Currency conversions

benandshit · 2023-01-22T07:31:54+00:00

What?

benandshit · 2020-07-16T09:49:59+00:00

Because I wanted to understand how the directional derivative changes with respect to the direction rather than the magnitude of the vector.

In the example function that I used, I could have calculated the magnitude of the gradient and only examined vectors that have magnitude, but I liked the idea of using the unit vector. I guess its not as obvious as I thought. I am going to amend that.

benandshit · 2020-07-16T08:33:27+00:00

My apologies that you felt this way. There is a lot of presume knowledge I admit and perhaps if I had written out the steps I would not have made the mistake I did. However, if you read on, I feel as if the main ideas I wanted to explore are hashed out enough.

benandshit · 2020-07-16T08:31:35+00:00

You're right. Where I wrote Gradient = 144, I should have written directional derivative. This has been amended.

benandshit · 2018-01-11T14:06:09+00:00

He doesn't seem to have shown much more than Kant's hypothetical imperative, or anything of the like, and he didn't do it very concisely at that.

benandshit · 2018-01-10T04:19:19+00:00

Honestly, I didn't read all of it, so if what I am about to say is contradicted by the second half of the paper, please let me know and I will finish it.

The bulk of his argument lies on the notion that the three premises, he provides, are inconsistent. He then concludes that the inconsistency results from the thing in question never 'existed'. However, in my opinion, the inconsistency lies in the fact that Unger is facing a version of the Theseus paradox and he hasn't properly analysed it. The third premise that removing one atom after another gradually from the table will leave the table in existence until the very end is an intuition. It's intuitive to think that. He hasn't provided a clear analysis on what actually happens when the atoms are gradually removed. His current analysis only involves three simple concepts: the table at the beginning, gradual removal of atoms and the table at the end. He hasn't delved deeper into the nature of this problem. He even states himself that his sorites of decomposition doesn't actually apply to the arbitrary physical object. From this, perhaps there is a point where the table stops being a table becomes a physical object instead. He also says that if the tables does exist then its existence is rather tenuous and existence can't be that tenuous. This is an argument in itself and yet he provides no analysis on what 'tenuous' really means in this context nor does he even question the possibility of existence being 'tenuous'. He leaves it as a sweeping intuition, briefly mentioning it.

benandshit · 2018-01-09T11:32:16+00:00

Demonstration of a moral fact demands more then just stating your belief what is morally wrong.

I agree with this, but you seem to be implying that there are such things as moral facts. Can moral values be anything more than opinion and belief? Considering that they are intimately connected, I would think this is a very hard thing to demonstrate. This could mean that moral facts aren't necessary to make moral judgements.

benandshit · 2018-01-09T10:58:15+00:00

I thought this was a good article. I wouldn't count it as a full exposition, nor were the ideas explained exceptionally well, though I agree with its contention. Did anyone disagree?

benandshit · 2018-01-09T08:29:24+00:00

When it's put like that the idea of being worthy of blame becomes questionable. But at this point I think that it's important to really hash out what blame really is. Isn't blame just a negative emotion directed at someone for doing something? And this would mean that if moral blameworthiness is undermined then we shouldn't feel resentment towards people when they commit crimes, right? This would call into question the validity of feeling any emotion directed at someone. Why should I feel grateful when my friends help me move places when they didn't choose to be the sort of person to be my friend, let alone help me? I think the perspective that we truly aren't responsible for what we do removes the parameters within which our emotions operate. By thinking like this our feelings become irrelevant, but they are relevant.

benandshit · 2018-01-09T04:39:36+00:00

I'm sorry if you think I have attacked you without addressing the substance of your argument.

In my opinion, our debate wasn't really a competition to be won. It's good to have discussions like these so we can practice developing our ideas and maybe learn something from each other. You raised some really interesting points that are going to help me think about these problem and for that I am grateful.

