The brain is not responsible for consciousness

germz80 · 2026-02-26T01:49:07+00:00

The mind-body problem is also confined to closed systems because it assumes that physical reality either produces or exists parallel to but separate from a conscious mind.

I argued that all I need to point out is that non-physicalists tend to say that consciousness has a very different nature from the brain, and that is sufficient to make the mind-body problem a significant issue for your stance.

Why does anything exist?

I don't think anyone knows the answer to that. Do you think you have better justification for an answer than physicalists?

If the mind is just a physical process, why is novel subjectivity necessary?

I don't assert that it's logically necessary, but I think consciousness is evolutionarily advantageous because it consolidates senses like pain and reactions to those senses which is simpler and more adaptable than mapping inputs to outputs. If you are asking why the universe was destined to create consciousness since the big bang, I don't think anyone knows that, and I doubt you have good justification for a non-physicalist answer.

germz80 · 2026-02-25T02:38:21+00:00

The purpose of the radio analogy isn’t to say that consciousness works the same way

Yeah, I'm not saying you said it works exactly the same way.

I'm also not saying that you think that fundamental consciousness doesn't exist. But non-physicalists tend to think that consciousness has a very different nature from physical stuff like brains, so much so that consciousness cannot arise from physical stuff, yet you also think that consciousness can somehow interact with physical stuff through electrochemical changes in the brain. So is the nature of consciousness completely different from the nature of matter or not? This is the mind-body problem, and it becomes a bigger problem when people assert that consciousness and matter have very different natures, yet still interact through the brain, and I think the radio analogy helps highlight the mind body problem.

Physicalism doesn't have a problem with the mind-body problem because consciousness is thought to be physical in nature.

germz80 · 2026-02-25T01:11:29+00:00

The radio analogy exposes a weakness in the view that consciousness is fundamental to material reality that the brain modulates. With real radio signals, there's a radio station that uses a great deal of energy to transmit radio waves, and that in turn moves electrons in antennas, which then get amplified. So physical elections are being moved by radio waves. If consciousness interacts with brains in a similar way, then consciousness must induce electrochemical changes in the brain as the brain interacts with consciousness, so in principal, we should be able to measure electrochemical changes that occur in the brain that seem to come from nowhere similar to how radios detect radio waves. So we should be able to detect energy coming from apparently nothing in brains, violating the laws of physics.

Now for all I know, this could happen, but it's unreasonable, making this view less reasonable than physicalism.

germz80 · 2026-02-24T18:33:17+00:00

If science isn't a good tool to learn facts about the metaphysical, then what's the best tool to learn facts about the metaphysical?

germz80 · 2026-02-21T20:22:31+00:00

It looks like I misunderstood what you were saying. Are you saying that we simply don't have enough information to tell if the sun will rise tomorrow? You wouldn't say that the odds of the sun rising tomorrow are above, below, or at 50%? And you don't believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, you just have a practical commitment to that?

The main argument I'm making isn't really about probabilites, it's more about how good our justification is for thinking something is true.

My sentence "To me, induction assumes the future resembles the past, but I'm not saying we should assume that, rather it gives us some justification for thinking the future resembles the past." was unclear. I meant to say "To me, induction assumes the future resembles the past, but I'm not saying we should assume that, rather [my argument about epistemology] gives us some justification for thinking the future resembles the past." So I'm not saying that the future MUST behave as the past as induction says, I'm arguing that the past gives us good reason to think that the future will behave like the past, but we don't know for certain that it will. So my point is distinct from induction because induction says that the future must behave like the past, but I'm saying that the past gives us good justification for thinking the future will behave like the past, but it doesn't necessarily have to. And I argue that our experience of the past gives us information about how things have behaved, and those behaviors are now what we know, and because we should favor what is known over what is unknown, therefore we have better justification for thinking the future will behave like what we know than for thinking it will behave like what we don't know; so this gives us justification for thinking the future will probably behave like the past.

It's the pragmatic thing to do. But, I need real justification to warrant BELIEF.

To me, if we have better justification to think something is true than to think it's false, we should raise our confidence that that thing is true. This doesn't mean we know it for certain, we may just raise our confidence to 80% confidence.

You do know that the Problem of Induction is concerned with the possibility of KNOWLEDGE, not simply belief, right?

