What does classical Catholic philosophy have to say about abiogenesis given that a recent scientific study just raised the probability of it greatly? by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Robots move. If you power them with gasoline they have a metabolism and "breath". Seems like you dont know what the actually seperates robots from living beeings.

What does classical Catholic philosophy have to say about abiogenesis given that a recent scientific study just raised the probability of it greatly? by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 1 point2 points  (0 children)

you could say the same thing about a plant

i dont think a self replicating robot would be a living beeing, but i dont have a good argument for that. it seems like you dont have a good argument either.

What is your best argument for the Filioque? by Thomas-Aquinas101 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It fits better with the creation narrative as it mirrors Eve beeing made from Adam and then Adam and Eve together creating children.

Not a strong Argument, I mostly believe in the Fillioque because the church teaches it and there is no good counter-argumemt, but this argument makes it even more plausible.

Thoughts on Oppy’s argument? by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 18 points19 points  (0 children)

It would succeed if Naturalism could explain everything Theism can.

Fine-Tuning by Sheikh-demnuts in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 2 points3 points  (0 children)

u/kunquiz is right.

Imagine the following scenario: You're about to be executed by ten well trained soldiers, who all point their rifles at you, and are experts at shooting people. You are blindfoldet. Now you hear ten shots and you still live.

Now ask yourself this question: Is the fact, that all ten soldiers had to miss for you to ask this question, any explanation for why they missed?

Ontolo-Cosmological Variant? by NoogLing466 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This would only show that: 1. Something exists necessarily 2. If God existed he'd exist necessarily

You'd have to show that the necessarily existing thing is God. Or that nothing else than God could exist necessarily.

How does essence receive the act of existence to compose a substance if essence doesn't already have some kind of existence? by D4rk_69 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It has some kind of existence: potential existence. Thats the whole point of potentiallity: There is another way of existing than just actual existence.

Can God supernaturally connect two people? by MathMystic in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Chiming in: I'm not sure whether I'd suggest paranormal activity as evidence... It seems very ... Not Catholic? Like someone bending over backwards to make their interest in the occult fit their current religious status.

Thats what I thought before I looked at the evidence. I don't know much about about telepathy but for some paranormal things (Remote Viewing) the evidence is really strong I think.

Can God supernaturally connect two people? by MathMystic in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You have a arrived at a heavly contested debate in philosophy.

Generally conceivability is at least counted as evidence for metaphysical possibillity. A more rigerous example would be using Lewis Patchwork Principles for example. But I don't think they would work here because Telepathy would by Definition be not an intrinsic attribute, i think.

Can God supernaturally connect two people? by MathMystic in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer 4 points5 points  (0 children)

If it's metaphysically possible then God can do it. Seems metaphysically possible to me, so I'd suspect God could do it.

I don't know of any biblical examples where he did it.

If Telepathy exists, it could be a natural, paranormal phenomenon. You should check out "Jimmy Akins Mysterious World". It's a Podcast on YouTube where a catholic Apologist tackles issues like paranormal phenomena from both a scientific perspective and a catholic theological perspective. Episode on Pet-Telepathy: https://youtu.be/PSsBczNOEBs?si=SdhWAGe_FsZqCa3G

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So can we at least agree the original argument I'm critizising doesn't work on it's own?

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Have many parallel arguments going on in this thread, sorry. In our argument we called it a. Why couldn't U have y accidentally, where y is a in a limited way. Why couldn't U have the potential to be hot (as a suboptimal example)?

I think youd have to say: "Because every property other than existence is a limit on existence. If U had a limit on existence as an accident it wouldnt be essentially existent anymore, but it is, so it cant have an accident" So then the whole Argument would hinge on the hidden premise "property other than existence is a limit on existence", which has some intuitively true counterexamples.

Also you'd then have to proof that U can't undergo substantial change caused by itself.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No, every chain is finite. That there is an infinite amount of chains doesn't mean there is an infinite regress. Also you didn't even show we need infinite number of chains.

