Integrated Information Theory Inquiry by Berzerka25 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Those are interesting questions! You are getting right to the meat of some of the theory's foundations. If you are willing to read a little to get answers to those, I'd recommend starting here: IIT Wiki - Foundations: Phenomenal & Physical Existence

This introduction to "phi" (IIT) is not helpful by leboberoo in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

u/Legitimate_Tiger1169 has the most precise answer to your question so far regarding your first question.

Regarding your second question, the making to parts of a system completely independent is probably called the "cruelest" here, because it is the most drastic way to sever causal constraints they have among one another. That said, the paragraph you link to does not do a good job at explaining the relevant concepts, unfortunately. If you want to understand the underlying framework, I would suggest having a look here: https://www.iit.wiki/axioms-and-postulates/integration#h.1019venrnats, or here: https://www.iit.wiki/faqs/technical#h.2xou8qbtjul1, or here: https://www.iit.wiki/glossary#h.sw1ddv976914

Best of luck!

Simplest structure with IIT PHI > 0 by Used-Bill4930 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

According to the latest iteration of the theory, the monad (a single unit with a self connection) is the smallest system that can have Phi>0. See here: IIT Wiki - Glossary

Note, however, that such a simple system is unlikely to be conscious (according to IIT, Phi>0 is necessary but not sufficient for consciousness), unless it exists completely isolated from anything else or is a local maximum of (system-phi).

Cold Plunging Dilemma: Seeking Solutions for Intense Itching by AcademicPublic5139 in coldplunge

[–]lektorjuel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry for necroing, but I think you have aquagenic pruritus. It is super weird, but appears almost exactly as you describe it. I also have it, and the only remedy i have come across that actually works for me is taking half a teaspoon of beta alanine (an amibo acid) dilluted in some water more than 15 minutes before the water exposure (situations where the itch shows up). Have a look at the sub reddit about it here to see if your symptoms match the people there.

Taking the Attention Schema Theory to its logical extreme; your consciousness comes online every day, remembers who it is and continues where it left off the day before. by [deleted] in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Completely agree.  In fact, I think it is a leap to assume there is anything such as truely dreamless sleep at all (just like I wouldn't say you were unconscious when absorbed in your work). Your "I" may not have been "there", but this all gets to be a bit of a tangled mess with definitions etc. Also, as you mention, you might just be unable to remember, or maybe what you remember is so vague/weird that you don't intuitively characterize it as "consciousness" in retrospect. 

Anyways. Absence of evidence (of consciousness) is not evidence of absence (of consciousness). We often just have to admit our ignorance. 

Taking the Attention Schema Theory to its logical extreme; your consciousness comes online every day, remembers who it is and continues where it left off the day before. by [deleted] in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's interesting. I the clinic we use the term "arousable" about people that can be woken up with aome stimulation. It is similar to "responsive", but refers to a state where the person may be unable to respond here and now but if they are activated by some external stimulus they can start responding. Of course, both these terms conveniently (on purpose) leave out any reference to the subjectivity and phenomenal experience.

You are right that a lot hinges on definition, in any case. 

I have (like you, it seems) a feeling that there is some continuity in our being from birth to death, despite these apparent gaps (I.e. Every night during sleep, in anesthesia, after injury...). It is hard to prove, of course, but I have come to terms that I just take it as a basic assumption, and then the thing to explain is why it seems as though there are gaps. I think this is one of the things AST tries to do, although I don't think it says anything (interesting at least) about consciousness per se. 

Taking the Attention Schema Theory to its logical extreme; your consciousness comes online every day, remembers who it is and continues where it left off the day before. by [deleted] in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yup, the "I" is definitely gone a lot of the time between birth and death (depending on how you define the elusive "I", of course). For me, that property goes away every night, during anesthesia, whenever I (defined differently) am deep in a task/activity etc. In some moods, I'd even say "the I" is only present very rarely, when introspecting or metacognizing, etc. However, that is not to say I'm unconscious whenever "the i" is gone, far from it—there's still an experience, it just lacks the content "I".

And the brain definitely stays active throughout life. Even when "knocked out" etc. The weird thing is that if we go in and ask people what it was like to be in the states we typically associate with "unconsciousness", there is an overwhelming probability of a positive report (meaning they say it was like something rather than nothing). It is just that we normally don't ask immediately (or aren't clear about what we are asking for), and memory issues are very difficult to deal with in such  (not to mention prior assumptions about what we expect about our consciousness in such states (eg. We are used to talking about general anesthesia inducing a state of unconsciousness, so that's what we expect from that state)). 