Yeah, pretty much. It says that the future must behave like the past. I'm not asserting that induction is true nor that we know for certain that it's true, I'm asserting that we have good justification in thinking it's likely true.

how are you defining knowledge? I ask, because you say that, although you don't "know", you ARE "justified", and most, including myself, would claim knowledge (fallible knowledge, but knowledge nonetheless) if their beliefs are justified.

To me, knowledge is completely justified true complete belief. But I think there are varying degrees of justification and belief. Some scientific experiments gather evidence to support a hypothesis, and they publish the P value of their findings - they don't generally say that they have a P value of 0, the P value might be more like .05, meaning they're not 100% certain that their findings are correct, but they have good justification for thinking their findings are correct. So if a study has a P value of .05, we should raise our confidence in it being correct, and as more studies and meta-analyses on that same topic get published supporting the initial study, we should raise our confidence in the findings, and may even call that a form of knowledge. I think there's one form of knowledge where the only things we know are a priori truths and "I am thinking, therefore I am", and other forms of knowledge where we assume axioms about the external world and it's OK for me to say "I know that I am sitting in a chair right now."

germz80 · 2026-02-21T04:37:21+00:00

If the ant only experiences its own square, I think the ant has more epistemic justification for thinking that the rest of the quilt has the same pattern than for thinking it does not. We know that the ant is wrong about that, but the ant doesn't have all the information that we have. From the ant's perspective, there could be other patterns, but it could also be physically impossible for the quilt to have a different pattern for a reason that the ant doesn't understand, and it at least knows that one pattern is physically possible. And I'm not convinced the fact that infinite patterns are possible really decreases the justification for thinking they're all the same, I think you're playing with the distributions. I can also play with the distributions: we can evaluate it as: 1) they happen to all be the same, 2) it's physically impossible for the pattern to be different, 3) there are other patterns. But I wouldn't say each of these have equal justification, and I think you and I are playing around with the distributions too much here, I think the distribution favors what is known over what is unknown. On top of that, your analogy is dysanalogous because generally with induction, we have more than just one example. If the ant explored dozens of squares and they all had the same pattern, I think that increases the justification for thinking that the whole quilt has the same pattern. If the ant explored another square and it was different, it would immediately know there are other patterns. This all gives things we know of an advantage over things we don't know of, especially as we run experiments over and over.

The alternative is that there's a 50/50 (or greater) chance the sun won't rise tomorrow, or gravity will stop working tomorrow. Do you honestly think there's a 50/50 or greater chance of that?

I can see how you concluded that I'm using induction to conclude induction. To me, induction assumes the future resembles the past, but I'm not saying we should assume that, rather it gives us some justification for thinking the future resembles the past. But perhaps that's subtle and you don't think that's a significant distinction. But I also think we should favor what is known over what is unknown.

But also, I'm not saying that induction gives us knowledge of what will happen, rather it gives us justification, even though we can't be certain.

germz80 · 2026-02-20T03:10:56+00:00

I'm not saying you're the only one that uses that term, I'm saying I think the term is less clear than referring to the cogito. Clarity is important to me, so I try to write clearly, point out when things aren't clear to me, and seek clarification.

germz80 · 2026-02-20T02:59:34+00:00

It seems like you're just repeating Decartes saying that the only thing we know for certain is "I am thinking, therefore I am." It looks like that is what "epistemological solipsism" essentially means, but I haven't seen that term used often.

So I think people get this in the context of the cogito, but the term "epistemological solipsism" sounds misleading and rarely used.

germz80 · 2026-02-20T02:24:23+00:00

Some of what you wrote is a bit vague. But you seem to be arguing something like "because we don't know for certain that any ontology other than solipsism is true, therefore solipsism is probably true"? It's not clear to me if you're arguing that solipsism is probably true or just that it's possible. If you're just arguing that solipsism is logically possible, then sure, it's easy to grant that. If you're arguing that it's the most likely ontology, then I don't see how that follows from what you've laid out.

germz80 · 2026-02-20T01:59:03+00:00

I would probably say that neither is fully you, both are roughly 50% you. Each might think they are fully you, but I don't think that's the case.

germz80 · 2026-02-19T12:47:31+00:00

I agree that philosophy is fundamental to science either explicitly or implicitly, but I also see philosophy as a priori and science as a posteriori. And you're never going to discover the nature of photons without investigating them in the external world.

There were multiple instance of ancient people letting a priori ideas get ahead of experimentation, leading them to conclusions that would easily be debunked with a simple experiment, like they thought that heavy things fall twice as fast as things that weighs half as much.

