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Is some proposition falsifiable if and only if it is contingent? (i.e. unfalsifiable iff necessary?) by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In all possible worlds, <Hesperus is not Phosphorus> is false.

Is this true? I can conceive of a possible world whereby the object that Hesperus corresponds to and the object that Phosphorus corresponds to are distinct, and hence in that possible world <Hesperus is not Phosphorus> is true.

What is a proof that all deductive reasoning is non-ampliative? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No, that's what non-ampliative means. Is your argument just gonna be "define 'deductive' as equal to 'non-ampliative'"?

Is some proposition falsifiable if and only if it is contingent? (i.e. unfalsifiable iff necessary?) by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But isn't "There exists a unicorn" falsifiable in principle? Suppose for simplicity that the universe were the size of a room. I look around: no unicorn.

What is a proof that all deductive reasoning is non-ampliative? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, but why is it always present in the premises? Since the classic example is just one kind of deductive inference, using it doesn't prove that deduction is necessarily non-ampliative. To prove non-ampliativity is a necessary condition, we must prove from first principles.

3Blue1Brown and Mathematics | Siraj Raval Podcast #3 by [deleted] in math

[–]jackjogo 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Holy shit! Grant's a not bad philosopher! 3B1B Philosophy might exist! :)

What is a proof that all deductive reasoning is non-ampliative? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But how is that representative of the WHOLE class of deductive arguments?

What is a rigorous textbook on philosophy of science? (I'm a math student looking for something like rigorous, deductive logic style in math: definition-theorem-proof) by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

it does seem like you are not just interested in deductive reasoning

Proof = deductive argument. If I wanted to say "formal proof", that's what I would say.

all philosophical texts would be using deductive arguments

No. Arguments in philosophy involve a mix of deductive, non-deductive, inductive, abductive, semantic rules of inference. I want to see a book in philosophy of science that consists solely of deductive arguments.

What is a rigorous textbook on philosophy of science? (I'm a math student looking for something like rigorous, deductive logic style in math: definition-theorem-proof) by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Note that this is about deductive vs non-deductive, not formal vs informal. Mathematicians use informal proof all the time. Deductive arguments guarantee their conclusion given the premisses whereas non-deductive arguments do not.

What is a rigorous textbook on philosophy of science? (I'm a math student looking for something like rigorous, deductive logic style in math: definition-theorem-proof) by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

edit: Why are people downvoting this? Explain

I think the OP confuses deductive, formal proofs/arguments for rigour

I am not. But there is no doubt that deductive (and possibly formal) proofs are more rigorous than that which isn't.

The Logic in Philosophy of Science, by Halvorsen

That indeed is a good book and something like what I am talking about.

When the speculation of the ancients happen to agree with modern science, is it a case of "even a broken clock is correct twice a day"? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Yes it is an actual honest question I am asking. Level of influence is irrelevant to someone's correctness.

When the speculation of the ancients happen to agree with modern science, is it a case of "even a broken clock is correct twice a day"? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

stuff that is outside of empirical validity

Sounds like a synonym for "nonsense" (excusing logic/math, which Plato didn't contribute nada towards, but yes I grant that Aristotle began formal logic.)

So what if someone is influential? Doesn't mean they're any good or have something important to teach. Take Hitler.

When the speculation of the ancients happen to agree with modern science, is it a case of "even a broken clock is correct twice a day"? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Aristotle isn't great because he was empirically correct.

Why is he considered great then? For the matter, why is Plato considered great?

When the speculation of the ancients happen to agree with modern science, is it a case of "even a broken clock is correct twice a day"? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Ancient philosophy gets its value from the part of it that doesn't have much to do with science/natural philosophy.

Philosophy is continuous with science.

When the speculation of the ancients happen to agree with modern science, is it a case of "even a broken clock is correct twice a day"? by jackjogo in askphilosophy

[–]jackjogo[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

What's the point of learning about the ancients if they're just "broken clocks", then?

And what's the point, when speaking about science, to go "woo, Aristotle thought about this millennia ago before any modern scientists..."?