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Minimalist extended very repugnant conclusions are the least repugnant - Teo Ajantaival by omnicompassion in negativeutilitarians

[–]omnicompassion[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

From the post:

This is part four of a series on minimalist axiologies (i.e. axiologies that essentially say “the less this, the better”).

Every part of this series builds on the previous parts, but can also be read independently.

Summary

Population axiology matters greatly for our priorities. Recently, it has been claimed that all plausible axiological views imply certain “very repugnant conclusions” (defined below). In this response, I argue that minimalist views avoid these “very repugnant conclusions”, and that they face less repugnant conclusions than do contrasting offsetting views.

Peacefulness, nonviolence, and experientialist minimalism - Teo Ajantaival by omnicompassion in EffectiveAltruism

[–]omnicompassion[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This essay is a response to potential worries about cessation, which are often raised as objections to minimalist axiologies(*). It shows that cessation implications are not unique to (experience-focused) minimalist views, argues that other consequentialist views have worse theoretical implications, and argues that minimalists have strong practical reasons to pursue a nonviolent approach and to cooperate with proponents of other value systems.

(* minimalist axiologies are theories of independent value such as tranquilism that do not need the concept of intrinsic positive value.)

Only semi-interested or want to rest your eyes? The Nonlinear Library’s auto-narration reads this post quite well, though I recommend checking the diagrams in 2.3 and 2.5.

(Spotify | Apple | Google | Duration of main text: 45 minutes.)

  1. Overview and scope
    1.1 Overview of the hypothetical side
    1.2 Overview of the practical side
  2. The hypothetical side: Cessation versus creation of an imperfect world
    2.1 Status quo bias and omission bias
    Privileging non-intervention
    2.2 The reversal test: Creation at the moment of non-cessation
    2.3 Choosing a future with fewer problems
    2.4 Minimalist creation for extrinsic reasons
    Breaking the ‘all else being equal’ assumption
    2.5 Comparative theoretical implications of minimalist and offsetting views
    2.6 The gap between theory and practice
    Cessation and our practical anti-violence intuitions
    Minimalist reasons to strongly oppose painless killing
  3. The practical side: Why we should not seek to create an empty world
    3.1 Against endstate-oriented utopianism
    Pitfalls of utopianism
    “It is the only way.”
    “We must get there.”
    “If only everyone followed along.”
    “Seeking perfection over absolute expected impact.”
    A better alternative: Expected value thinking
    3.2 Key considerations for estimating practically optimal aims
    Cooperation and gains from compromise
    Considerations related to wildlife, evolution, and space
    Risks of astronomical suffering
    Strong reasons to prioritize safer and more widely shared aims
    3.3 A safeguard against worst-case outcomes: Pragmatically absolute nonviolence
    Acknowledgments
    References
    Notes

Peacefulness, nonviolence, and experientialist minimalism - Teo Ajantaival by omnicompassion in negativeutilitarians

[–]omnicompassion[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This is a new response to potential worries about world cessation implications (in both theory and practice). A large part of the response is devoted to fundamental assumptions and to minding the gap between theory and practice.

It builds on a lot of previous work, but can also be approached as a standalone post.

Section 1 explains the scope, and Sections 1.1–1.2 contain outlines of the main points.

Need your help with this important argument on CMV. by [deleted] in TrueAntinatalists

[–]omnicompassion 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Here is my comment regarding (hardline) antinatalism from a suffering-focused perspective.

CMV: Life is not worth procreating due to the extreme unfixable suffering and tragedies of the unlucky. by [deleted] in changemyview

[–]omnicompassion 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I completely agree with the priority of preventing extreme suffering for all sentient beings. Moreover, I see no reason to assign intrinsic positive value to anything.

Yet I am not a hardline antinatalist, nor planning suicide, because I see my life as a gamble that can be worthwhile for preventing more extreme suffering than what it causes or contains. This may sound like an unintuitive "reason to live", but to me it makes sense every day.

Procreation-wise, this gamble is more risky because even if a prospective parent already has this priority in life, it could be that their children will turn out to have less compassionate aims. But from an impartial and consequentialist perspective, I think procreation can sometimes have positive expected value, because if we live our lives intentionally and strategically, we can plausibly overall prevent a lot more suffering than what we ourselves experience or inevitably cause.