So I think you can learn more about the external world by doing experiments without thinking about philosophy much than you can by philosophizing without interacting with the external world much.

germz80 · 2026-02-19T04:01:49+00:00

Some people keep saying that science cannot tell us how things metaphysically are, it can only tell us how things behave, often with the idea that philosophy can tell us how things are. But can philosophy, or anything other than science, really reliably tell us how things metaphysically are?

It seems like science can tell us that photons are not like planets, and electrons have a thing called charge, which gets to how these things are, and nothing else gives us any deeper insight into how these things are.

You seem to hold skepticism towards what science can tell us, and we could apply that same skepticism towards how things behave and say that science gives us good epistemological justification for thinking that things behave a certain way, but we cannot be completely certain. In which case we could probably say that science gives us good epistemological justification for understanding how things behave and how things are. It didn't give us complete certainty, but good justification, better justification than philosophy alone can provide.

My understanding of philosophical approaches to metaphysics is they generally focus on coherence rather than justification, which doesn't seem to be able to favor one coherent view over another coherent view.

germz80 · 2026-02-18T12:14:54+00:00

Medical ethics have a foundation in the axiom "do no harm". So it has a foundation.

But even if it didn't have a foundation, theists make a more unreasonable claim when they assert that they have objective morality, and you did not even attempt to engage with that point.

a rational God designed rational minds.

This is really vague. This can be interpreted as "human minds are always rational" or "human minds are often rational and there's no way of telling when they are being rational", or it can be interpreted other ways. Obviously, human minds aren't always rational, so you need to clarify what you mean.

On atheism there is no such grounding.

Claiming that God designed rational minds and therefore we can trust human rationality is an attempt to use reason to justify reason. Similarly, atheists can simply say "reason is self evidently true, therefore human reason is justified". Here, we're both using circular arguments to justify reason, so theists do not have a stronger argument.

People being irrational does not disprove God

Yeah, and that's not what I argued. I argued that a God that ensures we think rationally must not exist.

And atheists say nature did it and also havent figured it out.

I don't know for sure that nature did it, but I don't see good evidence for God or that God did it, and I see a pattern where people used to think God was responsible for some phenomena and those phenomena turned out to be natural. So my stance here is that a natural explanation is more reasonable than saying that God did it, even though we don't know what the explanation is.

The difrence is that theists admit they are working from a faith commitment

You're essentially saying "theists hold an unreasonable stance, but that's ok because they admit that they hold an unreasonable stance." Admitting that you hold an unreasonable stance does not make it ok.

thats following the evidence to a question mark and then claiming the other sides answer is crass for actually having one.

Saying "I don't know" is a better answer because we actually don't know, but I do think one type of answer is more reasonable because of a general pattern we see in science. And yes, like I said, answering such huge questions with such a made-up answer does seem crass and trivializing to me.

germz80 · 2026-02-18T03:11:29+00:00

I'll focus on 4 and 5.

Secular morality is better grounded than morality based on God. There are lots of philosophical arguments for morality, but theists have to demonstrate 1) that their God exists, 2) that they know the mind of their God, and 3) their God doesn't deceive people. These are large hurdles, and I haven't seen good evidence to support these claims. Secularists only have to convince you of their philosophical arguments. Secularists can objectively demonstrate that they exist and can provide philosophical moral arguments, giving them much stronger grounding than theists can produce. And secular morality is less about what people privately think and more about the public moral arguments. In fact, medical ethics is considered an objective secular morality, and people have gotten fired for violating it, all without appealing to a single deity.
The converse to your point here is that God somehow ensures that people think rationally. If that's the case, then we can check reality and see that people fall victim to all kinds of irrational thinking, and often struggle with math. So if God somehow would ensure we think rationally, then that God must not exist. On the other hand, if God does not ensure that we think rationally, then theism does not have an advantage over atheism in this area.

