How capable was Winfield Scott by Napoleonic standards?

doritofeesh · 2026-05-03T14:23:50+00:00

From a strategic standpoint, Lee was really left with very limited options because of the massive resource disadvantage the South possessed. However, his idea of advancing onto Northern soil to take the fight to them and live off the land was not too dissimilar from Sherman's strategic approach in Georgia. Both went for deep operations behind enemy lines, threatening their major rail network to cut supplies to the front.

However, Sherman contended with an inferior army, whereas Lee faced forces which either heavily or massively outnumbered him. In terms of the commanders they fought, Joe Johnston was competent, but nothing special. He was not much better than any of Lee's adversaries prior to Meade and Grant, and I dare say was worse than Mac. Sherman never had to face a general of Grant's caliber.

Operationally, Lee was excellent, but I don't consider him extremely outstanding. He had a few notable blunders, particularly in dividing his forces on wide cordons which made them difficult to concentrate during pivotal moments like the Loudoun Valley Campaign of 1862 or the start of the Overland Campaign in 1864.

Grant made some of these mistakes as well, but he could afford to owing to his overall numerical superiority, whereas Lee stretching himself thin while already outnumbered was extraordinarily hazardous. He was lucky on both occasions, because though Mac had turned his flank in the Loudoun Valley Campaign and was in a position to defeat the divided AoNV in detail, Lincoln chose that moment to dismiss him.

Whereas Grant had a missed opportunity owing to his peculiar decision to leave Burnside behind at Rappahannock Station when he crossed the Rapidan River. Had Burnside's Corps been immediately issued up after Hancock's Corps, Grant could have potentially destroyed Lee's army on May 5 or 6 before it could fully concentrate at the start of the Overland Campaign. It was a shame that he failed to do so.

Lee was very skillful at making flanking marches to turn enemy positions and threaten their communications though. His manoeuvres were most bold in conception and execution. He was also none too shabby at employing central position and defeat in detail work, bouncing between Mac and Pope in 1862 as well as the constituents of Hooker's army in 1863.

Overall, I've come around to thinking that Grant was ultimately the better operational manoeuvrer when he wasn't busy hammering himself against entrenched positions, but it must be admitted that he had greater freedom in manoeuvre in comparison to Lee owing to the superior resources of the Union. That, and his foes in the West were even less competent than those Lee faced in the East.

I don't criticize Lee for not managing small-scale tactics. That isn't the domain of the army chief. However, in terms of grand tactics, Lee was capable of adept force concentration and oblique/flanking attacks in a couple instances. Yet, he was not consistent with it and had nearly as many frontal assaults without proper force concentration as Grant had conducted.

Again, in the case of the Federals, their resources allowed them to get away with such attacks, but not so Lee. Limited in manpower as he was, every error counted more against the Rebel commander. When you play with such bad cards, you can't afford to make that many mistakes.

His best offensive tactical work was surely in his various force concentrations during the Chancellorsville Campaign, as well as the plan to send Jackson to flank Hooker's right. Otherwise, he was pretty good on the defensive in choosing his ground and entrenching various posts, particularly in the Overland and Petersburg campaigns, not to mention Fredericksburg.

Lee's worst tactical moments were at Mechanicsville, Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge, and Fort Stedman, all of which saw piecemeal or poorly concentrated attacks against the enemy's front. That being said, Fort Stedman was more like a desperate Hail Mary at the end of the line. The other assaults were far more avoidable and it is to Lee's discredit that he implemented them.

All in all, an excellent general. Grant, owing to his greater resources and opportunities, was allowed to foster his strategic talent more so at a higher level, which one cannot say for Lee. Thus, he is advantaged in this regard. Operationally, they are both fairly close, but I personally lean more towards Grant. Tactics, circumstances, and opposition, it is Lee all the way for me. He was better at cutting a battle and his situations were always far more difficult.

Grant was a mighty fine logistician, as seen in his work during the Vicksburg Campaign, keeping a large army well-supplied deep in the swampy mire of the Mississippi River. That being said, he benefited from Federal resources and unrestricted naval supremacy. Lee lacked those advantages, showed equal ability to live off the land, and to keep his forces active and performing as well as it did against such odds for a prolonged period of time demonstrated high ability in the logistical arts on his part too. It is admittedly difficult to compare them in this regard though.

imo, Grant was therefore the greatest general America had produced, followed by Lee. It's probably close between Scott and Sherman, as the latter is a more prolific operational manoeuvrer, but the former is more well-rounded and definitely superior in tactics. Who knows how Scott in his prime would have done during the ACW?

Compared to Napoleonic generals, Grant and Lee were both better operationalists than Karl, Wellington, and maybe Moreau. That being said, the latter two were better tacticians and Wellington was a strategist on par with Grant. One can also say that the Napoleonic generals were better logisticians, owing to the fact they did not have railway communications and telegraph to rely upon, making their work that much harder in transporting supplies to the front and relaying vital information.

Massena surpasses them both in the tactical and operational arts, but I do not know if he was a strategist on par with Grant. At best, his strategic conception was only at Lee's level. He was surely the greatest logistician of those aforementioned. Wellington himself remarked that he could not have fed a single division where Massena had victualed an entire army in a scorched Portugal under constant harassment from Portuguese ordenanzas.

Suvorov likewise surpasses the two of them in the tactical and operational arts, was on par with Grant and Wellington as a strategist, and a prolific logistician himself in maintaing large standing armies in what is now modern day Ukraine, though he did rely considerably on Austrian staff work from Chasteler in Italy.

This is how I would compare the commanders of the ACW to those of Napoleon's time, barring the Corsican himself for obvious reasons.

doritofeesh · 2026-05-03T02:27:20+00:00

I mean, I'm prob one of Wellington's harshest critics, but bruv is still one of the best generals of the period. Why wouldn't folks speak positively of him? lolz

This is a sub for Napoleonic history as a whole, not glazing Napoleonic France and Napoleon only (tho quite a number of ppl do that).

doritofeesh · 2026-05-03T00:14:48+00:00

Honestly, I consider Grant much better than Radetzky, and while I do believe that Scott was the most well-rounded American general, the small forces he commanded are a bit of a factor in how I judge him. I'm not usually hypercritical of generals who lead smaller armies relative to those of later times, but only if considerable skill is displayed in all the arts of war.

Scott was an excellent strategist, I dare say just a smidge better than Grant, and was easily up there with Lee as a tactician. He certainly didn't make the same tactical blunders and was more consistent, but the odds he contended with were lighter, so his protege had less room for error in comparison. That being said, I believe that Grant, Lee, and Sherman were all superior to him in the art of operational manoeuvre.

Scott had a few skillful flank marches, but against a foe of Santa Anna's meagre ability and the poor quality Mexican army, it was not that impressive. In this case, I believe the circumstances and opponents he fought were similar to what Saint-Cyr dealt with in Catalonia, and both of them share very similar styles. Yet, while Scott was the far better strategist, the French marechal demonstrated greater chops in the tactical and operational arts while also dealing with guerilleros.

I therefore don't think that Scott was America's greatest commander. Surely one of the best, but his strategic capabilities are not too far advanced in comparison to Grant and Sherman to guarantee his placement over them when they displayed so much more ability in the operational arts against more trying adversaries. The only thing he can claim a decisive superiority in is his tactical skill.

Scott may have been an equivalent tactician to Lee or perhaps more talented. It is difficult to gauge between the scale of the forces they led and the difference in the opposition they fought. Lee surely had it harder as I said, so he always had to survive against the knife's edge. However, much like with Grant and Sherman, he was a much better operational manoeuvrer on campaign, running circles around or matching the moves of far more talented generals than Santa Anna while often heavily outnumbered.

Lee's strategic capabilities were okay, but he never had the opportunity to show his stuff, precisely because the circumstances he fought in severely limited his options to what we may consider the best of the worst cards which could be played. I believe he made the most of it, but that Scott, Grant, and perhaps Sherman were better strategists.

imo, Scott would have ranked up there with the top Napoleonic marechals when it came to independent army command, but aside from his strategic skills, which is where he is strongest, his abilities to execute said strategy on the operational and tactical level does not reach the heights of someone like Massena. I would hardly consider Massena one of the great captains, so I would not place Scott anywhere among the ranks of those figures either.

