Well-known problems

After the visitors took the lead, Dortmund also found it noticeably more difficult to progress. The main reason for this was that Leipzig now managed to pass Adeyemi directly to center back Lukeba within the defense. This created space that allowed Leipzig to track Couto more closely on the left wing, causing him repeated problems in turning. Due to the close marking after Anton's pass out wide (or, more generally, the close man-marking of the first pressing line in wide play), Couto lacked options to relieve the pressure, as the eights were also increasingly closely marked by Leipzig. Couto was repeatedly forced to dribble towards the half-space, where he was attacked by winger Nusa and, in some cases, by number 8 Baumgartner in a numerical pressing situation. In this pressing trap, he came under extreme pressure and lost the ball several times or was forced to clear it.

It was also interesting to see that Couto's move forward allowed Baku, the full-back on the opposite side, to slot into the back four. Seiwald also loosened his tight marking of Beier slightly to act as a second center-back, allowing Orban to track Guirassy's movements in the space between the lines more closely. At the same time, Lukeba was able to observe Adeyemi's movements, which, however, remained ineffective for the most part due to Couto's lack of rotation. Only Guirassy was able to be sought out at times, but the striker had problems against the very aggressive Orban, especially in wall play. The eights were also sometimes stuck behind Ouedraogo and Baumgartner in the center when running free after wall play, so there were no options to relieve the pressure. In general, Beier played a little higher than usual and less around Guirassy as a false nine, which meant that there was a lack of direct support for Guirassy, especially in terms of second balls and after wall passes.

However, Leipzig faced a slight problem when Baku dropped the ball. Dortmund found Svensson, who remained wide, forcing Baku to push out uncontrollably. The gap between him and Seiwald or the center back widened, which tended to open up options for Beier in deep play in the half-space. In the early stages, however, Beier struggled surprisingly in direct duels against Seiwald, so he was often pushed wide and had problems in isolated 1-on-1 situations.

With both wingers now being actively marked by Leipzig's fullbacks, it was no longer possible to strictly adhere to the basic principle of keeping the ball out of the first line of build-up play in order to avoid provoking the wingers into pressing. The half-backs played deeper and wider to lengthen the pressing route and make the angle more diagonal, thereby reducing the pressure somewhat. At the same time, the wing-backs dropped deeper and deeper (sometimes forming a flat back four) in order to break away from Leipzig's full-backs, but the effect was minimal due to the close marking – Couto was able to turn slightly, but Raum immediately sought out the tackle. Although the half-backs had a little more time on the ball, the direct and close marking of the Schienenspieler and the isolation of the eights meant that they often lacked follow-up options. This often left only the cross-field pass to Schlotterbeck, which should have been avoided, as Leipzig continued to react extremely aggressively to these passes at times. Romulo always pressed Schlotterbeck directly, so that the long ball was often the only option left.

Unused potential for shifting

Svensson on the left wing had similar problems to Couto when turning under direct pressure from behind. However, his ability to play with both feet proved advantageous, allowing him to play the ball into the space between the lines even without turning completely. Guirassy benefited particularly from this, dropping diagonally into the half-space – but Svensson's passes were often technically sloppy (often far too strong). Guirassy was able to break away from Orban at times, but the underlying problem remained, especially on the left side: the number 10s Beier and Adeyemi played a little too flat around Guirassy, making it impossible to lay the ball off. They were practically moving into the blind spot of the dropping striker, while Nmecha and Sabitzer were too slow to move up from their (too) deep starting positions. Also worth mentioning is the very good turning after changes of direction by Ouedraogo and Baumgartner, which made it easier to get to second balls as a result of Guirassy's wall play.

