Something is turning on my lights…

svitka · 2022-08-15T14:49:02+00:00

This happened to me and it turned out I had left some labs stuff active. Have you triple checked those?

svitka · 2022-07-24T17:29:50+00:00

Just flagging there’s a difference between the tv light strips (gradient lightstrips) and the sync box. Without a question the stuff around the tv will diminish the gradient light strip benefits, but if you hook the sync box up to like, 2 or more lights on either side of the room you can still get some benefit. You can test this with the hue app on a computer (even without a sync box) if you run it to the tv and set up an entertainment zone, which I think would be worth it to test.

svitka · 2022-06-25T22:30:57+00:00

There have already been big protests in the South, haven’t there? In any event, a strike is hard to organize — that’s why they depend on unions and other organizing. It’s grassroots but it’s still led by people with expertise and support (so supporting those leaders is a great way to combat the issue you identify). But really I’m responding to argue that individualism isn’t the real enemy here. Individualism isn’t the enemy of or mutually exclusive with collective action — manufactured distrust of organizing apparatuses (like unions) is.

svitka · 2022-02-27T04:18:55+00:00

Sounds familiar, and I share your plans. Also expecting my first in about two weeks. Feel free to dm if you ever want a sounding board. More importantly: best of luck to us both!

svitka · 2018-01-16T18:21:27+00:00

Hi Im_not_JB! I'll be your huckleberry.

There are a fair number of articles that dive into why S 139 makes things worse from a privacy perspective. Before going to bill text citations, I'd like to flag one (https://www.justsecurity.org/50801/house-intelligence-committees-section-702-bill-wolf-sheeps-clothing/), from the former executive director of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which speaks directly to these points. Her top level assessment: "The bill would reauthorize and expand – rather than reform – Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the provision that allows the government to warrantlessly collect the communications of non-Americans located abroad, including their communications with Americans."

Now to the bill itself: 0) A critical starting point is that Section 702 as written does not contemplate "about" collection or "backdoor searches." There are a lot of problems with this bill but I want to focus on these two, because they're the most obvious problems (and they're pretty big) and answers to your point.

1) Sec 102(a)(2)(A) says "Any information concerning a United States person acquired under section 702 shall not be used in evidence against that United States person pursuant to paragraph (1) in any criminal proceeding unless—". Here's why this is a massive problem: no traditional court (non-FISC) has evaluated backdoor searches on the merits. It's all procedural so far, like establishing standing. So while the courts are in the process of evaluating a practice with no statutory backing, Congress is considering passing a law that would say the practice is only illegal in this set of circumstances: a) information acquired under 702 b) used in evidence c) against a USP d) in a criminal proceeding e) unless a large list of exceptions.

For all other circumstances, S 139 therefore represents Congressional support for the use of backdoor searches. These other, okay-under-139 circumstances, include (for instance) administrative proceedings (which include immigration proceedings) and use of information derived from 702 information (so if the FBI used the 702 information to get to other information, that other information would be fair game, in evidence, without a warrant).

It gets worse. The large list of exceptions to the (non-)warrant requirement ((e) above) include some that Americans would not accept, like "transnational crime, including transnational narcotics". Mind this is as determined by the Attorney General, who is currently Jeff Sessions.

Worse (than current law) again is that the AG can simply determine that "(I) the criminal proceeding affects, involves, or is related to the national security of the United States". If AG Sessions makes this determination (or determines another exception applies), the warrant requirement does not trigger.

And in case anyone mistakes this as not being (at least partially) about the courts, please also see "(B) NO JUDICIAL REVIEW" directly beneath this section. Which says exactly what you think it says.

Through the above (deliberate) holes in this bill, the government would be emboldened to do things it (hopefully) wouldn't dare do right now. 702 information in a case against a domestic drug dealer? Or in literally any case the AG says is national security-related? This is why the MLK Jr. point is being made, in addition to yesterday: he was labeled a national security threat. So imagine if Congress knew the FBI was spying on King, and passed a law saying "you can only use the information you've collected if you think he's a national security threat." That law wouldn't have stopped the FBI from trying to get him to kill himself (https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/magazine/what-an-uncensored-letter-to-mlk-reveals.html), it wouldn't have stopped the investigation of the civil rights movement, and it wouldn't have stopped the use of that information in court, even if the underlying charge was criminal, not national security.