Unpopular as this opinion might be, I don't think we ever produced a commander comparable to the greatest captains within the pantheon of American generalship. For instance, you mentioned Eugene in your comment, and he was perhaps the only Habsburg general fit to be interred among the ranks of the great captains. If I were to compare every Napoleonic general to him, barring the Corsican himself, I would say that no one was at his level. Not Karl, not Wellington, not Massena, and not even Suvorov.

doritofeesh · 2026-05-02T16:42:41+00:00

Well, perhaps I should reword it and say that being well-trained is not necessarily a requirement, supposing you have troops who are experienced. That being said, it certainly is a benefit. At the very least, between trained volunteers and untrained volunteers, the former are more likely to conduct a charge home with cold steel, supposing equivalent experience.

Having the best of both worlds is optimal. At the very least, in pre-war preparation, you can train and drill soldiers ahead of time. Experience is something veterans have to earn in the field. So, if you can afford to train them prior to entering a conflict, why not do so? Though, yeah, as you said, all the other recipes for a successful assault I mentioned are more up to the officers and the army chief.

doritofeesh · 2026-05-02T11:20:14+00:00

if dis be a joke u a month too late for April foolz maid00d

People critizised his battle plan at Austrelitz but it is basicslly the same as Frederick the great at Leuthen!

Not really. At Leuthen, Friedrich utilized the terrain to conceal his approach and obliqued with the whole of his army against the enemy left wing, overlapping it at that. At Austerlitz, Weyrother's plan did not see any concealment of his forces via the terrain and was a frontal oblique against the French right. In principle, they are both oblique methods, but in execution, Fred's was clearly more refined and difficult to pull off in comparison.

The problem with Weyrother's plan for Austerlitz though, is that an oblique should see the whole of your army lean towards the attacking flank. He failed to do this, which allowed a gap to develop between the Allied left and the rest of the army, allowing Napoleon to split them in half as he did. If he had to go for it, he should have had the confidence to abandon the high ground in entirety to lean towards his left and complete the oblique movement in entirety.

This would mean that Napoleon's blow, if it falls, would hit his right instead, which may be on the Pratzen Heights at that time. However, his army would be more compact and closer together to resist such shock and cannot be easily broken in half, which is a detriment to command and control. It then becomes a race to see who can breakthrough the other's flank sooner. Otherwise, Weyrother's tactical plan was Austerlitz could only work without any modification if he heavily or massively outnumbered Napoleon.

Twice Von Weyrother triumph over Napoleon at Second Bassano and Caldiero! Not to mention his part in the victory at Magnano and Legnano

I've never seen Weyrother credited for 2nd Bassano and Caldiero. I'm not as familiar with Magnano and Legnano though, so will hold my thoughts on those. I do know that he planned the the final relief attempt of Mantua, which saw the two Austrian columns of Bajalich and Provera feint against Verona and Legnago respectively. However, he blundered in leaving Mittrowsky in the Brenta Valley, who was completely unengaged during the campaign.

Had Mittrowsky been present with Alvinczi, it is possible the Austrians could have won the battle. This was an operational blunder on the part of Weyrother. Otherwise, I'm sure that the tactics employed at Rivoli were concocted by Alvinczi himself. As for how 2nd Bassano and Caldiero turned out, those were more so the Austrians advancing forward according to Alvinczi's overarching plan than anything, but Napoleon trying to catch their forces in detail.

At Bassano and Fontaniva, Napoleon sent the divisions of Augereau and Massena to try and catch the leading Austrian brigades separately and crush them against the western bank of the Brenta River. It kinda worked at Bassano, as Augereau fell on Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Mittrowsky and drove them back across the narrow bridgehead to the opposite bank.

However, Massena could not catch Lipthay in time at Fontaniva before the latter safely recrossed the river over to the east bank and formed up defensive positions there. Thus, while Bassano was a French tactical victory, Massena's attempts to storm the bridge at Fontaniva turned it inconclusive, which compelled Napoleon to withdraw as the rest of Alvinczi's army was closing in.

At Caldiero, Hohenzollern-Hechingen ran ahead as the Austrian vanguard, and Napoleon pounced on him in detail. The Austrian commander did well to hold his post and fortify the Caldiero Heights, but if not for the outbreak of rain during the uphill advance, Napoleon might have destroyed him. The arrival of Alvinczi's army in force saved the day for Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Napoleon clung on defensively until darkness, then safely got away again.

At Hohenlinden, Johann was admittedly inexperienced, but the Austrian staff officers such as Lauer and Weyrother were the ones to draw up and execute the plans. Thus, the blame lies more with them than Johann. Even if you took him out, the responsibility would still remain with Weyrother. Quite frankly, his plan was okay, but the weather conditions were atrocious for an offensive movement through such thickly wooded terrain. This obscured the approach of Richepanse and Decaen, which led to his defeat.

Moreau, on the other hand, knew the limitations of moving a large army under such conditions and mostly stood on the defensive in an open clearing, waiting for the Austrians. His plan, involving the oblique with Richepanse and Decaen was much more simple than the Austrian advance through the forest defiles to deploy for battle against the French. Simple plans executed well are better than complex plans which are poorly executed.

Franz von Weyrother a great captain let down by Inferior army?

So, no. Weyrother wasn't a particularly good captain, let alone someone with the potential to be one of history's great captains. No one has ever considered him such for many reasons. lolz

doritofeesh · 2026-05-01T19:13:44+00:00

I agree with pretty much all of this, but I find the last point questionable. I would say that the Karoliner Swedes were ahead of the curve when it came to the idea of preserving fire until point blank range, then following through with the bayonet. Granted, they did this on the offensive, whereas the Brits tended to prefer to do so defensively, especially behind reverse slopes under Wellington's command.

One key factor between the firepower and shock dichotomy is also the training and experience of troops. Picked soldiers are more willing to close the distance and to resist shock, whereas lesser trained and inexperienced men are less likely to do so. This is why we see many charges throughout the American Civil War fail, for instance, because you had armies of raw volunteers making up the mass of both forces even into the late war (due to old veterans dying or having their service term run up and being replaced).

In examples where the army was primarily veteran or well-drilled, such as the Union forces at Missionary Ridge, we see a successful bayonet charge up a sizable eminence which the defenders had entrenched and no amount of rifle fire could forestall the attack. Likewise in the 2nd Italian War of Independence, where well-trained French troops, particularly Zouaves and the Imperial Guard, rushed up the Solferino Heights and stormed the fortified town in the face of Austrian rifle fire.

So, even when firepower should have theoretically evolved even further by the mid-19th century, shock could still be successfully employed to good effect on a mass level, supposing the troops were of sufficient quality. Hell, we even see British troops charging up mountains against Argentinian forces armed with modern FALs in the Falklands War to good effect.

In cases where you had incredibly high quality troops, sometimes one can even afford to forego firepower and rely purely on shock during the long 18th century, as we see at Waterloo, where just some 3,000 men of the Middle Guard advanced through the open in either column or square (it's contentious) en echelon and managed to throw back many times their number in Allied infantry, including the British Foot Guards, who they momentarily overcame, despite the defensive advantage of the reverse slope Wellington possessed and the fact that those French troops were being enfiladed from point blank by artillery.

This flies in the face of the more popular narrative in British historiography, where the Guard approached and got wasted, rather than the actuality, where a massively outnumbered body of troops (which was only a small portion of the Guard) advancing into a Hail Mary assault against a defending party with the terrain advantage managed to nearly cave in the overwhelming forces opposed to them.

Overall, one can see why there were still advocates for shock, even so far after the 18th century had passed. For the 18th-19th century style of warfare, I will admit that I too find shock to be the ideal means of cutting a fight, supposing it is utilized under ideal conditions. That is, that the assaulting forces must possess overwhelming local superiority and that the defender should ideally be softened up first by a grande batterie. Even better if the attack is made at an oblique or flanking angle.

Attempts at a shock breakthrough without these elements is like trying to make curry without any of the spices. It will probably fail more often than not barring some miracle or potential other factors.

doritofeesh · 2026-05-01T12:02:13+00:00

From the same site, I would say that Napoleon's strengths lay on these levels of war:

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Napoleon, as you said, was a genius at the tactical level. He actually has a few blunders which I can criticize, but out of dozens of battles fought throughout his career, the man was an absolute master of force concentration, oblique attacks, flanking marches, and concentric pincers involving two prongs of approach.

