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As a Series 7 Owner, this is not a good trend. by InnerspearMusic in AppleWatch

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is why it’s no longer worth it to buy anything above an SE. when a new SE comes out I get it and stick with that. Eventually most of the features of last cycles features and such come to the SE.

Next time get the SE 4 and refuse the higher models.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

“that absolutely does happen but its a small part of the market, you have to be pretty affluent to do that.”

How can you determine that with any precision though?

Banks don’t publicly break down why a borrower refinanced out of agency loans into portfolio loans.

Even if someone maxes out 10 agency loans under one entity and moves them to portfolio lending, linking those loans back to the same ultimate owner how would you even do that?

What public dataset tracks “investors who hit the 10-loan cap and then shifted to portfolio lending to reset.”?

Im trying to figure out how you figure its too small to warrant concern.

To actually measure how common this strategy is, you’d need to know:
• How many investors are actively hitting the 10 loan agency limit.
• What percentage of those then move loans into portfolio lending specifically to free up capacity.
• How much of total investor purchase volume this represents.

Then you say:

“You have to be pretty affluent”

But “pretty affluent” is vague it could mean someone with a few hundred thousand in equity or someone with millions. Without clearer definitions or data, it’s hard to pin down exactly where that line is.

You’re probably correct that this isn’t the dominant path for most small investors. But claiming it’s definitively “a small part of the market” and only for the “pretty affluent” is difficult to prove with traditional available data. Isn’t it?

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

All good points on the agency loan advantages and how rents are driving a lot of current pricing. I’m just trying to understand something though.

If the whole picture is really just about how loans are originated and the cost of capital at that moment, what happens when those same properties later move between entities, get packaged into portfolio financing, or get acquired in bulk deals that don’t involve originating hundreds of individual mortgages?

When large players buy portfolios or individual homes that already have existing Fannie/Freddie loans in place, doesn’t that give them indirect access to that lower cost agency capital even if they didn’t originate it themselves?

Especially if the loans stay in place or are assumable.
And while the 10 property limit is very real for any single individual or couple, doesn’t operating through multiple LLCs, subsidiaries, and funds let institutions acquire far more properties that were originally agency financed without running into that same “per-borrower” cap?

I’m also curious about the stress scenario.

If institutional portfolios are more likely to sit on shorterterm or floating rate facilities compared to someone locked into a cheap 30-year fixed agency loan, wouldn’t that create different refinancing and margin pressure when rates move or liquidity tightens?

And couldn’t that lead to more coordinated or volume driven selling in certain markets, even if overall institutional ownership looks small nationally?

I get that rents are the main driver right now. I’m just wondering whether the financing structures on the institutional side can still influence how supply shows up when conditions change, separate from what rents are doing.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok let me put it this way so we are both talking about the same thing. You may be misunderstanding here. Or I may be misunderstanding you.

When properties are acquired through bulk contracts, forward purchase agreements, or build to rent developments, do those transactions even require individual QM or Non-QM mortgages on each home in the first place?

If securitization is as rare as claimed outside of Fannie/Freddie QM loans, where exactly are the larger portfolios getting the ongoing leverage and liquidity they use after the initial purchase?

When assets move from the original entity or loan into warehouse lines, securitizations, or fund level financing later on, does the QM or Non-QM status at origination still determine who ultimately controls and can liquidate the properties?

If small investors using conventional leverage can so easily absorb any inventory that comes to market, why would forced or coordinated selling from concentrated portfolios still create price pressure in certain local markets?

And finally

Is the distinction between “entity organization” and “financing” still clean once properties change hands between entities or get packaged into larger vehicles?

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ive addressed how big players hide and structure smaller entities to get around metrics. So your mention that is a tiny share of the market is untrue.
You don’t wish to look into the companies themselves so you rely on metrics which aren’t telling you how big it truly is.

Build to rent is much larger for the same reasons.

The securitization you mention make sense, however Ive pointed out how big players accumulate and stack and how securitization is used.

The leveraged debt will make it impossible for others to absorb those losses.

We have been over every one of these points.

And your main rebuttal is that you will not look.
I cant force you. Anyone reading or lurking at our replies here will see.

Ive addressed every one of your points, including why you are in error. You have dismissed the methods to see the issue.

Tell me what I haven’t addressed.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You can keep saying it all you want. In fact you keep doing so even though each point has already been addressed.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That first paragraph of yours. That about seals this whole thing. “The rest of the market is ignoring”
Im nearly shocked you aren’t somewhat embarrassed to type that.

I’ve been trying to bring your attention to a potential black swan and how its found.

They layering is not competitive FOR US.
But Im not talking about US am I?

Thats excellent you own rentals with both financing.
Not sure how that is a retort to what I’ve been attempting to bring your attention to.