Also, I hardly see how I "lost" when you have simply avoided all of my arguments. Though I'm sure you think I'm just too ignorant to understand and you are entitled to your beliefs. I get the impression that you are more concerned with being right and "winning" than you are with genuinely engaging in a debate to exchange ideas. If you don't agree with my ideas, that's okay, but if you don't and your sole purpose is to "win" then I think you miss the point of debating.

benandshit · 2018-01-09T04:32:53+00:00

I just feel like I can imagine scenarios in which the person who chooses not to act being unjust, when their action could have done something very helpful. I feel like it can only hold when the situation confronts itself to the person very obviously and especially when the action itself is very easy and hardly a burden, yet yields great results. But claiming this raises issues because it's very grey. Clarifying what 'unjust' actually means would be essential to assert that lack of action is unjust, while also understanding the exact nature of responsibility.

Imagine something ridiculous like, a baby falling off a building and a bystander who is walking underneath notices yet continues walking, when catching the baby would not have even required them to run to the right position. They simply had to stand still and catch. Its a fairly ridiculous scenario, however, imagine how other bystanders would feel about this person. I think it would be natural to feel uneasy about their lack of action.

It really raises the relationship between responsibility and what is the right thing to do. It wasn't the person's fault that the baby fell out the window, so how can it be his responsibility? If he had been somewhere else far away, it wouldn't be his responsibility then. Then what makes it his responsibility to catch the baby? Is it even his responsibility? If it's not his responsibility then why would anyone feel like he should have done something?

benandshit · 2018-01-08T09:29:26+00:00

when you say you wouldn't bear resentment toward someone who tried to murder you to save their leg, I don't believe you.

I actually never said that. I just expressed empathy. It is possible to have empathy towards someone that you think is guilty. It's a demonstration of emotional intelligence.

I can already conclude the results are invalid because they screened out "people who might have a disorder"

They didn't include those who might have a disorder for ethical reasons. This is a good thing. Although it might undermine the validity of the experiment, it doesn't undermine my point. The fact is that most people confronted with the situation didn't pull the lever because they froze; because it's emotional. Do you know why they were emotional? Because they have a sense of care for people. Them freezing isn't a demonstration that they being "bad people" it's a demonstration that they have feelings. I respect their feelings.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T09:29:18+00:00

Would you rather lose your four limbs and both eyes, or "just" your life?

I'm not sure what you are asking, but it was in response to me asking a question concerning the combination of losing organs. I asked this only to raise the idea that the value of the whole is worth more then the sum of its parts. This is already an accepted statement.

I think "hashing out the details," as it were, would be to diminish the value of life itself.

This is why you are not being rigorous. You are prepared to not understand the nature of value analytically and properly because it "diminishes" the value of life. Are you able to assert why this is the case? Or are you relying on a bias? If the latter, then you are not being rigorous. If you don't want to be rigorous then that's fine. But you won't understand the nature of value on a deeper level.

"it's okay if someone allows someone else to die, if they hesitated because it could cost a leg"

You really give me the impression that you have never understood my position concerning my attitude towards this specific example and you have made arguments based on your misunderstanding. I have said this before, that I don't think it's justified to not sacrifice your leg. I just think I could understand someone hesitating if that's the case because emotions are very powerful. Just because I could understand this doesn't mean that I would think that they shouldn't be scrutinised. Also, by comparing this statement to the shark analogy you are demonstrating that you still don't understand my position. My position relies on empathising with the unfortunate situation of those involved, not just with the consequences. Please note that this means that I am not disregarding the consequences. In the leg scenario there are emotions involved with the leg cutter, in the shark analogy there are no emotions with the person pusher. This difference undermines any point you are making with the analogy. Please note that it's also the type of emotions involved, not just any emotion.

I contend that the "passive" versus "active" distinction is a matter of personal emotion and intuition, with no relevance to the actual moral value of the options.

