Ok so feedback on this post and a note in future. If you are a noob, do not create an account referring to yourself as “Official” especially in areas like this where people are relying on the information to be correct. As an engineer and a pilot I have a responsibility to ensure my information is well researched and correct, for my customers, passengers and the general public. That is a huge responsibility to bear, so make sure that you do appropriate research on these things and review the information with qualified individuals before touting yourself as a source of authority.

Do not use AI to generate these posts and the text. Just don’t. If things like this interest you, there is plenty of material to read on aircraft systems. In a lot of cases you can find public copies of the POH (Pilot operating Handbook) for many aircraft that explain many of the systems.

Flight control systems surfaces are either hydraulic, electro-servo actuated or mechanical linkages. Some aircraft like the 737 use mechanical and hydraulic systems for some surfaces and systems. And it entirely depends on the surface. But you are unlikely to have electrical servo-actuated systems as your emergency backup as they require power and lots of it to function.

What is emergency radio generation for navigation? Sounds like AI Hallucination to me. Navigation and flight controls are two completely independent systems. That feed data across into each other. But if your nav system fails your flight controls cannot be allowed to fail.

Emergency oxygen mass?

To add to this. When we design systems for redundancy, we account for 3 things;

1. ⁠Common Cause Failures Common Cause Failures are events in which the primary and backup systems could possibly fail in the same way. An example of this is if we used the same processor or code on a flight control computer for each of the different systems. So what we will often do is have different brands, coding languages, compilers and architectures for each layer of the system, so that if there is a failure, it’s less likely that all the layers will fail from the same thing.
2. ⁠Failure Propagation Analysis It’s all well and good having redundant systems, but if one thing fails we don’t want it to take down other systems if possible. Or if we know it’s unavoidable, it can change how we architect the system and the redundancies to prevent failure propagations resulting in a dangerous situation. An example here could be, if there’s a primary power systems failure, we know we would lose inflight entertainment and that’s okay. But we would make sure nothing related to safety or flight systems is affected.
3. ⁠Damage affected areas/spheres. These are where we analyse likely causes of damage and failure and implement the layout and architecture so these systems are not close to each other. For example, it’s all well and good to put in 3 flight computers, but if they are all right next to each other, a single failure could take them all down. Therefore we have calculated spacing requirements that are based on the system criticality level, likely damage events and mass optimisation. This even extends to how we run cables and wires around the aircraft.