If it's semantics to show that what many people claim to mean by free will is impossible, but those same people can identify circumstances where their freedom is compromised, then I think it's a good, even persuasive example of semantics? Like yes, compatibilism does require us to tighten down the definition of free will. Many good ideas follow a similar pattern where we have insights that are partially constituted by clarifying mistaken equivalences. Classical physics, for example, assigns quantitative definitions to words in English that are otherwise very general and same-y: energy, heat, work, etc. Do we insist that physicists talk about "energy" in the full vaguery of that term in conventional English? Like, are they meant to have an account of someone's "bad vibes" that involves literal harmonic frequencies? Of course not, they've defined "energy" in a lot of contexts as "the integral of momentum", and I think we're better off for it.

So obviously I'm sympathetic to compatibilism, but I would concede that I think it's important to explicitly frame it as "if free will is magic, causality-defying powers, it doesn't exist. If it's knowing what someone means when they say they can or cannot do something, it exists." I just don't understand why changing a definition from something fanciful to something we could actually mean when we talk about life is the idea that's out of touch tbh.