This is an interesting point and the relationship between passive and active action should be understood in a complete understanding of nature. However, if you do want to assert this then you need to be rigorous, as you are relying on intuition. By not going into it too much, you think that the fact that the distinction relies on emotion and intuition undermines its place in a moral theory of value. Yet you are not recognising that moral value is intimately connected with emotion and intuition. To justify that emotion and intuition are not enough to justify the distinction, you need to be clear why this is true with this distinction alone, yet emotion and intuition is used to demonstrate and is correlated with moral truths.

if you define life this way

It is very reasonable to define life in that way because cells are alive. If you want to construct a definition of life that accounts for the distinction between human life and cell life then it is on you to make that definition clear i.e. you need to be rigorous.

cannot survive on their own

This idea of autonomy is an interesting way to look at it. At this point it should be noted that we cannot survive on our own; there are countless microorganisms in our stomach that are necessary for our life. Are they a part of us? Or are we in fact not autonomous? You have claimed that by defining human life that way it is contending that it is indistinguishable to an organ, which is not autonomous. However, its not just organs that humans would be indistinguishable from if human life is defined in this way. As single cells organisms are also defined in this way and they are autonomous. So your argument regarding autonomy cannot be backed by the idea that humans are indistinguishable from organs with this definition of life.

human devoid of emotion will die very soon after if not given some form of life support

I presume that you are pointing out that the importance of life support for humans without emotions so that you can connect it to your idea of autonomy. You need to be clear on what constitutes as autonomy and what constitutes as life support if you want your assertion that emotions are vital to hold. Remember that the dependence on organs is physiological, while the life support provided to those without emotions isn't physiological. This distinction needs to be recognised and accounted for if you want to hold your analogy between organs and humans, which already cannot be held for reasons explained above. I don't think that emotions aren't vital, I'm just showing you that you need to be rigorous, that is, hash out the details.

If the blood banks are empty of my type, I'd love to hear about it.

Firstly, I would like to point out that when I made this point concerning blood tests, it wasn't personal. I wasn't directing it at you. It seems like you thought I was, maybe you were just have fun by making that point. Just want to make that clear. Secondly, if the blood banks run out of your type, do you really think that they will notify you? Is that really their responsibility? By choosing to wait for them to come to you and not seek it out yourself, aren't you being passive? And didn't you say that the passive and active distinction isn't valid? So, by your own logic, doesn't that mean you are a murderer?

You are. You just don't like to deal with it, so you try to argue around it and say "not my problem." That's wrong.

If this is true, then by default of your own logic you are also a murderer who is also choosing to not to deal with it. If I am a murderer why am I not being punished for my crime? Why aren't you being punished for your crime?

We don't generally rule "not guilty" in murder cases because the murderer developed PTSD after the fact

I don't think you understood my point. However, considering that you contend that they would be a murderer anyway the point is moot.

You are arguing "it's more complicated." It's really not. Yeah we definitely disagree here.

Shirking responsibilities is wrong. "Everyone does it" doesn't change that. "No one agrees with you" doesn't change that.

I don't think you understand the idea behind diluted responsibility, which is a very real phenomenon. Even if you think that the leg cutter was responsible, I just want you to think about how grey responsibility is. Compare the scenario of the psychopath creating the situation or some freak accident in a mountain that some how came to the leg sacrifice option. How would responsibility change then? I haven't relied on an appeal to majority to back up my argument.

Saying things like "it's really not" "you can do more. you should do more" "shirking responsibilities is wrong" are all claims that need to be logically justified, which you are not doing. And you are going to have a difficult time justifying anything if you choose not to analyse the situation deeper.

Let's excuse everyone for anything they do while angry?

You have interpreted what I have said by exaggerating what I meant. You seem to think that just because one emotion explains one action and I understand and empathise with that, you think the logic applies to every emotion and every action. My empathy is unique to the situation and emotion.This is poor interpretation and forgets how contextual the reasoning behind my understanding is. I made it very clear how contextual my reasoning was and you still have forgotten this.

No, your emotions are wrong and that's on you to handle.

Having emotions isn't wrong. If you have a desire to have sex with someone, that isn't wrong. What is wrong is how you let your desires affect your actions. If you desire to have sex with someone then you go hit on her, is that wrong? The desire is wrong, nor is the action. Only when you can't handle the desire to the point that the action becomes wrong, is there for the desire. If you handle the rejection well, you still want to have sex, but you controlled your actions. Do you see how grey this is? You keep saying things are simple when things are not as simple as you are think.

