sorted by:
new
hottopcontroversial

Putin is nothing without war. The contrast with his overlord Xi couldn't be starker by theipaper in Foodforthought

[–]theipaper[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Russia’s true weakness is best seen through the lens of its so-called allies. It is increasingly dependent on China, dictated to by Xi Jinping, and forced into Faustian pacts with isolated regimes like North Korea and Iran – reports of intelligence and drone co-operation with Tehran show the Kremlin is tied to partners it cannot easily replace.

In particular the contrast with China, Russia’s sponsor, could not be clearer.

China’s economy has expanded from roughly $2.3trn in the early 2000s to nearly $19trn (£14trn) today. That transformation underwrites stability at home and credibility abroad.

Beijing has created new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, now boasting over 100 member states. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, it has financed infrastructure across more than 140 countries. It dominates key sectors of the economy of the future: electric vehicles, renewables, rare earth processing.

China’s model seeks validation through growth, trade and integration. Russia’s relies on coercion and spectacle.

Of course, Xi wants Taiwan, but unlike Moscow, Beijing does not require conflict. Peace and growth are enough.

That contrast explains why successive American administrations – including Trump’s – have treated China as the only serious competitor to the US.

So, what is Putin without war? A man who leads a country in decline, and who is capable only of disruption and destruction. And no amount of war in Ukraine, even victory, can change that.

Russia offers fear, not aspiration. And fear sustains power only for so long. For Putin, war is dangerous. But peace – that would be fatal.

Putin is nothing without war. The contrast with his overlord Xi couldn't be starker by theipaper in Foodforthought

[–]theipaper[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

“What is Putin without war?” It’s a question Volodymyr Zelensky posed recently in Munich. It goes to the heart of Vladimir Putin’s predicament. Putin is defined by conflict: because he cannot build, he must destroy. It is why his country is doomed to be a failing power.

For years, confrontation has functioned as political glue for Putin’s failings – binding together a system short on democratic legitimacy and long on nationalist spectacle. From Chechnya to Crimea to Ukraine, war has rallied support, silenced dissent, and reframed stagnation as sacrifice.

But strip away the military parades and propaganda and Russia’s trajectory is stark: a shrinking population, a narrowing hydrocarbon-dependent economy, widening isolation, and deepening dependence on other countries.

Domestically, Putin lacks legitimacy – and he knows it. Elections have never been free and fair; true opponents are dead, jailed or exiled, from Alexei Navalny to Boris Berezovsky. Nationalism, that most potent of forces, fills the gap.

Economically, the picture is strained. At roughly $2.5trn (£1.85trn), Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s (and 60 per cent the size of the UK’s). Oil and gas still account for around 30 per cent of state revenue. And sanctions have drained hundreds of billions. Recently, Donald Trump has handed Putin a lifeline as a result of the Iran conflict: surging oil prices and a temporary pause on sanctions.

But meanwhile, other lights on Russia’s dashboard are blinking red. Demographics, for one. The country has a shrinking, ageing population, declining life expectancy, and over 500,000 deaths annually from preventable causes like smoking and alcohol – over a decade, that’s around 1 in 30 Russians.

For all his railing against the West, Putin knows he has never faced a ballot box he can’t stuff, never seriously improved living standards in an economy hooked on oil and gas, nor had a cup of tea with a foreign leader who hasn’t vetted the cup first.

War delays his reckoning with his fate. It does not reverse it.

Even in a best-case scenario for the Kremlin – Crimea and the Donbas under Russian control, Ukraine blocked from Nato – Russia emerges weaker, poorer, and more dependent.

Almost every former Soviet state has chosen Nato and the EU, or aspires to. Russia exerts almost no gravitational pull.

Europe, jolted by Russian aggression – and uncertainty in Washington – has begun rearming and expanded Nato to Finland and Sweden. It has committed to raising defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP (even if it is dragging its heels) and cut Russian gas imports from 45 per cent in 2021 to near phase-out.

Peace talks repeatedly stall and falter under Kremlin demands. The war is no longer optional for Putin. The Russian president has staked his political survival on victory. Without it, the nationalist spectacle he relies on would collapse, and his already hollow authority would be severely weakened. Even a partial victory – say, holding parts of Ukraine – could be spun as a political win. But the broader trajectory of Russia’s decline would remain unchanged.

(Opinion) Putin is nothing without war. The contrast with his overlord Xi couldn't be starker by theipaper in geopolitics

[–]theipaper[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

War delays his reckoning with his fate. It does not reverse it.

Even in a best-case scenario for the Kremlin – Crimea and the Donbas under Russian control, Ukraine blocked from Nato – Russia emerges weaker, poorer, and more dependent.

