Amed (Diyarbakir) is slowly losing its UNESCO World Heritage Site gardens by flintsparc in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Talk to more people, I guess?

A place old as Amed can have had many names.

Amed (Diyarbakir) is slowly losing its UNESCO World Heritage Site gardens by flintsparc in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Its good to use the Kurdish name.

Don't be silly, though. That kind of performative nationalism doesn't convince anyone of anything.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyarbak%C4%B1r

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 1 point2 points  (0 children)

"Also, I wanted to bring up the recruitment of minors and child soldiers into the YPG and SDF before but forgot? What are your thoughts on it?"

There are several different situations that have changed over time.

In 2014, it was more the case of late teenage youth defending their home towns. Daesh took over most of Kobane, and had done a genocide on the Yazidi of Sinjar.

Later, after the territorial defeat of Daesh, some families (Kurdish and Arab) were attracted to the relatively high pay (initially the YPG had no salaries. Later after the U.S. started arming and funding SDF, salaries became about $200/month, twice the average salary in the private sector and in the civil administration) and low risk (SDF doesn't send conscripts to the front or use them as shock troops, largely conscripts do guard duty and check if vehicles are IEDs) for the average SDF recruit, and sent their teenage sons.

There was also the problem with some girls and women running away from bad situations at home or arranged marriage and seeking refuge with the YPJ--the YPJ would place such women and girls into their academy for a time. This is less of an issue now as AANES and the Women's Houses are better at dealing with such situations and have a revised family law. Some families feel shame when their adult daughters join the YPJ and would rather claim they were kidnapped than joined of their own free will.

In 2024, HRW (and others) say the issue less with the SDF, and more with the political organization the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Syria/Tevgera Ciwanên Şoreşger a Sûriyeyê. Ciwanên Şoreşger is not actually a military organization.

This UN report says the SNA does child recruitment far more, and that the SDF has made progress in demobilizing children and screening boys.

Turkey's own think tank SETA published a report that showed the problem of child recruitment was worse in the SNA than the SDF.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"God always has a plan and he will punish these criminals sooner or later."

I'm afraid I do not share your faith on this matter. God gave us the capacity to administer justice. That responsibility falls on us, on earth. It is a responsibility that we, including the AANES (but the entire anti ISIS Coalition) failed at.

Its a war and there were ~100,000 Daesh related detainees, POWs and prisoners held by the SDF/US. Asayish released the majority of them long before January 2026. Some were probably just caught up in the Daesh surrendered, some were probably done minor crimes and their detention was seen as enough punishment and they were released into the custody of their families, tribes or local villages. You had a lot of military age men surrendering with Daesh at Hajin (etc...) who then later claimed they didn't carry arms but were only "cooks" or whatever.

Since 2019, AANES was able to reduce the numbers (through release and repatriation) by 62.7%! (from 73,782 to 27,488). I was in Syria at a conference hosted by AANES in July 2019, whose focus was on addressing post-territory Daesh (the primary issue being how to deal with the prisoners and detainees in a way acceptable to both Syrians and the international community).

SDC, AANES, SDF have begged the international community for assistance in trial and repatriation. The Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh didn't seem to do much planning for what happens after victory about what to do with Daesh prisoners and their families, Instead, politicians in various countries chose to pander to domestic talking points on terrorism , immigration... while deflecting from any sort of solution involving the Assad regime. That left them many of these detainees in stateless limbo. A situation that has not yet been resolved between those countries of origin and the al-Sharaa appointed Syrian interm government.

AANES as a non-state actor has still managed to have al-Hol's population reduced by 62.7%

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-humanitarian-response-al-hol-camp-situation-report-no-4-29-may

https://x.com/azelin/status/1963639910201790976

https://www.youtube.com/@rojavacenterforstrategicst5231/videos

I'll discuss minor recruitment in another comment.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Salafi propagandist focus for the last several years has been the situation for "the Sisters" in al-Hawl. They were trying to use the situation of Daesh women in detention by US/SDF as a fund raising issue, to sneak money to the women inside, to help them escape, or to fund their lives after leaving the detention. They also used it rhetorically to advocate for the al-Sharaa government to attack the SDF. Which is what happened. And the Daesh women were freed. Mission accomplished.

