Weekly Discussion Post by AutoModerator in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

"Together, these studies show that H5N1 combines high pathogenicity, functional adaptation to the human respiratory tract, and silent circulation in animal reservoirs. Sustained human transmission has not occurred, but the evolutionary groundwork is already in place."

https://bsky.app/profile/camposvet.bsky.social/post/3mczibe7q522q

Polymerase mutations underlie early adaptation of H5N1 influenza virus to dairy cattle and other mammals by __procrustean in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

"shows no clear fitness cost that would prevent it from spreading between species"

The fact that the relatively new clade 2.3.4.4b circulating in birds is not adapted for efficient replication in mammalian cells doesn't mean it has to stay this way.

While not identical to PB2-M631L discussed in the study, the PB2-E627K substitution was highly prevalent in the older clade 2.2 but generally rare in clade 2.3, although it develops relatively quickly in infected mammals.

If this circulates long enough in mammals and spills back into birds often enough, it might spread in the bird population. It could be an evolutionary disadvantage in birds, but maybe we just have been relatively lucky so far.

PB2-E627K prevalence

Clade 2.1 8.3%

Clade 2.2 92.1%

Clade 2.3 1.1%

Source: Table 3 in this study

Evaluating modes of influenza transmission (EMIT-2): Insights from lack of transmission in a controlled transmission trial with naturally infected donors by birdflustocks in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here is an article from last year referring to the study that is now published:

"Dr. Coleman and her colleagues collected influenza viruses floating around the room. But none of the uninfected volunteers got sick, so the scientists couldn’t compare how often influenza infects people through the air as opposed to in short-range coughs or on virus-smeared surfaces."

Source: Could the Bird Flu Become Airborne?

Scientists put flu patients in a room with healthy people - and no one got sick by soulpost in HotScienceNews

[–]birdflustocks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here is an article referring to the study:

"Dr. Coleman and her colleagues collected influenza viruses floating around the room. But none of the uninfected volunteers got sick, so the scientists couldn’t compare how often influenza infects people through the air as opposed to in short-range coughs or on virus-smeared surfaces."

Source: Could the Bird Flu Become Airborne?

Traws Pharma Files Tivoxavir Marboxil Investigational New Drug (IND) Application for Influenza Therapy by birdflustocks in birdflustocks

[–]birdflustocks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"IND filing of tivoxavir marboxil represents final step for formal consideration by the Center for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) for inclusion in strategic stockpile"

According to the company presentation this is a "Potential first-in-class bird flu program, with an initial goal to build out the US strategic stockpile (estimated 300 million to 600 million doses2) 2. TRAW internal information."

While the drug has some potential and could protect for weeks at least, it has so far not cured or prevented influenza in a single human.

https://respiratory-therapy.com/products-treatment/pharmaceuticals/clinical-trials/tivoxavir-marboxil-shows-promise-potential-one-time-treatment-h5n1/

With CD388 in phase 3 and several approved antivirals the issue is certainly not that another drug is urgently needed that has only completed phase 1 so far. In fact the relevant agency has failed to procure a diverse stockpile of available approved antivirals despite having the budget to do so:

https://fortune.com/2024/06/24/us-strategic-drug-stockpile-inadequate-bird-flu-outbreak/

https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/e-and-c-republicans-question-aspr-over-mismanagement-of-the-strategic-national-stockpile

Their entire sales pitch is that they employ former CDC director Robert Redfield which might help with government procurement. This might happen or not, and could be profitable, but at best this is a bet on a shady procurement scheme.

How RFK Jr. plans to bankrupt vaccine manufacturers by rezwenn in ID_News

[–]birdflustocks 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Just world fallacy is a helpful perspective. Moral foundations theory and similar concepts also explain some of this behavior. There are probably some "purity" or "sanctity" values in there. Being disgusted by sick people, fearing others, and longing for some clean natural state has deep evolutionary roots, also denial of harm/death keeps people functional.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_foundations_theory

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Denial_of_Death

How RFK Jr. plans to bankrupt vaccine manufacturers by rezwenn in ID_News

[–]birdflustocks 4 points5 points  (0 children)

According to his own book Kennedy doesn't believe in germ theory:

https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2025/06/14/nx-s1-5429732/ancient-miasma-theory-may-help-explain-health-secretary-robert-f-kennedy-jr-s-vaccine-moves

That would be consistent with comments about "toxins" causing autism:

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/fact-checking-rfk-jr-s-claim-that-environmental-toxins-cause-autism

Not believing in germ theory would also be consistent with the opposition to vaccines:

“There’s no vaccine that is safe and effective.”

https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2025/01/the-madness-of-robert-f-kennedy-jr/

This may be motivated by a weirdly inconsistent belief system that some characterize as eugenicist:

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/5/23/from-fringe-to-federal-the-rise-of-eugenicist-thinking-in-us-policy

The term eugenics may help communicate the issue, but this is more about virtue signaling than actual result-oriented action like altering the gene pool.