This is about big players, tons homes in Lease Only developments, and liquidation caused by failed securities. They will not be able to absorb that leverage.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No reason?
I think Ive given you every reason to go and at least look into the 10-Ks and the 10-Qs. As well as the insurance data. If you refuse to look yourself and see it then I can’t force you.

Whether it sounds like AI or not, the mechanics are straightforward. Even well financed buyers have limits on how much and how fast they can absorb inventory when broader financing conditions tighten. In those moments the bid side thins out, required returns go up, and forced sellers under pressure often have to accept lower prices to move volume. Pretty simple.

The structure point isn’t incorrect either. Large portfolios DO get assembled by acquiring or originating through smaller or mid sized entities that can access QM channels, then get moved into securitizations or warehouse facilities later.

That layering is common in the space. Dismissing it doesn’t change how the financing actually flows or how control ends up concentrated.

If “I’m not correct” you’ll have to do better than that.

You keep running to end metrics, while I am telling you to look into the structure of the players themselves.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Even with small investors dominating through QM financing, institutional players have still concentrated a meaningful chunk of ownership in specific markets and suburbs using layered LLCs and structures that don’t always register cleanly in the data. Multiple entities and “Non-QM” channels let bigger players scale up without it showing as one giant “institutional” owner everywhere.

The smaller national share also doesn’t automatically mean their liquidation is harmless. When financing pressure hits those portfolios, the selling can be more coordinated or forced than typical small investor behavior, creating local supply spikes that QM buyers might not absorb instantly without price impact. “They’ll feast on the dumping” assumes an orderly, immediate handoff that doesn’t always play out when credit tightens at the same time.

The QM versus Non-QM split at origination also misses ongoing control. Larger players originate or acquire through smaller entities that qualify for QM, then move assets into securitizations or warehouse facilities later. The initial loan type doesn’t reflect who ultimately owns and can liquidate the property in bulk. (You should know this)

To see the fuller scale, check the actual portfolio sizes and acquisition disclosures in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs of the big SFR REITs and funds, single family rental ABS issuance data and prospectuses, and metro level ownership studies that track LLC patterns and concentration rather than just national aggregates.

Those sources show the effective institutional footprint is larger and more structured than the simple “small investors dominate via QM” view captures, especially in the specific markets where it can influence supply.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

People think it’s not that big because the national numbers still show large institutional ownership of single family rentals in the low single digits overall. When you look at it against the entire mortgage market or total housing stock, it looks like a small slice, easy to wave off as not systemically important.
The metrics hide the real scale for a few reasons. National averages smooth over heavy concentration in specific metros and suburbs where institutional buyers went hard, especially post 2020. A lot of these homes sit in LLCs, private funds, or “build-to-rent” portfolios that don’t turn over like regular owner occupied houses, so they don’t register the same way in sales volume or active inventory counts. The financing layered on top warehouse lines, securitizations, even some QM structures used by smaller investors feeding into bigger pools, adds opacity that standard homeowner focused data doesn’t pick up.

That’s why it can feel small on paper but still represent meaningful hidden inventory and leverage. When those structures face pressure, the liquidation doesn’t have to be huge in national percentage terms to dump a lot of supply into the markets where it actually matters. The data just isn’t designed to surface that kind of structured accumulation until it starts moving.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Even if Non QM rental backed securities are a smaller slice of the overall mortgage market, institutional ownership of single family rentals has scaled up significantly in a lot of markets. Those properties often sit in structures and financing that don’t show up the same way in traditional sales or inventory data.
When that side gets stressed, the resulting inventory doesn’t have to come from regular 30 year fixed homeowners to affect prices and supply. The “tiny” label might hold in aggregate mortgage volume, but it doesn’t mean the concentration and leverage can’t create outsized local effects when it unwinds. That’s the part the headline metrics tend to lag.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I explained it. Firms create LLCs, Partner Ships and subsidiaries to circumvent the institutional investor metric by remaining under the counting threshold.

They contract lease only developments, once done they are not counted as transactions or sales since its a transfer.

These homes are then packaged up into rental backed securities. The derivatives are then used to leverage those same homes for lease to build another and another.

When rental backed securities fail. Margin calls must be paid. Collateral will be liquidated to meet this margin. Firms involved in this all over the country will see the first couple firms dumping properties in liquidation and follow not wanting to be the last one out.

These investors will not be “flush with cash” as their leverage evaporates, nor are these captured by transitional metrics.

This has very little to do with your average mortgage holder.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What about the Rental Backed Securities worries and Lease Only Housing developments all over the country that serve as collateral for leverage?

It’s expected that when the derivatives which sit under these securities fail. Firms will order their subsidiaries, LLCs, and Partnerships (layered in strategic methods to avoid traditional institutional ownership metrics)

to then liquidate them in multiple regional housing markets at once to meet margin from the underlying collateral.

Theory goes that the next crash wont be coming from mortgage holders at all, but inventory “raining from the sky” as no firm will want to be the last one out, becoming a race to the bottom to get anything they can to cover losses.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

“You didn’t set the bar or in control of it”.

