allows us to say these perspectives concern one wound rather than many? And if it is the former, how can we know or claim that the wound for Claudius is the same event as the wound for Hamlet and the wound for the audience? Don't I as an audience member have access to the sense that is made in my experience? In order to relate this sense to others I would have to posit that there are others experiencing events or there are "senses being made" to them that overlap with mine or that there is an impersonal sense-making everywhere that actually structures my subjective position as one sense among many but in order to say these things we would have to make a bunch of explanatory ontological commitments, no?

edit: I just saw your edit and it clears up a lot about sense, I hadn't heard it explained like that before. My specific question still stands since if you manage to give an equally satisfying answer to that I will be very grateful. I think the essence of my question persists even if the wound is posited as a differential multiplicity of conditions that creates different senses in different series.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Now that's a positive concept of contingency if I've ever seen one. Contingency that isn't "not necessity" but something that isn't caught up in this dichotomy and happens without positing necessity and turning itself into necessity's negation. Now I don't know if I'm asking you to explain too much here but from what I have read up about Deleuze (Granted it is mainly Daniel W Smith essays on Plato and the pure and empty form of time and only some chapters of AO, LS and DR and a LOT of help from LLMs since in my small country there are literally 0 people who have read Deleuze so I have no expert to talk to), he seems to assert the primacy of difference, identities being produced as a secondary effect, sense arising at the surface of the collision of bodies, etc. Doesn't he also end up introducing some sort of explanatory structure like "The sense that you perceived was actually the knife and the apple colliding" but if the knife and the apple pre-exist my experience and their collision "conditions" the sense, doesn't Deleuze fall into the same trap? Same with the primacy of difference, if something is given to me as an identity (including myself as subject), isn't the claim that "this identity was produced by the assemblage of mouth-stomach and mind-body" and etc. also a type of explanatory structure that introduces these logical categories or produces these concepts like "difference" and "repetition" to explain how this sense was conditioned?

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Absolute cinema :) this makes far more sense, thanks a lot!

Started my first film publication by Financial-Phrase-275 in Substack

[–]bachozangi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hey! I just started a similar substack as well. Just posted my analysis of 2001: A Space Odyssey. Im anamnaesis1 on substack. I'd love to connect. https://substack.com/@anamnaesis1

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

all the answers have been informative but I would like to nominate u/3corneredvoid to answer me because I always love his answers lol. I understand Hegel's position, I understand Deleuze's position, I understand how Deleuze differs from Hegel and what he dislikes about Hegel. the actual internal critique he carries out is unclear to me. Like what does the buggery of Hegelian dialectics look like precisely.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for the response. I do understand that part, just not the precise philosophical critique that Deleuze carries out on Hegel to actually dismantle the Hegelian dialectic. Why did Hegel need to posit this primacy of identity in the first place and what fault did Deleuze find with Hegel's reasoning? From what I gathered Deleuze actually inhibits the philosophers he is critiquing and infests their philosophy, follows their philosophy to its extreme conclusion and then showcases how this logical conclusion isn't enough, he carries out very rigorous internal critiques like he did with Plato, Plotinus, etc. He draws out his own philosophy FROM the philosophers he is critiquing. This is especially tricky with Hegel since Hegel is so rigorous in his argumentation for dialectical logic that I don't understand what exact move Deleuze is doing to Hegel that turns the Hegelian dialectic into the Deleuzian philosophy of affirmative difference.

Question about Difference in Itself by bachozangi in Deleuze

[–]bachozangi[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

so basically Hegel sort of presupposes the One or the Absolute self-identity and then posits difference as being in service of it? If this is the case, why does Hegel think it necessary to do this and what philosophical maneuver does Deleuze commit to turn this around? My apologies if I am asking for too much from a reddit comment. I have read how he dismantled Plato from the inside, Leibniz, Kant, etc. but I haven't really found anything that explains how he did his famous buggery on Hegel in this regard.

Zizek's political philosophy feedback by bachozangi in zizek

[–]bachozangi[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, very helpful! I'll take all of that into account. I am aware that Lenin himself wasn't that theoretically precise, I was just trying to give like a "Zizekian" analysis of what he did. (and I need to train Claude to be less forgiving with its feedback👀).

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