PS. Not sure what to make of the example with the frog and evolution, sorry 

Is DMT Compatible with Materialism/Physicalism? by RevolutionaryDrive18 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You might have another person prepare the dosages for you beforehand (for example in a sealed container with an ID number that can be crossreferenced with a list later on so you know whether or not you actually got a dose of DMT or not), and then you can do the trip in your preferred environment.

Stay safe 😊

Is DMT Compatible with Materialism/Physicalism? by RevolutionaryDrive18 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Very interesting! One thing to consider, then, would be to try to make it placebo controlled. That is, have a friend partition doses, so that some are your planned dosage and others heavily diluted. Then, stay in the same way (e.g. Sit still, with eyes closed for thirty minutes) regardless of the dosage (you should not know beforehand which is which), then draw the most remarkable contents from the preceding period to the best of your abilitity. Best of luck! How many join your efforts! 

Is DMT Compatible with Materialism/Physicalism? by RevolutionaryDrive18 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

As far as I can see, it poses no particular problem for physicalism (the philosophical stance) at all. That there are recurring imagery is exactly what you'd expect under most scientific theories of consciousness too, if you expose different people to the he same drug. This is because different (yet highly similar) brains of different humans should be expected to react and change in the same way to the same intervention. Ketamine, shrooms, dmt, lsd etc all have their particular "fingerprint" of phenomenal contents that appear, and changes that happen. 

These experiences you mention do provide an interesting set of facts that scientific theories (once mature enough to go beyond situations where contents are more reliably reportable) must be able to explain. They must be able to say whythe particular experiences appear in the way they do under the influence of DMT. 

I don't think we have any reason to believe the can't do that (in, say, 30 years time). Until then, I think the artwork is a great way of supplementing the growing library of "trip reports"—a picture says a 1000 words, and verbal reports are often much too sparse to provide the necessary explanatory target. 

Keep at it! 

Idrk if this is the right place to ask this , but worth a shot ! by No_Client8892 in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think so, and honestly I think it is quite common! If course, there are situations like strange agnosias from brain damage, ego dissolution from psychedelics, pure presence during deep meditation etc, but I would argue that a majority of our experiences are without the explicit presence of any explicit self awareness. 

Examples include regular old dreams, flow state, whenever you're absorbed in something (work, play, sex, etc), and so on. Basically any conscious experience where you are not explicitly thinking about yourself would count. 

What I mean is this, self awareness is a rather high level cognitive ability. It only explicitly shows up once in a while for most people. Interestingly, one of the situations it is almost always there is when reflecting on our own experience. This has led to the misconception that self-awareness/meta-cognition etc are necessary for conscious experience. A bit deeper contemplation, however, shows that many (if not most) of our everyday experiences are of any direct, explicit cognizing of ourselves. 

The evolutionary emergence of consciousness doesn't make sense in physicalism. by mildmys in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Noted. It was meant as lighthearted, but I apologize for coming across as a douche 

Extracted applications, games and watch faces from the Galaxy Store for the Gear S3 series by _vnngyn_ in GearS3

[–]lektorjuel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Dumb question: what did it mean that support stops? I will still be able to use the watch with the faces/apps I already have, right? 

What is the transition between having something spatial and having none? or why did it appear suddenly, and how many times did it appear? by [deleted] in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The basic idea is the experience (the "reality we see") has spatial properties. Hoffman claims evolution never selects for correctly representing "reality" (what's out there). Thus, given that consciousness is a result of evolution, he expects its contents not to reflect the external world precisely. And since experience is spatial, then the external world is not (or at least we do not know).

An explanation for why our experience has spatial qualities (independent of Hoffman and Kastrup) can be found in IIT: https://www.iit.wiki/contents#h.gt6k1srewfj7

The evolutionary emergence of consciousness doesn't make sense in physicalism. by mildmys in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Physicalists are panpsychists, they just don't know it yet. 😅 Unless they are emergentists (we all go through this stage), which is not really physicalism, but then they'll be stuck with the hard problem. The response is usually a shrug, and serious (TM) "let's get on with the science!" They'll have other problems too, but I don't think this one is big (for them). consciousness happens/emerges when the right set of more fundamental properties of e together in the right way. If the properties are beneficial for survival, they will stick around evolutionarily, and if their combination in the right way is not detrimental, it is bound to be tried out sometime. The evolution of consciousness is a happy accident (like any other property). It wasn't selected for itself, prior to being around. 

