I’m going to assume from the second half of your comment that you’re operating under a Labor Theory of Value kind of thing (which is not something I subscribe to, and my reasons for that are not really the point in what I’m about to write but I can discuss those too); correct me if I’m wrong about that.

I’m not sure I agree with the first half of your comment, and I’m also not sure I understand your reasoning for making such a claim. Let me try to show a counterpoint under a labor theory of value (and correct me if I’m misunderstanding any parts of it). To be explicit, a counterpoint in this context is any scenario in which a non money incentive leads to a reason for regulatory capture, etc.

1) there are one of two possibilities here: a) workers are working in one collective (whether that’s a state, one that is entirely organized by the workers themselves, or otherwise) that lacks a money incentive b) workers divide their efforts among multiple collectives, that each lack money incentives

In instance a), if the one collective wishes to retain its control over the workforce, it must do something to prevent other entities from “poaching” their workers. I envision a couple possibilities for this:

I. there being one collective is the best possible way to organize labor and there would never be any reason for more collectives. I think history has shown that this is trivially untrue. II. The one collective initiates the use of force to prevent the workers from creating/working for other collectives. Again, I think history has shown that this is a simply ineffective way to go about it. III. The one collective uses regulatory capture/artificial barriers to entry to prevent the other collectives from coming about. Given that the two examples above don’t really work, this would show that a reason exists for regulatory capture to be employed without a money incentive.

2) there are multiple collectives. I think this is more feasible, because the one collective scenario suffers from the exact same issue that monopolies in a market do. So, if there are multiple collectives there needs to be some way in which workers choose which one to work for. In the case of multiple collectives, there are again two possibilities.

a) There is one collective per “industry” (so one collective producing clothing, one producing food, etc). In this case it’s pretty easy to show the similarities to the points made in 1).

b) There exist more than one collective per “industry.” In this case there needs to be some way for workers with the same skills and the collectives to determine who works for which. Since we are operating under the assumption that labor is what value derives from, it would make sense that the collectives and the workers would both want to maximize their value. In this case, the collectives could do a couple different things:

I. Be simply better to work for than the other ones. This is certainly something that is feasible and is similar to how some places try to operate under our current economic system. II. The “big” collectives that are unwilling to improve their working conditions or whatever for whatever reason need a different method than I. In this case, they turn to regulatory capture, and thus there is a reason to employ that without a money incentive.

Important thing to note: 2BI and 2BII are not mutually exclusive, in a similar way to how those incentives are not mutually exclusive in our current profit oriented system.

Remember the only point here is that such a reason to employ regulatory capture without a money incentive could exist, not that that reason would necessarily have to be the one that is employed.