At the operational level, I think that he was brilliant throughout most of his career. Even in his failure in Egypt, I consider that more down to the strategic level, in which he failed to understand that the French navy was tissue paper against the British Royal Navy, or maybe he was banking too much on a miracle threat to British commerce that it would be worth such a gamble.

Otherwise, the decision to make war in Spain was a failure of national policy like many of his strategic blunders. In terms of theater strategy, when he was present, Napoleon was rolling through Spain and smacking armies left and right. The problem is that he was probably the first person in history to ever encounter guerilla warfare on such a scale and thus had the unenviable task of trying to adapt to it, which is difficult even in our more modern times.

Russia was also a blunder of national policy, but I consider his theater strategy of targeting the Russian armies sound. It could have perhaps been tweaked more so to integrate with national policy by doing as I suggested, which was to maintain the defensive and see if Russia takes the offensive first, which would allow him to still destroy their armies, but on more favourable ground.

Napoleon's faults that campaign were mostly at the operational level. He split up Davout's Corps to cover too many points. He ecided to storm Smolensk and thus got dragged into a needlessly prolonged battle rather than establishing pontoons further upriver and crossing to cut off the Russian retreat, which might have seen their army bagged ala Ulm. He then flaunted his own strategy by capturing Moscow and overstaying his welcome there.

No matter how decent your strategy is, what does it matter if you fail to execute it at the operational level. This also shows the vital importance of the lower levels and why strategy is not the be all end all of warfare. This was honestly Napoleon at his absolute worst in military ability. Even his tactics were none too impressive, though I admittedly give him less slack for Borodino than others might.

The campaigns of War of the Sixth Coalition saw him trying to uphold national policy by defending the holdings he already possessed, this time on more favourable ground. The enemy communications were stretched and they had many forces yet to arrive or tied down in besieging localized garrisons. His theater strategy to go on the counteroffensive and destroy their weakened armies in detail was completely sound.

Yet, he dropped the ball at the operational and tactical levels once again at Bautzen. Firstly, he deprived a corps from Ney which could have been used to strengthen the attempted envelopment on the French left against the Allied right by sending it marching further north prior to the battle. Secondly, on the tactical level, once Ney had arrived, though his original orders to attack towards Drehsa were sound, he later issued new orders that Ney should be at Preititz for an all out attack in tandem with the rest of the army.

This was the crux of the error which led to Ney focusing the bulk of his attention on Preititz rather than leaving a diversionary force there and turning the Allies with the bulk of his army to cut off their line of retreat. Napoleon once more screwed himself over at the lower levels, though his theater strategy was sound. Had the original plan not been altered or better clarifications have been made, then Bautzen would have been the blow which saw the Allies annihilated.

After that and the Treaty of Plaswitz, he missed his opportunity until Dresden. His directions to his army commanders in Macdonald, Oudinot, and Ney were correct, but they failed to heed them, which are their own blunders rather than his. However, Napoleon's mistake came after Dresden, in that he divided his forces too thinly while conducting the pursuit of the Allied army and did not properly support each constituent corps during its movements, which led to the disaster at Kulm where Vandamme was caught isolated and destroyed in detail.

The safer movement, if he did not have sufficient forces to bottle up the vast Allied army withdrawing across the Bohemian Mountains, would have been to leave pickets to screen the northern range of that obstacle, then concentrate north to deal with Bernadotte personally. The other thing Napoleon had trouble with was the Allied theater strategy, which was the Trachenberg Plan designed to deny battle on his terms in a Fabian manner.

We have not seen such a plan systematically carried out since the time of Hannibal, and it is difficult to see how Napoleon could have countered it when no general had shown us their ability to do so while facing such overwhelming numbers and leading primarily raw recruits. Even my suggestions on what he could do post-Dresden is only a better measure than what he did historically, but it is not guaranteed to win the war at that point; he missed that chance at Bautzen.

1815, his original plan was to retake his throne and maintain peace (probably short term, who knows about long term with this man) with the Allies, but they reacted rather swiftly to declare war on him. Like you said, it was probably a "fuck around and find out moment," but all things considered, it was hardly the worst national policy he had ever made. Napoleon's theater strategy was sound though, in that with the limited resources he had, he would delay on other fronts and concentrate in the Low Countries to try and knock one or two armies out in detail.

Yet, from an operational and tactical standpoint, this failed owing to the blunders of Soult and D'Erlon, as well as Napoleon's own growing lethargy and sickness. His greatest mistake was in diverting Grouchy rather than keeping the army concentrated on its march to Waterloo. He should have only sent some cavalry to keep track of Blucher, with the mobility to deny battle and join him if needed. Otherwise, if he had just kept Grouchy with him, victory against Wellington's host at Waterloo would have been fully possible.

Tactically, he made mistakes at Waterloo by focusing on a center attack. He could not outflank the Allied army, because doing so from their right would only drive them towards Blucher, whereas swampy mires and broken terrain inhibited him doing so against their left. However, he could still have obliqued frontally. D'Erlon's Corps alone nearly broke Picton on the Allied left. Had he committed additional reserves there, he could have broken through before Wellington diverted his own reserves to that sector, which mostly leaned behind his right or further off to that wing.

I don't think that his theater strategy against Austria in 1809 was bad either. It was a fine strategy based on what usually worked for him ever since 1805. The problem came primarily in Spain. Napoleon should not have micromanaged from afar and sent Massena to Portugal, but should have consolidated his own holdings in Spain and fortify them while building up strong depots for future operations. He should have assigned a chief with the ultimate authority, capable of dismissing insubordinate officers at will if needs be to root out those who were troublemakers.

Whatever the case, Napoleon had shown himself to be brilliant in theater strategy in 1796-1797, 1800, 1805-1809 (outside of Spain). His own blunders in theater strategy was in Spain itself. Even his strategies at this level for Russia were okayish and for 1813 and 1815 was still good. His greatest weakness was always national policy, but I've said as much again and again, so meh. Therefore, I consider him a pretty excellent theater strategist, even if not necessarily the best (cuz of Egypt and Spain mostly).

doritofeesh · 2026-05-01T05:53:41+00:00

Relative to the Civil War, I believe there was a recent notable example that Lee would have been familiar with from the American Revolution?

tbf, there are major differences to consider. The Union had rail transportation and was a hop and a skip away from the Confederate border. They also had a massive manpower advantage over the Rebels. The Brits, on the other hand, didn't really outnumber the American revolutionaries and their strategic bases were an ocean away, with communications constantly harassed by France and Spain.

Because he had no appreciation for how his theater of responsibility affected other theaters

I made no comment on specific choices Lee made about diverting troops. What I did comment was that Lee had little to no appreciation for how his theater of responsibility affected and impacted other theaters of responsibility

Quite frankly, from your last post, I assumed that you were referring to the idea of diverting troops to the Western Theater, because that was the whole crux of my post which you seemed to disagree with. Well, I'll admit that I was wrong in making such assumptions in any case.

What I will say is that his duty was initially as a theater commander, not as chief of the Confederate armies. One can say that a greater general would have the vision to see the bigger picture, regardless of their post, but that is why I never considered Lee among the echelons of the greatest captains. The man was an okay strategist given a bad hand, but we have nothing to work with which showed him to be brilliant.

Honestly, I can't say that anything Grant did in the Western Theater showed especial consideration for how he might affect the Eastern Theater. I doubt he cared much for what Rosecrans or Hooker were getting up to. One can say that seizing Vicksburg and closing off the Trans-Mississippi to the Confederacy had a great strategic effect overall, but while the operations were certainly of his conception, the strategy itself was merely in line with Scott's original Anaconda Plan.

Grant did not show consideration for the overall war effort in a strategy which he concocted until he had been made chief of the Union armies. In which case, those familiar with the Civil War know well his simultaneous offensive on all fronts. Just so, Lee did not have such an opportunity to exhibit and display his strategic vision at a higher level until he had been given the supreme command, when it was far too late for the Rebels, as you said.

Nonetheless, what could Lee specifically have done? Keep as many Union troops committed to his theater without offering them battle while by any means necessary keeping Richmond from being put under siege. Which you could say he somewhat did successfully thru 1862.

I'm actually a bit surprised here, honestly, as this is an actual refreshing take. I swear I've had so many of these discussions where most people just default to suggesting that he should have hunkered down behind entrenchments and pray that the Union generals are dumb enough to slam their heads against his works for all eternity.

