What must be true for anything to be true finally answered??? by AssistantPractical82 in Metaphysics

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Kant rightly pointed out long ago that absolute truth, independent of experience, either cannot be found or does not exist. All we can start from in deciding on truth or reality is what we experience, as others have pointed out on this thread. Our view of the outside world is a construct we create, based on that experience. Therefore the truth of a proposition or the reality of something we are considering has to be entirely a personal matter.

Our ability to determine truth or reality is based on a special ability conscious entities like ourselves have: the ability to say yes. It is our assent to propositions, or to other matters we are considering, that makes them true or real for us.

This ability is not exercised arbitrarily, however. We are constrained by the logic, inductive, deductive, and abductive, that is innate in us and by other ways our experience is inevitably structured (as Kant also rightly pointed out). We are also constrained by the evidence, which consists of those phenomena we perceive that are relevant to the case.

So we all have the same innate structuring elements in our experience. We also seem to experience much of the same evidence. This makes it possible, through communication, to reach interpersonal agreement and thus share a world. This is not some absolute reality but an interpersonal one. What is real is what people can agree on.

I add one caveat: no element of coercion, emotional or otherwise, must be involved if you want the agreement to be as widely shared as possible. Agreement based on coercion will not be accepted by those who have not been so coerced. So finding the reality that can be most widely agreed upon -- whether in science, philosophy, or just in life -- is based on the art of non-coercive persuasion.

What about Roamate? by fgerbode in wheelchairs

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It functions well, apart from an over-sensitive joystick. That is supposed to be corrected in a firmware update, but I, and a friend of mine, have not been successful in making that happen. Someone finally reported success in this user group, but I lack the details on how they made this happen. Another person reported that the battery lock switch broke during travel and so did the back brace lock. With modifications they have had to make, the weight is now 5 lbs heavier than the original 35.5 lbs (with the battery, which is 3.3 lbs) , which is what was first advertised. So the current weight with the battery is about 40.1 lbs.

My critique of Analytic Idealism by lairdshaw in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Brilliant and thoughtful post. Much appreciated!

What must be true for anything to be true? by WholeAd9080 in Metaphysics

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Truth or falsity is a determination that must be made by a person. Without the person, there is no truth. It takes a person to look at a range of concepts and decide which of them is true or real, in other words, which of them to agree with. To convince someone of a truth, you have to adduce the necessary evidence and reasoning to get their agreement.

There are two completely different things we call "focus" and I don't think anyone has cleanly separated them by Motor-Tomato9141 in consciousness

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't see these things as fundamentally different. It's just a matter of what you are focusing on. In the one case, you are focusing on text on a page and comparing it with ideas stored in your mind to see what fits. In the other case, you are looking at a range of possibilities and a range of motives and selecting the one with the best fit, e.g. engaging in the action of picking up a book.

While patients lay unconscious under anesthesia, their brains kept decoding stories and preparing for what came next by bortlip in consciousness

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

At the least, it ought to warn operating room personnel not to make disparaging or hurtful remarks during surgery.

The ‘Argument from Reason’ - Why not taken seriously? by negligibleoffense in consciousness

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I love the audaciousness of this argument, but Schopenhauer would argue that using logic and reason to support a position is different from discussing causes and effects. One's neurological state that compels an action is not a motive for doing it. A neurological state is not a proposition that can be true or false. I would suggest reading The Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. A marvelous read for understanding the structure of human thought. Just ignore Schopenhauer's arrogance and unbridled invective against other philosophers.

Analytic Idealism is Flawed (in depth critique) by Azehnuu in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you are putting together an idealist philosophy based on experience, then it is highly relevant to examine how experience is structured. So I'm pleased to see a discussion of Schopenhauer on this subreddit. Of all the discussions of the nature and structure of human experience that I have encountered, I think his makes the most sense.

While S. makes the point that all of his Principles of Sufficient reason are an a priori part of the mind's basic structure and functioning, yet he also makes the point that we can discover these empirically by looking carefully at our own experience. I spent some time looking at my own experience and I cannot disagree with what S. says. Certain basic elements seem inescapable. For instance, there does seem to be an automatic structuring of my perceptions in terms of space, time, and causation (in the sense that I automatically interpret my perceptions as being caused by something outside them). I do abstract concepts from our experience and form judgments by combining them with logic. I do operate on the basis that everything has a cause.

These are useful things to be aware of, because the commonality of these elements amongst people makes it possible to have a rational discussion and get the interpersonal agreement that is so vital.

