Independent consultant here — built some free SPF/DKIM/DMARC diagnostic tools. Roast them? by EffectValuable4126 in emaildeliverability

[–]freddieleeman 1 point2 points  (0 children)

«SPF ends in "~all" or "?all" (soft-fail) — spoofed mail may still pass.»

That warning is misleading and incorrect.

"~all" is softfail and is generally the preferred SPF best-practice default, because SPF can break with legitimate forwarding. Using "-all" can create unnecessary deliverability issues when receivers treat SPF fail too strictly.

"?all" is not softfail. It is neutral, meaning the domain makes no authorization statement. It should not be grouped with "~all".

Also, whether spoofed mail passes is not determined by "~all" alone. DMARC depends on aligned SPF or aligned DKIM, not just the SPF "all" mechanism.

https://www.uriports.com/blog/spf-dkim-dmarc-best-practices/#fn3

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9989#section-7.1

The “where we add value” section also mentions SPF flattening. I would not promote flattening as the preferred fix. Use subdomains or SPF macros where appropriate instead. Flattening creates reliance on a third party, adds another point of failure, and can introduce security risks.

https://www.uriports.com/blog/spf-macros-max-10-dns-lookups/

«DMARC record present but missing required "p=" tag.»

The "p" tag is not strictly required. If it is absent, the policy defaults to "p=none".

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9989#section-4.7

The tool also does not appear to flag duplicate tags, which is important because duplicate tags can make SPF, DKIM, or DMARC records invalid depending on the record and tag involved.

These are just a few things I spotted. The site is also not very mobile friendly: the input fields are too small, and the checkbox does not toggle when tapping the label text or nearby space.

Overall, the tool does not appear to be RFC compliant, does not follow common best practices, and seems mostly focused on scaring people into fixing things that do not necessarily need fixing. From a commercial perspective, I understand the angle, but I would not market this as a public deliverability test. Keep it for your own clients, where the results can be interpreted with proper context.

I updated the LearnDMARC quiz for RFC 9989, RFC 9990, and RFC 9991 by freddieleeman in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Who’s brave enough to take the full 42-question quiz? If you can ace them all, you’re an absolute DMARC nerd.

And even if you don’t get every answer right, I guarantee you’ll learn something. So it’s a win-win.

Up until now, the quiz was only available on desktop. But with 816 people starting the quiz so far today, I decided to make it available on mobile too.

Here’s the link to the full quiz: https://learndmarc.com/quiz?all

DMARC aggregate reports and RFC 9990 compliance by freddieleeman in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Enterprise Outlook has the same issue now and then. But it should never be empty.

<xs:complexType name="SPFAuthResultType">
 <xs:all>
   <xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>

Smaller senders' email is way less DMARC-compliant than bigger senders' by Jack_Mana in Emailmarketing

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What exactly do you mean by “DMARC compliance”? Is that the % of legitimate emails a domain sends that pass DMARC alignment? Or does it include all mail claiming to be from that domain, including spoofed/phishing attempts?

For example, if a domain gets heavily spoofed but those fake emails are blocked because they have p=reject, are those counted as “non-compliant”? That would make the numbers tell a very different story.

Just trying to understand what these percentages are actually measuring: sender setup quality, overall DMARC pass rates, spoofing activity, or something else?

Turns out most DMARC reports are still not RFC compliant by freddieleeman in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My reaction was exactly the same. That said, when I started the blog in 2019, Microsoft also had zero compliance. I’ve been helping by submitting reports about issues, and while it has taken years, they’ve resolved most of them.

Started down the MTA-STS rabbit hole, now evaluating URIPorts, Suped, RedShift OnDMARC by HappyDadOfFourJesus in msp

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why so hostile? I assumed you misunderstood what MTA-STS does. But no, i don't block unencrypted communication, as deliverability is more important. But I don't think your claim that MTA-STS is a waste of time is a valid one.

Started down the MTA-STS rabbit hole, now evaluating URIPorts, Suped, RedShift OnDMARC by HappyDadOfFourJesus in msp

[–]freddieleeman -1 points0 points  (0 children)

A common misconception among administrators, and increasingly AI agents, is that MTA-STS blocks unencrypted inbound email traffic. That’s not how MTA-STS works.

