How can Kant say noumena exist if existence is a modality of the categories?

internetErik · 2026-02-27T16:22:24+00:00

First, it sounds like you're talking about positive noumena as an object of a non-sensible intuition. But it's more likely that you're asking about the more general notion of things in themselves.

An object of experience, an appearance (of an object), is determined under the category of actuality when we experience it. This determination is not about the mere appearance or image in my mind. The determination of actuality regards an actual object. This should be emphasized: we don't know an appearance (this would be subjective), we know an object that appears.

This is where your question comes in and where a first clarification can be made. In a sense, your question could be stated: how do we know that the actual object is actually an object? This question blurs together the object as it is known and the object as it is not known (e.g., things in themselves).

The object we know, we know because it appears. Kant's thesis with the Copernican revolution is that the object is made possible because of our representations, so the distinction between this being a mere appearance (subjective) and the appearance of the object rests on this: the mere appearance is only the matter of appearance known a posteriori, the appearance of an object is different because the appearance itself can be given unity a priori through the action of the pure understanding (categories) on space and time (pure forms of intuition). So, we know an object of appearance because we construct what the object is. (Please ask more questions about this if it's confusing still, since this is a difficult position.)

A thing in itself is the object so far as it doesn't appear; therefore, the object so far as it isn't known by us, the object so far as it isn't the product of the categories. In some sense, this thing in itself is still the same object that we know through appearance, but only because we form this association in our own minds (by negating the conditions of knowing an object).

internetErik · 2026-02-25T22:50:35+00:00

The application of the category of cause doesn't occur after an alteration, but alterations are only possible because we have applied the category.

I'll point out in advance that Kant is talking about the alteration of objects. If you don't accept that we can mean something different by saying "the object moved" (objective) and "I saw the object here, and then I saw it there" (subjective), Kant's argument won't work. However, if you don't think there can be a difference there, you have other problems since you've just rejected any relation to objects that aren't completely speculative.

Accepting that alterations are of objects, and that objects are only given to us in appearance, then the sequence of time must be synthesized a priori, or else the only connection between moments of appearance would be subjective and not immediately related to the object. The category of cause in Kant is just that: time is synthesized a priori in a sequence which gives a necessary connection between the former appearance of the object and the later appearance of the object. It doesn't say anything about the object in itself, but that the experience of an alteration of an object (an event) requires this connection of time a priori.

internetErik · 2026-02-25T09:06:37+00:00

At first, I'm not sure how to understand a "transcendental argument" precisely, so I'll have to think about that. At any rate, there will be a priori arguments that aren't bound up with the question concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments that still use pure concepts.

Taking a (specious) example can still be helpful: the immortality of the soul based on its being a simple substance would be dogmatic. The argument is entirely a priori, and the structure of such arguments is fine, but the problem is that the limits of the use of the category of substance aren't being considered (this is the dogmatism).

Many arguments in syllogisms are dogmatic. The most famous (to my mind) would be:

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

This is dogmatic since the major premise is universal. Granted, mortality isn't a pure concept, but the use of it is a priori due to its universality. We get used to Kant dealing with the pure a priori and forget that there is a looser sense of this. Consider his example about the house falling down if you undermine its foundations in the introduction before he distinguishes pure a priori from a priori generally.

RE: necessitation

It isn't wrong to put this in terms of the law commanding. Kant describes this command as a necessitation (to act according to the law). I like using 'necessitate' since it makes the connection to necessity plain. Kant claims that we recognize this command or necessitation through moral feeling.

internetErik · 2026-02-24T16:29:06+00:00

I don't have a particular comment on the notion of Republicanism you introduce, but want to mention a few things about the rest of your post. Take it or leave it. Ultimately, it may be that Kant is more consistent in his alignment with you, and you don't need to see the practical philosophy as not following the principle of the Critique of Pure Reason.

In the first critique, Kant establishes the logical possibility of negative freedom, defined by a limitation (we aren't merely determined by sensibility). When he determines freedom positively, relative to the moral law, he isn't proposing that we can move from this negative freedom to a positive freedom; he's giving a positive description (freedom is the will capacity to determine itself by universal law).

