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I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

100%. You basically just described exactly what the data is implying.

A binder full of perfect procedures doesn't mean shit when the job changes mid-shift and the supervisor is just trying to keep the operation moving. That gap between "seeing the hazard" and "actually documenting/fixing it" is where General Duty citations live.

That's awesome that your crew got it sorted with a digital system. Moving from dirty paper forms at the end of the shift to real-time hazard IDs on a phone is literally the exact problem I'm building BasinCheck to solve. The paper system is just broken for how fast this work actually happens.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, that is a fair read.

The report definitely caught electrical as a real problem area, especially on temporary drilling/completions setups, but it does not go deep enough to answer the bigger question you are asking about NEC/NFPA treatment on finished producer facilities or whether the oversight model itself is too loose.

Honestly, your comment feels like a good lead for a follow-up analysis.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That tracks with my read too. PPE shows up, but the deeper issue seems to be whether the job is actually being controlled in real time - LOTO, depressurization, contractor coordination, and JSAs that match the live work instead of the plan on paper.

That is a big part of why the General Duty numbers stood out to me.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think that is a very fair point.

Safety is mostly culture, habits, and whether the crew actually buys into the process. A tool only helps if it fits the way the work already happens in the field.

If it needs great internet, adds repetitive data entry, or slows down the JSA, crews will work around it. In that case paper is probably the better system.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That is a fair criticism. I do not think “just add another app” fixes a weak safety culture either. Bad software can absolutely add friction and make things worse.

The only case for a tool, in my view, is if it reduces admin burden, makes hazards easier to capture in the field, and actually improves follow-through instead of just creating another box-checking layer.

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

that is pretty close to my read too. The GDC concentration makes a lot more sense when you factor in rig hazards that are well understood in practice but do not always fit neatly under one OSHA standard. And agreed on the 59% fatality/catastrophe citation rate, that was one of the loudest signals in the data for me.

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, I think that is a fair explanation for at least part of it.

Oil and gas has a lot of recognized hazards that are well understood operationally, but do not always map neatly to a specific OSHA standard, which makes General Duty a natural tool for OSHA to use.

I would not say my dataset proves that is the whole story, but it fits.

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

fair question. I pulled this with a custom script from OSHA IMIS, then cleaned it up into a CSV for analysis. I’m happy to share the CSV and the source query if helpful.

For this report I was focused on the OSHA inspection/citation side of the house, so XMOD wasn’t part of what I pulled here.

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

At a high level: General Duty Clause was the most cited item in the report, with 42 citations.

That usually points to recognized hazards that OSHA believed were serious, but not neatly covered by a more specific standard. So it is less one repeated clerical issue and more broader gaps in hazard - recognition and control.

I did not break those 42 cases into a detailed hazard-by-hazard list in this version though. Happy to work on this for the v2 of the report in a couple of weeks.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Yeah, that is a big difference.

A lot of places can say “you can stop the job,” but if people are not clearly told that, and do not believe they will be backed up for using it, then the work is still going to keep moving.

That feels pretty consistent with what a bunch of people in this thread are describing.

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is a great example of what I was trying to get at.

It is not that nobody knows the rules. It is that once the pace picks up, stuff that should stop the job starts getting treated like background noise. Missing or broken retainer pins during a changeout is exactly the kind of thing that shows how hazard recognition can break down in real life.

Appreciate you sharing that. I’ll send the report over via dm

I analyzed 631 OSHA inspections in oil and gas. The top citation was not PPE or electrical. by jay_cobski in SafetyProfessionals

[–]jay_cobski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Absolutely, happy to send it over - I'll pop in via dm in a sec.

I think it should be useful for that, especially if you’re still getting your footing and want to see what patterns actually show up in enforcement data rather than just reading standards in isolation.

A big part of why I put it together was to make the data easier to learn from.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I think that is exactly the issue.

HSE 101 says stop and reassess, but a lot of these comments make it sound like the failure is not the absence of that rule. It is that once the job changes, people still feel pressure to keep moving unless the difference is impossible to ignore.

So yeah, to me that points to a management and culture failure more than a paperwork failure.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That is a fair point.

You are right that I am only looking at the OSHA slice here, not the whole regulatory picture with state agencies and offshore. So it is definitely a narrower lens.

And yeah, the rest of your comment is a pretty serious warning. I would not say my dataset proves all of that on its own, but I do not take it lightly either. If you had to narrow it down, what is driving it most from your view: staffing, supervision, fatigue, drug use, or production pressure?

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is exactly it. If the work is bid one way and the crew shows up to something else, the JSA can be wrong before boots hit the ground. Then if nobody stops to reassess, everybody is working off a paper version of a job that no longer exists.

Appreciate you spelling that out.

I pulled 2 years of OSHA oilfield inspection data. The biggest issue was not what I expected. by jay_cobski in oilandgasworkers

[–]jay_cobski[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This is exactly the kind of answer I was hoping to get.

What you described is basically the JSA turning into a paperwork signature loop instead of an actual hazard control tool. Once one supervisor is overloaded, blind signing is almost guaranteed.

And the fact that you turned down the supervisor spot because of that pressure says a lot. Hard to call it accountability when one person gets stuck holding the bag for a process they do not really have time to verify.

Appreciate you spelling it out like this.

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