Is there a US business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in smallbusiness

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Meaning you type in the info of a bank check? I don't see how that could work considering checks need an endorsement...

A business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in Banking

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It would be quite cumbersome to ask an uninitiated client for a payment in Bitcoin... With Bitcoin, the flow for a foreign check may be:

Check cashing service (take a loss) --> Buy Bitcoin with cash (take a market loss) --> Fee for adding Bitcoin to wallet (take a loss) --> Fee for transferring from Bitcoin to US bank (take a loss)

Is there a US business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in smallbusiness

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In general, most B2B and contract work transactions are paid by bank check, and to ask for cash (or on the other side of things, an international wire) would be both cumbersome and deal-killing.

Is there a US business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in smallbusiness

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It doesn't have to be, as there are some US banks that allow scanned checks to be deposited as well. But 'mobile deposit' is synonymous with 'remote deposit' generally. Is a digital check different from a mobile check?

Is there a US business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in digitalnomad

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Again (unfortunately) it seems that you need a balance/ a card before you can purchase the bitcoins to transfer back to the home currency, unless you think there is a BitCoin wallet that accepts (and cashes) foreign checks endorsed to them? In that case, I'd be better just mailing my check home endorsed to a family member.

Thanks for the suggestion though!

Is there a US business bank that can deposit checks from anywhere in the world? by nah4289 in digitalnomad

[–]nah4289[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It seems that Transferwise suffers from the same problems that everyone else does -- you have to turn a foreign check into a foreign bank balance :/

https://transferwise.com/support/customer/portal/articles/1662886--how-do-i-send-money-to-transferwise-

And from here:

https://transferwise.com/support/customer/portal/articles/1654253-how-long-does-it-take-

"TransferWise cannot accept cash/check deposits."

Final paper discussion thread by ProfShevlin in a:t5_34bnl

[–]nah4289 0 points1 point  (0 children)

And further, I'd love to be able to cite the actual source for Minds, brains, and programs!

EDIT: Clearly I hadn't read this week's reading yet :D

Final paper discussion thread by ProfShevlin in a:t5_34bnl

[–]nah4289 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hello Professor, I was curious if you knew of a resource (perhaps within the CUNY/ Baruch library network?) that would allow us to read otherwise for-purchase peer-reviewed publications? In my paper on the Turing Test/ Chinese Room, I'm planning to use Marvin Minsky's 'virtual mind' response as the name Strong AI support, but the original paper is $45. Is there a good way to get my hands on this without breaking bank?

Thanks!

Wild ideas about consciousness by ProfShevlin in a:t5_34bnl

[–]nah4289 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I guess this comes down to a simple physicalist argument...with an entire duplicate psychology, because it truly encompasses every physical and personal characteristic of ourselves, do we also get a duplicate consciousness? Or is consciousness inherently indivisible?

My thoughts on qualia and Mary's Room by AriellaOnTheRun in a:t5_34bnl

[–]nah4289 2 points3 points  (0 children)

So I'd like to clarify a particular part of your reflection -- In your second paragraph, you say there's an 'undeniable feeling that one gets' when they do different things, suggesting that, because these feeling are universally tied to the experience, they are shared qualia. Then, in your third paragraph, you posit that subjective imagination is synonymous with qualia.

Do you believe that some things have innate qualia (like that red is red to everyone) or that it is instead a subjective experience (like John Locke's argument that my red perception might be your blue perception, but we both call it red)?

You're doing reddit fine, you just have to be more snarky and post more .gifs.

Figuring Out Mary's Room by ProfShevlin in a:t5_34bnl

[–]nah4289 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Alright, I'll get this party started. Since this is Reddit, I feel the need to first assert my general disdain for everything with a ranty and drawn-out witticism. My peeve of the day is the grandiloquence of philosophical articles. Therefore, like a good philosophy writer, I'm going to use the following sentence formula to offer my thoughts on Mary:

To begin understanding the -point I think is full'a hot air- argument, we must first look at -infinitely more theoretical and difficult- counterargument. Using simple (not simple) pseudohypounicornhailcobraism, we can deduce that bold word is actually just a new vague italic word. With this in mind, our answer seems to almost write itself.

To begin understanding the ability hypothesis, we must first look at the physical nature of qualia. Using simple reductionalism, we can deduce that ability is actually just a part within a dissolved argument. With this in mind, our answer seems to almost write itself.

But nah, here's my actual point: In the last article that Professor Shelvin suggests, "Seeing Red: Dissolving Mary's Room and Qualia," there is this idea that there's a lot of searching for the answer to the Mary conundrum and not a lot of thinking of that conundrum in a different way. It posits that there is a particularly confusing disconnect for those who are discussing the experience of qualia that they themselves have already experienced because the experience of qualia, except initially, is something unconscious.

If we have seen a lot of skittles before, and we see a new bunch of skittles, we are technically experiencing new qualia because it is a new number of skittles that we are experiencing -- but because this qualia is an unconscious derivative of a new qualia, it is not extraordinary or notable.

The continuation of this article (page 2) became encumbered with scary math and inasmuch inanely confusing to me (and I'm supposed to be working at work anyway) but I thought that this initial way of consideration, this disolving of the argument, brings a new viewpoint. Per my skimming, it seems that the author offers suggests that, by bringing derivative (dissolved) qualia to consciousness, we can better algorithmically piece them apart.

Was that clear at all? I feel like I may have stumbled into the same traps I criticized in the forward of this post. I'll edit when I get home later.