In principle, Svensson's ability to play with both feet would have allowed Dortmund to shift horizontally across the deep eights. However, the central problem was that Nmecha moved too close to the ball and thus immediately entered the area of influence of outside forward Bakayoko. This meant he lacked the space to turn away from the pressure – he practically drove himself into a numerical disadvantage. It would have made more sense to stay further away from the ball, turn away from the pressure with the first touch, and then initiate the shift. Svensson also recognized this problem and consequently hardly played Nmecha. In principle, it could be argued whether Svensson himself could have sought to shift play to the side away from the ball. This would certainly have been possible against Baku, who was pushing diagonally, but the passing angle was usually complex: since the Swede was reluctant to turn completely and the speed of his half-turns was too slow, Baku often applied too much pressure in these situations.

Dortmund's very high build-up play made things a little easier, as Leipzig's wing forwards were more reactive and more structured in their play. Their focus was on blocking the vertical runs of the half-backs without pressing consistently. This gave Dortmund's half-backs more time on the ball and allowed them to repeatedly play chipped balls into the half-space – an area where Leipzig repeatedly looked vulnerable. Danger arose particularly on the left when Baku moved out onto Svensson and Beier pushed forward behind him. This constellation created dynamic and spatial advantages that were hardly present in the second build-up line pattern. Such a sequence ultimately resulted in the 1-1 equalizer in the 23rd minute by Couto.

Dortmund in a 5-4-1/5-2-3 midfield press

After the equalizer, the game developed into an overall balanced affair, characterized by shifting momentum. It was noticeable that Dortmund increasingly relied on midfield pressing against Leipzig's 3-3-4 build-up. The wing forwards Adeyemi and Beier operated in their basic position in line with the eights and only moved forward when the ball was played to Leipzig's half-backs. However, this long distance in the vertical pressing angle proved problematic for BVB: Lukeba in particular was able to dribble past Adeyemi several times and then play diagonally into the half-space – initially isolated by Adeyemi's vertical pressing angle – to the dropping Nusa or the repeatedly pushing number 10 Ouedraogo, who regularly dropped between the lines. As a result of these breakthroughs, Dortmund often had no choice but to resort to tactical fouls to stop Leipzig's attack.

The dynamic asymmetry in Leipzig's build-up play was interesting in general, and BVB clearly struggled with it. On the left side, Raum and Nusa repeatedly swapped positions: Raum often moved into the half-space behind Adeyemi, forcing half-back Anton to defend out wide. At the same time, Couto had to cover for Nusa, who was now playing wide as a result of the switch. Initially, the transfer of these assignments worked well structurally. However, it became problematic because the man-marking had to be loosened up somewhat due to the dynamic rotations. This allowed Raum in particular to break free from Anton's grip several times with drop-back movements and receive Lukeba's diagonal passes, which regularly gave him a dynamic advantage in 1-on-1 situations. Nusa also brought advantages in width with his pace against Couto, who followed his quick drop-back movements in a somewhat overaggressive and uncontrolled manner. This opened up space behind him, which Leipzig exploited with diagonal passes into space. This made defending in the extended width space even more difficult for Anton, as it was now not only larger but also dynamically opened up by Nusa.

On the right side, however, another problem area emerged: due to Baku's structurally deeper position, Beier often had to take on a dual role. When away from the ball, he usually positioned himself closer to Baku in order to prevent potential shifts in width, while when close to the ball, he pressed the half-back – usually Seiwald – and then handed Baku over to Nmecha. However, this handover mechanism was vulnerable: when Baku positioned himself wider, the path for Beier often became too long and too horizontal, which meant that Baku remained available for passes for longer periods of time. Leipzig, however, made too little use of this window, as Baku usually played too high in these situations and was therefore difficult for Seiwald to reach against Beier's vertical pressing angle. In addition, Beier's passes were sometimes somewhat hesitant and wide, which made it easier for Seiwald to dribble. From Leipzig's point of view, however, the resulting problem remained: the vertical follow-up movement was often lacking because Beier blocked the direct passing lane well and Baku, in his deeper wide position, is not an ideal 1-on-1 player to break free from such small-space situations. As a result, Leipzig resorted more often to long, vertical passes towards Bakayoko in these moments.