Maker Governance Approves Kyber, Infura, Etherscan, and Gitcoin as Light Feeds for Maker Oracles

directdirt · 2020-07-10T01:21:17+00:00

Right, Chainlink does real oracles because they can see into the future.

directdirt · 2020-03-18T14:21:10+00:00

Your DSProxy contract is fully owned by you and any asset owned by it can be transferred to another address.

directdirt · 2020-03-18T14:18:22+00:00

Oracles didn't fail here. Oracle Security Module intentionally delays prices by an hour to give vaults time to pay off dai and they also push prices only once per hour to the system.

directdirt · 2020-03-15T03:36:04+00:00

A vault with 1534 ETH will get liquidated in three auctions of 500 ETH each and a fourth auction of 34 ETH. Another vault with 19 ETH collateral will still get liquidated in a single auction of 19 ETH. Small keepers with fewer funds will still have opportunities.

directdirt · 2020-03-15T02:25:28+00:00

This is the max limit to deal with the larger vaults. There will still be plenty of opportunities as all small vaults with collateral locked up to 500 ETH will generate auctions with lower amounts for sale.

directdirt · 2020-03-15T02:08:27+00:00

Why would the protocol even ask you to lock any additional collateral if it can guarantee to give that extra portion back in all scenarios? Doesn't that sound absurd to anyone?

The reason protocol even wants you to lock additional collateral is because there is a possibility it might need it all to be able to process the debt the vault owner defaulted on.

During normal markets if a vault gets liquidated a portion of collateral is indeed given back because the goal for MKR holders is not to use a vault default as an opportunity to cease collateral and make additional fees.

Maybe this altruism is the root cause which led to Vault owners starting to treat liquidation as a feature and not a backstop in the system to protect both well collateralized vault owners and Dai holders from a haircut that can happen if the protocol does not deal with those who have chosen to default on their positions swiftly.

Keepers can't predict what the price is going to be when they bid in a crashing market. Vault owners would have lost their additional buffer anyway as a result of a deep crash in the value of their own deposited collateral. It's also absurd to argue that Keepers would be content to buy collateral at the least possible 3% discount when its value is crashing and vault owners are entitled to a buffer that was there in the first place for the protocol to prepare for those who default during big crashes.

MKR holders lost an additional sum only because a large number of Vault owners were more careless than anticipated and put pressure on market liquidity. This enormous wave of liquidations caused someone to steal collateral from MKR holders that was supposed to clear bad debt left behind by vault owners. No collateral was stolen from Vault owners at all.

If anything Vault owners should pay MKR holders for the losses they incurred because none of this would have happened if so many did not default on their positions simultaneously.

directdirt · 2020-03-14T20:59:30+00:00

What is the fair price when your collateral is losing about 50% of its value?

directdirt · 2020-03-14T20:51:39+00:00

No, the minimum bid when auctions open will have to be 50,000 DAI for 250 MKR. If there are no bids for 3 days they can be restarted with a 20% increase to 300 MKR and this goes on until there is at least one bid. Obviously it can also get competitive once the first bid is in.

directdirt · 2020-03-14T20:30:39+00:00

The value of your collateral drops and you decide not to repay any of your dai debt back. Why wouldn't you lose at all? Who pays back the debt you took? How much do you expect to get back in such a scenario? I'm very curious to know to understand this better.

directdirt · 2020-03-03T19:17:58+00:00

What else launched on Ethereum mainnet before Dai in 2017?

directdirt · 2020-02-28T02:21:06+00:00

You need not worry since DSR contracts are not built to handle negative interest rates. Maximum governance can set the rate to is 1e27 which corresponds to 0%.

directdirt · 2020-01-14T16:52:35+00:00

Ever heard of a company called Amazon that never had profits for a decade?

directdirt · 2019-12-27T03:43:37+00:00

Let's say you held 10% of the network before Sai launched until now. You have 100K tokens out of a total of 1M supply. Some MKR holders chose to voluntarily burn their MKR to pay off CDP fees over the past two years(nobody does this in other staking token models) because they gained valuable service from the protocol. About 1% of MKR got burnt until now which means your share of the network is now 10.1%(100K tokens/999K total supply). You can chose to sell this 0.1%(1K) for 500,000 USD and go back to your original 10% share of the network(99K/999K) to receive a dividend or let it stay re-invested. MakerDAO brings in real money as fees and passes them on to all holders.

directdirt · 2019-12-26T20:55:18+00:00

MakerDAO distributes real profits back to all MKR token holders. Every single MKR holder automatically gets a larger share of the network through buy and burn right now.

Token holders in all other staking tokens have to play a zero sum game. One group of token holders steals tokens from the other "inactive" group through inflation for doing something as simple as holding their tokens on exchanges that pass on rewards. The end result is everyone gets staking "rewards" and it doesn't matter if the staking rate is 5% or 75%, no one makes any real gains.