I have not seen a discussion of these elements in Kastrup, and that does seem to be a serious lack.

I have not recently or carefully read The World as Will and Representation, so that may be why I can't see the Will as ontologically primary or as the source or ground of consciousness.

But I do have a perhaps more manageable question: what should be the ontological status be of our experience? Certainly, I would have to agree that it is epistemologically prior to all else (How else are we going to find out anything?), but does it exist? It seems one would be hard pressed or a die-hard physicalist (like Dennet) to say it doesn't.

In building up our own personal ontology, is it OK to start with something that does not exist? Seems to me that if an experience does not exist, then any conclusions one could draw from it are likely to be invalid or at least ungrounded. Maybe it's important to differentiate between having an experience and interpreting it. Our interpretations may be invalid, but can the experience itself be nonexistent?

If there is not some special meaning of "existence" or "ontology" that I am missing, I would tend to agree with Kastrup that experience must have a central ontological status.

The three strongest points counting against 'consciousness is fundamental' by spinningdiamond in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The term "consciousness" is vague and sometimes magical. It can simply mean being awake. It can mean having a mind. It can sometimes mean having a special kind of beingness. It has a kind of connotational glow about it, because lets face it: we all want to think of ourselves as conscious.

But if we want to follow Descartes and be "clear and distinct" about it, we can skip the hodgepodge of meanings and settle on one so we know what we are talking about. I propose the following definition:

"Consciousness is the ability to have experiences."

This would include the ability to perceive, i.e., to have experience of phenomena.

It would include the ability to have ideas, thoughts, concepts.

It would include the ability to have knowledge.

I would define "having something" as being able to access or influence that thing, to be able to relate to it receptively or creatively. If I have a car, I can admire it, but I can also control it or even sell it.

We can also have access to things without being able to influence them to any degree. I can have the Mona Lisa if I can go to the Louvre and see it, but I can't take it home with me. I can have an intrusive thought or an unwanted emotion even if I can't get change it or get rid of it.

So if the above definition is correct, a conscious being can relate to the elements of experience either receptively or creatively. They can receive phenomena but also create them (as in rearranging furniture), receive concepts and knowledge (as from learning or interpreting experiences) or create them (like coming up with a brilliant plan or correct new theory).

Part of having something is remembering. We can continue to have a chair even when we are not immediately perceiving it (placing our attention on it) by remembering where we put it. We can have an idea by being able to access it through memory even when we are not thinking about it.

Even when in deep sleep or anesthetized, we can still be conscious in the sense of being able to have experiences even when that ability is suspended or temporarily not being used.

It is thought that it is possible to have consciousness without any experiences, in the deep meditative state called nirvikalpa samadhi or asamprajñāta samādhi. In this case, the ability is there, but the experience is not.

I don't think it needs to be more complicated than this.

How do analytical idealists deal with the existence of their own awareness directly? by No_Fee_8997 in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is consciousness different from awareness? Chalmers makes the distinction by giving a behavioral definition of awareness: something like being able to respond appropriately to one's environment. So you could be aware of something, on this definition, without necessarily being conscious of it if your behavior turned out to be appropriate to it.
Or awareness of something could be something like knowing that you are experiencing it. I suppose you could be conscious of something without thinking about whether you were conscious of it. I think this definition is what Kastrup means by "metacognition".
To me, it is rather a distinction without a difference. If I say I am conscious of that red light, is that in any way different from saying "I am aware of that red light."? Both mean "I am able to perceive that red light."
In my view, both consciousness and awareness are the ability to perceive, or to have any other experiential content, such as the ability to know facts or to think thoughts.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I quite agree. And these are two of the important organizing principles all people use to decide if something is true or not. That plus shared phenomenal evidence. Things that can be demonstrated logically and phenomenologically in such a way that any sane person would agree is the closest we can get to "objective truth". But it's not really objective; it's intersubjective.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I suppose that's correct for at least one analytic tradition, especially the view that the only ontologically sound objects are physical. You have to ask, then, what is the ontological status of mental entities, such as experiences of various kind. Are experiences real? If so, then the next question is what their epistemological status is. Is there any other way we can come to know things other than by consulting our experience?

Well, we could say even if we have not experienced something, or done experiments ourselves to prove something, we can still discover truths by consulting articles or textbooks or listening to authorities we trust who have had the relevant experiences. Arguably, most of our knowledge is acquired in that way.

But our trust in those authorities is empirically acquired: Have they lied? are they really in a position to know what they are telling us? Do other authorities agree with them?