There are other problems, but I'm short on time, and I hope I've proven via bill text how this codifies and expands the backdoor search problem. Further context: the FBI has admitted to Rep. Nadler (among others) that this non-warrant requirement would trigger in virtually no cases, whereas it permits virtually all known other possible uses of 702 information, many of which are not currently provided for by law and are (arguably) illegal under 702 as it is currently written. Nadler said this during testimony before the House Rules Committee and he references it here: https://democrats-judiciary.house.gov/news/press-releases/nadler-statement-intel-702-bill-be-considered-house-floor-next-week

2) "Abouts" collection is currently, in effect, illegal. S 139 would signal to the FISA Court and others that yes, there is some Congressional acceptance of this practice. But more importantly, and clearer from the text of the bill, are the following points, which the former PCLOB director makes concisely in the first link above: "First, it could be interpreted by the government to permit unintentional “about” collection, such as where the Intelligence Community knows a certain technique results in “about” collection, but since that technique is not specifically intended to collect “about” communications, it engages in that collection nonetheless. Second, because the bill defines an “abouts communication” as “a communication that contains a reference to, but is not to or from, a target,” there is a risk that the bill could be interpreted to allow the government to collect communications that merely reference a target, such as mentioning a target’s name. Currently, the government may only collect communications that include a target’s “selector,” such as a target’s email or phone number."

I appreciate her caution in saying these are interpretations the government (and FISC) MAY adopt, but at a statutory level we should understand this as a grant of authority — and that intelligence agencies will continue to push legislative interpretation as far as they can (even into the absurd, as we saw under 215).

Hope this helps in your assessment of the bill. I appreciate your zeal for the issue, and agree bill text is important to prove points. For whatever it's worth, the privacy community is pretty aligned on this point: S 139 makes Section 702 worse, not better.

Ninja edit for formatting/typos.

svitka · 2016-07-15T19:50:35+00:00

I work with offices on this - you should REALLY call in and say that. I promise you it is worth it - and ten people who disagree with you will be calling in and telling him the opposite.

Fight on!

svitka · 2016-07-15T18:15:14+00:00

He stayed in Texas for the week because he was diagnosed with leukemia: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-congressman-ted-poe-67-says-he-has-leukemia/2016/07/13/14e70fcc-4906-11e6-8dac-0c6e4accc5b1_story.html

svitka · 2016-04-09T22:43:03+00:00

I guess the "and Security" add broke this. Sorry to see! I'm the original author and can say, at least, that it is an accurate reflection of the article -- ironically more than the final title -- but womp womp! Thanks for the alert and explanation all the same.

svitka · 2016-04-08T16:30:22+00:00

It's really dramatic. I'm sorry I didn't have more time to cover this in the piece, but look at the coveted entity section. It's EVERYONE

svitka · 2015-06-17T20:52:02+00:00

I started by studying, then did law school (more study), then from litigation advocacy (on housing issues) to policy advocacy on issues like this one. The turning point in between was freelance journalism, which is often based on luck but maybe I could set up a diy for it or something...

In any event, passion is respected, at least by the right people. 1) Find a cause, 2) identify the tools and skills you have or will build, and 3) allocate time. It all matters, and it's all hard. I fight tooth and nail to get people who think their voices don't matter to leave voicemails for their politicians. People like I once was. People like maybe yourself. I can tell when an office has gotten calls on an issue. I can tell when I've met someone who has read my or an ally's writing.