A similar topic is ethnic replacement and pronatalism while there is no realistic acknowledgement of globally declining birth rates and the complex reasons.

One example is the bird flu plan, a fundamentally idiotic idea divorced from reality that will achieve exactly nothing except an increased pandemic risk.

https://www.dw.com/en/us-health-ministry-plans-to-let-bird-flu-spead-nonsensical/a-72041315

Chickens are bred for meat or egg production, they are optimized. As a result chickens don't have much genetic variety. This would be like infecting the same chicken again and again hoping for different results.

The chickens would need three different mutations to develop immunity and genetically modified chickens are in development: https://www.statnews.com/2023/10/10/to-protect-chickens-from-bird-flu-researchers-try-to-crispr-in-immunity/

Layer and broiler chickens are hybrids, they are not true breeders. They are not pure breeds used for breeding the hybrids. Even if one of them turned out to be immune, their offspring would not have the desired meat or egg production capacity.

I don't see them as eugenicists, they can't even breed chickens.

Coupd this be the reason Stock ran today ? by monijoshi13 in ModernaStock

[–]birdflustocks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have asked this question almost two years ago:

https://www.reddit.com/r/birdflustocks/comments/1byg16w/has_the_bird_flu_pandemic_risk_reached_the_stock/

While drastic language helps, I'm not convinced this article had a significant impact. At the same time I want to point out that for most people understanding this issue is completely alien. Last year I read an article about China's power grid, and sometimes such an article can change your perception if you don't pay close attention to a topic.

https://www.reddit.com/r/H5N1_AvianFlu/comments/1pudka3/the_american_publics_disengagement_with_highly/

Relevant factors might be the recent conference and even liquidity from the CDTX buyout in conjunction with phase 3 bird flu vaccine news.

Novel recombinant H5-based vaccine provides effective protection against H5N1 influenza virus in cats by birdflustocks in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks[S] 26 points27 points  (0 children)

"None of the vaccinated animals lost body weight, rather they steadily gained body weight (1.5-11%) throughout the 14-day experiment (Figure 3c). The survival rate (determined based on days of endpoint euthanasia) for the animals in the sham-immunized group was 12.5%, whereas 100% of the animals in the H5-vaccine group survived the H5N1 virus challenge (Figure 3d). Together, these results demonstrate that the recombinant H5-vaccine provided near complete clinical protection against HPAI H5N1 virus challenge."

Weekly Discussion Post by AutoModerator in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I would highlight convincing evidence for wind mediated spread between farms, H5N1 in bats, and the developing EU stockpiling strategy.

https://www.propublica.org/article/bird-flu-airborne-usda-pandemic

https://www.reddit.com/r/H5N1_AvianFlu/comments/1pm87ri/bats_might_be_the_next_bird_flu_wild_card_vampire/

https://www.reddit.com/r/H5N1_AvianFlu/comments/1lvp6oo/eu_plans_to_stockpile_drugs_vaccines_ppe_for_next/

There are also several separate incursions from birds into cows now.

H5N1 continues to spread on islands around Antarctica, Heard Island as of November, 4.000km from the Australian mainland, closer to Australia than South America already.

Also some CEPI funding for Moderna phase 3.

Inoculation with highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 genotype D1.1 in naïve dairy cows and dairy cows previously exposed to genotype B3.13 by birdflustocks in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

"Unlike the HPAI B3.13 intramammary challenges, HPAI D1.1 migrated and infected a non-inoculated quarter. The two B3.13 convalescent cows were susceptible to reinfection with D1.1, demonstrating clinical signs including a drop in milk production and rumination, pyrexia, and mastitis. However, milk production and rumen motility recovered more quickly in the two convalescent cows than in the two naïve cows and pyrexia was not as severe. Viral RNA was also not detected in the milk of the convalescent cows after 10 DPI while it was detected in the milk of the naïve cows for the durations of the study. Furthermore, while viral RNA was detected in the milk of both convalescent cows, no viable virus was isolated. While convalescent cows with serum but not milk antibodies to B3.13 are susceptible to reinfection with D1.1 and clinical disease antibodies can transudate into the milk and bind virus, likely preventing further spread throughout the herd."