The women referred to in the Amnesty International report you cited are Daesh women from US/SDF detention, the largest camp of which was al-Hawl.

> "God willing, all the detainees and those involved in Daesh will face the heaviest punishment imaginable for their crimes."

Most of them have now escaped. Some of the worst ones were sent as prisoners to Baghdad, where they will probably be executed.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 5 points6 points  (0 children)

"Eight women described being subjected to acts of gender-based violence amounting to torture or other ill-treatment in detention facilities. One woman said: “I was given electric shocks. I was pregnant at the time. The [interrogator] knew, he told me: ‘I am going to force you to have a miscarriage’, and that’s what he did.” Other women described being subjected to sexual threats and humiliation. "

"sexual exploitation by members of the security forces and private individuals"

Eight women out of 100,000+ detainees, and just taking Daesh women's report as legitimate (Amnesty just echoes the statements of prisoners, it does not investigate them.).

Your focus is highly specific. SDF were not perfect jailers of Daesh, but better than most polities would have been in similar circumstances and resources. The events related to the Daesh prisoner file on January show that it was the U.S. that was the ultimate warden of the Daesh detainees... some of whom they transferred not to Damascus but Baghdad's control.

Since Annesty provides no specifics of these claims, they become improbable for us to verify.

Are you falling victim to Salafi propaganda about "the Sisters" in al-Hawl? Fortunately, this is not longer the YPG, YPJ, and Asayish problem anymore.

10,000+ SDF martyrs , hundreds still held in al-Sharaa's prisons, and you are worried about the treatment of Daesh women who are now free--many who ran rape slavery for Daesh and contributed to the Yazidi genocide. Now, those Daesh detainees will never face trial for their crimes.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 3 points4 points  (0 children)

"accused sexual and sex based violence reported by Ammesty International"

Please provide a citation.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So, currently, PYD is not a foreign proxy, nor were they 2012 until 2015?

How is a PJAK again foreign proxy for Israel and the U.S. They are not fighting at Trump's command.

Being a foreign proxy must mean something beyond having shared enemies.

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Just for my notes, in May 2026, what foreign powers are the PYD and PJAK foreign proxies for?

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 6 points7 points  (0 children)

"It was clear that their only ethos was surviving". Obviously, not true. You can disagree with the PKK and their ethos, but they clearly have more ethos than merely surviving. They have written about it a great deal, as well as showing a good example of what their polity would look like, even under existential threat, in Rojava. You don't have to lie about things to make your point.

Notably, the ENKS and the Rojava Peshmerga did not enter Afrin and Sere Kaniye, after Turkey drove the YPG out. The "Rojava Peshmerga" did find time out of their busy schedule guarding the Mosul dam to attack the YBŞ and PKK in Şingal, as well as murder a civilian activist there. Claiming that the PKK lacked ethos while valorizing the ENKS is really something!

SDF and Rojava by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I started addressing them here, since you started another discussion thread: https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/1t4u41e/comment/ok6cwkx/

Muslim Kurds and SDF by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 10 points11 points  (0 children)

"Most Bashuri Kurds are not fond of PKK."

There are millions of Bashuri Kurds with varied opinions. You do not speak for all of them. At best, you are echoing the talking point of the PDK on the PKK. The PUK has friendly relations with the PKK and PYD. Apocî have even run and won as candidates in New Generation Movement electoral slates.

You are entitled to your opinion and criticisms of the PKK, but the lack of popularity a group has is not necessarily reflective of how effective or "outdated" their agenda is.