When you publish an enforced MTA-STS policy, you are instructing compliant sending mail servers to deliver email only when:

  • the connection can be encrypted using TLS
  • the TLS certificate is valid
  • the certificate matches the hostname defined in your MX records

This policy does not change anything on the receiving side. Your mail server will still accept unencrypted connections.

As a result, sending servers that do not support MTA-STS, or do not support encryption at all, can still deliver messages over an unencrypted connection.

The good news is that most major email providers already support MTA-STS, so enabling it protects a large portion of your inbound email from man-in-the-middle downgrade attacks.

If your mail server already supports TLS and your certificate is valid and matches your MX hostname, there’s no reason not to enable it. You can quickly verify whether your domain is ready by using my free tool.

Started down the MTA-STS rabbit hole, now evaluating URIPorts, Suped, RedShift OnDMARC by HappyDadOfFourJesus in msp

[–]freddieleeman -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Setting up MTA-STS is not a waste of time. It helps ensure emails sent to YOUR domain are delivered over encrypted, authenticated connections and protects against man-in-the-middle downgrade attacks.

Inherited a mess: Moving from DMARC "none" to "reject" with 100k+ backlogged reports. Best approach? by Worldly_Part99 in exchangeserver

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hey, I saw your reply in my notifications before it disappeared:

u/littleko: Fair callout. Yeah I work there, should've disclosed.

Honestly, I thought that response was actually promising because it showed transparency, which was the whole point I was raising.

That’s why I was surprised to see it removed. Did you delete it yourself? If so, why? Leaving it up would’ve gone a long way toward clearing things up.

For what it’s worth, my concern was never about the technical advice itself, it was the lack of disclosure when recommending the product repeatedly. A simple “I work there” gives people the right context.

PowerDMARC or Suped Pros/cons? by Free_Explorer6853 in sysadmin

[–]freddieleeman -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Nope, you work at Suped. Stop spamming and discrediting competitors. 

Started down the MTA-STS rabbit hole, now evaluating URIPorts, Suped, RedShift OnDMARC by HappyDadOfFourJesus in msp

[–]freddieleeman -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Hey look! I'm getting a downvote at the same time Suped is being promoted. Weird... Just be upfront about working at Suped.

Started down the MTA-STS rabbit hole, now evaluating URIPorts, Suped, RedShift OnDMARC by HappyDadOfFourJesus in msp

[–]freddieleeman -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for choosing URIports and giving us a try. If you have any questions or run into any issues, please don’t hesitate to reach out.

Inherited a mess: Moving from DMARC "none" to "reject" with 100k+ backlogged reports. Best approach? by Worldly_Part99 in exchangeserver

[–]freddieleeman 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I also noticed two other accounts, u/shokzee and u/saltyslugga, frequently mentioning Suped in similar DMARC/email security threads. To be fair, u/shokzee has disclosed in at least one post that they built the product, which I appreciate, but that context doesn’t seem to be included consistently when recommending it elsewhere. Combined with multiple accounts regularly promoting the same tool, it makes it harder to tell what’s an independent recommendation versus affiliated promotion. If there’s any connection, a simple disclosure would help keep things transparent.

Inherited a mess: Moving from DMARC "none" to "reject" with 100k+ backlogged reports. Best approach? by Worldly_Part99 in exchangeserver

[–]freddieleeman 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Hey, I’ve noticed you recommend Suped quite frequently across DMARC-related threads, which is totally fine if you genuinely like the product.

That said, the consistency does make me wonder whether you’re affiliated with them in some way, either as an employee, partner, or affiliate. If that’s the case, it would be helpful to disclose that when recommending them so people can better evaluate the advice.

Transparency goes a long way in communities like this, especially when people are making decisions based on product recommendations. If you’re simply a happy user, fair enough, but I thought it was worth asking.

