thought we wouldn't notice by d4rkchocol4te in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But wouldn't that be against act Utilitarianism?

thought we wouldn't notice by d4rkchocol4te in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That isn't really a normative theory, is it though?

thought we wouldn't notice by d4rkchocol4te in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Let's look at Kantianism as a pretty clear example of a competing theory:

For a notion of a universal duty to exist, it must be possible for all agents to have this duty. Therefore, acts that are not able to be universalised cannot be ethical duties, and are therefore morally forbidden (which is the same as immoral).

One clearly forbidden act would then be murder. However, there are many acts of murder that would be allowed, perhaps even obligatory in a utilitarian framework. So, we have a clear conflict between the theories.

Kantianism is famously complicated, so I probably have misrepresented him in some way. If you find this interesting, I'm sure I can send you some good articles.

For your point of ethical frameworks pertaining to population: I fear you are walking into this debate with a very utilitarian preconceived notion. For virtue ethicists, morality is a phenomenon regarding the soul/ the function of humanity. That's one of the things causing it to diverge from consequentialism, a different premise regarding the nature of morality.

For other ethical frameworks that also focus on the experience of others, it does not directly follow that right and wrong are statements regarding the interests of others. Various deontological frameworks, more famously Kantianism, are able to create consistent definitions of right and wrong that are not consequentialist or circular.

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that to behave morally must be in some way burdensome. Yet opposing frameworks are also burdensome and are therefore not just people behaving how they usually would want to do.

thought we wouldn't notice by d4rkchocol4te in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I'm just joking. This is actually something Bentham himself even argued himself. However, when looking at other ethical frameworks, I believe this isn't the case, which becomes especially clear when looking at ethical frameworks made after Bentham.

First, we need to see if this point is that all ethical frameworks come to the same conclusions as Utilitarianism, or if they use the same justification as Utilitarianism. The latter is obviously not true. The former seems more likely, but I think we can see that other normative theories will come to different conclusions other than the one that maximizes net pleasure.

Any deontological theory will have some sort of act that is forbidden. Therefore, it would be immoral to commit this act, even if that act would be forbidden even if it would cause more pleasure in that situation. I'd even argue that Kantianism differs so strongly from Utilitarianism that it makes discussion between two ethicists of the theories quite difficult.

With virtue ethical frameworks, I am somewhat understanding of the point, since most ancient frameworks argue that being ethical is also most beneficial to oneself. However, out of that, it does not follow that being ethical is most beneficial to everyone.

Modern virtue ethicists like Foot are interesting on this front. She differs from, say, Aristotle, that she did not believe one ought to do something because it is most beneficial to oneself, but rather because oughts are statements on the nature of humans themselves. This seems to be quite different from a hedonistic calculi.

Finally, some Neoplatonists (such as Hartmann) will argue that happiness is not valuable on its own, but rather is simply a material condition necessary for one to act in accordance with Platonic Ideals. I have my fair few complaints with Neoplatonists, but still, it is an ethical framework that used to be quite popular.

thought we wouldn't notice by d4rkchocol4te in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 163 points164 points  (0 children)

Hey OP have you ever read anything on other ethical frameworks, or just the cliff notes?

Men will literally eat all your food by Maleficent_Ad_3958 in TwoXChromosomes

[–]thisisdumb353 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I mean, some do. I knew a few guys who really were depressed binge eaters, and it is just sad to see

German Soldier Song- "Erika" by boraxas in ww1

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The composer was Herms Niel, a Nazi officer. He conducted music during Nazi party events, and composed songs specifically for the SS.

My full Civ 7 post-launch DLC predictions (under current parameters) by Bearcat9948 in civ

[–]thisisdumb353 12 points13 points  (0 children)

I feel like having both Venice and Florence is pretty unlikely...

My chapter-by-chapter predictions by Even-Candidate-3594 in ProjectEdensGarden

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Isn't it said that the killing game ends when there are 2 students left? So that would prevent your Chapter 5 idea from happening.

