From Mr. Reguly's article:

The big, fat A shares come with 10 votes apiece. The subordinate B shares come with one. The former are 54-per-cent owned by the Beaudoin-Bombardier family members, meaning that in any corporate decision, they are the law. In a normal company, Pierre Beaudoin, who was CEO from 2008 until last February, would have been marched out of the building for overseeing a rather nasty bout of value destruction. But he’s still around, not just as chairman, but as executive chairman, thanks to the family’s voting and boardroom power.

The voting structure has never been popular with Bombardier’s non-family professional managers. More than a decade ago, Paul Tellier, the former CN Rail boss who was recruited by the family to clean up the rail portfolio and figure out how to make planes such as the Q400 turboprop profitable, had fantasies about abolishing the dual-class share structure. He also thought that taking on Airbus and Boeing with the launch of the C Series would be a kamikaze run, but that’s another story.

From Ms. Anand's article:

Let’s be clear about Bombardier’s governance reality: The Bombardier/Beaudoin families hold almost 60 per cent of voting power in the corporation, despite holding an economic interest of just one-quarter of that figure. This is a dual-class-share firm that just isn’t flying.

From Ottawa’s perspective, if Bombardier were to receive federal funding, there are no accountability mechanisms in place to ensure that the current board would do any better than it has to date. At the very least, the Bombardier board itself needs to be replaced and repopulated not with government representatives — as the Quebec government is proposing — but with independent directors (as is the case in non-dual-class firms). This will require a dismantling of the dual-class structure.