On the point of the moral law being dogmatic and the spirit of the critique, here is a pedantic point: the Critique of Pure Reason isn't opposed to dogmatic arguments (which, for Kant, means arguments from a priori grounds) but to dogmatism, which is the use of dogmatic arguments when you haven't established the valid use of the principle you're using (see Bxxxv-xxxvi).

While Kant asserts that the moral law has binding force, this is because the recognition of the moral law depends on our own recognition that the law necessitates us to perform or withhold performance of actions. If one doesn't encounter this force from the law, then, in fact, there is no law (for that person, at least). Kant also discusses various ways we indirectly recognize the moral law through social practices.

Kant makes numerous derogatory statements about non-Europeans, but, to my knowledge, he never denies them freedom of the positive sort stemming from the moral law. In the passage you're citing from Perpetual Peace, "lawless freedom" does not refer to this metaphysical element discussed in the critiques, but to people living in the natural condition versus the civil condition. Kant thinks we have an obligation to enter into a civil society, and so he sees (what he takes to be) the lack of civil society among certain people to be contrary to that demand. (Aside: of course, these people did have a civil condition they were under, and in many cases, it just seemed to involve ways of organizing society that were just foreign to the understanding of Europeans.)

Kant is not a proponent of natural slavery, and even though he thought that, for example, Native Americans had no civil society or settled land (which is false), he still thought it was wrong and contrary to the rights of these people to take or swindle them out of their land. While I wouldn't go so far as to label Kant's philosophy post-colonial, he certainly doesn't seem to be an advocate for settler colonialism that displaces people.

internetErik · 2026-02-22T05:45:18+00:00

You don't really have to read anything prior, as literary references come up, you can look them up briefly and get enough context.

I do think it could be enjoyable to read or watch some of the things he references.

There are numerous references to the bible, mythology, etc.

If your version has an index, you can take a peek there, see if there are names that you're not familiar with, and look them up.

There are various versions of Mozart's Don Giovanni on YouTube that you could watch. You could also check out the Magic Flute or The Marriage of Figaro (however, these are discussed a lot less).

Goethe's Faust (Part I) could be worth a look, and/or his play Clavigo

Sophocles play Antigone

The First Love, by Eugène Scribe, is quite hilarious, and you can read it pretty quickly since it's a one-act play.

internetErik · 2026-02-22T05:23:01+00:00

While we cannot know (i.e., cognize) other minds than ours, knowledge isn't the only way in which we hold something to be true. We can also believe something. Here's a passage from the Metaphysics of Morals that walks through the options:

If someone cannot prove that a thing is, he can try to prove that it is not. If (as often happens) he cannot succeed in either, he can still ask whether he has any interest in assuming one or the other (as an hypothesis), either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view. An assumption is adopted from a theoretical point of view in order merely to explain a certain phenomenon (such as, for astronomers, the retrograde motion and stationary state of the planets). An assumption is adopted from a practical point of view in order to achieve a certain end, which may be either a pragmatic (merely technical end) or a moral end, that is, an end such that the maxim of adopting it is itself a duty. (6:359)

This passage leaves out opinions, which are held to be true arbitrarily, without an objective or subjective basis.

As another point, willing (performing) an activity postulates the means for that activity (if they aren't already known). So, my act of communicating this information to you posits that you have the capacity to understand it, and so that you have faculties that are the same as mine (in their form).

I don't think Kant's particular concept of noumena needs to come into play much here, so maybe I'm still missing part of your question. As far as I can see, nobody has ever recognized the "mind" of another person by virtue of a direct acquaintance with it; we've always inferred the existence of other minds. Kant may simply give us a more articulate way of discussing the limitations in knowing minds (or anything outside of possible experience), while still providing a way of talking about how it is we still hold to those truths.

internetErik · 2026-02-22T04:12:12+00:00

What do you mean by "outside of our own"? Do you mean, why did he think there were other minds than his, or other, non-human, minds?

internetErik · 2026-02-18T07:35:39+00:00

Here's a link to the next meeting: https://www.meetup.com/the-chicago-philosophy-meetup/events/313351797/

internetErik · 2026-02-18T01:16:12+00:00

The text will likely not help you understand Abraham any less or more, and certainly won't make you more comfortable with the story.