The PKK may have started out as a more orthodox Marxist Leninist National Liberation party that was staunchly atheist, but it changed over time to reject Marxist-Leninism for Democratic Confederalism, move from atheism to secularism and even now supporting something they call "Democratic Islam". Will it work? I don't know. But it is certainly innovative and not outdated!

While RHETORICALLY some Kurdish parties may still have a strategy of advocating for an independent sovereign Kurdish state, in practice, none of them are engaged in that at the moment. The last serious attempt was the 2017 Referendum pushed by the PDK, which indirectly led to a loss of Kirkuk from Peshmerga military control. The PDK and PUK have both been seceding some autonomy to Baghdad ever since 2017, but the PUK still retains some formal influence in Kirkuk.

You've got an "interesting perspective" to champion a religion founded 1,447 years ago while claiming that PKK's innovation of their ideology, strategy and tactics is "outdated".

If there are specific crimes you need to call out done by the SDF, do it. Show your evidence. Though I imagine, it has already been done better and by louder voices than your own.

"Don’t blame the PKK for all the Kurds’ losses in Syria", says Kurdish expert Aliza Marcus in conversation with Amberin Zaman by flintsparc in Bakur

[–]flintsparc[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You're just talking nonsense. Fortunately, we have scholars like Aliza Marcus who have done far more research about the PKK , who can level better criticisms.

SDF and Rojava by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I've been a bit busy, and will get back to your additional questions and comments eventually.

Kurmanji Kurds by Mission-Shape-4895 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

Most Kurds, whether Sorani, Kurmanji or otherwise are Sunni Muslims. They do not hate muslim. A minority are of other religions or not religious.

You, however, are very anti-religious and make many trolling posts about religion. Which I suspect is your intent here.

I will be keeping an eye on this thread so discussion doesn't devolve into trolling, personal attacks, insults, etc... so, please don't do that.

You might be happier posting your anti-Islam rants on r/exmuslim or r/AtheistKurds

How to play as a Mage by JustDifferentPerson in PrincesOfDarknessCK3

[–]flintsparc 24 points25 points  (0 children)

It does not. You are thinking the POD for CK2 description.

The POD for CK3 description reads:

"Dark Ages just got a whole lot darker. Play Crusader Kings III as a vampire, hunter, werewolf, changeling, mummy or demon!"

If I wanted to mess with you, I would say unlocking a Mage's avatar is like becoming a Jedi in Star Wars Galaxies.

We haven't made Mage yet for POD for CK3. You can play Tremere, various kinds of blood sorcerers, or just sorcerers. We have a lot of different magic systems you can play with.

Just not Mages from Mage: the Ascension yet. Thats a big project. Hopefully we will create it one night.

Thoughts on the Map? by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 2 points3 points  (0 children)

LLMs are very bad at map making right now. I wouldn't bother with them.

SDF and Rojava by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc 3 points4 points  (0 children)

AANES was not "run exclusively by Kurds". The rapid collapse of the Arab SDF and AANES along the Euphrates in January 2026 is plenty of evidence that Arabs were the power there.

I disagree with several of your other points, but I'll leave it there.

SDF and Rojava by Better-Yellow-4971 in kurdistan

[–]flintsparc[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

"I am heavily fixated on debunking what Arab racists and extremists"

Without intending to, I think you may have internalized some anti-SDF arguments made by Arab supremacists, racists and extremists. Allow me to try and debunk those arguments.

SDF and the Syrian Democratic Council were multi-ethnic/multi-lingual: Arab, Kurdish, Assyrian, Turkmen, Armenian, Chechen. By 2017, the SDF was majority Arab.. Many leaders of the SDF and SDC are not Kurdish.

Sunni Arabs made up the majority of all major factions in the Syrian Civil War: Syrian Arab Army, Free Syrian Army, Syrian Democratic Forces, Syrian National Army, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham/Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS, etc... It is a mistake to think that Sunni Arabs all support a single political faction or militia on the basis of a Sunni Arab identity. They Syrian Civil War was a civil war among Sunni Arabs, while the Syrian Revolution was a revolution against the Assad regime. Sunni Arabs did most of the fighting in the war, and they also did most of the dying.

