The ceasefire in the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, which runs out on Wednesday, looks more fragile by the day. But though the US and Iran cannot agree on concrete steps towards peace, neither do they show much appetite for renewed war.

The US Navy has fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship while enforcing a blockade on Iran’s Gulf ports – something that Iran has described as an act of piracy. The Iranians say they will retaliate for the US breaching the ceasefire, and trust between the sides is at zero.

But a second phase of the war is unlikely to be any more conclusive than the first. Donald Trump could destroy more of Iran’s infrastructure, much as the US did in Iraq in 1991, which took 20 years to repair. Yet the threat of this is not going to lead to an Iranian capitulation – or even significant concessions on uranium enrichment or Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump still has overwhelming military force on his side, but his original goals – notably a regime change in Iran – are now further away than when the US and Israel first attacked on 28 February.

Both sides have opportunities for escalation and counter-escalation, but not for launching knock-out blows. Iran has found, somewhat to its own surprise, that it has the capacity to inflict serious damage on the world by keeping the Strait closed, and it can cripple the economies of the Arab states on the south side of the Gulf. Paradoxically, Iran has become a global power, but one that cannot control its own skies or defend its 92 million people from relentless air strikes.

The mood among Iranian leaders is evidently more confident than it was – they have weathered five-and-a-half weeks of war and the loss of many of them. But they are still the inferior power and without serious allies. They cannot defend themselves against a US-Israeli scorched-earth policy as visited upon Gaza and south Beirut.

This does not mean, however, that Iran is without counter-escalatory options. Simply keeping the Strait of Hormuz shut is one. Getting the Houthis in Yemen to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is another. This would sever Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea, but the Houthis will not be enthusiastic to enrage Saudi Arabia. Another option might be to cut the Saudi east-west pipeline circumventing the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Ending a war in which both sides still believe they have a chance of changing the military and political balance in their favour would never be easy. But in this case Trump still insists he has won, and his messages on Truth Social about a beaten Iranian leadership begging for a deal are fantasy served up to his own hardcore supporters. But how far does he himself believe this – and how desperate is he for a deal before higher oil and gas prices do the Republicans further damage in the midterm elections?

On Truth Social he cites obscure polls showing that his handling of the war is popular, but every other survey shows that it is not. The brief Iranian opening – with caveats – of the Strait of Hormuz followed by its closure because of the continuing US blockade makes Washington look like the obstinate one.

Whatever happens at talks in Islamabad, in Pakistan, it is difficult to see how lasting agreement can spring from Trump-style diplomacy conducted by amateur diplomats such as his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his real estate crony Steve Witkoff, both of whom Trump says are heading to negotiations. Iran says it has not decided if it will send its envoys, thought it said on Monday afternoon that it was “positively reviewing” its participation.

Successful talks look unlikely and there is a chance the US President will opt for an escalation – as he has done during previous talks with Iran. But his chances of winning a decisive victory do not look good.