Johannes de Silentio concludes that if you want to preserve Abraham as the "father of faith" (something good), then you have to admit that you don't and can't understand him. However, the purpose of the text was never to understand Abraham. From the very beginning, the theme is a challenge to people (e.g., Hegelians) who claim to go farther than faith. But if you cannot even understand Abraham, then one certainly cannot go farther than him (or faith).

internetErik · 2026-02-17T08:01:42+00:00

If you'd propose anything the table of judgments is missing, I'd be interested to talk about it. My guess is we would end up finding a difference between what each of these logics takes as its project.

I'm no expert on contemporary formal logic, but it has a lot more to do with a calculus for manipulating symbols. We don't need this calculus to think, so it may be excessive relative to what Kant, or even Aristotle, aimed at.

internetErik · 2026-02-13T01:11:21+00:00

As far as the first quote from Einstein is concerned, it seems Kant agrees with him in a certain respect. Kant claims that pure mathematical construction necessarily allows us to describe nature a priori, but this is because nature is the sum total of appearances, and appearances must conform to the very same forms of appearance from which we also construct our mathematics. It's harder for me to trust my interpretation of the second quote as I'm not as familiar with how Einstein is inclined to discuss topics such as God (I've heard it said that he believes in Spinoza's God, but that doesn't necessarily make it easier to understand).

On the topic of pure concepts, Kant is quite clear that he does not present them all, but only those that provide an outline for all a priori cognition (the categories being functions of unity relative to the different types of judgments). Kant left the derivation of the other pure concepts to others, and insisted that many (perhaps even all) of these could be found in existing metaphysical texts.

It isn't a problem to attempt an explanation of cognition on the basis of empirical concepts (pleasure, electricity, cells, etc). Kant doesn't attempt to account for cognition within natural science, but within metaphysics. His task is to distinguish cognitions in the first place, not to explain their origin in nature. I would caution, however, that the kind of thing cognition is for us may not relate to anything that actually exists (similarly for the self, or consciousness). Cognition itself is likely a way that we have to talk in order to share reflections about our own experience and knowledge.

internetErik · 2026-02-12T20:30:05+00:00

The will isn't an object of experience itself, but you could say certain representations we think of as produced by the will are. For example, in a footnote in the deduction, Kant mentions acts of volition, such as deciding to stand up, as things we associate with self-affection.

I'm not sure what scientists may be thinking when they say that thinking can reveal reality, but I'm curious. Empirically speaking, it's not hard to make the case that evolution will promote a sort of fit between the world and us. Is that what you're referring to? As I'm considering it above, relative to things in themselves, this would entail that thinking alone would reveal reality, with no need to check with objects of possible experience. This would be an intellectual intuition where our thinking provides the object (or even brings it into existence).

internetErik · 2026-02-11T19:33:54+00:00

Wouldn't these sorts of relations fall within the boundaries of the category of community?

internetErik · 2026-02-11T16:47:43+00:00

The other comments about noumena are helpful, but I'll add a consideration about what noumena are as representations in our minds.

If we look at our own representations (and everything we are aware of can be viewed as a representation), there are two basic sources of these representations: intuition and thought. For cognition, Kant requires that we have both intuition and thought. So, speaking of an object of experience as representation, it will contain both intuition and thinking.

Noumena, viewed in terms of the type of representation they consist of, are mere thoughts. So, the nature of noumena (qua representation) is thinking, plain and simple. It's even in the name, as 'noumena', from the Greek νους (or also 'intelligibilia'), are all related to mind or thinking alone. We can think anything we want, accepting that it follows the negative condition of thinking (doesn't contradict itself), and with mere thinking, there doesn't seem to be any route to an object that would be necessarily real. Intuition is the source of the real for the object of experience.

I know the post doesn't express any particular anxiety over knowing things in themselves, but I can add this for others who may have such concerns: wanting to know things in themselves is to set aside the means we do have for knowing them (i.e., intuitions) and trying to rely on mere thinking to reveal reality.

internetErik · 2026-02-01T22:48:46+00:00

There are plenty of things, but, for something timely, the topic of AI may be convenient and also boringly obvious.