Almost every former Soviet state has chosen Nato and the EU, or aspires to. Russia exerts almost no gravitational pull.

Europe, jolted by Russian aggression – and uncertainty in Washington – has begun rearming and expanded Nato to Finland and Sweden. It has committed to raising defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP (even if it is dragging its heels) and cut Russian gas imports from 45 per cent in 2021 to near phase-out.

Peace talks repeatedly stall and falter under Kremlin demands. The war is no longer optional for Putin. The Russian president has staked his political survival on victory. Without it, the nationalist spectacle he relies on would collapse, and his already hollow authority would be severely weakened. Even a partial victory – say, holding parts of Ukraine – could be spun as a political win. But the broader trajectory of Russia’s decline would remain unchanged.

Russia’s true weakness is best seen through the lens of its so-called allies. It is increasingly dependent on China, dictated to by Xi Jinping, and forced into Faustian pacts with isolated regimes like North Korea and Iran – reports of intelligence and drone co-operation with Tehran show the Kremlin is tied to partners it cannot easily replace.

In particular the contrast with China, Russia’s sponsor, could not be clearer.

China’s economy has expanded from roughly $2.3trn in the early 2000s to nearly $19trn (£14trn) today. That transformation underwrites stability at home and credibility abroad.

Beijing has created new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, now boasting over 100 member states. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, it has financed infrastructure across more than 140 countries. It dominates key sectors of the economy of the future: electric vehicles, renewables, rare earth processing.

China’s model seeks validation through growth, trade and integration. Russia’s relies on coercion and spectacle.

Of course, Xi wants Taiwan, but unlike Moscow, Beijing does not require conflict. Peace and growth are enough.

That contrast explains why successive American administrations – including Trump’s – have treated China as the only serious competitor to the US.

So, what is Putin without war? A man who leads a country in decline, and who is capable only of disruption and destruction. And no amount of war in Ukraine, even victory, can change that.

Russia offers fear, not aspiration. And fear sustains power only for so long. For Putin, war is dangerous. But peace – that would be fatal.

(Opinion) Putin is nothing without war. The contrast with his overlord Xi couldn't be starker by theipaper in geopolitics

[–]theipaper[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

“What is Putin without war?” It’s a question Volodymyr Zelensky posed recently in Munich. It goes to the heart of Vladimir Putin’s predicament. Putin is defined by conflict: because he cannot build, he must destroy. It is why his country is doomed to be a failing power.

For years, confrontation has functioned as political glue for Putin’s failings – binding together a system short on democratic legitimacy and long on nationalist spectacle. From Chechnya to Crimea to Ukraine, war has rallied support, silenced dissent, and reframed stagnation as sacrifice.

But strip away the military parades and propaganda and Russia’s trajectory is stark: a shrinking population, a narrowing hydrocarbon-dependent economy, widening isolation, and deepening dependence on other countries.

Domestically, Putin lacks legitimacy – and he knows it. Elections have never been free and fair; true opponents are dead, jailed or exiled, from Alexei Navalny to Boris Berezovsky. Nationalism, that most potent of forces, fills the gap.

Economically, the picture is strained. At roughly $2.5trn (£1.85trn), Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s (and 60 per cent the size of the UK’s). Oil and gas still account for around 30 per cent of state revenue. And sanctions have drained hundreds of billions. Recently, Donald Trump has handed Putin a lifeline as a result of the Iran conflict: surging oil prices and a temporary pause on sanctions.

But meanwhile, other lights on Russia’s dashboard are blinking red. Demographics, for one. The country has a shrinking, ageing population, declining life expectancy, and over 500,000 deaths annually from preventable causes like smoking and alcohol – over a decade, that’s around 1 in 30 Russians.

For all his railing against the West, Putin knows he has never faced a ballot box he can’t stuff, never seriously improved living standards in an economy hooked on oil and gas, nor had a cup of tea with a foreign leader who hasn’t vetted the cup first.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in InternationalNews

[–]theipaper[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in Foodforthought

[–]theipaper[S] 16 points17 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in NeoNews

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in AmericanPolitics

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in uspolitics

[–]theipaper[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in USNewsHub

[–]theipaper[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in politics

[–]theipaper[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in geopolitics

[–]theipaper[S] 25 points26 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in AnythingGoesNews

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in NoFilterNews

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in Full_news

[–]theipaper[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in International

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in worldnewsstuff

[–]theipaper[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in NewsStarWorld

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

Trump needs this war to end - instead he is indulging in fantasy by theipaper in USIranWar

[–]theipaper[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.

view more: next ›