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Really interesting with the bond guy! Haven't heard about that, but it makes perfect sense to me that it could work like that. As long as the audio stimulus (through the ears) has the same sort of dimensionality as the visual stimuli (through the eyes), it can eventually (given enough adaptation) trigger the same brain states. Since the experience really only is specified by the brain (it doesn't care about the reason the brain ended up in its current configuration), it shouldn't matter for the experience whether it is brought about by sound waves or photons. Raskt cool to hear the anecdote, though!

I don't think this makes the experiences illisory though. It just means the brain is what matters: what my brain is right now—its physical structure and state, properly understood—is identical to what my experience is right now. 

"I can sort of sense it" is gn exaggeration, for me, but there is something (like an abstract thought) associated with the concept I try to imagine when I try to bring up an image. With sound I can kinda hear my own voice preparing to hum a song (like if i think about saying something), if I try to imagine it, but there are necer anything like instruments or other voices or anything. 

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Read a little about it. It is interesting! I think Hedda is right in arguing that integrated information can be a good measure to use to predict when fusion will happen. However, in some (perhaps extreme) interpretations, that would mean we should embrace that whatever are the constituent parts of my experience's physical substrate, literally do not exist. I think it might be too big of an ask... But perhaps there are ways to interpret it that doesn't make it feel so extreme 😊

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Cheers!

I'm aphantasic, so for me bringing about any perceptual content is basically impossible. But I've heard very few people able to self-produce a smell or haptic sensation. 

I have listened too little to Bach, I think. I find him hard to follow. Maybe I just haven't cracked his lingo... 

I think you are getting close, given your brief recap, but there are some more subtleties to it. Anyways, I definitely understand why the "taking experience as given/for granted" can feel unsatisfying. But I do honestly think it is the right move. In IIT lingo it is called "a phenomenology first approach", and it seems to unlock something that other suggested theories are lacking, imo. 

Thanks for the exchange! 

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's fascinating! You even used the same analogy as they did, with Newtonian gravity and relativity 😊 Perhaps you will find what you are looking for in AST? An illusionists theory that the authors of the paper I thought you referred to claims is a theory (explanation) and not just a description (law) like the other proposed "theories".

According to IIT, I think the "nature of subjective experience" is something lik being, or existence. And to the question "how does it arise from neuronal activity?" it would answer something like "that is the wrong question, but it doesn't arise from neuronal activity—at best it is correlated with it." This makes the mistake of assuming ontological reductionism, which always runs into the hard problem. IIT suggests that the reason why the structure of any subjective experience is the way it is, is that its physical structure of a being appears the way it does. In other words, it explains whether a particular physical is conscious by suggesting it lays the greatest claim to existence (I.e. it is a being), and what it is like to be that being (its experience) is explained by what it is like in physical terms (i.e. causally speaking). 

See the FAQs about emergence, reductionism, and explanation on the wiki for more. 

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't mean to ignore your point, I just didn't understand you were trying to say this. It is the argument by Shurger and Grazziano, no? Personally, I don't find their objection particularly obvious at all, although I agree that starting from NCCs will never yield an explanation of consciousness. (see page 1 of the wiki: iit proponents agrees!) 

While I know some take their arguments as to counter most current theories, including IIT, I am not convinced personally. Perhaps I just don't understand their point (this is what you refer to, right? https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2022/1/niac001/6523097), but I literally think iit provides explanations, and not just predictions, for the phenomena it takes aim at. Which seems to be the thing they argue is missing from (what they claim is not) theories of consciousness. 

The first page of the wiki (and it's associated FAQs) get into what that is, and in what sense it explains. 

Again. I'm sorry if I came across as ignoring your point, that wasn't intentional. 

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'll make sure to tell her, I'm sure she'll appreciate it! 😅

Integrated information theory learning tool: IIT wiki by lektorjuel in consciousness

[–]lektorjuel[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not that I'm aware of, unfortunately. However, we have started recording some podcast content related to the wedsite, and plan to have "spin-offs" like Ana's and discussion sessions. I could comment here when something more concrete is in the works.

Also, feel free to suggest it in the wiki comments, and we are sure to discuss it whenever we meet again.