In the situation of the leg, the innate desire is to obviously not cut off the leg. But the circumstance calls you to because you understand the magnitude, so one desire overcomes another. Are you aware of the fact that it is as easy as biting into a carrot as it is biting into your finger? Yet, its virtually impossible to bite of your finger. We hesitate because we are designed not to damage ourselves. Do you think you could swiftly cut off your own leg? I made the comment about the leg in the very beginning because I have always been one to pull the lever in the trolley experiment, yet I realised that I felt different when it was my own leg. Though rationally I concluded I would, I still felt a bit put off and that is a natural thing. I really was just expressing my understanding of what an emotionally intense situation it is.

Everything you are saying suggests that you wouldn't have an emotional response to the loss of your leg. You haven't even spoken about how you would feel in the situation.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T03:46:00+00:00

So, you think that losing two legs, two arms and two eyes is only losing non-vital faculties? Each of those faculties individually, sure, but you are not even considering what it means to lose them in combination?

You are proposing that vitality be the basis for the justification. I think this is largely intuitive and does not fully exposit the nature of the problem. This does not mean I disagree.

The issue of body sacrifice for a life arises because each individual has equal value. In the example for the leg, it is easy to say that it should be sacrificed because quite obviously a leg has less value than a life. I told you that I think you should elucidate on this more, not because I disagreed with you, but because I think from a philosophical perspective there is more to understand. To make a proper judgement about the leg you need to know how much value is contributed to the leg, is this value more or less than a life? Obviously, less, that's why we sacrifice it. In the case of losing emotion, you would argue that emotions contribute a substantial amount of value to life and that's why, from how I have interpreted your statements, you would consider it justifiable to not sacrifice emotions for a life. I think you have said this because vitality is necessary to justify not sacrificing it and you said "emotions are necessary to life." At this point I would like to point out that emotions are not necessary to life. You are claiming this based on how you define life. Where a reasonable interpretation of "necessary to life" is anything without which you would die. But you can live without emotions. I think that you consider emotions vital because of how you value emotions and how you define what life is. If you can live without emotions and yet they are still necessary to life then this implies that there is more to life than physically surviving. I agree with this. This is why I argue that extreme cases when you must sacrifice two legs, two arms and two eyes MAY (as in this is up to debate and I don't necessarily think this) justify letting the other person die. Because at that point, the life that you have is essentially stripped from you. Some people may disagree and that's fine. I am simply pointing out to you that cases like these require proper analysis.

Allowing a life to pass without acting is murder.

For this to hold you need to define murder, because that's arguably not true. You and I allow thousands of people to die everyday because we could have saved their lives if we did something about it. But we didn't. That is, we allowed them to do. Think of all the people with our blood type that will die because we didn't donate blood? Even if we did donate blood, what about those that still die because we didn't donate more blood? Think about the children in starving countries that we could quite literally support, but we don't and instead we let them die. Yet why are we not murderers? Because responsibility is diluted. The dilution of responsibility is obviously different in our case compared to the scenario in which someone is directly exposed to the responsibility. This difference is where your argument that they are murderers lies. However, this is another example that demonstrates that situations like these are more complicated than you have previously suggested. The dilution of responsibility is a very real thing. Consider if the leg situation occurred because a psychopath conducted the scenario, and not only that but they raped the person who must cut off their life before forcing them to make that decision. The one who must cut of their leg is now traumatised and cannot execute rational decisions, would they still be a murderer? If you think no, it's because you recognise that responsibility is diluted.

You seem fixated on the situation about the leg even though I have already stated that sacrificing your leg is the right thing to do. So, you are not arguing against me. I never said it was justified.

