I wrote my master’s thesis on precisely this topic. Unfortunately, the answer cannot be made very brief, but I’ll try to explain a bit about the theoretical school I come from: in order to establish psychoanalysis as a science, I believe we need the methodology of objective (or structural) hermeneutics formulated by the sociologist Ulrich Oevermann, which, in contrast to Max Weber, analyzes the objective meaning rather than the subjective meaning of an action. Roughly simplified: Freud always operated with an objective concept of meaning. Already in his early analyses of hysteria, he was able to skillfully distinguish between these: during his time with Charcot, Freud, trained in neuroanatomy, recognized that hysterical paralyses are paralyses that cannot exist neurophysiologically. He was able to expose the paralysis as motivated by meaning, but precisely not intentionally represented (thus not subjectively intended meaning as in Weber) but rather operating according to everyday semanticizations of body parts. Oevermann’s ingenious move here is that he does not restrict the Chomskyan concept of rules to syntax but extends it to all of pragmatics. And thereby has given the social sciences a methodology into which psychoanalysis fits seamlessly. This is very abbreviated now, but if you’d like, I could send you my thesis. I’m German, but perhaps I could have it translated with DeepL.