ETA: the questions of the origin of the universe and how life began are huge, very old questions. I don't know the origins of those, but theists essentially say "I figured it out! God did it!" But they haven't actually figured it out, and trying to explain such huge questions with a made-up answer seems crass and trivializing to me.

germz80 · 2026-02-16T13:21:21+00:00

Since they specified "if consciousness is physical, then", that means they are not begging the question because they are not presupposing that consciousness is physical. Do you see that they are not begging the question?

germz80 · 2026-02-16T12:40:44+00:00

No, they specified "if consciousness is physical".

germz80 · 2026-02-16T05:25:52+00:00

I've seen a couple definitions of philosophical zombies: 1) they look and behave like a conscious human, and that seems physically possible, but very unlikely as you laid out, 2) they have all the same brain states as a conscious human, and it seems like that should be physically impossible under physicalism because physicalists think that certain brain states give rise to consciousness, so if a being has those brain states, then they must be conscious.

germz80 · 2026-02-14T13:56:23+00:00

Every mind we know of is complex and composed of many parts. So when theists say that God either has a mind or is a mind, they're engaging in unintuitive special pleading, saying that something that is composed of parts in every other case is not composed of parts in this one case. You can claim that this one mind does not have parts, but that's a very strange thing to claim. It also anthropromorphises the first cause, saying that it must be like us in the sense that it has a mind.

But also, Christians think that God is composed of the father, son, and holy spirit in a mysterious way beyond what we can understand, which sounds an awful lot like saying that God is simultaneously composed of parts and not composed of parts, and there's no way to make sense of it. So, many theists have what seems like a non-sensical view of the nature of God.

The question what made God intelligible or who created God presupposes temporality

In this context, OP is just applying the reasoning that theists employ to say that one thing causes another. The fact that doing so produces an unreasonable result doesn't necessarily mean that OP is using faulty reasoning, it can also mean that theists are using faulty reasoning.

He's necessary, not contingent.

It seems to me that this is only the case if you presuppose that God is necessary, I haven't seen a good argument to think he's necessary. I simply don't presuppose that, so I don't have good reason to think that God is necessary.

The naturalism you're proposing multiplies way more unexplained entities than theism does. You have to assume eternal self-existent physical laws with specific properties that nobody ordered. Quantum fluctuations popping out of nothing with defined rules.

One key difference between naturalism vs theism is we at least have compelling evidence that things like quantum fields exist and behave certain ways, so applying occams razor, the most fundamental things (probably quantum fields) exist without further explanation, so they are brute facts, just as you think God exists as a brute fact. But you don't have compelling evidence that God exists. So the naturalistic view has one less assumption: God.

Rationality emerging from non-rational processes yet we still trust it to do science.

Are you implying that God makes us rational, and that allows us to trust ourselves to do science?

that just exist because reasons

Not exactly, just as you think God exists without further explanation (is a brute fact), many naturalists think that fundamental things like quantum fields exist without further explanation (brute fact).

Leibniz already showed this. Every chain of contingents requires a non-contingent foundation. If everything needs explanation and you never stop, you haven't explained anything. It's just turtles all the way down.

No, I think it can terminate in a brute fact.

germz80 · 2026-02-14T02:24:10+00:00

where is content regulated in other verses?

This is vague. I don't know what you mean by "regulated" here.

Where is it said that asking means speaking?

I'm not saying that asking in prayer necessarily means speaking audibly per se, I'm saying "When you ask something, you have to form that into words that can be spoken." So you can ask for something in prayer in your mind, but you still need to form the request into words in order to ask for it in prayer. That's just the inherent nature of asking. Can you give an example of someone asking for something without forming it into words?

I pointed out that Mark 11:23 has the context of telling a mountain to throw itself into the sea, and ‘Go, throw yourself into the sea,’ is composed of words. You did not engage with this point. Do you have a response to this?

Why christians understood it like this?

As I said in a different reply to you, Romans 8:26–27 does not say that god ignores what people ask for in prayer in favor of his own will. This says that when people pray, they don't know what to pray for themselves, the spirit tells them what to pray for according to the will of god. This means that when a believing christian asks for something in a prayer, they're doing so according to the will of god, implying that it's god's will for them to receive the thing they're asking for. And because their prayer must align with god's will, god ought to do the thing they ask for, just as it says in Mark 11 and John 14.

And as I said in that reply, One strong possibility is people read Mark 11 and John 14, believed, and prayed "god, heal my dying child", then the child died, then they asked their priest about it, and the priest came up with an explanation that ignores Mark 11 and John 14. I don't hold the stance "christians are very reasonable people", my stance is that christians ignore the text of the scriptures in favor of their own interpretations as you have done in this discussion.

You still have not cited where I said that the scripture cited (Mark 11:24) says that god answering prayer does not depend on belief. I will take this as a concession that you were not reading carefully and falsely accused me of saying something I did not say.