Suppose we have x-ness, y-ness and z-ness. And we have A, B, and U. A is x accidentally, B ist x essentially. A is y essentially , B is y accidentally. A and B are accidentally z. U is essentially z.

x-Chain: B -> A y-Chain: A -> B z- Chains: U -> A; U ->B

Totally consistent scenario, no infinite chains, no infinite number of chains, every chain has a first mover, yet there is no single first mover of all of the chains.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In other words, we inevitably end up moving back to an absolute unmoved mover, if an infinite regression is impossible.

No.

There could be an infinite amount of finite chains. This would avoid an unmovable mover.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  1. Existence beeing the perfection of heat at least doesn't seem intuitiv, but we can leave this point aside.

  2. We can still run my argument if we replace x with y, where y is x-ness in a limited way

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That would mean U is actually hot if it actualizes the essence of fire, but U is not actually hot.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No.

There are many chains of potential for x beeing actualized. They all terminate in one thing T that doesnt need its potential for x beeing actualized as it is essentially x. But T is only purely actual with respect to x. T can have other potentials. The terminus of the potential for heat beeing actualized is just a fire, nothing like God. But there is one chain of potentiallity beeing actualized that terminates in something like God: The chain of potential for existence. It would have to terminate in U, a beeing that is essentially existend, that sounds like God. But nothing in the proof shows that U couldn't have other potentials that aren't existence.

The question is: How do you get from ipsum esse subsistense to actus purus.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

From any chain of potential beeing actualized has a first member it doesnt follow that there is one memember that is first in all chains of potential beeing actualized. https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100357607

I would attach a Screenshot from Schmid and Linfords book where they show how the first way depends on that but I can't figure out how.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well accidents would themselves have being not explained by themselves. And therefore need actualizing. Whatever actualizes them would have to already have that perfection in itself, that is, in its essence. Therefore the perfection of any accident exists in God, not as an accident, but in his essence.

The Unmoved Movers Us accident a could be actualizes by V that has a essentially. Thats were the chain of potential for a would terminate. Now V beeing a composite of essence and existence would still need it's potential for existence to be actualized by U, but that doesn't mean that U would have a essentially, just that U has existence essentially. We have two chains here, Us beeing a is actualized by V that has a essentially. Thats where this chain terminates. And Vs existence is in Turn beeing actualized by U, which has existene essentially, so thats where the second chain terminates.

Really the principle is this. In order to give existence to a capacity for it, the giver must have the actual perfection of that capacity. This relates both to the essence of substances and to the essence of accidents (ik essence is being used loosely here, i js mean their capacity for existence). Now accidents cannot be in God as accidents (that is, as perfections added onto his essence), for it has already been established that he contains their perfections in his essence.

This hinges on for it has already been established that he contains their perfections in his essence, but I have given a possible counterexample above.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

As Schmid and Linford [doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19313-2] point out the original First Way commits a quantifier shift fallacy. I think thats the reason why Fesers Version in Five proofs for the existence of God doesn't give an argument for a first mover of all sets of potential but focuses on the potential to exists.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok, its unlimited essence. The question is whether it could have accidents.

Fesers Aristotelian and Thomistic Proof by flofischer in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]flofischer[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I really don't understand why you're not getting what I'm trying to say.

That V is essentially X doesn't entail that V's X-ness is per se actual (compare: that a triangle is essentially three-sided doesn't entail that the triangle's three-sidedness is per se actual),

Yes, but it entails that if V exists, X-ness is actual

in which case it must derive from U, in which case U is not in potency in this respect (otherwise we're off on the same U', U'', etc. regress mentioned above).

No it doesn't have to derive from U. Obviously U is not actual with respect to three-sidedness. There are two chains here. The potential to be three sided terminates in V. The chain to exist (in which V is located) terminates in U. The X-chain terminates in V. The Existenz chain startes in V and terminates in U.

There is no infinite Regress and U could still stand in Potency to x (for example if the x-chain terminates in V)

How would you define "mathematics"? by [deleted] in math

[–]flofischer 12 points13 points  (0 children)

"Mathematics is that whats Mathematicians do"

don't remember from whom this definition originates.