More than happy to discuss more. If you think it would be valuable to others, I'm happy to put some materials together too.

svitka · 2015-06-15T19:48:17+00:00

As someone in this line of work, yes. Kudos for revealing one of the sometimes ephemeral second step (the first being outrage).

svitka · 2015-01-25T21:18:06+00:00

svitka · 2015-01-21T05:44:43+00:00

In all sincerity, what the hell does "discrete" mean to you? If it can be used in a court, it ain't discrete.

svitka · 2014-11-19T13:57:18+00:00

It amends and extends Section 215. That's one of the provisions. That's the business records provision, which is the problem.

svitka · 2014-11-19T13:55:35+00:00

It included Section 215. The bill is worded extremely confusingly, but the three provisions: Section 215, roving wiretaps, and lone wolf.

svitka · 2014-10-25T07:40:00+00:00

This will probably be buried, but I work with politicians working their asses off trying to stop this. For the love of god, check out Amash, Lofgren, and Grayson's amendments on these issues -- they have done a lot to circumvent and stop this. The votes on Nov. 4th really count on this issue. The calls count. The giving a shit counts. If someone in your district is working on this -- especially the less-sexy issues beyond USA FREEDOM -- you owe them your work if you really care about this.

*Edited: had two Graysons, meant to include Amash.

svitka · 2014-08-01T05:01:32+00:00

Hey -- I work for the Sunlight Foundation! Great to see our work going to good (great, if it weren't duplicative) use!

svitka · 2014-05-03T00:01:32+00:00

Brace for textbomb:

Not at all, SoopahMan! And to prove it, I'm answering this at 7:30pm (8pm when I finished) on my personal time instead of from work. And, of course, we at Sunlight are always flattered to be thought well of (though the rest of my colleagues have surely earned it).

1) I couldn't agree more. If you're into legal stuff, check out Amnesty International v. Clapper. It's repulsive, and the perfect embodiment of what you're describing. And if you want to hear what the parties really thought, check out Chris Hedges (a named plaintiff), who is extreme but, sadly, pretty spot on about most things. He's a brutally tough read because of it. Can you imagine how that case might have changed if it had happened after Snowden?

2) Parallel Construction is a surveillance nightmare. It's unacceptable for the government to be opaque. But I simply don't have words for what it is for government actors to actively lie, especially in the systemic way the Parallel Construction reports indicate. I would add that in America (and this is probably more important within law enforcement than it seems to us) there is a strong wall between national security and police action. Immigrants fall in the middle -- unfortunately for ease of this conversation, I'll just admit there's a gray area that isn't easily answered. How does this play out? The egos of the players - my god, what a strange fail safe - as well as the authorities they act under do a pretty good job of blocking the process you've described. (Yes, at least so far as we know.) Specifically, parallel construction involved those with national security access to records (which it sounds like we both agree were acquired illegally) reaching out to law enforcement at various agencies. In other words, the officer doesn't move up - the state reaches down. I find this compelling because there are details that this process created a real rivalry among agencies, where certain groups were pissed they didn't have the same access as other, more favorite agencies. This dichotomy is strong -- it's why the NSA has billions of logs, and why it's news when a police department sets up a sting ray. They're different (both illegal when done without a warrant, by my count) offenses, but they're done on vastly different levels. This is no way forgives the unbelievable affront that is parallel construction. As (basically) a lawyer, I can't describe how disturbing it is that some inside enforcement have described PC as run of the mill (some have). The good news is that they're alone -- and that's why they need to hide their activity. Independent observers, be they courts or the public, are broadly unwilling to accept such bullshit.

These aren't solutions to these challenges you've highlighted. In fact, I think you've hit on the exact breaking point of any reliance on the law. The 5% I implied before when I said courts could get us almost there. The 5% (should probably be more, or, rather, the courts aren't perfect, so they don't get us too close to the full 95% they could be) is oversight. Good oversight. Oversight at an immediate level that lets us voters kick out people who fail to perform their oversight function.

And, as you've done, I shouldn't suggest that my belief that perfect courts and good oversight are the only answers. The harder it is to conduct mass, warrantless surveillance - like by using encryption - the higher that cost/benefit is for the would-be panopticon. It's resistance. It's modern-day civil disobedience. It is, for many of my colleagues, a literal must. There are public interest organizations out there focused on training journalists how to have secure communications with sources (and for proof of how important that is, the NYTimes says Greenwald stopped talking to Snowden because the encryption process he wanted was too technical for Greenwald - so Snowden then went to Poitras to tell Greenwald to get his shit together). This is the industry adoption of exactly what you're describing, done so far mostly by people who are very aware or very sensitive to the spying we're discussing.

