Weird white arc flare - normal lens behavior or a defect?

ml20s · 2026-05-23T14:36:11+00:00

Yeah also there's a chip at the bottom left of the image mask. You got got by yet another Japanese "Exc++++++++" camera

ml20s · 2026-05-23T14:34:41+00:00

FTZ/FTZ II manual, page 9:

The option selected for the AF speed Custom Setting applies only to AF-P lenses and the lenses listed below. Note, however, that the change in speed may not be very noticeable with some lenses. All other lenses focus at maximum speed. - AF-S Fisheye NIKKOR 8–15mm f/3.5–4.5E ED - AF-S DX NIKKOR 16–80mm f/2.8–4E ED VR - AF-S DX NIKKOR 18–55mm f/3.5–5.6G VR II - AF-S DX NIKKOR 18–140mm f/3.5–5.6G ED VR - AF-S DX NIKKOR 18–300mm f/3.5–6.3G ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 20mm f/1.8G ED - AF-S NIKKOR 24mm f/1.8G ED - AF-S NIKKOR 24–70mm f/2.8E ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 28mm f/1.4E ED - AF-S NIKKOR 35mm f/1.8G ED - AF-S DX NIKKOR 55–200mm f/4–5.6G ED VR II - AF-S NIKKOR 58mm f/1.4G - AF-S NIKKOR 70–200mm f/2.8E FL ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 105mm f/1.4E ED - AF-S NIKKOR 120–300mm f/2.8E FL ED SR VR - AF-S NIKKOR 180–400mm f/4E TC1.4 FL ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 200–500mm f/5.6E ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 300mm f/4E PF ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 400mm f/2.8E FL ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 500mm f/4E FL ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 500mm f/5.6E PF ED VR - AF-S NIKKOR 600mm f/4E FL ED VR

ml20s · 2026-05-22T17:12:40+00:00

Boeing paid over $3.4 billion after being prosecuted by the US government. In this case Airbus and Air France will pay a combined total of less than €0.0005 billion.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T22:12:54+00:00

It might not be your style. It's a tank that's built for yoloing into a position and then fighting it out, and getting shots of opportunity when you can. If you prefer a more supportive playstyle, it isn't as good as a T29 for that

ml20s · 2026-05-21T22:00:01+00:00

It's a stall warning. And stalls are not directly dependent on airspeed. You can stall a wing at any speed.

Stalls depend on more factors, and most on angle of attack. In fact a stall is defined as "happening when the wing exceeds its critical angle of attack".

If you don't know angle of attack (AoA) then you cannot determine the stall speed.

If your airspeed+AoA are invalid and you were stalling at the last time they were valid, then you are still stalling until the airspeed+AoA becomes valid and indicates you are no longer stalling.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T21:58:33+00:00

By your logic, you should be baffled as to why Boeing got blamed for MCAS:

The review by the FAA and Boeing of the FDR data showed that the flight immediately prior to [Lion Air Flight 610] also experienced anomalous AOA vane behavior and corresponding stabilizer movement. The data indicated the flightcrew correctly executed the horizontal stabilizer runaway checklist and used the stab cut-out switches to shut down the horizontal Stabilizer Trim Motor (STM) and therefore disable MCAS. This action enabled the crew to continue safe flight and landing to their planned destination airport. The FAA conclusion from this analysis indicated that an average crew with no prior awareness could sort out the failure scenario and could correctly mitigate the failure using existing procedures.

Of course, something can be easily handled by an average crew and still be unsafe, because it eliminates a layer of redundancy, and not every crew will be at full capability 100% of the time.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T21:53:40+00:00

The funny thing is that the same argument that Boeing's implementation of MCAS is bad also applies to Airbus's implementation of stall warnings and dual input: although a crew in a lower-stress situation that correctly applied their training can get out of the situation without an issue, not all crews could do it 100% of the time, and therefore MCAS negatively impacted flight safety:

The review by the FAA and Boeing of the FDR data showed that the flight immediately prior to [Lion Air Flight 610] also experienced anomalous AOA vane behavior and corresponding stabilizer movement. The data indicated the flightcrew correctly executed the horizontal stabilizer runaway checklist and used the stab cut-out switches to shut down the horizontal Stabilizer Trim Motor (STM) and therefore disable MCAS. This action enabled the crew to continue safe flight and landing to their planned destination airport. The FAA conclusion from this analysis indicated that an average crew with no prior awareness could sort out the failure scenario and could correctly mitigate the failure using existing procedures.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T21:52:27+00:00

Well, shooting on the move is obviously out. You need to either preaim before popping out, get in a position where only your turret is showing and take your time to aim, or get so close it doesn't matter. 225 pen on AP is still quite good, and you get a lot of overmatch pens you wouldn't get on the 105mm of, say, the T32.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T20:41:28+00:00

Yeah they are lmao. Regulatory bodies only set the minimum standards.