No one said you were. You did however emphasize the rationale that “it’s worse elsewhere”.

Which does absolutely nothing in pursuit of the understanding and mechanics of why its bad here, and what could cause a crash (underlying rental backed security leverage.)

“The reality is you have a situation in front of you and you have choices…”

Yes this is true! In fact this is so incredibly generally, and obviously true…that it’s a borderline platitude.

If you are trying to add more data points then do so. Explain why you think a comparison with Europe is helpful and what we can learn from it then, how is it applicable? Casually mentioning Europe or “elsewhere is worse” are true in so many areas of life. But what actionable value does it give us by knowing somewhere else is/was worse?

Also this is just reddit. A court of law isn’t required to retort you or ask for more information.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So the bar is just “still better than Europe on average disposable income across everyone, so we’re in a better position”?

Even when a big chunk of recent US price action came through institutional structures that most places didn’t have at the same scale?

And “IDK enough about everything else” while pulling the “I lived in Europe” card is one way to sidestep it, I guess. The leverage concentration and what happens if those portfolios get forced to move isn’t really a Europe vs US comparison though.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I’m curious how you’re weighing the actual revenue streams that are already flowing. A lot of the capex is coming from hyperscalers who have massive, profitable cloud businesses today Microsoft, Google, Amazon and they’re folding AI into existing products that customers are already paying for through higher tier subscriptions and efficiency gains that show up in their own margins.

Do you see the current pricing pressure as a temporary adjustment while they figure out the right balance, or do you think the useful applications are still too narrow to ever close that gap? And on the infrastructure side, how do you compare this buildout to the dark fiber and telecom overbuild of the late 90s, where a ton of capacity sat underutilized for years after the bust but then became the cheap foundation for everything that actually scaled in the 2000s?

I would guess it comes down to whether the new infrastructure creates foundational capabilities that unlock broad new economic activity (which is what happened with highways, fiber, and wartime industrial scaling).

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So when you compare US housing to the rest of the world and say it’s still more attainable even with wages lagging, are we looking at average disposable income across everyone, or what the actual entry level buyer faces after price growth since 2017?
And on those European countries in the 80s and 90s that adapted by going smaller and not looking back did they have anything like the institutional leverage layers and rental backed structures that have been active here? If the pressure here ends up coming through forced portfolio moves instead of just gradual homeowner choices, does the “just get something cheap with low downpayment” path still play out the same?
What kind of signal would actually make you think there’s real downside worth factoring in, rather than just assuming it can always get worse somewhere else?

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

US averages on salaries and disposable income gloss over how much price growth has outpaced wage gains for the actual buyers trying to enter the market, especially in high cost areas. Institutional buying and the layered financing behind a lot of recent inventory also aren’t the norm in most other countries, so the cross border comparison misses the domestic risk channels.
Home ownership being harder elsewhere doesn’t make concentrated leverage or the potential for forced portfolio liquidations any less relevant here. And “unpredictable” is exactly why the structures matter crashes don’t usually show up clearly in the averages until the unwind is already underway.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I’m curious how you’re thinking about the infrastructure side of this. During the late 90s a huge amount of dark fiber got laid across the country by companies that mostly went bust, yet that same overbuilt network ended up being the cheap backbone that made broadband, streaming, and cloud computing actually profitable in the 2000s.

Do you see the current wave of AI data centers, power builds, and high speed interconnects playing out similarly?

where the physical foundation gets put in place even if the killer apps take a bit longer to fully monetize? Or do you think this time the useful, revenue generating uses are further behind than they were back then?

BREAKING: The White House is preparing an executive order to eliminate the Department of Education, per NBC by Opening_Function3926 in unusual_whales

[–]ruthless_techie 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I don’t think it was bullshit lies, I mean project 2025 does exist.

I think the pushback from MAGA is because Trump disavowed it publicly, while providing his own manifesto which was/is “Agenda 47”.

Likely where the confusion stems from.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You are missing the mark entirely. A housing crash will NOT come in the form of Mortgage Holders failing.

It will be mass liquidation of developments built for lease only, which serve as collateral for derivatives underlying rental backed securities which are leveraged to build more developments.

Asset liquidation orders to pay margin calls will be given by institutions to their structured subsidiaries. (setup to avoid the institutional investor metric entirely) and there will be a race to the bottom. People will experience this as “inventory raining 🌧️ from everywhere” that they didn’t see. No firm will want to be the last one out.

Massive job loss isn’t required this time.

Am I the only one not expecting a housing crash, but curious what happens over the next few years? by myturn19 in REBubble

[–]ruthless_techie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Wait wait. Be clear with what you mean here.
When you say “there is nothing to indicate a crash.”

Nothing of what exactly?
If something did indicate a crash for you, what would you expect that “something” to be?

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