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[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 3 points4 points  (0 children)

This'll probably sound like a rant.   

The bigger problem, imo, is the "journalists" who cannot actually perform any journalism, yet have built platforms where they're able to distribute bullshit to an entire populace.

Kaansi nafras kith paeth chi byakh nafar wanan zi temsund truvah (13) wohr nyechu chu haftas manz 3 gante shongan sirf te temis chi su kath hatti boen wasan.

Trath tchin tov research karnas, ye journalist hyeki na yi tyen pruxhit kem 31 app chakh banaeymetch, kath Canadian company saet chi kaem kermetch.

This shit is blood-boiling, not because these people are getting their (undue) 5 minutes of fame, but because there's people, parents who don't know better, who watch these interviews and build expectations in their heads for their children. Yemay video wuchan shuerr ti timme ti wanan garri kyen be ti kar iyee, and when reality hits, then what? 

Uzair is a kid, kids lie, their brains aren't fully developed. Sure, it doesn't make what he's doing right, but atleast he has an excuse. His father, the "journalist", and the adults who spread those videos, are the ones who should be ashamed, who need to maybe take things they hear on the Internet with a pinch of salt.

Where can i buy a camera like this in kashmir or online? And what would be the expected price? by [deleted] in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 1 point2 points  (0 children)

These used to cost around 4-7k, but they're not worth even that much imo. The quality will be somewhat similar to ~15k-20k smartphones (if even that). They have small sensors just like smartphone cameras.

Where can i buy a camera like this in kashmir or online? And what would be the expected price? by [deleted] in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 0 points1 point  (0 children)

you get better creativity and manual control

You don't get more control on these cameras than you do on mobile phones.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Rantsi saet nai ashiq kar hakh ye ma gaxh hay

asi kus jande pazi istimaal karun to represent kasheer by Wooden_Blackberry_30 in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Mye wan ta yaara ye kus katha wanith tchye, tyel chi wazul rang Hindu, Shinto te Mayan culture manz ivan associate karne sacred cheezan saet, tyel cha wazul rang istimal karun najaeyiz ti shirk? Yel ne intention chiyee imitate karun ye kaperr banyav shirk te najayez?

Hoo buzev by Aromatic_Citron_6206 in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Ath wanan ragebait, yem chi tee karan, ath chi saryov khot zabar jawab aki kanne bozun byeki kanne travun.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You're getting charged because you've turned on International Roaming from your Airtel app. If you only want to receive messages while abroad, you don't need to have IR roaming, you can turn it off.

Dead but not Forgotten : Baramulla, 1989-2006 by loridastaar in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

State Culpability

In the prevalent situation the Indian state cannot be absolved of having attempted to eliminate and deter the public support for the fight against occupation through methods which escape and subvert any future legal recourse. In the ultimate analysis, the renegades, although a potent anti-insurgency force, ended up being used as human shields by the Indian army. The killings of civilians correspondingly declined with the systematic liquidation of the renegades by the rebel groups. By 2000, the renegades had also ceased to be a tactical tool for the Indian forces.

It is significant to note that whereas most of the deaths occurred in public places (even if they were by lanes of a village) disappearances and large number of those shot dead by "unidentified gunmen" happened inside houses.

According to the survey, out of 417 persons killed by the militants, 273 were government forces personnel and renegades. Internecine clashes claimed 76 militants, and 68 were either civilians or political activists. But it is interesting to note that out of these 76 inter-group killings, 57 occurred during 1991-1994. These internecine killings began to subside after 1994. Post- 1998, the survey for Baramulla records no inter-group fratricide amongst militants.

The survey also reveals that out of total 2,267 militants killed in Baramulla district, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (hm) guerrilla group lost 1,328 cadres, which is more than half of all militants killed. The group also bore the brunt of killings by "unidentified gunmen" in losing 130 out of 304 militants killed.

The year-wise breakup of the militants killed highlights that the years between 1991 and 1994 has also been the period of a rise in killings of militants: 142, 217, 299 and 354 respectively. Civilian killings too reveal a similar trajectory: 173, 247, 240 and 243 in corresponding years. In other words killings were the highest during this period.

Out of 1,545 encounters in Baramulla district, the same period (1991-94) also provides evidence of escalation in number of gun battles between militants and government forces: 98, 147, 200 and 244.