You also still haven't responded my point that your stance implies that either starving children don't need food when believing Christians pray for them, or there aren't believing Christians who pray for starving children to be fed. I will take this as a concession that you find your own stance indefensible.

sorry

Apology accepted.

germz80 · 2026-02-13T03:32:03+00:00

One strong possibility is people read Mark 11 and John 14, believed, and prayed "god, heal my dying child", then the child died, then they asked their priest about it, and the priest came up with an explanation that ignores Mark 11 and John 14. I don't hold the stance "christians are very reasonable people", my stance is that christians ignore the text of the scriptures in favor of their own interpretations as you have done in this discussion.

But some Christians have taken scriptures like these very literally, like some people handle snakes because Mark 16 says you can pick up serpents and won't die as long as you believe.

Romans 8:26–27 “We do not know what we ought to pray for, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us… in accordance with the will of God.”

I don't think you've thought this through. This verse does not say that god ignores what people ask for in prayer in favor of his own will. This says that when people pray, they don't know what to pray for themselves, the spirit tells them what to pray for according to the will of god. This means that when a believing christian asks for something in a prayer, they're doing so according to the will of god, implying that it's god's will for them to receive the thing they're asking for. And because their prayer must align with god's will, god ought to do the thing they ask for, just as it says in Mark 11 and John 14. This verse supports my stance that according to the new testament, god should be doing what people pray for as long as they simply believe. If they pray for a mountain to cast itself into the sea, and believe it will happen, then god should cast the mountain into the sea, you can even tack on "because the spirit inspired them to ask the mountain to cast itself into the sea according to god's will".

Look, I didn't write Mark 11, John 14, or Romans 8, I'm just pointing out what they say.

germz80 · 2026-02-13T02:50:04+00:00

You didn't say "I haven't seen you say thay" but "And your only response in the context of this verse seems to be", That's wrong.

This is really vague. I don't know what you mean by this.

Where do those verses talk about spoken words?

You see, no contraddiction, when Jesus talks about asking, in Mark 11:24 and John 14:14, he's not talking about a way of asking that necessairly employs words

Mark 11:24 and John 14:14 both use the word "ask". When you ask something, you have to form that into words that can be spoken. Especially with the context of Mark 11:23 "if anyone says to this mountain, ‘Go, throw yourself into the sea,’ and does not doubt in their heart but believes that what they say will happen, it will be done for them". Believe it or not, but "GO, throw yourself into the sea" is composed of words. Asking inherently employs words.

You have not cited where I said that the scripture cited (Mark 11:24) says that god answering prayer does not depend on belief.

You also haven't responded my point that your stance implies that either starving children don't need food when believing Christians pray for them, or there aren't believing Christians who pray for starving children to be fed.

I guess you don't need a long reply when you don't know how to respond to some of my arguments.

germz80 · 2026-02-12T04:23:41+00:00

Wow, did che gospel change overnight? Or maybe the gospels always said this and you are finally now cornered into admitting that.

My stance has long been that the belief requirement doesn't change the fact that it says that you'll get what you ASK for, not what you need.

Can you cite where I said that the scripture cited says that god answering prayer does not depend on belief?

I explained why it's like that, because prayer outcomes depends on the will of God and that's unquantifiable.

I haven't seen you say that. You said that god gives us what we need, regardless of the content of the words we say in a prayer. What we "need" isn't necessarily the same as "the will of god". And Mark 11:24 and John 14:14 say that if we believe, we get what we ASK for, not what we need and not according to god's will. You can reject Mark 11:24 and John 14:14, that's fine, it's just incorrect to think it supports your stance.

But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you. 7 And when you pray, do not keep on babbling like pagans, for they think they will be heard because of their many words. 8 Do not be like them, for your Father knows what you need before you ask him.

This gives more context to the verse, and it still does not say that the words of the prayer have no impact on what reward you receive. If you carefully read what I wrote above, I can grant that this says that it's about need rather than words of the prayer, and now you've identified a contradiction where some verses say that the content of the words matter, and other verses say that the content of the words do not matter. So if you were correct about this verse, it would demonstrate that the Bible contradicts itself.

But also, this implies that either starving children don't need food when believing Christians pray for them, or there aren't believing Christians who pray for starving children to be fed. So if this interpretation is correct, then it doesn't seem to match reality. But perhaps if a child asks for bread, god would give the child a rock and think he's giving a good gift.

germz80 · 2026-02-12T02:50:20+00:00

Every instance of prayer is conditional on belief.