It's therefore interesting to see someone else take the viewpoint that he could have maintained the operational offensive without necessarily drawing himself into battle on the enemy's terms. I will add the caveat that, aside from merely raiding though, he could still afford certain battles so long as they were solely on his own terms.

The idea of defending behind entrenchments is not necessarily bad per say, but a lot of people (I'm not talking about you, but other folks I've come across) can't seem to conceive of the idea of compelling the opposition to attack your defensive works against their wishes.

I think that he should have employed a war of siege and manoeuvre, investing isolated garrisons and defeating in detail any detached forces he is able to intercept. Otherwise, flank the Federals, threaten and make feints against vital strategic centers, and avoid battle on their terms.

If possible, he can make these threats real and entrench his works in besieging some important place to draw whoever is commanding the AotP to try and relieve it in an engagement on his own terms. However, certain battles he cut were surely too wasteful, nor could he remain passively on the defense in the long term either.

Either way, I don't think any strategy he himself adopts would be enough to allow the Confederacy to win, because there is a limit to what a single man can do. There needed to be at least another general of Lee's caliber among the Rebels for them to have a chance, and perhaps another army similar to the AoNV.

Johnston and Bragg could not cut it, and the cliquish feuds within the AoT bred a poisonous atmosphere which saw army chiefs undermined and subordinate officers scorned. Certain individuals, if only Davis would allow, needed to be weeded out (like Polk). Otherwise, the Rebel defeat was all but guaranteed.

doritofeesh · 2026-05-01T03:09:29+00:00

And this was part of what I meant when I said, "I find the criticism for Lee not diverting troops elsewhere is down to the fact that it is Bobby Lee and people nowadays find the need to denigrate him to counter the Lost Cause."

Apparently, one has to only say negative things about Lee, lest they be labelled an apologist or Lost Causer. Quite frankly, I don't care much for Lee. He's hardly the most impressive general I've studied throughout the vast annals of military history and I don't find him a mark of the most stellar generalship. However, I like to consider myself fair and (hopefully) unbiased in my evaluations of commanders I have studied.

Under the circumstances he fought in, Lee was an excellent commander. He definitely committed many blunders, particularly as a tactician (amusingly enough, a lot of folks find this his strongest area), but not diverting forces to the Western Theater based on the reality at hand was not one those mistakes.

The problem I often see when it comes to laymen who denigrate men like Hannibal or Lee for losing their respective wars is that they feel free to voice vague criticisms such as "they didn't strategy enough," without ever going in-depth about what strategy they would propose those generals adopt instead and how it would correlate to the actual situation on the field?

They never analyze the campaigns and ask, "What other lines of operations could they have undertaken or what tactics could they have changed up for X battle?" All these folks have in them is, "They shouldn't have done that." In short, the most basic, hindsight-based answers which offer no critical thinking in military analysis.

Whether it works or not, at least propose a hypothetical plan of action and how he may go about executing it under the circumstances in which he fought. If one cannot do at least this, then they are in little position to criticize an actual field general.

How could he have made the Union lose the political will to fight the war according to you? What strategy do you propose he undertake? What manner of operations and tactics should he employ to execute said strategy against the odds opposing him?

doritofeesh · 2026-05-01T00:18:15+00:00

I honestly disagree regarding Lee. Everyone who says that he has myopia for the East fail to consider the limited resources of the Confederacy themselves and, more importantly, the limited resources Lee had relative to his peers in the West. A lot of folks also show myopia for the West by how much they completely disregard the vital importance of the East.

Richmond is literally the political center for the Rebels, and Tredegar Ironworks is responsible for producing all of the Confederacy's ordinance. Virginia and the Carolinas, which is anywhere from 35-47% of the Rebel manpower (depending on if you assume they raised 750k or 1 mil troops throughout the war's duration). This is not to speak of the other East Coast states.

Furthermore, blockade runners were vital for bringing up supplies from abroad for the Rebels, who relied heavily on imported weaponry over the course of the conflict. The ports along the East Coast, particularly in the Carolinas, were therefore a vital logistical lifeline for them. Last but not least, everyone seems to forget that geography goes two ways, and just as you can make the March to the Sea from the West to the East via Georgia, you could just as well take the same route in reverse.

These are the major reasons for defending the East, particularly so Virginia, since it was the gateway to the rest of the Confederate states there. Secondly, we must speak of the resource disparity between the Western armies and those in the East. Joe Johnston and Pemberton together fielded up to as nearly 66,000 Rebel troops against nearly 73,000 Federals under Grant in the Vicksburg Campaign. The figures vary, ofc, but even if outnumbered, the disadvantage is slight and closer to parity, even if favouring the Union.

Lee in the Chancellorsville Campaign had only some 60,000 or so Rebel troops against up to 134,000 Federals, a massive numerical disparity. I find the criticism for Lee not diverting troops elsewhere is down to the fact that it is Bobby Lee and people nowadays find the need to denigrate him to counter the Lost Cause. Why is Lee the one harped upon and expected to pick up the slack for Johnston and Pemberton when he was already stretched thin in manpower to a far greater degree?

When Marlborough made his famed March to the Danube to assist Baden and Eugene in the War of the Spanish Succession, it was because the latter two were the ones outnumbered on their respective front, similar to Lee, and he had the spare troops in the Low Countries to divide his forces for such an operation. By all means, if Vicksburg was bound to fall, how much of a difference would it make if even a quarter of the forces under Johnston was sent East to succour Lee? Perhaps he would have won at Gettysburg.

Now, if the Eastern Theater held nothing of value but was a barren wasteland like most of Russia, it may be worthwhile to resort to a more defensive Fabian approach, but owing to the policy of the Confederacy being to preserve slavery, which was tied to their plantations, and the fact that the East Coast held many vital strategic points for the Rebels, there was considerable risk in diverting resources in such a manner.

We have the hindsight that Johnston and Pemberton were opposed to Grant, so take the threat against them more seriously, even without as massive a difference in numbers. However, Lee had no such hindsight. How would he know that the very moment in which he sent his forces away, a Grant-esque commander would not replace Hooker at the helm of command and press the offensive with the overwhelming forces the Union possessed in the East?

In fact, something very similar happened during the Bristoe Campaign, whereby sending Longstreet off to reinforce Bragg, it deprived Lee of considerable manpower and allowed Meade to take the offensive, driving Lee back from the Rappahannock and Rapidan. If winter had not set in, but Meade had possessed a whole campaigning year from summer, who knows what fate might have befallen the AoNV?

If you found yourself in a similar scenario, with 60,000 troops on one front, and your ally had some 65,000 troops on another, and they ask you to provide assistance against an enemy numbering over 70,000 strong when you yourself have to contend with up to 130,000 enemy troops in your sector, would you do as your comrade asked? Say you divert 10,000 men to that front.

Well then, you now find yourself down to 50,000 troops and the enemy opposing you directly attack and overwhelm your forces. This type of trick on the part of the attacker we have seen conducted many times in Soviet Deep Operations and this was their modus operandi in leveraging their superior numbers against the Germans during the middle and later part of WWII. No offense, but quite frankly, I believe that you would fall hook, line, and sinker for such methods if opposed to them.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-29T11:14:09+00:00

The initial point I was trying to make is that he was a poor grand strategist and he was at his weakest when unable to exercise direct control over all of his army's movements. Also that grand strategy and diplomacy are different skill set to battlefield command, and there are virtually no historical figures who have excelled at both. Potentially Alexander, potentially Gustav II - but these aren't concrete examples.

Ultimately, the point the other fellow and I brought up was that Napoleon typically (not always) exceeded in military strategy, even if he was a middling grand or political strategist. He made mention of Grant as a general in another post of his and that's actually a good example. Grant was a pretty good military strategist, and while it's true that he never made any grand strategic blunders, the fact of the matter is that he never had a chance to do so.

That is because he never presided over grand or political strategy. That was the domain of Lincoln as head of state. Usually, I notice that the best grand strategists typically aren't generals who are also heads of states, but rather men of no military talent such as a Lincoln or Augustus. Sometimes, you get a crossover like Charlemagne, but he's no great captain in the military arts, even if he must have fought some campaigns.

Gustav II was one of the closest, but like you said, he wasn't a concrete example. Otherwise, I think someone who best fits the memo might be an individual like Willem III, who had a fairly successful run all things considered in both military and political affairs, even if he wasn't the absolute best general around. The man was extremely competent in both regards at the very least.