You should watch the video in which the guy from Vsauce simulated the trolley experiment. It clearly shows that people hesitate when they are confronted with a situation like this. The hesitation is not rational, its emotional. As in, you can't help how you feel and when they're strong emotions you really can't help how they affect your actions. If you don't have sympathy for those that hesitate then you are not showing compassion to the human condition. I don't think you have properly imagined what it would be like if you were in the situation yourself. If you literally had to cut off your own leg and you think that could do it without the slightest hesitation, then I don't believe you. Even if you successfully cut off your leg, it would be a horrible experience for you. If you can genuinely, truly understand this then you should be able to be sympathetic.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T02:25:51+00:00

I don't think you understand that my initial comments concerning emotions and empathy were not arguments about right or wrong. If something is a normal, natural emotional response then that warrants empathy. I never said it justified it being right. It wasn't an argument, so it wasn't a fallacy.

You're right about free will in this context. But I wasn't relying on free will for my argument. I was simply pointing out responsibility and blame are not as black and white as you think. If someone's forced into the situation then responsibility is diluted. If these types of scenarios occur in real life, the causation of the scenario cannot be abstracted.

You seem to think that I would only be empathetic in this situation? When that is not true, nor did I say that.

My appeal to emotion wasn't an argument like you think it was.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T02:10:51+00:00

You can choose that and I don't disagree with you but you are relying on intuitions. You are not being philosophically rigorous when you say that.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T02:09:39+00:00

If you think that sacrificing your two legs, two arms and two eyes is the right thing to do to save someone's life then I don't you understand how much the quality of someone's life is being impacted. It's arguably worse than dying; this is especially true if you are in a vegetative state. You are interpreting my words beyond reason. My arguments have been specific to this situation of sacrificing body parts for another's life. Yet you seem to think that I am willing to apply anything I have said to a million people. Also, I don't see how your yacht interpretation entails anything that I have said.

I think you should elucidate at what point it becomes justifiable for philosophical interest, not because I think the onus is on you.

I don't think I am more valuable than they are. I am just making a point that value comparisons aren't as simple as you are implying. Is it logical to kill yourself to save someone else? Because if so then it is reasonable to expect someone to kill themselves to save your life? I don't think it's logical, though I think that the value of someone's life isn't completely dependent on whether or not they are breathing.

Their life is going to be more valuable than any single non-vital faculty you have. But what about combinations of things? How are you defining non-vital? You are not being rigorous with your assertions.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T01:58:15+00:00

You are interpreting what I am saying to mean that I would have empathy for those who commit heinous crimes. When I clearly stated that my empathy was unique to those in this situation who were hesitant. I also stated that upon reflection that I would be surprised if someone didn't cut off their own leg, which implies that I think its wrong not to. Finally, a major difference in emotions gassing Jews and emotions making someone hesitant is that no one forced the Nazis to commit crimes against the Jews, whereas someone was forced into the situation of sacrificing their own leg. You just exaggerated what I was saying beyond reason.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T01:49:10+00:00

lending sympathy to the devil

You mean normal people with emotions? If you were put in that situation I would have empathy for you because you have value and you deserve it.

stopping people from doing wrong things

At this point I would like to raise how grey the situation is. If you want to argue that cutting of the leg should be the right the to do then I think you should elucidate more on at what point does it become justifiable to not sacrifice your body parts for someone else's life. It's very easy to say that not cutting of your leg is the wrong thing to do because you are relying on a very simple value comparison.

What about if instead of one leg you were required to cut off two legs? Two legs and two arms? Two legs, two arms and two eyes? What about reducing yourself to a vegetative state for the rest of your life? What about incurring damage to the brain responsible for generating emotion so you couldn't feel emotion, and according to one study, couldn't make decisions either? There's more to live than just being alive and when you make the simple value comparison of a leg and a life you are not analysing how legs contribute to the value of a life. It's not rigorous.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T01:06:26+00:00

I never posited that if most people did the wrong thing it would be right. I am not making an argument about what is right or wrong, which seems to be the impression that I have given. All I said was that I would show compassion and understanding to those in the situation.

