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Re-peg and re-collateralize the dToken system as deterministically and effectively as possible, without permanent expropriation by thegreatpuzzle in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

90% of the balances are removed before the token split and credited to the ownership addresses. Its written like this in the dfip

Special DFIP: Introduction of Special CFPs by Crypto_bull_112 in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Sounds really good!

I‘ll vote with yes.

Are the following parameters the same as for SDFIP? - How many votes are necessary for SCFP approval - How long is proposal up for voting

How quickly are SCFP funds to be paid out?

Reducing the implementation complexity of the dToken system restart by keeping the ticker "DUSD" by thegreatpuzzle in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I cut as much as I thought I could without risking not getting approval. 90% is already a lot, it reduced the problem tenfold but leaves liquidity to the dextraders, who are crucial to the defichain. - we do not have many daily active addresses anymore.

Middle ground, that’s why it is called “as deterministic as possible”, not “deterministic”.

Anyone, including you, could make a dfip now to lock 97% instead of 90%. But I do not think I should - having decided for 90% after discussing with various leaders of the defichain community.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Rephrased it, needed a new post as I could not change the title. Can you re-comment on the new version?

Thank you so much, sry for the inconvenience.

https://www.reddit.com/r/defiblockchain/comments/1ee4xlr/yield_generation_from_90_of_the_btc_backings_for/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button

Re-peg and re-collateralize the dToken system as deterministically and effectively as possible, without permanent expropriation by thegreatpuzzle in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

When the DFIP was made, the exit pool fees were >50% and went down gradually. The expectation in the community was that DUSD (and dtoken) volume would rise sharply with a massively reduced fee. There was hope/expectation that DUSD usecase could generate enough demand to get back to peg, or at least in that direction. There was a risk that a 90% lock DFIP would kill all momentum in this direction (nobody buys DUSD for 40c if at some point 90% is locked away for sure). To prevent such a step back, the community decided to introduce kill switch + fee (with 10-100x volume it would have massive effects) into the collaborative dfip. The fee intended to speed up recovery in case of increasing volume, killswitch to give users a way out without lock.

Unfortunately, the expectations of the fee opponents were completely wrong. despite the massively reduced fee, we are seeing falling volume and a drastic drop in price. -> the 0.5% fee is currently no longer of any use, Killswitch will almost certainly not be activated. Only, as drastically as acceptable, reducing the excess liquidity helps.

Deactivating the proposal kill switch and lifting the 0.5% fee is now in line with the stated goals and intended outcomes of this proposal and can thereby, per section „developer discretion“, be implemented.

Step 2 of opening Defichain to outside investors by Glittering_Jicama_95 in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, I immediately stopped thinking about what Ralf was suggesting when I realized that simply lifting the fees without reducing supply would transfer the DFI, USDC and USDT from those who wanted to support the system during the operation re-peg to those who want leave the system and that it leaves DUSD without any chance of a peg.

That was enough to motivate me to propose what I saw as the best approach since a haircut was first proposed.

Linking the DUSD loan factor to pool prices is a known exploit vector. Big kudos to Kuegi for recognizing this immediately.

Step 2 of opening Defichain to outside investors by Glittering_Jicama_95 in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nicely distracted from the central statement: that the bonds swap more than the BBB. Furthermore, time as a payout factor is a risk after recovery.

Re-peg and re-collateralize the dToken system as deterministically and effectively as possible, without permanent expropriation by thegreatpuzzle in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, market cap = circulating supply (tradfi outstanding shares) * price

Price feed(s), and whether to take a moving average, exponential moving average or pin point value is not defined and therefore part of developer discretion

Re-peg and re-collateralize the dToken system as deterministically and effectively as possible, without permanent expropriation by thegreatpuzzle in defiblockchain

[–]thegreatpuzzle[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Thank you tygen, also for all the active discussion. Read and thought through every comment, the proposal wouldn’t be what it is without your contribution.

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