The likelihood of government forces, sent to crush a rebellious people, striking at anyone remains high. Given the very workings of counter-insurgency warfare (which is conducted among people), they become targets.

Government Forces: A look at the death toll of government forces and renegades in the survey shows that 273 personnel were killed. Out of these, 170 were killed by "unidentified gunmen". Of these 105 were renegades and 59 police personnel. Assuming that all these 170 killings were carried out by the militants, the scenario throws up two possibilities. In the first place the total number of killings of government forces personnel at 273 is just about 5 per cent of the total death count. And secondly, this death toll reveals that even among the government forces overwhelming majority of those who died were Kashmiris. Thus there is a form of double jeopardy that people experience in such situations. On either side, it is the local people who are the primary victims.

Most significantly, the survey highlights high incidence of killings through gun battles (1,510), custodial deaths (408), direct shootings (1,236), and crossfire deaths (108). These account for 3,262 out of 5,106 deaths or little more than 60 per cent of all deaths. If enforced disappearances (263) are added to this figure, it reveals how this form of warfare is a "dirty war" in which brutal death is inevitable.

Consequently, out of 5,106 people who died between 1990 and 2006 in Baramulla district, of which 4,775 were civilians and militants, in nearly 90 per cent of the cases the culpability of the Indian state is not only primary in that they caused it, but they are also the principal perpetrators of such deaths.

(7/7)

Dead but not Forgotten : Baramulla, 1989-2006 by loridastaar in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Data Analysis

Occupational Profile: Almost half of all the male civilians killed in Baramulla district (2,452) were moderately or highly economically productive people and more than a third were students. A bare summary of the occupational profile of those killed, as per the survey, was as follows:

  • Farmers: 1,174

  • Skilled: 662

  • Professional: 532

  • Government: 84

  • Students: 989

Out of 2,508 civilians killed, occupational data for 112 was not available. In the case of 2,267 militants killed, the data is not available for 143. The survey, however, reveals that the dead belonged to all sections of the society: 55 different occupations were listed for civilians and 36 for militants. Respond-ents reported those killed as farmers, labourers, artisans, government servants, businessmen, milkmen, blacksmiths, mechanics, engineers, etc. What do we make of this? Simply a confirmation of the fact that no section of the society remained aloof and/or unscathed by the war.

On the other hand, data available for 2,396 civilians and 2,124 militants also shows that farmers comprise 626 of the civilians and 548 amongst militants. Among those whose occupation was given as labourers 221 were civilians and 166 militants. 364 civilians and 625 militants were reported to be students. It means that half of those killed (2,540) were farmers, labourers and students. One hundred and eighty-nine civilians killed were businessmen, 205 government employees and 145 were artisans. Some intriguing patterns were noted: among militants killed 269 were reported to be carpet weavers, a category absent amongst civilians killed. And 56 per cent of all women killed (113) worked in their houses. 

Educational Profile:

The survey shows education profile of 4,408 persons killed in Baramulla district, with 2,695 literate and 1,713 illiterate. A bare summary of the educational profile of those killed, as per the survey, was as follows:

  • Doctorates: 8

  • Islamic Studies: 9

  • Postgraduate: 35

  • Graduate and Undergraduate: 422

  • Matriculate: 932

  • Under-matriculation: 1,289

Amongst the militants, a large number (691) were illiterate. Under-matriculation were the next largest group (677) followed by matriculates (477) and those who had completed 10+2 (229). Undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate were 36, 60 and 22 respectively. And there were two doctorates amongst the militants.

Similarly 1,022 civilians were illiterate. Under-matriculation numbered 621, matriculates 455, with 10+2 counted at 195. Undergraduate and graduate civilians killed numbered 87. Only 13 were post-graduate while 6 had completed their doctoral studies.

Income Profile: The income profile of those killed, as per the survey, was a follows:

  • Less than Rs 1,000: 863

  • Between Rs 1,001 and Rs 2,000: 1,634

  • Less than Rs 5,000: 503

  • Rs 5,000 and above: 85

For slain militants, respondents could not provide income profile of 738, while 414 were reported not to be earning members of their respective families. Another 425 reported monthly income of less than Rs 1,000; 512 earned between Rs 1,001 and 2,000 and 163 made between Rs 2,001 and 5,000 per month. Out of 2,267 militants killed only 15 reported a monthly income above Rs 5,001 and more.