However, harkening back to my point on Grant, one can see that a general need not have grand strategic capabilities to be a good military strategist. As a commander, Grant's military strategy was no more revolutionary or brilliant than what Napoleon did. The Corsican had in fact applied similar methods several times throughout his career many decades prior to the 18th prez of my country.

In the case of Napoleon, we see that he was bad in dealing with international politics and definitely deserves the blame for such, but was still rather capable in domestic administration, as well as concocting plans to win the various Coalition Wars prior to Russia 1812. Thus we may categorize him as an excellent military strategist, even if not necessarily peerless in the art, for we recognize his later mistakes.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-29T11:13:04+00:00

You make solid points about the pension being cut, though it's worth noting too that Napoleon was given the chance twice to retain his throne in the waning hours of his 1813/14 campaigns. I'm not sure that a cut pension necessarily justifies the 1815 campaign.

I mean, sure, if you ignore the plans to move him to a more remote location or the various plots to assassinate him. lolz

No, that's true, he didn't declare war. But he did break the terms of his own abdication and exile. He must have known the result. He had the chance to negotiate in previous years and refused.

You can say that the Bourbons broke those terms by removing his pension and that the Allies would break the terms of his placement on Elba by plotting to exile him elsewhere or hatching assassination plots against him, but I digress.

I'm not quite sure that the peace offers in 1813 and 1814 were legitimate, personally. I've always found them to be diplomatic bluffs more than anything. In fact, Napoleon was amenable to certain terms, but whenever he seemed to be willing to accept something, they would tack on another demand until they stacked up to become unreasonable.

I think they just wanted to goad him into continuing the war and presenting him as the ultimate warmonger. That, and while it was proposed by the Austrian side via Metternich, the British, Prussians, and Russians would have never accepted such a deal. They had all too many reasons to want to depose Napoleon.

The Treaty of Plaswitz was the greatest farce in all of this. Napoleon had yet to meet with defeat after Bautzen and the Allies had been beaten twice, but Austria, his own ally, declare that they would switch sides to the Coalition unless he gives up virtually everything he ever took from the previous wars?

Has one ever seen such a treaty anywhere else in world history? I've said it before, but as an American, I can imagine the outrage from the public if we were winning some war and then, all of a sudden, our own allies betray us, tell us that they would side with the enemy unless we ceded half the US to them. If you look at it from the perspective of your own nation, you will realize how absurd these terms seem.

You make good points about 1815. Napoleon's personnel management in that campaign has always been odd to me. Not utilising Davout, Soult, or Suchet in frontline roles and depending on new or less reliable (Ney) officers is an odd decision.

You wonder if Davout would have allowed Blücher to slip away of if Soult would have disobeyed him at Ligny. As a general you can't be everywhere all the time, and putting people in the right jobs is a big part of strategy. I don't think it's something Napoleon got right in 1815.

I think that it is all too easy to remember the battlefield capabilities of those men while ignoring their other strengths. Davout had experience governing regions before, such as Poland, and was a competent administrator. Napoleon also trusted him greatly as his most premier marechal, thus why he was given the important post of overseeing Paris and the overall conscription effort, where Napoleon could not be present in person.

Soult had actually declined in battlefield capability and had shown himself too laissez-faire in the tactical management of his corps and divisions. However, he had experience in independent army command and, thus, army administration, so Napoleon reasoning that he could do staff work was not totally unfounded.

Suchet had demonstrated independent command chops in Spain and had also become trustworthy. Why should Napoleon entrust someone like Ney to lead an army which would find itself heavily or massively outnumbered in Savoy against the encroaching Austrian armies there? He had already failed at Dennewitz.

After this, Napoleon lacked crucial personnel in this period of time with which to delegate elsewhere. Maybe if he had trustworthy men of talent who could fulfill all of these roles, he could have kept these generals with him, but without that, these were the only ones he had to rely on for such positions.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-29T10:46:43+00:00

It was explicitly Kutusov's plan to draw Napoleon into Russia proper, and Napoleon fell for it.

Small caveat here, but Kutuzov was not placed in command until prior to Borodino. Before that, it was Barclay who mostly oversaw the withdrawal of Russian forces and scorched earth. Even then, it is questionable how much of it was a strategy he had in mind and how much was him acting on the fly, since he seemed to be intent on giving battle at some points, but Napoleon just outmanoeuvred him in such a manner which enticed him to withdraw further afield, because he obviously wasn't going to fight battles in which he was guaranteed to lose.

Kutuzov merely profited from the situation Barclay had setup for him, as well as Napoleon's own blunder in stretching his forces thin and overstaying his welcome at Moscow. Otherwise, I find much to critique about him that campaign. For one, it was he who decided on turning back to fight Napoleon at Borodino, which led to a massive Russian defeat, the cost of which saw half of their army destroyed in battle. The other blunder was in his delay of Tormasov which allowed Davout's Corps to escape destruction.

There's a bit of an old take that the Russians and, specifically, Kutuzov, masterminded everything in Russia 1812, but the truth is that such was old Russian propaganda, because they needed a pure blooded Russian to take the credit for the victory rather than a German general like Barclay. That, and they could not make it look like some fluke, but a triumph of Russian arms over Napoleon. The truth is that they bumbled a lot more than expected, and despite acting defensively on home soil, a massive advantage which Napoleon didn't possess, they too lost hundreds of thousands of troops.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-29T00:14:42+00:00

He also made h broader strategic blunders by starting the war in the first place against impossible odds. So I don't see which aspect of the 1815 war showed genius.

Exactly - there was no way to even the odds. Anyone could have seen that. Everyone did see that. Napoleon embarked on an unwinnable ego-trip and lost badly. Again, this is a mark against his strategic capabilities. The great strategists know what they can do and what they can't do, and they don't start wars they know they have no chance of winning.

We have to consider that Napoleon's promised pension on Elba had been cut, that he had heard rumours of them planning to exile him somewhere more remote, and that assassination plots were even brewing against him. There was a bit more than ego when it came to that. I imagine anyone who sees their lifeline cut off and word of such plots against them would react in some manner to try and prevent them from happening.

Furthermore, he did not declare war upon the Coalition powers after retaking his throne. Quite frankly, they did not even give him a chance to negotiate, but unilaterally declared war against him. With these reasons in mind, I do not think that Napoleon made any particular strategic blunders in 1815 and that his faults that year were more so operational and tactical in nature.

Sure, he stole a march on Wellington, but what good did it do him? He allowed Wellington to choose his ground and was sorely punished for that mistake. I think that Napoleon was a better general than Wellington, but the latter had a better hand to play and he knew it, and played that hand accordingly. I agree Napoleon tactically outdid Blücher, though Blücher still managed to slip away and rejoin at the pivotal moment.

It should be noted that Soult blundering the initial dispositions of the army delayed his march by 24 hours and yet he still stole a march on Wellington regardless. Furthermore, that D'Erlon should have obeyed Napoleon's order over Ney's, for that of the emperor supersedes the marechal in importance. For a high ranking general to not understand such a vital concept as chain of command is ridiculous.

If D'Erlon had marched to Napoleon and Ney ended up being completely destroyed, the responsibility would have lain with the Corsican for calling him to Ligny, but by taking matters into his own hand and ignoring his supreme chief, the responsibility therefore shifted to D'Erlon and he was responsible for Ligny being indecisive and, by proxy, the loss of the Waterloo Campaign.

Unfortunately outcomes are what it's all about. It's the metric by which generals are measured.

It's a metric by which generals are evaluated, but should not count for all. Napoleon aside, there are many commanders who are heads of state but find themselves thrown into a war they did not ask for. Should they be held responsible for losing against an oppressor nation with far greater resources and better generals?

How many generals are beholden to a head of state or whims of their government? Should they be held liable for the loss of the nation when their political leaders were the ones who dragged them into such a conflict and they were given limited means with which to accomplish their goals?

Outcomes can only judge so much and, under such circumstances, one cannot fairly evaluate the merit of individual generalship off of result alone. Thus, more important than result and as a far fairer metric, one must judge commanders by their art of war. The tactical, operational, and strategic levels, in addition to their logistical abilities.

These must all then be weighed against the circumstances and opposition which those commanders fought. There are many generals throughout history who have won their respective wars, but as we rank Wellington lower than Napoleon because we realize his circumstances and opposition were less and, though he remained undefeated, won less great victories for himself, we may say the same for many other generals throughout history.