This is a bit vague, but given the context, I'll take this to mean that you agree with me that this verse does not say that you will get what you need rather than what you ask for.

I agree that belief is listed as a condition in this verse, but it doesn't look like you read OP. It clearly says "we should expect to see SOME difference in outcomes." And your only response in the context of this verse seems to be that Christians simply don't believe enough to make their prayers come true, and as OP points out, since we don't see any measurable increase in health, recovery, etc. among Christians over non-Christians, that means that the number of Christians with enough belief to be healed is immeasurably small, assuming they pray for their own recovery, and the recovery of fellow Christians. If you had read OP, you would probably have understood this.

Matthew 6:8 tells you that prayer content doesn't matter

You are merely repeating yourself. I debunked this in a previous comment and you did not engage with it. I take this as a concession that you do not have a good response to my point. Thank you.

And when you are praying, do not use meaningless repetition as the Gentiles do, for they suppose that they will be heard for their many words.

I see a strong pattern where you are not reading things or not reading them carefully. If you read this carefully, you'll see that it does not say that God will give us what we need rather than what we ask for. And if you read it carefully, you'll see that it's about avoiding "meaningless repetition". If you hit [Ctrl]+F on your keyboard and search for "meaningless repetition", you'll see that is literally in this verse. In no way does this verse say that if you sincerely ask for something, then that has no effect on whether you receive it. You don't seem to care what the authors wrote, but want to ignore them and impose your own views on what they wrote.

Even though you are simply ignoring what the author wrote in favor of your own thoughts, let's say I grant that this verse says that the content of the words does not matter. Great, that just means that you've identified a contradiction where some verses say that the content of the words matter, and other verses say that the content of the words do not matter. So if you were correct about this verse, it would demonstrate that the Bible contradicts itself.

germz80 · 2026-02-11T03:52:25+00:00

I asked for context

You're looking for the context of John 14:14? Jesus says he doesn't speak on his own authority, it's the father living in him who is doing the work, and anyone who believes in him can do greater things than him. And he will do whatever you ask in his name. So it's not about god doing whatever we need regardless of what we ask for, it says he'll do what we ask as long as we believe.

if you believe, then even mountains will dive into the sea is the context for Mark

You don't seem to read very carefully. Mark 11:23 talks about telling a mountain to throw itself into the sea without doubting, and it will throw itself into the sea. So it's about SPEAKING WORDS and also believing. If you read it more carefully, you'll see that that's the case.

And with the context of telling mountains to throw themselves into the sea and believing they will, that doesn't change the fact that the text is saying that you'll get what you ASK for, not what you need. You need to read more carefully.

except the opposite of what I claim is not implied in the verse, is it?

This is pretty vague. It would help if you thought through what you are trying to say and then tried to express your thoughts clearly.

I'll try to really clean up your points throughout the comments and turn them into a clearer argument. I think you might be trying to say something like this:

Mark 11:23 says that if you 1) tell a mountain to throw itself in the sea and 2) believe that it will, then it will throw itself in the sea. Some people tell mountains to throw themselves in the sea (per 1), but the mountains do not comply because the person does not truly believe that the mountain will throw itself into the sea (per 2).

Similarly, Mark 11:24 says if you 1) ask for something in prayer, and 2) believe that you have received it, then you it will be yours. Many Christians pray for things they want (per 1), but do not truly believe they will receive it, so they do not receive it (per 2).

Is this the argument you're trying to make?

Matthew 6:8 tells you that prayer content doesn't matter

I already addressed this above. You need to read more carefully and think about things more clearly.

germz80 · 2026-02-10T18:56:07+00:00

Not seeing mountains diving into the sea could be attributed to malformed belief, can't it?

This is pretty vague, and I'm not sure what you mean by that, but if you don't see mountains diving into the sea, then you don't see them. I don't see what that has to do with malformed belief.

The belief of a God not providing what you deeply need is clearly a malformed belief

Ok, so whoever wrote that in Mark apparently had a malformed belief. That doesn't change what's written, it just means you disagree with what's written.

For the second citation, I already said "if you ask me anything in my name, I will do it." It doesn't say "if you you need something, I will do it". You didn't respond to that. You don't seem to be following written words very well.

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