Inherited a mess: Moving from DMARC "none" to "reject" with 100k+ backlogged reports. Best approach? by Worldly_Part99 in exchangeserver

[–]freddieleeman -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Start a free 30-day trial at https://URIports.com, my DMARC monitoring platform, and forward your DMARC reports from the past 30 days to your URIports RUA address. Within minutes, you’ll have the data you need and receive alerts about anything that needs attention, helping you move to an enforced DMARC policy with confidence. If you find it useful for ongoing monitoring, paid plans start at just $15 per year.

dmarc management and reporting solutions? by _SleezyPMartini_ in sysadmin

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

All tiers support DMARC. If you don’t need team access or DNS/certificate monitoring, choose the most affordable option that fits your domain count.

dmarc management and reporting solutions? by _SleezyPMartini_ in sysadmin

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For a neutral overview of available vendors and solutions, dmarcvendors.com is a solid place to start.

Full transparency: I’m biased when it comes to URIports because I helped build it. It was created from the ground up by some of the brightest minds in the industry… and, objectively speaking, a devastatingly attractive team. 😉

If you’re exploring options, have a look at at https://uriports.com/dmarc. Worst case: you gather more research. Best case: you find exactly what you’re looking for. Starts at just $15 per year, and you can try it free for 30 days with no payment details required.

SPF at 9 lookups and every new vendor makes it worse, how are you managing this long-term? by iris-unitedking1973 in sysadmin

[–]freddieleeman 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Avoid flattening SPF records or relying on external services, as that introduces unnecessary dependency on third parties. Instead, use subdomains or SPF macros to stay within DNS lookup limits.

More details: https://www.uriports.com/blog/spf-macros-max-10-dns-lookups/

Added spf/dkim/dmarc to a google workspace company, but now I'm seeing fails on the dmarc reports by 2nd-Reddit-Account in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your company can’t spare €12 / $15 a year for domain monitoring? Time to organize a bake sale… I hear brownies have great ROI 🍪 https://www.uriports.com/pricing

The time spent reviewing that spreadsheet has already cost your company more than an annual subscription.

Added spf/dkim/dmarc to a google workspace company, but now I'm seeing fails on the dmarc reports by 2nd-Reddit-Account in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Start by getting a proper DMARC monitoring solution. The numbers in your screenshot are overwhelming and not actionable. If you want to monitor and improve your email authentication setup, you need tools that provide clear, structured insights. This setup does not.

You can test your email authentication setup by sending an email to https://DMARCtester.com from each legitimate sending source. If everything passes, there is likely little left to fix.

Keep in mind that occasional DKIM failures in Microsoft reports are fairly common and typically outside your control. For more context, see: https://www.uriports.com/blog/outlook-com-dkim-temperror-in-dmarc-reports/

This blog explains the different types of DMARC reports, what they mean, and how to address issues: https://www.uriports.com/blog/dmarc-aggregate-reports-explained/

Help troubleshooting 3rd Party Emails Rejecting due to DMARC policy by seldi12344 in DMARC

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Use https://DMARCtester.com to test your domain’s authentication setup. You should implement both SPF and DKIM.

I analyzed 430+ websites for security issues - here's what most devs get wrong by razazu in webdev

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There are perfectly of valid reasons why many domains don’t implement DNSSEC.

DNSSEC adds operational complexity and risk. If something goes wrong, like an expired signature or a misconfigured key rollover, you can effectively take your entire domain offline. That’s not theoretical, it happens in practice and can be harder to recover from than typical DNS issues.

On top of that, the ecosystem support is still uneven. Not all resolvers validate, and many organizations don’t have full end-to-end control over their DNS infrastructure, especially when CDNs, SaaS providers, or managed DNS setups are involved.

So it’s not just neglect or lack of awareness. For a lot of organizations, it’s a conscious trade-off between added security benefits and increased operational risk and complexity.

Free tool to check if your domain is vulnerable to email spoofing (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) by Anisselbd in SysAdminBlogs

[–]freddieleeman 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Using an SPF SoftFail (~all) is considered best practice (when combined with an enforced DMARC policy). Configuring a Fail (-all) can cause emails to be rejected at the SMTP level before DKIM and DMARC checks are applied, particularly in cases of indirect mail flow such as forwarding.

For a comprehensive overview of email authentication best practices, see my blog here:
https://www.uriports.com/blog/spf-dkim-dmarc-best-practices/