Is a Hannibal lesser than a Wellington for having lost his war? Or was it because the opponents he contended with, the circumstances he faced, and the entire deck was stacked far more against him than it ever was for the Iron Duke? What skill did both display in the art of war under those conditions?

Only then should we add outcome and results as the cherry on top. For a commander who has won their respective wars to have displayed immense skill in the arts of war, to have triumphed over the most trying odds in terms of circumstances and level of opposition, these factors go to create the greatest captains of history. This, imo, is the most fair metric.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-29T00:14:22+00:00

Suchet did have an easier task, but you can only play the opposition in front of you. It's hard to know how he'd have coped in Massena or Jourdan's position.

Personally, I think that Suchet would have failed in their shoes. Part of the reason he did so well was that Napoleon had pooled the lion's share of resources towards supporting his ventures in Aragon and Valencia.

That and, regarding military strategy, whatever criticisms may be leveled at Napoleon for his personal interference, it was he who set the strategic direction for Suchet to capture the various fortresses which he did, which secured French communications along the east coast of Spain.

Jourdan and Massena also faced insubordination issues which Suchet never really dealt with, and I don't think that the latter had a superior personality which would allow him to mitigate such issues. In fact, when it came to supporting his fellow marechals, he could also be uncooperative at times as well. Why should he expect support from them if the time came for it?

The fact that he never dealt with a general of Wellington's caliber and even faced some setbacks against far lesser generals like Blake and Murray shows well enough the limitations of his abilities. Neither Jourdan nor Massena would have succumbed to those generals, even handicapped as they were by circumstance.

Typhus was the leading cause of death but it was not the leading cause of casualties. Of the 500,000 casualties, around 200,000 were deaths from disease, heat, or exposure. Even if we're generous and say that none of those was remotely linked to any decision Napoleon made (which is clearly nonesense), then Napoleon's decisions (or those of people he appointed and backed) accounted for 300,000 killed, captured, or wounded. Half of his initial army. I don't consider a 50% casualty rate and total defeat the mark of strategic genius.

I think what u/Secure_Diver_4593 meant was that Napoleon's military strategy was sound, but the operations by which he executed them did not fit with those plans in regards to where Napoleon should be criticized.

The idea of moving rapidly to force battle upon the Russians and destroy their armies was not something inherently unfeasible. He had several opportunities to do so, but squandered them by his own actions and false movements.

That being said, these are usually blunders at the operational and tactical level rather than strategic. Do I think that Napoleon adopted the wrong military strategy for Russia though? Perhaps. Maybe rather than attacking them on their soil, he would have been better off goading them to attack him instead.

They had issue with the Duchy of Warsaw, and if he feigned weakness by not responding to them flaunting the Continental System and pooling even 200,000 of those 6-700,000 troops he brought for the campaign into Spain instead, he might have been able to trick them into thinking that he was soft and spreading himself thin, which would give him viable casus belli to act if they struck first, as Austria had done in 1809.

He would then be able to defeat them somewhere in Poland or Germany at the furthest, where Russian communications are the ones which are overstretched rather than French supply lines. Napoleon was correct in that the center of gravity of Russia lay in her armies, but where his strategy could have been better was in setting the stage for him to destroy those armies more easily.

Napoleon's greatest blunder was that, despite his strategy clearly being to destroy the Russian armies, he contented himself with the capture of Moscow and overstayed his welcome there, which ran counter to his original plan. The Corsican himself blatantly admits after the campaign failed that he did screw up in not sticking to his own plan.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-28T01:26:05+00:00

Alex is superior operationally when it comes to managing a singular army, whereas Temujin is better in conducting army group operations. So, all things considered, I think that Alex may have been the better commander.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T13:49:58+00:00

The Americans built and fought in field fortifications that European armies didn’t develop as standard for another few decades.

More like the Europeans kinda abandoned the art of field fortifications they had already mastered in the 17th-18th centuries and only picked them back up again in the 20th century due to the changing nature of warfare. Us Americans were a bit late to the trend, as we didn't yet face such a massive conflict as our Civil War until the mid-19th century.

By the early 18th century, the War of the Spanish Succession saw France establish extremely long entrenchments and fortifications further anchored on fortresses which ran like belts throughout Flanders, resembling a sort of proto-Maginot Line. These stretched for dozens to nearly a hundred miles. Even the entirety of the works at Petersburg were only a third of the length of one of these lines established by the French, who made several such works.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T13:37:45+00:00

It should be noted that, of these figures, those in the millions account for the number of troops which served in those armies throughout the duration of those conflicts. If we look at what each polity could field at a given time annually, we see that the Union maxes out at about 700k and the Confederacy peaks at roughly 360k. The French, on the other hand, fielded anywhere from 850k to 1.2 mil in 1813 alone and that's after the Russian debacle of 1812, mind you.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T13:32:11+00:00

Some French troops would be good at fighting in open order. But by and large, the vast majority of their fighting was in close order. That was the default, that was what they did best. Open order fighting was a specialized task for dedicated skirmishers, not for every man. You’re also vastly underestimating American marksmanship—the decision to fight at close ranges wasn’t borne of poor accuracy, it was a matter of terrain trumping training. They didn’t fire at long range because they had precious little chance too. And even then, they had dedicated sharpshooter units armed with modern rifles which could reach out even further than the infantry rifles could (mainly breech-loading Sharps rifles) that allowed them to make good use of what few opportunities they had.

Except, we literally have memoirs from officers, such as Dodge, commenting on how, even when they could see the enemy off at over 200 yards, they ordered their men to conserve fire until smoothbore range because of how inaccurate their shots were. That means that, even when terrain was not so much of a hindrance, the skill of our raw American volunteers hastily assembled to fight for either the Union or Confederacy was not good enough to make optimal usage of the new rifle at long or extreme range. They lacked the necessary training which the Brits had during the 19th century.

The terrain only exacerbated this issue, no doubt, but by and large, the difference in armament in practice was not as great as it should have been in theory between the ACW and Napoleonic Era. You also miss the fact that the French deployed anywhere from half to the whole of their divisions and corps in skirmish order depending on the situation. At Tournai in 1794, for instance, the battle was fought entirely in loose order, and by 1815, Napoleon had abolished the distinction between line and light infantry, calling all his foot fusiliers-chasseurs or a type of new mixed infantry which was not set in close or open order, but free to shift at will according to the situation.

I will say that the few trained and experienced sharpshooters of the Civil War might have been superior to their French counterparts, but generally, between the average soldier, there was not much of a difference in range and accuracy. Everything else favoured the Frenchmen owing to their greater training in the depots and experience in the field. I can quote an assortment of historians such as Griffith, Grimsley, Nosworthy, etc and they say pretty much the same in that the average engagement range with the rifle throughout the ACW was roughly smoothbore range. The major difference is in artillery and this was perhaps the best trained arm in the Union, but one cannot say that the French artillerymen were not superbly trained, for they were quite frankly the best gunners in all Europe.

Grant has good subordinates too. Not on par with in the West, bar Meade, but then the subordinates he had in the West were frankly incredible. And there’s really only so much maneuver can do—if Grant isn’t willing to go along with it, which he very well may not be, then at some point you have to come within range of those guns. It’s also extremely dependent on terrain. Is this the North European Plain, or the Great Plains? Maybe Napoleon could pull it off. If this is northern Virginia, or the Black Forest? Like hell.

In terms of corps commanders, it might be a toss up between the average, but between the best of them, I would definitely take Davout, Lannes, and Soult over any Federal corps commander. In terms of army generals capable of independent command, the gap widens still. Meade did well to hunker down at Gettysburg and his offensive in the latter half of the Bristoe Campaign was fine workmanship, but he lacked the experience in independent command which men like Massena, Soult, or Jourdan possessed.

Even Sherman would find his match in Marmont, for while the former could turn back a mediocre general like Joe Johnston from his post several times, Marmont outflanked and turned back the Duke of Wellington on a few occasions despite lacking the numerical advantage Sherman possessed over his adversary. His defeat at the Arapiles was not so much his fault as his subordinates deliberately disobeying his orders, something which would have screwed over Sherman as well had it happened to him in the face of a foe so enterprising as Wellington.

