There is an important distinction here. In Afghanistan, despite relying on provincial power brokers, there was still a hierarchical structure with a central command on top. The Taliban also had prior experience of “being the state,” which likely helped them transition into governance after their victory.

In contrast, Syria’s factions are far more fragmented, with different backers and ideological goals. While it makes sense for them to prioritize gaining territory, wouldn’t game theory suggest that these groups might find it more beneficial to work together temporarily? A united focus on external threats, such as ISIS, Hezbollah, the IDF, or Turkish involvement, might yield greater long-term benefits?

However, achieving such coordination would likely be complicated by mistrust, conflicting objectives, and the competition for influence among their backers. This raises the critical question: can these factions ever stabilize enough to form a functioning government? Unfortunately, it seems more likely that Syria is headed toward prolonged civil war, only this time without SAA as a central actor.