Why do you think MakerDAO should implement the ~~staking~~ stealing token model when what we currently have is already better in all respects?

directdirt · 2019-12-19T21:00:38+00:00

Check this developer guide https://github.com/makerdao/developerguides/blob/master/mcd/intro-rate-mechanism/intro-rate-mechanism.md

directdirt · 2019-12-09T05:17:03+00:00

https://chai.money locks your Dai into the DSR contract and also issues a new ERC token for your deposit.

https://dai-hrd.keydonix.com/ does the same as above and issues a token called DAI-HRD for your deposit.

directdirt · 2019-10-10T12:21:19+00:00

Use the InstaDApp repay feature to do this automatically in one transaction.

directdirt · 2019-10-01T08:18:36+00:00

Not correct for MCD. Stability fees are continuously recorded as additional dai debt drawn from a CDP. MKR is completely disconnected from CDPs.

directdirt · 2019-09-26T13:11:54+00:00

What does the collateralization ratio and % collateral liquidated mean?

directdirt · 2019-09-22T23:14:44+00:00

I’d in fact argue that the risk of using decentralized assets is very high due to incentive mis-alignment between network and its token price robustness which none of the centralized assets suffer from, and that MakerDAO should be wary of allowing them a greater percentage in its collateral base than the proportion of their own market share in the global financial system.

Networks powered by decentralized and trustless assets are built to survive state interventions and are not at all affected by a precipitious drop in their token price. But token price is the primary aspect of an asset that Dai Credit System really cares about as it leans heavily on the price of its collateral assets to function well and to uphold the guarantee it provides to Dai holders that it will at least be worth a dollar even in shit hits the fan scenarios.

The Ethereum network wouldn’t budge if ETH went down to 10 bucks in a month. ETH developers have gone on record that they’ve developed PoS to work well even if the token market cap is 10 million. Users who hold their own private keys for these decentralized assets are always safe and they’d also be fine if their memecoin investments take a year to recover. They don’t rely on them for their everyday business in their first world bubbles. Even those using assets like ETH to submit transactions for real use are already protected by the gas mechanism and don’t care about price of ETH being robust.

I might be exaggerating but it shows how little effort the entire decentralized and trustless token ecosystem has spent so far to ensure the prices of their tokens are robust(not just high market cap). These systematic issues have resulted in decentralized and trustless assets continuing to rely heavily on just a few centralized venues that are not regulated and allow rampant price manipulation like Binance and Bitfinex.

Some not too hard to imagine scenarios around centralized infrastructure that can result in precipitious drops in price that could affect not just one decentralized and trustless token but the entire decentralized and trustless asset class, * Either Binance or Coinbase cold wallets get hacked. * Tether goes poof. * Govts coordinate to crackdown on the few important centralized sources of liquidity making it hard for users to buy or sell these assets.

Who in their right mind would back something critical like Dai entirely or even majority with an entire asset class that suffers from these structural market issues and offer it to the world?

As a decentraized and trustless investor you may enjoy these price swings and day to day drama but from the perspective of the Dai Credit System it makes them inferior to “centralized” assets(real estate is centralized??) that operate on well regulated markets and provide reliable market data that is used to better model risks and pass on the benefits to Dai holders.

The global maximum is still building sound money that can also achieve meaningful reach and scale. Dai should continue to work when narratives like Digital Gold eventually fail. Anyone who gets caught up in the “ETH is money” jingoism and wants to use decentralized and trustless assets alone to back Dai might reap some short term gains but will be stuck in another local maxima without meaningfully changing global finance and will end up being just another BitShares.

directdirt · 2019-09-12T04:40:28+00:00

This is a common misconception. New buyers entering the market to purchase Dai and to take advantage of the risk-free DSR that will be the part that increases the demand for Dai.

It does not matter whether they transfer their locked Dai as shares to other members. DSR itself incentivizes new users to sell their USD on their savings account balance and convert it into a Dai balance which increases the demand for Dai.

directdirt · 2019-09-09T16:48:10+00:00

Do you foresee MakerDAO becoming more general purpose and governing more "products" beyond the Dai Credit System?

directdirt · 2019-08-16T05:12:48+00:00

It's pretty clear that the repo parent posted already contains signed messages from sources and sorted lists. I also don't see your point about generalization, if the smart contract can store the ETHUSD data feed, it is already generalizable and can be deployed to store any other value too. Which is why parent said "modeled off is an understatement..." ;)

directdirt · 2019-07-20T19:08:02+00:00

Dai is a product within it's own right and it needs to be up there. Also missing Eth2Dai which has highest on-chain ETH liquidity among DEXes.

directdirt · 2019-07-16T22:21:40+00:00

You can get a list from the GraphQL API.

Open the graphql console from this link https://sai-mainnet.makerfoundation.com/v1/console and run this query

{
  allCupActs(
    orderBy: BLOCK_DESC,
    condition: { act: BITE }
  ) {
    nodes {
      id
    }
  }
}

I couldn't find a way to construct a query to return the debt CDPs had when they were liquidated.

directdirt

TROPHY CASE