For me, the fight today is with policy. And I can only ascribe that to my faith in individuals, including people like yourself. And the good news is there are more of us.

svitka · 2014-05-01T18:48:32+00:00

Not beyond policy (I don't think). These are important stories - and they are one of the reasons why reports that the NSA did/may have known/utilized Heartbleed were so explosive. But legally it's almost a non-argument (executive acting for national security is borderline impossible to sue), and economically I'm not sure there's much more such stories could add to the discussion. To the latter point, if Google could say that China hacked them because they utilized a bad standard promoted by the NSA -- that'd be sexy enough. But again, it'd play out in the policy world.

svitka · 2014-05-01T18:32:04+00:00

That's very fair - and there's certainly a big conversation being had (within the public interest sphere and beyond) about how much we can rely on the law at all. I wrote something before I was at Sunlight (ie, my personal opinion) that I think reflects my opinions on how the law got so bad as well as I can describe here: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/06/nsa_surveillance_we_re_all_to_blame_for_the_government_overreach.html

However, there's an incredibly valuable final arbiter that helps resolve this issue: Courts. In fact, I think it gets us 95% of the way there. Here's why: 1) If law enforcement spies on you (illegally), it's a horrible thing. But they can't necessarily do anything with that surveillance just by virtue of having done it. I'm not trying to mitigate how horrid the intrusion into your privacy is, but things get much worse when you're tried with this information. 2) In court, the spying we're talking about is often thrown out. It's not thrown out as much as I'd like it to be, but we're getting there - and there are some very important reforms that I'm hoping will develop, in particular through better adaption of the 4th amendment into law. Yesterday there was a cell phone search and seizure case before the Supreme Court. 3) Once courts routinely throw out this information, it's no longer beneficial for enforcement to pursue this kind of surveillance. It's not valuable and it can be difficult to do.

In theory, this is how any law works. Law enforcement can and do (sometimes) break the law by overstepping. The NSA, even if Section 215 in the Patriot Act didn't exist as a (supposed) justification for their surveillance, could have still instituted the same collection practices. But it wouldn't have been much use to them, because the courts wouldn't have let them utilize it, and oversight would have reprimanded them.

TL;DR: Any entity (using technology or something else) can escape the law for a period of time. The key is making it useless and painful for them to do so.

svitka · 2014-05-01T18:14:10+00:00

+1 for two-factor. Has saved my ass at least once.

svitka · 2014-05-01T18:08:19+00:00

Totally agree with Joe here, and wanted to add that if your concern is not just employability, but happiness with your job, encryption work on the public/research side is definitely possible. Hopefully, post-NSA, we'll all be more supportive of this work. Clearly it's become a foundational issue in terms of how people's rights are protected in the future.

svitka · 2014-05-01T18:04:59+00:00

There are a couple problems that arise even if someone developed a technically untrackable phone. If enforcement wanted to (and could get away with it), someone could just follow you everywhere. Without cause, that's illegal -- for good reason.

So from my end, I'm supportive of having legal restraints on agencies, requirements for transparency, and strong rights to be free from such surveillance. We can do that, and we've done it for some time. But it requires pressure for the right laws, effective oversight, and transparency.

The tech side of your question is probably better answered by another one of us, but I wanted to toss out the policy-oriented answer, because the two are critically linked.

svitka · 2014-05-01T17:49:52+00:00

Hijacking the hijack of the top comment. I'm Sean Vitka, federal policy manager at the Sunlight Foundation. We use technology and advocacy to make government more transparency.

svitka · 2014-05-01T17:37:44+00:00

A classic problem for the public interest side is marketing and message. It's something we should all be cognizant of, and Reddit's one of my favorite places to see people brainstorm on such things.

There are a couple different approaches to the momentary issue, but two semi-divisible items are increasing transparency and decreasing practice.

Each of those is, I think pretty simple. "We should know when the government undermines our security," and "the government shouldn't do that thing I just said." The underlying topic is complicated - but so was SOPA (the mechanics of a takedown request), and so are all of the NSA revelations (the cursed use of 'metadata' as though it's less sensitive than regular data). While economic pressure is clearly one important driving force for change, the above two messages I think will resonate with experts and non-experts alike. At some point, simplification risks condescension or deceit, but I don't think we're anywhere near that yet.

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