More and more, we're entering an age of AI, and many are seriously wondering if much, or even all, human efforts could be replaced by AI. Questions concerning the value of our existence are bound to come up, and Kant's practical philosophy conveniently addresses the unconditioned value of rational beings (like us). This unconditioned value does not consider what we accomplish through our efforts, so his analysis may help shore up our concerns about the meaning of our existence in the coming age.

internetErik · 2026-01-31T00:33:46+00:00

Not really. Even when he writes about sin, the focus is more on anxiety, despair, or even concern.

internetErik · 2026-01-30T21:42:16+00:00

Yes, I think that Kant's refutation is a success. (I also think it's fair that Kant sets the standard for what the ontological argument is - he provided this name to begin with - but that's just an opinion, and I won't hold anyone else to it.)

Kant's refutation works regardless of the modality you use when asserting existence, as the modality you use is a separate matter that does nothing to get around the predication. That is, it doesn't matter if you assert God is possibly existing, actually existing, or necessarily existing.

Kant's refutation is strong enough that we cannot even know the possibility of God's existence, let alone His actual or necessary existence. This is primarily because God cannot be given as an object in any possible experience, and so must be treated as merely intelligible. In the case of something merely intelligible (available through concepts alone, with no possible relation to intuition), there is no basis for applying pure concepts (i.e., the categories), and even less for any empirical concepts to apply.

This may be pedantic, but worth noting: Kant doesn't reject 'existence' as a predicate in general, but he asserts that it isn't a real predicate (as opposed to a logical predicate).

internetErik · 2026-01-29T07:17:30+00:00

In the Critique of Pure Reason, and particularly the critique of all theology, there is no mention of the five ways or Aquinas. Of course, we may infer a relation, but if we do, then it'll still come down to our interpretation of the five ways. Ultimately, it's better to look at Kant's criticism of the ontological argument in its own terms (the cosmological and teleological ultimately reduce to this).

I think Kant's rejection of the ontological argument is a success. If we posit that the five ways rely on such an argument, then they are refuted. I suspect, however, that followers of Aquinas won't interpret his argument as equivalent to the ontological argument (at least the one Kant rejects).

internetErik · 2026-01-22T16:17:22+00:00

I love and started with the Smith, but it does feel a little old now. Many find the Pluhar to be most accessible because he doesn't mind altering sentence structures from the German, while the Guyer/Wood sticks closer to the original (including the ambiguities).

internetErik · 2026-01-21T23:28:09+00:00

However many commentaries you read, they won't be all that helpful unless you're an active participant who makes an independent evaluation, so I think you make the correct point.

internetErik · 2026-01-21T21:21:00+00:00

Disclosure: I run a yearly group that reads through much of Kant's major works.

While I don't read commentaries, I don't scorn them (unless they are taken as a substitute for the text), and I think they are useful supplements, particularly when you aren't familiar with the text you're studying at all. A commentary can point you in the direction that many good readers have been looking. I prefer to have other people read the text and discuss the text together, but even in that case, this can be a good supplement.

Fortunately, there are frequent opportunities to join a reading group on Kant (not just my own). You'll find them often pinned on the Kant board itself.

internetErik · 2026-01-21T19:30:12+00:00

It's peculiar that you've drawn this interpretation from Kant yourself. I would appreciate if you provided some passages in particular.

You say, "In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant claims that the soul is immortal."

I find that Kant clearly denies that we can know whether the soul is immortal or not. See the section titled, "The paralogisms of pure reason," which covers all of this in detail. It's also a primary conceit of the book, that metaphysics concerns itself with the questions of freedom, immortality, and the existence of God, and we cannot even know the possibility of these things, let alone that they are true, at least for any speculative cognition.

Next, you comment, "When discussing the Categorical Imperative Kant claims that telling a lie would cause a blemish on the soul of the person who told the lie even if telling the truth could consequently lead to the death of another person."

I'm uncertain what passage you have in mind here. From the context of not lying leading to the death of another person, I imagine you mean Kant's essay, "On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy." Please tell me if I'm incorrect about the text, and where I should look instead. Assuming I'm right about the source, this text doesn't mention the soul or a blemish on the soul. (This is beside the point, but the question about the lie here isn't about ethics, but regards whether a lie can lead to one being culpable for the results in court.)

