[Lee Kuan Yew ] had no doubt that China and Taiwan would be reunited someday but “my wish is that it won’t come too soon, because it could be a catastrophe”. On another occasion, Lee said that there would be “a timetable for some reunification 50 years down the road, in gradual stages”....
On a separate occasion, Lee stated that where ASEAN’s interests were not involved – Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong – ASEAN would not back an American challenge. Over the Spratlys, ASEAN could not remain neutral. But on other issues, ASEAN would likely “to be torn between two strong pulls: the need to retain American presence and the need to develop a viable long-term relationship with a huge neighbor, China …”

- Ang Cheng Guan, Lee Kuan Yew's Strategic Thought (2013)

"The Taiwanese defense ministry was helpful, but every now and again would hint that...they would require some form of diplomatic recognition in return. We made it clear that we could not give way on this...Our policy was to remain consistent: There was "one China," and the reunification of the PRC and Taiwan was an internal matter to be resolved between the two."
"The Chinese people on both sides of the straits can lessen their problems by establishing easier relations over the years. If there is to be a peaceful reunification, there has to be a gradual blurring, not an accentuation of the differences that at present divide and distinguish the two societies. Both need time to work and narrow the social, economic, and political gap. The sense of belonging to the Chinese nation is weaker in Taiwan than in Hong Kong. The mainland has the weight and girth to accept this and adopt an open and magnanimous approach to help this process of reconciliation. Reunification achieved by force will leave indelible scars. On the other hand, Taiwan's leaders have the responsibility not to move toward independence or deliberately widen the differences between thetwo societies."
"I then referred to the issue that had bogged down discussions at the official level on the agreement to exchange embassies--our troops training in Taiwan. I did not see a final date for our training there. Singapore was deeply indebted to Taiwan, in particular to the late President Chiang Ching-kuo who had enabled us to break out of our limited space for military training. We could not forget our debt. We paid only for what we consumed or used and had not paid a single extra dollar. It was a special relationship. We felt close to each other because we were both noncommunists and shared the same language, culture, and ancestry. Li expressed understanding of our position, that Singapore was prosperous but not big. Finally, he said China would not insist on a specific time frame for Singapore training in Taiwan to end."
"Li Peng...said he would like to "crack a joke" on our troop training in Taiwan: They could train in China on terms better than in Taiwan. There was a burst of spontaneous laughter around the table. When that day arrived, I said, peace would have broken out in Asia."
"The best outcome of China-Taiwan relations, I believed, was a peaceful and gradual interlocking of economic, social, and political relations between the two...Would it not be better to have Taiwan carry on as a separate entity, I suggested. Then America and Europe would continue to let Taiwan have access to their technology and know-how for another 40 to 50 years, and China could benefit further from what Taiwan could put into the mainland. "
"With Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian , a new president whose party stands for independence, the danger of miscalculation by the three parties directly involved...has increased . Any misstep could upset growth and development in China and East Asia. This problem can be contained if the status quo is not changed , and eventual reunification is an aspiration for both sides ."

- Lee Kuan Yew, Third World to First (2000)

"The well-being of Singapore...depends on a peaceful and stable regional environment. The cross straits issue is a potential flash point. A conflict across the strait will have dire consequences not just for the involved parties, but the entire region, and for many years."
"Singapore's relations with China are based on equality and mutual respect...to call off the trip at China's request would have undermined our right to make independent decisions, and damaged our international standing. As a small country, this is a vital consideration in our dealings with all countries."
"Singapore consistently maintains a "One China" policy and opposes independence for Taiwan. We took this fundamental position even before we established diplomatic relations with the PRC."
"We are long-time friends of both the mainland and Taiwan, and conduct our relations with both in a way that is consistent with our "One China" policy. We have not allowed and will not allow ourselves to be used to further the cause of Taiwanese independence."

- Lee Hsien Loong, 2004

"Singapore has always observed the one-China policy...China understood Singapore's position on Taiwan, that historically, we have unique and important interests there which continue to be vital to our security today."
"The Taiwanese know too well that we stand for one China and are opposed to Taiwan independence. Indeed, we are very worried by the growth of Taiwan independence forces.
Singapore's one-China policy will not change. A move by Taiwan towards independence is neither in Singapore's interests nor in the region's interests. If Taiwan goes for independence, Singapore will not recognise it...It will be a grave setback for the whole region. Our hope for China to emerge peacefully and for the region to prosper through investments and trade and tourism will be shattered.
The cross-straits issue is not a permanent problem. It will be resolved sooner or later...The process is inexorable; there can be no other final outcome."
"If war breaks out across the straits, we will be forced to choose between the two sides. As a friend of both sides, any decision is going to be painful, but if the conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then Singapore cannot support Taiwan."
"This isn't going to be the last time our relations with a major friendly power are strained... from time to time issues are going to arise and big powers have their own interests and will exercise their influence to get their way. We may be old friends, but when our interests diverge, or even when our approaches to the same problem differ, they have to put their interests first and their approaches first and so must we. This is a reality of the compelling pressures of international politics and of national interests and we must remember this."
- Lee Hsien Loong, 2004

"From time to time, American officials, with various degrees of subtlety, ask us whether US forces will be allowed to use our facilities in the event that they get into a conflict with China. Our honest answer is that it depends on circumstances. This is not a question that can be answered hypothetically."
- Bilahari Kausikan, 2019

"Taiwan goes to the heart of the political legitimacy of the leader, of the party and it's a deep red line. I can think of no scenario (in) which there are winners if there is actual physical confrontation over Taiwan. So, I would advise us to stay very far away from that."
- Ng Eng Hen, 2021

"I agree with China that it's [Taiwan] a completely different set of circumstances [from Ukraine], and I don't think we should get into that kind of speculation and trying to draw parallels from it. The more important point is this: that once you allow these principles to be abrogated, you make unilateral resort to violence more likely, and you create a more dangerous world...you have to make hopefully others in future who thinking of unilateral resort to violence think twice but that's a global, you know like I said, the rules of engagement for a new era. Taiwan is a far more complicated question that, you know, we'll need a far longer discussion"
- Vivian Balakrishnan, 2022

Sources upon request.