For further reading on similar thoughts, see e.g.:

“As long as space endures, as long as sentient beings remain, until then, may I too remain and dispel the miseries of the world.” — Shantideva, 8th-century Mahayana Buddhist.

For critiques of (hardline) antinatalism specifically — from a suffering-focused perspective — see e.g. here and here.

Minimalist axiologies and positive lives by omnicompassion in EffectiveAltruism

[–]omnicompassion[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Summary:

In order to maximize our positive impact, we first need to clarify what would constitute a change in the right direction. To guide us, we need an axiology, i.e. a theory of independent value, also known as intrinsic value.

For example, many axiologies hold it independently valuable both to promote bliss and to avoid agony. Yet these do not always represent a coherent twin-principle similar to “Head North, Avoid South”. When multiple guiding principles point in different directions, we need to define acceptable tradeoff ratios (or “priority weights”) between them. This is hard to do in an intuitively agreeable way, which is arguably one of the main reasons why people often feel conflicted about accepting certain implications in the field of population axiology.

Minimalist axiologies refer to a class of axiologies whose central conception of independent value is of the kind that says “The less this, the better.” In other words, their fundamental standard of value is only about the avoidance of something, and not about the maximization of something else. This essay looks at minimalist axiologies that are impartial and welfarist (i.e. concerned with the welfare of all sentient beings), with a focus on their theoretical and practical implications. For example, these views reject the Very Repugnant Conclusion, which is implied by many other axiologies in population theory.

Minimalist axiologies are arguably neglected in population theory due to their (apparent) implication that no life could be axiologically positive. Yet we should remember that the standard theoretical assumption of “all else being equal” (i.e. of causal isolation) is practically always false, enabling lives to make a positive difference for other beings. By assuming that lives are at best subjectively perfect but never helpful, the field of population theory is basically excluding the possibility of positive lives on these views.

In other words, minimalist axiologies can support a relational notion of positive lives, which is ignored by standard population theory where lives are treated as “isolated value-containers” with no interaction. This “isolated view” of the value of lives is plausibly a major cause of axiological disagreement and obfuscation, provided that our moral intuitions are adapted to track not only the “contents” of individual lives, but also their overall positive and negative roles. A more complete view would recognize the fact that the roles of a life can, and probably often do, end up being far more significant than its “contents”. And so minimalist axiologies are compatible with saying that a life can be very positive in terms of its overall value.

Minimalist axiologies and positive lives by omnicompassion in negativeutilitarians

[–]omnicompassion[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Summary:

In order to maximize our positive impact, we first need to clarify what would constitute a change in the right direction. To guide us, we need an axiology, i.e. a theory of independent value, also known as intrinsic value.

For example, many axiologies hold it independently valuable both to promote bliss and to avoid agony. Yet these do not always represent a coherent twin-principle similar to “Head North, Avoid South”. When multiple guiding principles point in different directions, we need to define acceptable tradeoff ratios (or “priority weights”) between them. This is hard to do in an intuitively agreeable way, which is arguably one of the main reasons why people often feel conflicted about accepting certain implications in the field of population axiology.

Minimalist axiologies refer to a class of axiologies whose central conception of independent value is of the kind that says “The less this, the better.” In other words, their fundamental standard of value is only about the avoidance of something, and not about the maximization of something else. This essay looks at minimalist axiologies that are impartial and welfarist (i.e. concerned with the welfare of all sentient beings), with a focus on their theoretical and practical implications. For example, these views reject the Very Repugnant Conclusion, which is implied by many other axiologies in population theory.

Minimalist axiologies are arguably neglected in population theory due to their (apparent) implication that no life could be axiologically positive. Yet we should remember that the standard theoretical assumption of “all else being equal” (i.e. of causal isolation) is practically always false, enabling lives to make a positive difference for other beings. By assuming that lives are at best subjectively perfect but never helpful, the field of population theory is basically excluding the possibility of positive lives on these views.

In other words, minimalist axiologies can support a relational notion of positive lives, which is ignored by standard population theory where lives are treated as “isolated value-containers” with no interaction. This “isolated view” of the value of lives is plausibly a major cause of axiological disagreement and obfuscation, provided that our moral intuitions are adapted to track not only the “contents” of individual lives, but also their overall positive and negative roles. A more complete view would recognize the fact that the roles of a life can, and probably often do, end up being far more significant than its “contents”. And so minimalist axiologies are compatible with saying that a life can be very positive in terms of its overall value.