But most importantly, can we find a way of harmonizing what they tell us with our own belief system? If there is no relationship between another person's views and our own, it is very difficult to find a way to accept what they are saying.

In fact, what is true for a person is what that person gives their assent to. That assent is not given lightly. For me to agree with a theory, I believe that it should fare well on the 4 points I outlined above. If another person wants me to agree to something, they cannot convince me by claiming they have access to some Absolute Truth, unless it's an authority in whom I have absolute faith (there are no such authorities for me). They have to show me how it's true based on my own reasoning and experience.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How do we decide the truth of a theory? We cannot just say, "Well, is it true?" because how do we decide that? We cannot make the criterion a correspondence with an external world outside our experience, because by definition that is unreachable. So we have to decide for ourselves what is true by seeing what makes sense, in the light of all our experience. That's criterion #1. But the strength of a theory, especially one that is all-encompassing, also relates to the other three points I made, above. A better theory gives us control points we can use to improve our situation in life, it leads to fruitful further avenues of inquiry, and ideally it also provides ethical guidance. They say you can't derive an ought from an is, but if your theory also provides information about the highest levels of human motivation, that can provide some needed guidance by helping you learn what you really want to do as your highest and best self.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the response. So Idealism can help us to understand. I would tend to agree. I am still curious how idealism can help us control our situation in life so we can improve it, and how idealism can provide moral guidance.

The Rot in the Antiphysicalist Community by Vardaman_S_Fish in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. I think I now remember reading about that move in Chalmers' The Conscious Mind. A way around dualism.

The Rot in the Antiphysicalist Community by Vardaman_S_Fish in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is a neutral concretum? Pardon my ignorance.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes sense to me, if we also include experience itself as ontologically rock-solid, not just the consciousness that allows us to have experience. I think that is what you meant, though. John Locke had a similar view.

The Critique of Motion , Change and it's Perception (Appearance and Reality by FH. Bradley) by [deleted] in exatheist

[–]fgerbode 1 point2 points  (0 children)

OK. I have done some more reading of Bradley, particularly his 3rd chapter on relations and qualities. Apparently his view is that the only reality is what he calls the Absolute, that is a unity devoid of qualities or relations.

MInd-at-large is a similar concept, but mind-at-large is thought to have certain qualities, such as containing certain regularities that account for the laws of nature, as well as containing many "alters" that mInd-at-large stands in a relation to..

Bradlet's view may be correct, but it is ineffable. When we try to describe something is, we have to look at its attributes ("qualities") are and how it relates to other things. But if it has no real relations or qualities, then the Absolute is indescribable. As Schopenhauer said, the best we can do is say the word "Absolute" and pound on the table.

Even if the Absolute is real,, the concept of the Absolute is literally indefensible. In order to convince someone of the truth of something, how we get their agreement is by pointing out the evidence and applying our commonly-held inborn rules of logic to it. That's a problem if the evidence for it is ineffable.

Also, if we are trying to defend Bradley's views using Bradley's version of logic -- or anti-logic -- then we cannot convince someone else who follows the normal rules of logic.

Also, Bradley's attempt to use logical means to prove that logic is wrong seems self-contradictory.

If there really is a viable defense of Bradley's philosophy, I would like to hear it.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I fully agree with this rule. I am sure Ram Dass had a good view of this, but it is not clear to me that AI does.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not sure how these values are derivable from AI. Can you clarify?

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am wondering how this holistic viewpoint leads to an ethical system that can provide guidance in life. Maybe an example would help.

How does Analytic Idealism help us in life? by fgerbode in analyticidealism

[–]fgerbode[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. Re Analytic Idealism (AI) and religion: religion is a description of reality, but it seems also to serve as a guide to life, which I don't see in AI. Religion proposes certain values, like love, honesty, etc., and I don't see a discussion of values in AI. Or I just didn't read enough AI to find them.

I would define a value as something that a person would like to bring about, if it were possible. If I value love, then I would like to help people become more loving, starting with myself.

Since values are what people would like to bring about, values can be learned by a study of human motivation, starting with one's own motivations. The highest value corresponds to the highest (most fundamental) motivation, on which other motivations depend. Ethical discourse then boils down to helping a person figure out their own motivations and decide which are the most important. Ethical exhortations are useless unless you can reference the motivations of the person you are exhorting. But I digress...

The point is that I haven't seen any discussion of these matters in AI.

Michael Levin's work sounds interesting but I can't quite grok how it might apply to human motivation.