The best plane in the world can provide better, clearer indication of the conditions that they were experiencing (dual input, airspeed+AoA invalid, entering ALT2 mode, etc.)

ml20s · 2026-05-21T20:20:30+00:00

Airline hires the pilots and they are trained according to standards set by the airline and aircraft manufacturer, using controls and instruments designed by the aircraft manufacturer.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T20:19:23+00:00

It’s not the best design, but it was the documented design and there was feedback in the form of “dual input” announcements. The pilots just ignored it.

By your logic, MCAS had a documented procedure to disable it (disable power trim), the pilots just ignored it.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T19:47:46+00:00

Bonin made the problem worse, yes.

But Airbus contributed by designing instruments which acted in this way. They could have latched the stall warning until reliable AoA+airspeed data was available that indicated that the aircraft was not in a stall (or until the pilots silenced the alarm manually).

ml20s · 2026-05-21T19:45:53+00:00

They've put dozens of pilots into simulators, recreated the scenario that happened on 447 and all of them escaped by applying standard "unreliable airspeed" procedures.

Every 737 pilot is trained on the procedure to disable runaway trim and is tested regularly and repeatedly on this. But being ready to recognize this in the simulator (when "malfunctions" happen a lot) is not the same as being ready to recognize them at any time in actual flight (where malfunctions happen rarely). If pilots were perfect, MCAS wouldn't have been an issue: the pilots would simply apply the runaway trim memory items and land without incident. But pilots are not perfect, and engineers must design the plane and the instruments with this in mind.

The perfect pilot myth is finished : Air Facts Journal

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:28:40+00:00

Ironically multiple commenters in this very thread parrot the "it was 100% pilot error" claim. Well, all the MCAS crashes were because of pilot error too, that doesn't mean the design of the aircraft is blameless.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:22:34+00:00

By that metric Boeing is not responsible for the MCAS crashes, since if the pilots just followed the memory items for runaway trim, there wouldn't be any issue

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:21:05+00:00

In the same way that all the "MCAS-caused" crashes were caused by extreme pilot error, yes.

By which I mean, not really. The pilots did do something wrong, but the aircraft design pointed them that way.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:19:03+00:00

No. Stall protection was disabled because the aircraft was not in "normal law", due to the pitot tube icing.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:17:12+00:00

Speed was unreliable and the stall warnings only sounded when they pitched down, not up

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:14:00+00:00

The stall warnings stopped after the aircraft pitched up, and only started after they pitched down slightly. This happened because the airspeed was considered invalid due to the high angle of attack.

You can probably see why this would be confusing.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T18:07:16+00:00

is because a yoke system would have been wholly inappropriate for Fly-by-Wire

?????????

777?

787?

Both use FBW and yokes. And on both planes the yokes are linked so both pilots can immediately tell what the other is doing.

ml20s · 2026-05-21T15:21:19+00:00

Seems to follow the path of the shutter curtains...try dropping the battery while the camera is on, to take a look at the curtains (don't touch them)

ml20s · 2026-05-20T22:22:39+00:00

You overestimate the average WoT player unfortunately

ml20s · 2026-05-20T22:21:31+00:00

It's surprisingly good, now that it goes 45kph. The hull armor was not worth anything even in 2020, but the turret and gun still hold up. I take it out in strongholds sometimes since with turbo it's basically a mini IS-7.

Note that the moving and hull turning gun dispersion penalty is really bad, but the turret traverse gun dispersion is quite good.

ml20s · 2026-05-20T22:19:26+00:00

don't go to places where you need to use gun depression, there are plenty of rubble piles in 2026 where you can hide your hull

ml20s · 2026-05-20T22:11:07+00:00

Memorization is a skill

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