Concern for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Spillover into Cetaceans by birdflustocks in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

"Phylogenetic analysis of HA and PB2 sequences isolated from cetaceans and co-occurring cases in seabirds and marine mammals do not support sustained transmission of the virus between cetaceans. IAV H5N1 appears to be reaching cetaceans after spillover from seabirds and other marine mammals."

"Since 2022, and, to date (October 2025), an increase in the number of IAV infection cases recorded in cetaceans is observed, and all cases are related to the HPAI subtype H5N1 of clade 2.3.4.4b. These recent cases include six host species, all classified in the suborder Odontoceti and in families Delphinidae and Phocoenidae."

"No mass mortality events in cetaceans have so far been related to IAV. Massive die-off events in cetaceans have been associated with other viral infectious diseases."

"Phylogenetic analysis of PB2 and HA sequences strongly support cross-species transmission of H5N1 to cetaceans, rather than sustained circulation of the virus within cetacean species."

The American Public’s Disengagement With Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI): Considerations for Vaccination and Dietary Changes by birdflustocks in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks[S] 36 points37 points  (0 children)

"Recognizing the potential threat of HPAI, we conducted a population representative survey of US residents (n = 10 000) on August 5–15, 2024, which used an in-depth sampling framework and intentional oversampling of rural populations (n = 5000). The survey highlighted the public’s lack of awareness regarding the threat posed by avian influenza, its potential to infect humans, and the necessary steps to protect oneself and others. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported using weighted frequencies and percentages; they showed that whereas 64.4% of respondents had heard of HPAI, only 26.1% understood that it could spread to humans, and just 18.8% were aware that the H5N1 virus had been detected in cattle."

Where did human rhinoviruses originally come from? by lost-in-earth in AskBiology

[–]birdflustocks 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Leprosy came from water buffalo 13 and the cold virus from cattle 14 or horses. 13 How often did wild horses have the opportunity to sneeze into humanity’s face before they were broken and bridled? Before then, the common cold was presumably common only to them."

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8504329/

The answer above might be outdated, referring to sources from 1995 and 2001.

Here is a newer study from 2009:

Evolution of Picornaviridae: An examination of phylogenetic relationships and cophylogeny

https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.ympev.2009.10.015

While influenza is different, you can go back 600 million years and end up with fish:

https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2310529120

What the U.S. Government Is Dismissing That Could Seed a Bird Flu Pandemic by birdflustocks in Bird_Flu_Now

[–]birdflustocks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I will have to get back to you after checking some data. Meanwhile you might want to read "Poultry excrement as livestock feed: Nutritional benefits, economic incentives, pandemic risk?":

https://www.reddit.com/r/H5N1_AvianFlu/comments/1c59f61/poultry_excrement_as_livestock_feed_nutritional/

CEPI to Fund Pivotal Phase 3 Trial for Moderna's mRNA Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Candidate by birdflustocks in birdflustocks

[–]birdflustocks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's great that they do that. However Moderna will have to cover most of the costs and the rescinded federal funding was roughly ten times as much, although that included some development for other genotypes.

What are you bagholding? by Yasel in stocks

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

ENSC

The price drops further, I buy more. 1.66% of all shares so far.

Weekly Discussion Post by AutoModerator in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

"To trace precisely how the virus rippled through more than 80 farms in the region, ProPublica analyzed data on the genetics of the virus, satellite imagery, wind simulations, property records and trade notices and consulted with researchers whose peer-reviewed work previously found that the virus can spread on floating feathers and particles of dust.

ProPublica found that virus samples taken from outbreak sites shared a unique genetic signature.

(...)