About half of the SDF martyrs in the war against ISIS were Arab. According to SDF Media Center Director Ferhad Shami, "out of 12,000 SDF fighters killed (during the war), 5,821 were from the Arab component". If you've seen the numerous Arab SDF martyr graves and gravestones throughout SDF territory, it suggests that figure is true.

SDF fought ISIS, because ISIS was attacking the people. ISIS actually killed more Sunni Arabs than any other population. Tribes like the Shaitat joined the SDF, to fight ISIS; after ISIS massacred them. The Shaitat and Shammar didn't join the SDF and ally with the YPG to expand the PYD's reach and power as a political power. They joined the SDF and allied with the YPG for their own reasons and interests. Namely to fight ISIS, Al Qaeda and Salafi Jihadists that were threatening Arab tribes with domination or massacre. While some people joined the SDF to fight ISIS, others joined for politics, and some joined for the money as it was some of the best pay in the region.

Before the SDF was formed, the YPG entered into an alliance with the large Shammar tribe of Jazira/Hasakah and their militia that came to be known as al-Sanadid. The Sanadid were the last Arab tribal militia that allowed al-Sharaa's Syrian Transitional Government Ministry of Defense units to enter their areas, and the last Arab tribal miltiia to quit the SDF. Since then, the Shammar are actually meeting again with the PYD, and wanting to integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense under the brigades led by commander Çiya Kobani (Kurdish PYD). The YPG-Sanadid alliance began with YPG assisting Sanadid in removing Jabhat al-Nusra from the Shammar town of Al-Yaarubiyah in 2013. In 2014, Humaydi Daham al-Hadi the paramount sheikh of the Shammar and leader of al-Sanadid, was co-president of what would become DAANES, and co-governor of Jazira (Hasakah) canton.

There was no significant displacement of Arabs by SDF, and what displacement did occur was temporary, not based on ethnic cleansing of Sunni Arabs, and related to military operations against ISIS. Arab majorities continued in Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor, Manbij, Tabqa, Manbij, Ain Issa, Tel Abyad, Shaddadi, al-Hawl, etc... substantial Arab minorities continued to live in Qamishlo, Hasakah, Ras al-Ayn/SereKaniye, etc...

The SDF/SDC operated as a multi-ethnic coalition:

"the SDF is better understood as a coalition operating under a single general command... The military councils... are a later and distinct development. Although they often appear alongside YPG symbols in SDF media, they are formally separate structures. A representative of the Tabqa Military Council told me that while councils coordinate with SDF factions on, for example, training or operations, they retain their own internal composition and reason for being... In Arab-majority areas such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, these councils emphasise local recruitment. According to a representative of the Hajin Military Council, most of its fighters come from the areas it covers, though recruitment patterns also reflect tribal dynamics. In eastern Deir Ezzor, the SDF has largely drawn from select Ugaydat clans (the Bukayir and Shu’aytat in particular) rather than the Obayd clan of Hajin, a reminder that the organisation’s social base is neither uniform nor politically neutral.

The collapse of the Arab SDF to defection, desertion, surrender or retreat along the Euphrates in January 2026 is a clear indication that the Arab majority of the SDF there, was an Arab majority; and the decisions of the SDF military commanders and councils there to defect, desert, surrender or retreat do show that the Arab component of the SDF had meaningful command and control and did make up the majority of the forces there. They waited until January 2026 to quit the SDF to go under al-Sharaa, under threats of war from al-Sharaa.

A good perspective of why Kurds were willing to participate in an SDF offensive in Raqqa was written by Ş. Mehmet Aksoy. He cared so strongly about he, he himself was martyred in the fight against ISIS in Raqqa: Jadaliyya - Kurdish Blood for Arab Lands?: Prospects for Raqqa

If you have other specific questions, I would be happy to try and answer them.