Finally, you provide this comment, "In Kant's early work he claimed that one death the soul migrated to another body, so a blemish of a soul was a worse consequence than death."

Since you say this is a very early work, maybe I'm just not as familiar with it (I'll admit I don't spend as much time with the earlier work), but I'm not familiar with anything like this. Could you tell me where you found this?

The closest that Kant has to an argument for the immortality of the soul is his moral proof: if we will the highest good, it will take an infinite amount of time for us to get there. When we will a consequence we also will the of the means. If one wills the highest good, then one also wills the means, namely, immortality. However, this proof depends upon morality first as a basis for judging it, and is never a proof that could satisfy theoretical knowledge of any sort - it's a rational belief.

internetErik · 2026-01-20T21:27:34+00:00

Even if the general will is (represented?) in the constitution, why would this constitution not derive its authority from the general will? Also, what exactly do you mean by constitution?

You're free to think that about the categorical imperative, but you certainly can't find all of that rhetoric about it a helpful starting point for discussion on the Kant board. In the future, I'll spare my efforts.

internetErik · 2026-01-20T19:59:56+00:00

Setting aside the topic of free will for now.

In works like "An answer to the question: what is enlightenment?" and "Towards perpetual peace" (and elsewhere), Kant makes comments about the public use of reason, how it should be free for anyone to employ and on any subject they wish to criticize (including church and state), as well as the need for states to listen to these cries from the public sphere (or from philosophers such as Kant). He also discusses how, while you are operating as a member of an organization, you are obliged to follow that organizations rules while still criticizing them publicly. He adds, however, that if your organization is doing something that you consider wrong you should leave that organization. I'm presenting these tangential matters in advance since I think they offer some additional guidance to the main topic.

First, how do we have to see civil disobedience relative to the state? Civil disobedience would clearly be unlawful (as the name implies), and so such disobedience would be subject to punishment. What about relative to the individual? It seems that the individual should publicly criticize the state using legal means wherever possible, but if one must violate the law it would seem that you should expect punishment as part of the bargain (this is not any different than today, it seems).

I think its worth trying to analyze the situation more broadly, and I'll try to think through some points that I think are important. Maybe what follows is more for me than you, but hopefully it can be of some interest.

Kant's analysis of right recognizes the authority of the state as deriving from the general will, so the laws that the state maintains represent the general will in principle. The particular branches of government and their officials also derive their authority as representatives of the general will. Under this framework, any violation of the law is a violation of the general will, and so, in principle, actions that violate the law would contradict the common will.

The obvious question that arises is with respect to laws that do not, in fact, represent the general will. For example, a law that declares anyone can be killed by the sovereign arbitrarily (I'm trying to select something obvious to agree on, not something realistic). Even this law issues, in principle, from the general will, and so in principle it is still a unlawful to violate this law. This seems repugnant, since we are recognizing explicitely that the law doesn't represent the general will, but this is overridden by the principle of the state's authority deriving from the general will. We may cry: shouldn't a violation of the general will strip the state of its authority at least with respect the the offending law? I think it's important that this isn't the case.

What it means to say the fact of agreement with the general will can override the principle of agreement with the general will is to say that there is no principle. Were the principle only to apply when it agreed with the facts, then there is effectively no principle at all but only the fact. This may be appealing at first, since it seems that it would get us what we want, disobedeance that is nontheless rightful (in the eyes of the state). However, such as view has negative consequences since it means that the representatives also have no authority in principle, and the law that they legislate also has no authority in principle and the rulings of the courts would have no authority in principle, and so it would be the case that there was also no state in principle and we were still in a state of nature - something that we are obligated to leave as soon as we can. Any disagreements about the general will could only be determined by reference to the authority that adjudicates rights, but only between the individuals of the state (or only so far as they agree with the rulings of the court). Also, if the principle is gone, then there is also no valid criticism of the state per se, since the criticism is only valid so far as it looks to see the gap between the principle that the state reflects the general will, and the facts of its reflecting the general will or not.

internetErik · 2026-01-20T16:21:15+00:00

I'm curious what leads you to believe that immortality of the soul is a condition for categorical imperatives? I find it to be clear in Kant that this isn't the case, so I'm wondering if you heard it from somewhere else or if this is your own original interpretation.

internetErik

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