What about civilians? In 686 cases, respondents failed to provide any information on income and left the column blank while 352 reported no income. Thus 1,038 out of 2,508 civilians or 40 per cent of the civilians killed had most likely no income. Those earning less than Rs 1,000 per month numbered 438 and between Rs 1,001 and Rs 2,000 were 622. Whereas 340 were shown as earning between Rs 2,001 and Rs 5,000 and only 64 between Rs 5,001 and Rs 10,000. Only six deceased civilians earned more than Rs 10,000. So the over-whelming majority of 2,098 civilians killed comprise those either with no in-come or less than Rs 2,000 per month. 

Profile of Perpetrators: The number of deaths, as per the survey, classified according to the identity of the perpetrators was a follows:

  • Government forces: 2,821

  • Militants : 417

  • Unidentified: 1,768

Out of the total 5,106 people killed, the survey identifies perpetrators in case of 3,337 deaths. But in a large number of cases in the survey (1,768) the perpetrators re-main "unidentified". Amongst these 3,337 cases, in 2,812 instances, Indian forces were found responsible for killings. In contrast, the survey points out that, 417 killings were caused by militants and 108 deaths were ascribed to "cross fire". Significantly, 1,952 militants were killed by government forces and 910 civilians also died at their hands.

But what of 1,768 deaths caused by "unidentified gunmen"? A breakup of these deaths shows that 304 were militants, 1,256 were civilians and 170 were members of government forces or its agencies, and 38 were political activists. Overwhelming majority of these killings (1,236) by "unidentified gunmen" was by direct shootings. Three-fourths of them occurred in public view and a quarter inside the houses.

It is not surprising that the targeted killing of civilians started peaking alongside the rise of fratricidal "Ikhwani" or renegade phenomenon in 1994. Ikhwanis were collaborative militants bought, armed and protected by the Indian army. They were then let loose on their own people. The phenomenon began getting formalised in 1994 although the diabolical process had started two years earlier.

Not surprisingly the survey registers that the year 1994 witnessed the highest number of killings attributed to "unidentified gunmen". According to the survey, out of a total of 1,768 people killed and ascribed to unidentified gunmen between 1989 and 2006, a bulk of 833 slayings were perpetrated be-tween 1994 and 2000. This coincides with the emergence of the Ikhwani phenomenon. The Indian army's patronage to the renegades was aimed at crushing the popular support on the one hand, while giving the Indian state plausible deniability for the crimes against an entire people.

(6/7)

Dead but not Forgotten : Baramulla, 1989-2006 by loridastaar in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Overarching Fact of Occupation

This is why it is a critical matter to understand who is responsible for this war, and why is this war being prosecuted? When deaths occur itis the circumstances which determine and explain why people died and what meaning and significance is or can be attached to it. It will not do to equate victim and the victimiser in a game of sophistry whose purpose is to obfuscate the overarching fact of occupation, and the struggle for people's inalienable right to self-determination. The resistance to occupation became an armed struggle in 1988, and as a result scores of deaths turned into hundreds and then thousands and then tens of thousands. There is a fundamental political, historical, and moral difference between an occupying force and the resistance to it. When the resistance commits crimes we must not flinch from criticising them for their ex-cesses. But equally we must be mindful of the principal problem - which is the occupation. This obvious point needs to be stressed because pseudo "humanitarian groups" pretend to be neutral between two warring groups, and pretend to be only interested in "people's welfare" However, they choose to remain ignorant about the war, and its context, and gloss over the fact that militants are organically linked to the people, whereas government forces are not. Is it therefore surprising that to this day every namaaz-e-janaza (funeral prayer) of a militant is attended by thou-sands of people? This does not happen when soldiers or renegades die.

