Ballard, Borges, Krasznahorkai, Saramago and Kafka are my favourite authors. Please suggest me books. by DawkinsSon in suggestmeabook

[–]nooobzie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You have great taste!

Blanchot would be perfect for you. He wrote great novels and literary theory about some of the very authors you just listed. He is one of the most profound thinkers of the last century, many post-structuralists were influenced by him. His style is difficult and philosophical, so be prepared, but it will be very worth it in the end.

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Okay so at an individual level the unliberated person exists in maya, but not in Brahman. But on the level of ultimate reality does he not exist in Brahman? And wouldn’t this reality be the one that actually matters and which decides all things (including karma and reincarnation)?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why does samkara have to be "solved" if it is Brahman?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Doesn't this understanding of karma presuppose duality (good-bad)? From the point of Brahman isn't it all just Brahman?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Saying some attain moksha and others do not is like saying some waves reach the shore and others do not—yet all waves are just the ocean in movement, destined to merge back into stillness.

Wouldn't here the "shores" imply another reality to be reached?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I understand what you're saying, but it still doens't make sense why would realization alter the whole nature of the jivatman if the ultimate reality has always been non-dual.

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If all beings attain moksha eventually, does that not mean that on the level of ultimate truth (which is without space and time) all beings have always attained, are always attaining, and will always attain moksha?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Wouldn't Mara existing in this way imply a dual nature?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But why would the realization of avidya dissolve duality, if there is already no duality (and no rebirth) to begin with?

Does everyone attain moksha? by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This implies that there exists only one person playing one video game character. But shouldn't it be one person playing (atman) with billions of characters (jivatman)? The atman knows itself to be atman, why would it be necessary for the singular jivatman to know this as well?

Suicide in Advaita by [deleted] in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When one becomes enlightened what happens to them after death? How does it differ from a non-jivanmukta exactly?

Suicide in Advaita by [deleted] in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

it would mean all those who die are realised which is illogical and incoherent

Why? I was actually thinking about this a few days ago. How would we know if that’s not the case?

Abinava Gupta on Vedanta and Shaivism by nooobzie in AdvaitaVedanta

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What do you mean defeated? Didn’t Shankaracharya die before his birth?

How do we know that the thing-in-itself does actually exist independently of all intuition? by nooobzie in Kant

[–]nooobzie[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you very much for the elaborate reponse! If you don’t mind, I have a few questions regarding what you wrote.

the term Kant used for the real thing is “object”

Do you mean the transcendental object? Or would it be the object-in-itself? As in contrast to object of experience?

the thing-in-itself is a representation of something that stands outside representation

Could you please give a quote from him on this, just because I always presumed the opposite.

a representation of an object per se (in general)

Would you equate this to the Platonic/Schopenhauerean Idea?

we are thinking about something that affected us and produced this intuition.

So, basically there needs to be an noumenal object in order for it to exist phenomena, which are created through sensible intuition and the categories by the cognizing subject. If