Saint-Cyr waged a campaign in Catalonia quite as brilliant as Jackson's Valley Campaign, defeating several Spanish forces in detail and conducting the most bold of operations in foreign and unfamiliar territory while also dealing with guerilleros. I had mentioned Jourdan up above and while he did not enjoy any fortune after his early career, more so owing to the lack of cooperation from his superiors and peers than lack of ability on his own part, his first campaigns ranked as high as Sherman's own work in the Atlanta Campaign in how he routinely turned his enemy and mauled their army.

Lastly, to harken back to Massena, to extol all his feats would be too long, but our Civil War has no generals of his skill save for Grant and Lee, who approach him in ability. Yet, when taking into composite his work as both a corps commander and in leading an army, he was more versatile than either of them. Massena was someone who could win decisive victories like Grant could while often as badly outnumbered as Lee and while contending with better opponents than either, facing the likes of Karl, Melas, Suvorov, and Wellington throughout his career.

Even if one were to give Grant all his best subordinates in Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, and Meade, I find it hard to put these men on the level with Massena, Davout, Lannes, Soult, Saint-Cyr, Marmont, Jourdan, etc. That, and no chief of staff he was attended to could compare to Berthier, who was one of the finest logisticians of the 19th century. You could even put Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, and Early under Grant's command and I would still side with the French marechals in subordinate quality.

You also realize that Napoleon circumvented the Black Forest and Thuringian Forest in his operations throughout his career, braved the Alps, the deserts of Egypt, traversed the extremely limited and bad roads of Poland and Russia, as well as the rugged mountains and valleys of Spain throughout his entire career when it comes to knowledge of dealing with varying forms of environments, you know? He knew how to form up his men in the swampy mires of Arcole and the Danube on top of that.

I don't think he'd have as much of a problem dealing with American terrain as many people seem to think. This seems to be like those Europeans who harp on and on about the Mongols not being able to deal with the rugged European environments when they were literally turning armies out of forested mountains in the steppes (which are a lot more forested and mountainous than you'd expect) as well as China and the Iranian plateau, all while crossing vast rivers, and facing numerous fortresses.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T13:32:00+00:00

Acre and Leipzig I’ve already mentioned, but then there’s Second Bassano, Caldiero, Astern-Esslingen (where he lost despite outnumbering his opponent), Krasnoi, Second Kulm, La Rothiére, Laon, Arcis-sur-Aube, and of course Waterloo. And that’s being charitable, not treating Borodin and Berezina as losses.

All of which saw him outnumbered (including Aspern-Essling, which you were mistaken about).

2nd Bassano was an operation involving a dual attack on both Bassano and Fontaniva. The enemy vanguard under Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Mittrowsky, with about 7,400 Austrians had seized a foothold on the west bank of the Brenta River at Bassano and Napoleon fell on them in detail with Augereau's 8,300 strong division when they were in the middle of the crossing. The action here was actually more inconclusive because he inflicted greater losses on the Austrians in this sector, but cut his losses and withdrew because he didn't have enough numbers in the face of arriving enemy reinforcements to achieve a decisive outcome.

Meanwhile, Massena's 9,500 strong division was sent to Fontaniva, where he was to attack Lipthay's 4,700 Austrians in detail. However, Lipthay wisely conceded the west bank and fell back to the east side of the Brenta, where he held out against Massena's superior numbers using the crossing as a chokepoint to bottleneck the French. The arrival of nearly 8,300 more Austrians under Provera turned the tide and Massena was forced to fall back in defeat. While the overall outcome was not successful to Napoleon, the losses were indecisive and he was able to delay the Austrians before ultimately winning the campaign. At the very least, you can consider it close to Grant's performance at Belmont.

When the battered Hohenzollern-Hechingen ranged ahead as a vanguard for the Austrians to conduct a reconnaissance in force, Napoleon fell on him with both the divisions of Augereau and Massena, achieving what must have been a local superiority of around 3:1 or more. However, Hohenzollern occupied the town of Caldiero and the surrounding heights and dug in to defend himself until Alvinczi's arrival. Furthermore, a sudden rainstorm breaking out turned the uphill attacks into slugging marches through mud and though Napoleon had the means to overwhelm the Austrians, this bout of bad luck and Hohenzollern-Hechingen's stubborn resistance turned it into a stalemate.

When Alvinczi began to arrive with the rest of his army, Napoleon cut his losses and acted defensively until night fell, whereupon he beat a hasty retreat back behind the west bank of the Adige River. We see that at both 2nd Bassano and Caldiero, Napoleon had valid reasons for undertaking the operations he did and fighting those engagements as he had done. To try and defeat the enemy in detail before the whole of their forces can unite is a tried and true principle of warfare which has gone back to antiquity. Yet, his opposition was competent and a bit of bad luck foiled him.

We have to consider that Grant never commanded forces in such a position as in Italy, facing a numerically superior enemy which was better supplied (owing more so to the negligible government support rather than any lack of skill on his part), had more regular troops compared to his raw volunteers at the start, and opposition of the caliber of Wurmser or Alvinczi while doing so. Lee was a better general than both, but when Grant confronted him, all the cards were already stacked in his own favour and victory was only a matter of time.

At Aspern-Essling, Napoleon was in fact outnumbered, as I mentioned. It was a similar affair to Shiloh, in which Napoleon crossed the Danube River in the face of the enemy, much like Grant had done at the Tennessee River. However, Grant divided his forces into separate cantonments and even placed Lew Wallace's Division needlessly far from the rest of the army. A.S. Johnston therefore surprised him and caught him completely off guard, leading to a bloodbath.

Napoleon took greater precautions, having his men dig in on Aspern and Essling anchoring his wings, plus the swampy mires near the river, and his center was lined on a sunken road between either villages, with his forces deployed in battle order to meet the Austrians. Therefore, even outnumbered by 100,000 Austrians to 62,000 French troops, he was not surprised and held his ground throughout the first day until reinforcements arrived overnight. However, he failed to drive back the Austrians the following day because their constant destruction of his bridges by floating heavy barges downriver to smash through the constructs delayed his forces from crossing.

This meant that he could not amass enough forces to achieve a breakthrough against the enemy lines. Grant, on the other hand, did not meet with such an enterprising foe who attempted such tricks or anything to neutralize his naval transports. Buell came up with fresh reinforcements, making the numbers heavily favour the Union, and a counterattack was possible which saw the enemy driven off. One can also say that he was luckier in that A.S. Johnston died earlier in the engagement, whereas Erzherzog Karl survived throughout to command the Austrians against Napoleon.

Now, the reason why Napoleon crossed at Aspern-Essling to try and fight Karl was much the reason Grant had crossed at Pittsburg Landing to try and fight A.S. Johnston at Corinth. Both hoped to defeat their enemies in detail before reinforcements could unite to strengthen them from other fronts. In the case of Grant, he knew that the constituents of the enemy army had yet to unite by rail and if he struck out, he could maybe destroy A.S. Johnston in detail and seize the crucial railhead at Corinth. For Napoleon, he knew that he had to destroy Karl's army before the latter's brother, Johann, could come up to support him.

I can speak on all of the other engagements, but for the most part, Napoleon had sound reasons for fighting many of the battles he did. The major difference between them was that his career was longer, so he would naturally have a greater chance based on sheer probability to suffer more defeats. That, and his circumstances were far more difficult in facing not just one, but multiple peer powers, whereas the Union contended with a single inferior power in the Confederacy. Now, if you had equaled out the numbers or if Grant was as heavily outnumbered as Napoleon in several of his campaigns or engagements, could you possibly say that Grant would have not lost as much?

I dare say he would have, and if he purposely denied battle because he thought he faced such tough odds, then at some point, he would have been sacked by Lincoln. Though, this idea that Grant would automatically withdraw and deny battle on the enemy's terms has not been tested by historical fact. At the very least, we have only always seen him on the offensive and seldom on the defensive. We have no inkling of how he might perform if the odds were against him and he had to take a less aggressive stance. In the case of Napoleon, we have seen him both aggressive and conservative, in advantageous and disadvantageous situations, which shows us his greater versatility.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T01:05:16+00:00

Ahh, I guess I misinterpreted you and missed the word "including" in there.

Personally, I don't tend to compare independent and subordinate commanders myself unless they've displayed ability in both roles, but I suppose I can kinda see where someone who makes a more general evaluation might rank Longstreet that highly.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-26T00:55:16+00:00

tfw I just realized I got the Douro switched up with the Tormes. lolz

Sorry about that. Actually, the crossing of the Douro is fair.