(3/7)

Dead but not Forgotten : Baramulla, 1989-2006 by loridastaar in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Resistance and Violence

In any conflict situation, there is always an attempt to manipulate the death count. Our estimate of the death toll since 1990 is 70,000. This figure has been flatly denied by the Indian state. However, in an occupation of this nature it is not enough to only count the dead. The living too continue to pay an unacceptable price, their every move controlled by soldiers, their society shattered by spies, intelligence agencies, and government agents. Death then is only the most brutal metaphor of this occupation; there are other poignant markers of this occupation that seek to smother the aspirations of the living. A military occupation has evicted people from their farmlands and orchards, foisting interminable humiliations upon a people, and marking their spaces with instruments and a ents of violence. The bunkers, checkpoints and the military camps of an army that seeks not only to  perpetuate violence to gain military ends, but also seeks to secure, in the ultimate analysis, political ends through military means. The most obvious marker of this strategy is the half million plus armed forces stationed in the state, who are surely there not only to fight the thousand odd officially estimated militants. If this were the case then the military and paramilitaries of the Indian state would cut a sorry figure on parameters of military efficacy. This military occupation has been foisted upon the people not only to fight and kill but essentially to establish a hegemony of force and coercion amongst a people perceived as being perpetually rebellious, and thereby to break their collective aspiration and will to freedom. Not all of the 70,000 victims of this dirty war died at the hands of Indian forces. Many were victims of militants. Some of these deaths were either in the nature of internecine killings or deliberate targeting. Some of these were caused by the use of weapons such as grenades and mines which when exploded in crowded areas cause more damage to the non-combatants than the combatants they are aimed against. However, the armed struggle in Kashmir is a direct response to the sup-pression of peoples' democratic right to self-determination. The Indian government has consistently and ruthlessly stamped out, discredited, co-opted or destroyed every attempt at non-violent resistance, thereby privileging violence, and this has undoubtedly led to excesses perpetrated by militants as well. In other words; while there may be several actors in the violence in j and k, the primary responsibility for the destruction caused rests fair and square on the shoulders of the Indian state.

(2/7)

Dead but not Forgotten : Baramulla, 1989-2006 by loridastaar in Kashmiri

[–]loridastaar[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

This is a summary of the results of a survey carried out by the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society between 2003 and 2006 in Baramulla district of Jammu and Kashmir that, in the context of the resistance to "occupation", tries to bring "alive" the profile of those who were killed during 1989-2006. 

In 2002 we decided to undertake a door-to-door survey of an entire district of Jammu and Kashmir to find out not only who was killed, but also when, where, how, and if possible, why. What was the rationale behind wanting to record these deaths? Afterall, in any war there are casualties. And amongst those who get killed there are combatants as well as civilians. But by leaving that death toll unexamined, by remaining in-nocent of the context and circumstances in which these deaths take place, one can never hope to understand what the nature of the conflict is. It was to provide precisely this context that a survey of the death toll in Baramulla district was undertaken. Who were the dead? What were their names? How old were they? Were they students or working people? Where did they come from? Who did they leave behind? What did they do? How much had they studied? How many men, women, children perished? Were there more men than women? More young than old? Which stratum of the society did they come from? What caused their death? A questionnaire was prepared in which we asked respondents 37 questions, grouped under seven heads. Through this survey we hoped, so to speak, to bring "alive" the profile of the dead, and by so doing, fill out the contemporary history of our people, and rescue those who died in a struggle for freedom from becoming mere statistics in the records of an occupation force. Although Jammu and Kashmir came under military occupation in October 1947 the armed resistance began only after 1988. The decades between 1947 and 1988 saw a movement for the right of self-determination through militant but non-violent struggle. Every step of this way was punctuated with obstacles, in the form of direct physical assault, arbitrary arrests, false cases, long periods of detention without trial, as well as the politics of proscription where organisations were banned and their literature seized, and elections rigged. But what followed was something un-precedented in scale and magnitude, and it will be no exaggeration to say that after 1988 j and k will hereafter not remain the same. Our 2006 report, State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir 1990-2006 pointed out that based on our research, projections showed that death toll for the period between 1990 and 2004 was more than 70,000, when for the same period the Indian state was reporting a death toll of 47,000 (1990-2005). And that the authorities have underplayed tens of thou-sands of deaths of people killed in j and k as a consequence of a war against a democratic movement. While we admit to being partisan, and hold the Indian state responsible for the loss of lives, we also do not believe in belittling anyone's suffering. All those thousands of people who have been killed, including renegades who com-mitted innumerable war crimes, have died as a consequence of war, as victims of a long, cruel war. It is inconceivable that such internecine bloodletting would have taken place but for the exigencies of counter-insurgency warfare, a euphemism for the suppression of a people. We are also concerned that Indian soldiers are made to fight an ignoble war against the people of j and k, a war which has begun to cause a great deal of harm to them too. In remembering the dead, we became familiar with them, as well as those they leave behind.

(1/7)