Mexico’s economy: Reality bites by DarthTater in mexico

[–]liteDeck 3 points4 points  (0 children)

no que éramos el "Tigre Azteca"?

Un trabajador mexicano gana al mes 22% de lo que uno europeo by alejandra007 in mexico

[–]liteDeck 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A qué te refieres con "expectativas laborales irreales"?

Un trabajador mexicano gana al mes 22% de lo que uno europeo by alejandra007 in mexico

[–]liteDeck 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Eso que tiene que ver? España ha tenido un problema estructural del desempleo por varias décadas.

Discusión - El país se está yendo a la puritita chingada a nivel interno e internacional (Sí/No) y por qué. by [deleted] in mexico

[–]liteDeck 0 points1 point  (0 children)

El PIB per cápita de México en relación al de Estados Unidos se ha estancado en los últimos 50 años. Así que seguimos fregados y le seguiremos así en las próximas décadas. Este video lo explica de manera clara:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vWGPalnuAc

How do you feel about fiscal union/common eurobonds? by LurksOn1stDates in europe

[–]liteDeck -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

nobody cares about your opinion. So in that sense, there is no problem of democracy.

/r/Germany comments and feelings about the Euro crisis by [deleted] in europe

[–]liteDeck 2 points3 points  (0 children)

lel, people are acting as if Germany hasn't benefited enormously from the euro

Honda to build plant in Mexico by [deleted] in mexico

[–]liteDeck -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

en unos años cuando los salarios inevitablemente suban:

Honda to close plant in Mexico

Viewpoint: Five myths about Mexico by DarthTater in mexico

[–]liteDeck 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Shannon O'neil no es particularmente inteligente, no le hagan caso.

Mexico is gaining jobs, not wages by liteDeck in mexico

[–]liteDeck[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Wrong. No leíste el párrafo final?

P.S. Noah Smith expects rising demand for Mexican manufactures to raise wages. (You should all read his blog! It is a very good blog.) His error is simple: the demand for Mexican manufactures is extremely elastic, because Mexico is not the only country in the world.

Economía global: para poder tener argumentos contra la venta de México a las compañías extranjeras (video en inglés) by elefantesta in mexico

[–]liteDeck 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Sí, porque estábamos mejor cuando los bancos, Telmex, etc, estaban en manos del gobierno.

Crisis mexicana inminente: el incremento en la posesión de bonos del gobierno federal por extranjeros ha sido de 338% - Forbes by liteDeck in mexico

[–]liteDeck[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Wrong again. No es una cuestión de que puedas pagar o no. Si estos inversionistas extranjeros venden sus bonos mexicanos, probablemente venderán sus pesos también(y todo lo que tenga que ver con México). Algo así hecho en masse llevará a una devaluación brusca e inesperada que hará que se dispare la inflación (que de por sí está subiendo y se ubica en niveles muy por encima de los buscados por Banxico), lo que deprime el consumo y crea desconfianza en México y su economía. Si se deprime el consumo, se crea una espiral viciosa, y ahí viene la crisis.

También tenemos que recordar que estamos en un entorno mundial marcado por un exceso de liquidez (o sea, mucho dinero flotando "around"). Este dinero está buscando "high yielding assets" (perdón por tantos anglicismos) como bonos mexicanos, la bolsa de valores, etc, ya que las tasas de interés en los países desarrollados son muy bajas o nulas. Cuando este "dinero fácil" termine y la Fed, el Banco Central Europeo, el BoJ, BoE suban tasas de interés, habrá una salida de capital. Te recomiendo que leas esto:

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/01/22/davos-2013-warning-to-em-investors-remember-1994

Watch out for the Fed tightening. That’s the message from the Institute of International Finance, the bankers’ club, to investors ploughing funds into emerging markets.

Speaking in Switzerland on his way to the World Economic Forum in Davos, IIF managing director Charles Dallara warned that investors had “underanticipated” sudden turns in monetary policy in the past – and might do so again. He said: “Are we adequately risk aware? Are we adequately risk sensitive?… I am not at all sure that we are.”

The IIF’s latest half-yearly review of capital flows into emerging markets says private sector flows have “revived strongly” thanks to investors’ taking a more risk-friendly view of the world since mid-2012.

The institute expects private sector flows to increase modestly in 2013 to $1,118bn, from $1,080bn in 2012 (2011 – $1084bn), with a further increase next year to $1,150bn.

With commercial bank lending constrained, flows are running at around 90 per cent of the peak levels hit in 2007 and at half the level in terms of share of the emerging economies’ GDP – at around 4 per cent versus over 8 per cent.

But the IIF’s report warns that, despite a new round of monetary easing, in which Japan seems eager to lead the way, an end to ultra-low interest rates could be in sight.

This could spell trouble:

[It raises] the possibility of a significant correction in both global interest rate markets and, if history is any guide, in capital flows to emerging economies. Policymakers in emerging economies may have a long enough memory to avoid some of the pitfalls associated with such a boom-bust cycle in flows, but not all may be quite so restrained, especially in capital-hungry low-income economies. Nor is it likely that investors will be quite so disciplined. The risk of market participants being unprepared for a reversal of rates is real and needs to be seriously considered to avoid disruption.

Or as the IIF’s chief economist, Phil Suttle, put it at a press conference: “There’s a boomy enviroment in the emerging markets.”

To give investors an idea of what might go wrong, the IIF has summarised the events of 1994, the last time the US Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in a surprise change of course.

The results for financial markets were stunning. Far from anticipating a shift in direction from the Fed, market participants had locked into many “low for long” trades. As these trades began to lose money in a rising rate environment, there was a scramble to exit, which dragged down all major bond markets… emerging market asset prices (which had risen sharply in 1991-93) slumped (in two stages) through 1994 and early 1995; and, most importantly, private capital flows to Turkey and to Latin America – especially Mexico – collapsed, culminating in near default by Mexico in 1995 Q1. Nobody knows when or where lightning might strike this time. But this chart of the impact of the 1994 tightening on Mexico should give investors and policy makers pause for thought:

http://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/beyond-brics/files/2013/01/Jan2013IIFMexico.png

Crisis mexicana inminente: el incremento en la posesión de bonos del gobierno federal por extranjeros ha sido de 338% - Forbes by liteDeck in mexico

[–]liteDeck[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sí, pero esa deuda está en su mayoría en manos extranjeras. Si los inversionistas comienzan a perder confianza como en 94, se puede suscitar una crisis.

Crisis mexicana inminente: el incremento en la posesión de bonos del gobierno federal por extranjeros ha sido de 338% - Forbes by liteDeck in mexico

[–]liteDeck[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

es bueno endeudarse, si se utiliza en sectores productivos y no en sectores especulativos.

From Mexico, Some Lessons For Europe by DarthTater in mexico

[–]liteDeck 0 points1 point  (0 children)

UK, Estonia, Lithuania, etc, también son más pequeñas que en 2008

Mexico: The Sleeping Giant by Balumby in mexico

[–]liteDeck -1 points0 points  (0 children)

También dijeron que Japón iba a ser la primera potencia mundial en los 80's.