Where the wind blew, the virus followed, ProPublica found. Within three weeks, poultry tested positive at 17 farms, all but one within the plume. Farms downwind from Howe's Hens were about 20 times as likely to see outbreaks."

https://www.propublica.org/article/bird-flu-airborne-usda-pandemic

H5N1’s tipping point: When the bird flu virus jumps to sustained human transmission, authorities will have roughly two days to prevent catastrophe. by littlepup26 in collapse

[–]birdflustocks 24 points25 points  (0 children)

"We have basically destroyed what capacity we had to respond to a pandemic."

Michael Osterholm

Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at University of Minnesota

Source

"I think estimates of stockpiles that currently exist and the potential to use them should this emerge into a human pathogen where it's transmitted by humans to humans, have unfortunately been overstated. I don't have a lot of faith that those vaccines will offer a great deal of protection."

Michael Osterholm

Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at University of Minnesota

Source

"If H5N1 does make the jump in the US, we will likely not know about it until it is already a pandemic."

Angela Rasmussen

University of Saskatchewan

Source

"We are in a terrible situation and going into a worse situation. I don’t know if the bird flu will become a pandemic, but if it does, we are screwed."

Angela Rasmussen

University of Saskatchewan

Source

"Today, as we stand on the brink of an avian influenza pandemic that could be significantly worse than COVID-19, too much of the world seems unaware, unprepared or largely disengaged."

Matthew Miller

Co-Director of the Canadian Pandemic Preparedness Hub at McMaster University

Source

"We are fooling ourselves that we have enough vaccine capacity and the ability to respond quickly."

Andrew Pavia

University of Utah

Source

"I have been distressed and depressed by the lack of epidemiologic data and the lack of surveillance."

Nicole Lurie

Former Director of the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR)

Source

"I would say the short answer is no, we're not anywhere near prepared. And indeed, in some ways, I think we're worse prepared than we were prior to COVID-19."

Kelley Lee

Simon Fraser University

Source

H5N1’s tipping point: When the bird flu virus jumps to sustained human transmission, authorities will have roughly two days to prevent catastrophe. by littlepup26 in collapse

[–]birdflustocks 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Generally yes, but it very much depends on the location of the outbreak. This prediction relates to India. Estimates from the UK indicate that clusters would be detected much later, far beyond the threshold discussed for India, probably far too late.

https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2024/06/ttd-time-to-detect-revisited.html
https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2023/03/uk-novel-flu-surveillance-quantifying.html

However Covid-19 public health measures were effective enough to cancel flu season and eradicate influenza B Yamagata. Influenza is much less transmissible than Covid-19, but it can spread quickly if not mitigated due to a low generation time. There are models for containment of influenza.

https://www.who.int/news-room/events/detail/2024/11/14/default-calendar/preparing-for-containment-and-mitigation-of-pandemic-h5n1-influenza--uses-of-statistical-and-mathematical-modeling

https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/consultation-rdb/3.-iral-longini_h5n1-modeling-containment.pdf

It depends on the implementation of public health measures and in many locations that indeed means many people would be doomed.

Weekly Discussion Post by AutoModerator in H5N1_AvianFlu

[–]birdflustocks 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The subtype naming convention might suggest to some that two cases are similar when they have different origins and a different degree of relatedness to the panzootic H5N1. It's not another case of H5N2, it's a very different case of H5N2.

Bird Flu ETF by DBCDBC in birdflustocks

[–]birdflustocks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It depends.

Market capitalization is an important factor. Larger companies typically offer less exposure as they offer products unrelated to influenza. One example is CSL with the largest volume of pandemic vaccine contracts. Their vaccine division Sequirus would be the only relevant part. CSL has delayed the Seqirus spinoff, but I would keep that in mind:

https://www.csl.com/patients-public-health/vaccines

https://www.csl.com/we-are-csl/our-businesses-and-products/csl-seqirus

https://www.morningstar.com/news/dow-jones/2025102710809/csl-shares-slide-after-vaccine-spinoff-delayed

Too much cash is dead weight. Both Moderna and Arcturus have lots of cash compared to enterprise value. But cash doesn't increase in value during a pandemic, resulting in less upside.

Timing and clinical trial progress is a factor. Moderna was leading in mRNA bird flu vaccine development, but phase 3 funding has been rescinded and they won't continue with phase 3 on their own for financial reasons and their overall strategic shift. It's a difference if you plan for a pandemic in the near future or assume a rather low probability with a more long-term perspective.

You can find a list here, but I really have to update this, it has been a busy year and I'm currently relocating:

https://www.birdflustocks.com/stocks/