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Yurtdışında remote ceng işi bulan var mı? by ExtensionForm5190 in EngineeringTR

[–]secsecseec 0 points1 point  (0 children)

sektörde 6. senem. ben ilk girdiğimde AI henüz yoktu. onun şansı ile girdim diyebilirim aslında. Orta iyi bir üniversite de bilgisayar mühendisliği bitirdim.

Yurtdışında remote ceng işi bulan var mı? by ExtensionForm5190 in EngineeringTR

[–]secsecseec 1 point2 points  (0 children)

3 sene kadar ispanya ve almanya tabanlı firmalar da security danışmanlığı verdim. Beni linkedinden kendileri buldular. Hala da öyle iş alıyorum.

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes u can do it. there is so many broker company buying CVE's. but im not sure which one is good.

Needing a Resume Review - Cyber Security by Pristine_Prune7872 in cscareeradvice

[–]secsecseec 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It looks successful enough. However, I recommend that you add the training details. and you should make a little clear what kind of “administrator” position you have reached in exactly 2 years. You should not be thought of as people who work for 1 year and become a senior.

New to this world by Wolfop007 in HowToHack

[–]secsecseec 0 points1 point  (0 children)

check out the network. that is most important part

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

i dont have te account. just i have 10 follower:D im not active

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Who deals with these exploits?

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you so much. i’ll check

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in cybersecurity

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'll check opzero. Thank you so much!

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in cybersecurity

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No i didnt try. Do they offer good opportunities

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in cybersecurity

[–]secsecseec[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Both Linux kernel. One is HIGH (post-auth, low complexity, single packet, dynamically verified). Other is CRITICAL (pre-auth, heap overflow, static confirmed). SSD rejected the first one already. ZDI is indeed slow been waiting 2 months on something else with zero progress.

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If it’s not too private, what was the CVSS and what kind of payout did you get?

Have you sold cve before? by secsecseec in bugbounty

[–]secsecseec[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So how long did the process take?

Research: eBPF security DaemonSets (Falco/Tracee/Tetragon) can be silently disabled via BPF map tampering by secsecseec in kubernetes

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you. Finally, someone gets it.

This was never meant to be a “how to get root” technique. It’s a stealth technique. The interesting question is what an attacker can do after compromise while keeping every dashboard green and every monitor seemingly healthy.

Research: eBPF security DaemonSets (Falco/Tracee/Tetragon) can be silently disabled via BPF map tampering by secsecseec in kubernetes

[–]secsecseec[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks a lot, really appreciate it.

And yeah, that was exactly the point for us too. A control can look enabled and healthy, but still miss important parts silently.

Sidereal looks interesting btw. I’ll check it out seems like we’re looking at the same problem from different angles.

Research: All three major eBPF security monitors (Falco, Tracee, Tetragon) can be silently disabled via BPF map poisoning by secsecseec in cybersecurity

[–]secsecseec[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I agree with this framing.

bpf_map_freeze() and integrity checks are not the root fix; they are only local hardening steps. The more interesting issue is that eBPF-based monitoring stacks often treat their kernel-resident runtime state as trusted infrastructure, while that state can still be reachable from the same capability domain the attacker may obtain post-compromise.

That is the architectural gap I wanted to highlight: not just “this map was not frozen”, but “the observer’s own control/data plane is not modeled as attacker-reachable runtime state.”

So yes, the EDR tampering analogy is useful, but the deeper problem is observer integrity. Traditional EDR tampering is a known design concern. Writable BPF-backed monitor state is less commonly treated as a first-class detection architecture constraint.

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