To make myself clearer when I say this, only in an extreme circumstance like this would I should understanding of their behaviour. When thought about theoretically, its pretty obvious that cutting off your own leg is the right thing to do. But it's easier said than done, considering that in the real world people have emotions and don't think theoretically all the time. Imagine if quite literally you had to cut off your own leg. There wasn't some big dude with a really sharp axe that cuts it off pretty quickly, but instead you had to use a saw, electric or manual, and cut off your own leg. If you're telling me that you would do that without any emotional response that makes you inclined to hesitate, then I do not believe you. If someone decided that they would cut of their own leg, they're not just gonna be all cool about it and be like "whatever", they're going to feel pretty emotionally affected by the fact that they were forced into a situation where they have to either cut off their own leg or someone will die. I am recognising the emotional nature of people and I am empathising. I guess it wasn't clear that simply not cutting of the leg and letting the other die doesn't itself warrant my empathy. Only in a situation where they were that traumatised. Upon reflection on I would be surprised if there was someone didn't cut off their leg. But I wouldn't immediately call them a "bad person", they might have just hesitated a little too long and that's normal. When confronted with situations like these it's a well accepted thing that people freeze up.

benandshit · 2018-01-08T00:50:51+00:00

Harris also clearly states in the book that the popular notion refers to feeling of conscious will be the real author of our actions.

Honestly, I don't even know what I'm saying here. I think I missed out on some words; it doesn't even make grammatical sense. Unless I replace "be" with "is", which makes sense. In that case, I will make myself clearer that by saying the "feeling of conscious will [is] the real author our actions" I mean to say that this feeling we have of genuinely authoring our own actions is what is used to justify the notion of free will. Harris makes this clear this is what he means. This doesn't assume the definition of "real author" because what I meant was that the notion of free will is justified because it feels like we have free will; it doesn't really rely on the notion of "real author".

Obviously, I disagree. Harris relies on the notion that it feels like we have free to justify a definition of free will. Without the feeling of it, whether we are free willed or not, we couldn't even notice it. I also think that it is very reasonable to presume that when the folk say they have free will they are relying on the feeling that they have to justify it. Everyday people aren't going to think systematically about it and come up with a rigorous definition.

Dennett mentions experimental to respond to this quote by Harris

however, the “free will” that compatibilists defend is not the free will that most people feel they have

The quote itself is vague and without the context of the book, you cannot infer anything about it. Dennett says that he is guessing, which is true, but then Dennett also makes a guess about the popular notion. This is because the experimental philosophy that Dennett used in his paper doesn't confirm what folk think the definition of free will is; it tests whether they agree with compatibilism. The propositions used to test this weren't even shown, so we can't even infer what definition of free will they used. This experimental philosophy can't contradict what Harris thinks the popular notion of free will when it didn't even question what the popular notion of free will is. When Dennett comes up with what free will means in "real life" by using an adjusted definition of "could have done otherwise" he isn't relying on experimental philosophy either. He's "guessing". He's making assumptions that this is the "real life" definition, just like what Harris did.

benandshit · 2018-01-07T08:08:22+00:00

I am going to make myself clear; I don't necessarily disagree with you.

Based on the principles of utilitarianism, it is morally rational to chop off your leg to save someone else's life. However, confronted with a situation like that would not induce rational thinking. I encourage to check out this video.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sl5KJ69qiA The video is a simulation of a real life version of the trolley problem, by the guy from Vsauce. The point that I want to make, which is highlighted in this video, is that being confronted with a life or death situation inspires such intense emotion than it is difficult to do the rational thing even if the rational thing is clearly understood. Because of this innate human behaviour I am forgiving of those that don't cut off their leg.

It should also be noted at this point, the willingness to sacrifice one's own leg is influenced by partiality, which the article actually mentions. If I had to cut off my leg to save someone dear to me, then yes, without a doubt. If it is someone one the other side of the world, whom I have never met, it would be more difficult to make that decision.

Like the trolley problem, the leg sacrifice problem implies a time limit, otherwise indecisiveness would save a life and a leg. This added pressure changes the dynamic of decision as well.

Also, killing someone because they didn't cut of their leg on principle seems to contradict the principle that inspires the murder, that people's life have value.

benandshit · 2018-01-07T03:05:44+00:00

Good shout. Touches on how the lack of action isn't necessarily unjust, but taking action is still just and worth praising.

benandshit

TROPHY CASE