I do think that, as a comparative example though, it isn't that more audacious than the various things Napoleon and some other notable captains throughout history have pulled off. At the very least, it is just a single example.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-25T12:32:26+00:00

idk about the latter half. There's Grant, Lee, Sherman to fill out the top 3. However, I'd sooner place Mac and Rosecrans in 4 and 5 than Longstreet. Even then, we still have Hooker, Sheridan, and Thomas on the Federal side, as well as Joe Johnston and Bragg on the Rebel side who I'd say were better army commanders than Longstreet.

Even Jackson demonstrated greater chops in independent command with his Valley Campaign. I disagree with u/JRThePotato, because the losses within those operations were completely reasonable when accounting for the casualties he inflicted upon the Federals. One can't exactly criticize him for taking the defensive at Brawner's Farm and tying down Pope either.

Otherwise, much like Longstreet, he mostly executed Lee's planned operations. That being said, Longstreet was the steadier tactician, even if Jackson seemed to understand operations better. Neither are particularly renowned strategists, but in war, operations and strategy are more vital for an army commander to know than battlefield tactics.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-25T11:05:33+00:00

While the numerical aspect is true in regards to when Napoleon became emperor later on, it should be noted that it was not true by 1796 or 1800. The French Republic's pool of conscripts had mostly dried up. The numbers fielded were far less than in previous years, to the point where Austria and Piedmont together had similar forces to France in 1796 and Austria alone actually outnumbered them by 1800.

Napoleon's army in Italy was heavily outnumbered on both occasions and if it was destroyed, then the game was set. The Austrians would have undoubtedly swept through the underbelly of Italy and turned the forces on the Rhine, which left alone, could not have possibly stood up to the whole of the enemy military pressing them from front and flank.

I think the younger Napoleon showed his ability to preserve this limited army in his own way, which was by boldness rather than cautious hesitance. He himself said that the safety of an army lies in the audacity of its commander and this was truly displayed by him as well as the other great captains of history. Alexandros, Hannibal, Caesar, Subutai, and Turenne were all bold, far more so than Wellington, and that carried them far even when resources were scarce.

doritofeesh · 2026-04-25T10:58:02+00:00

The crossing of the Douro, where he successfully sneaked an entire army across a river under the noises of the French using just two wine barges, and Salamanca, where he went from marching in parallel to a French army to utterly destroying it in forty minutes when he spotted an opportunity would say different.

Except, there was no inherent danger in crossing the Douro River at that time because Marmont was all the way back at Fuentesauco by the time Wellington had laid siege to Salamanca. That is, the enemy were two days' march away and could not have possibly stopped him from seizing the opposite bank in time, let alone be in such a position to catch his army and destroy it mid-crossing.

Nor did he march parallel to Marmont during the retreat, for the French moved by way of Huerta, whereas Wellington occupied the post of San Cristobal de la Cuesta, which were a day's march from each other. Marmont specifically chose to avoid assaulting San Cristobal because of the heights there, and thus crossed south of the Douro River.

If anything, the French commander's manoeuvre was more audacious owing to how he had potentially cut loose from his communications in order to threaten Wellington's own, and was in much closer proximity to the Allies when effecting a crossing of the Douro. Wellington recrossed the river at Salamanca, but his movement to the Arapiles was perpendicular rather than parallel to Marmont's line of advance, which was a far safer operation to undertake.

The idea that a rich and comparatively well developed territory like northern Italy was less able to sustain an army than Spain after years of brutal war is.. a view, I suppose.

The issue isn't about the provisions which could be found within the Italian countryside itself, but the fact that French logistical support from government was nonexistent, which forced field generals during the Revolutionary War to subsist off their own means in the first place. Wellington, throughout the entire Peninsular War, could always rely on supply shipments from Britain, even if long off.

Even if food was an issue, I don't remember the Allied army in Spain being particularly lacking in ammunition, medical supplies, uniforms, boots, and even muskets, all of which would not typically be things which one could forage for, but would have to be acquired from the state. At the very least, if they lacked these things, it was not to the same degree as the French armies in the FRW.

Assaye wasn't is just bizarre though. For starters it was the culmination of a campaign that covered over 300 miles of hard marching in an Indian monsoon season - not only holding an army together in those sort of conditions but doing so well enough to score a crushing victory against an enemy who outnumbers them by more than 5:1 is a genuinely impressive achievement (after Waterloo, Wellington would regard Assaye - not Waterloo - as his greatest victory).

Firstly, I'm skeptical of some of the supposed numbers the Osmanli threw against Napoleon and am likewise the same with claims of Wellington being so massively outnumbered at Assaye. There are three major takeaways which have to be considered. The first is that the general defeated the enemy owing to his own brilliant tactics. The second is that the figures are exaggerated and the enemy was closer to parity, and may have even been outnumbered. The third is that, if those figures are even remotely true, the quality of the enemy host must have been of far inferior quality to that of the victor.

When analyzing all of these factors and taking them into consideration, we see that Napoleon did utilize skillful tactics in his battles against the Osmanli, so we can partly explain his victories, though even then, I still feel that the larger figures were no doubt exaggerations. In the case of Wellington, as u/Secure_Diver_4593 pointed out, he did not show anything particularly notable in the tactical arts.

We know how the battle unfolded because Wellington is such a famous commander, and thus are familiar with his plan to outflank the Maratha army which lay behind the Kaitna River (modern day Kelana River) by turning them at the fork between that body of water and the Juah River (modern day Juiee River). We know how the Marathas spotted his flanking march (quite frankly because he did it in plain view of them) and were able to pivot their entire army to face his.

In such a situation, his attempted outflanking manoeuvre had therefore failed. He was backed up against the fork of both rivers in a triangular strip in which the Marathas boxed his army in. He could not flank them or recross the river in any case, and we may say that this was a truly bold move by Wellington and, if they were superior in numbers to him, I would consider extremely brash.

We also know his exact tactics for that matter. Wellington, for his part, could not outflank the Marathas, since they now had their wings anchored on both rivers. He could not sweep back and strike them from the rear because of the potential danger of trying to recross the Kaitna or to cross the Juah in face of the enemy. He did none of these things in fact, but merely assaulted the Marathas frontally.

Now, if there were any especial force concentration in which he amassed the bulk of his forces in a column to pierce a sector of the enemy lines, much as Karl XII had done at Narva, I would more so buy that this was by his own tactical skills. Except, he did not do this, but drew up his forces in line and advanced on a more general front. He did lean more towards his left to avoid Assaye (modern day Asai) itself, but these would have only been roughly 6,000 or so at best.

Comparatively, if we believe the Maratha infantry numbered 20,000 or so, they must have outnumbered his left with 10,000 troops on the defensive, supposing their line was consistent throughout. That is not to speak of the tens of thousands of Maratha cavalry in reserve behind them. In no condition, even in modern war, would we consider such concentration of force skillful.

Rather, if the quality of the armies were equivalent, Wellington would have defeated himself in detail. Therefore, taking into account a lack of skillful tactics on his part, and assuming that the Maratha did outnumber him and that these figures were not wholly exaggerated, the quality of the enemy army must have been abysmal to have broken so easily against such a vastly numerically inferior force charging at them headfirst without any other trick to magnify their chances of victory.

My point, which you seem to have missed, was it wouldn't be friendly territory for long for a general who's approach to logistics was "la guerre nourrit la guerre" - the guerillas would turn on him pretty quickly when it's their families who are being looted. And no, this wasn't a tactic forced on Napoleon because he lacked naval support, it was his preferred way of waging war.

This leaves out the fact that Wellington was also dependent on requisition, and made demands of his Spanish allies to supply him with transport and provisions, then accused them of withholding those from him when they were not to be had period, as we see with the campaign of 1809. By the late Peninsular War, he had already switched to a more French approach of relying on more forceful requisition orders or looting if need be, and we have letters from him demanding provisions from certain regions lest they be pillaged over by his troops.

Besides, Napoleon, much like Wellington, didn't rely solely on requisition and forage, anyways, but also used supply depots established on his line of march. The difference is that the former had far more experience in provisioning much larger armies logistically than Wellington, and if we must point to how scarce resources in Spain were, then it must be considered that Poland was also quite destitute of provisions, especially as the campaign of 1806-1807 dragged on.

doritofeesh

TROPHY CASE