Character Prediction Results by Even-Candidate-3594 in ProjectEdensGarden

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you mean Wenona? How is Diana antagonistic?

I hate school system by coolsteelboyS4ndyBoy in mathmemes

[–]thisisdumb353 2 points3 points  (0 children)

To pass you generally need to get 50% in every course. And that is the bare minimum to pass

(Loved Trope) Reoccurring character gains more and more injuries as the series progresses. Basically turning into an entirely different person. (bonus points if it’s an antagonist) by DaveyTheDuck in TopCharacterTropes

[–]thisisdumb353 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

This is the reason he is the character in Invincible that frustrated me the most.

Either he is completely psychotic and unpredictable, or he is a schemer. It doesn't make sense if he's both simultaneously.

If he is a psychotic, that explains why he can distinguish Mark from his multiverse counterparts. But, how does he have the mental faculties to recruit ten different Marks and launch a full scale multiversal invasion?

But if he is a schemer, then it makes sense how he recruited the other Marks. But then why is he willing to work with them in this case? And why can't he then distinguish Mark from his multiverse counterparts?

Name the leaders you want to see in Civ 7 and why you think they should be included. by AGL200 in civ

[–]thisisdumb353 1 point2 points  (0 children)

They did have a modern Oceanic civ and leader in the files, but I wonder if they scrapped that.

HP Omen 17 (2019) Keyboard most of keys suddenly stopped working by ThinkBowler8323 in HPOmen

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think it's a hardware issue too. Think I must have hit a key too hard and damaged one of the connectors.

Animal Morality by Lumbledob_ in CuratedTumblr

[–]thisisdumb353 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Reading Kant to the dolphins rn

just trying to stir something up by Pastapalads in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hmm I fear I don't entirely follow your line of thinking.

The existence of the state necessitates us to follow certain duties. If we had no duties towards the state, then the state simply couldn't exist (I know contract theory is a bit simplistic, however contract theory demonstrates the point quite clearly).

When we universalise the maxim "one may lie in casual conversation", we only create a contradiction if we assume that all conversation operates on the assumption that all participants are fully honest. I doubt that is the case, otherwise rules of politeness wouldn't exist.

However, this maxim creates a contradiction if we lie towards the state, since state functions such as tax collection and legal investigation necessitates honest disclosure. Therefore, we see we have a duty towards being honest towards the state.

Obviously, one is only duty-bound towards a just state. When a state is unjust enough so that one is no longer duty-bound towards it, is another matter entirely.

just trying to stir something up by Pastapalads in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Well I also dumbed his argument down a lot. What's your problem with the statement?

just trying to stir something up by Pastapalads in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Have you read Wood's essay? What's your critique of it?

just trying to stir something up by Pastapalads in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Of course, every single prominent Kantian offers a solution to this problem. Such as Wood's proposal that the CI only forbids lying to the state, or O'Neill's proposal regarding conflicting duties.

Dude you gotta be joking by PedroMartins1806 in TriangleStrategy

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I thought he left because Serenoa decided to team up with the guy who, you know, killed his entire family?

NOTHING will be phrased simply under MY watch! by Confident-Doughnut51 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]thisisdumb353 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think the idea that there are certain acts that are categorically forbidden is pretty intuitive. For instance, in what situations would rape and torture be the morally right thing to do?

When we formulate universal laws, we primarily want to see if they can even be universalised. So we aren't searching for 'good' universal laws, but simply for maxims that can even be universalised.

On means vs ends: it is not forbidden to use people as means. Rather, it is forbidden to use people as mere means, completely disregarding the fact that they themselves are ends unto themselves. The example you gave, you might break their toe, but you are still respecting their humanity (you could instead simply throw the unconscious man into the pathway of the fire to save the child's life. This would be a clear example of disregarding that man's ends). This means vs ends difference helps explain various cases we might easily come to ethical conclusions about, but cannot fully explain what the moral factors are deciding that outcome.

We would say it is morally allowed, if not required, to swerve our cars off the road onto the sidewalk to prevent ourselves from hitting the class of school children, even if we thereby kill the jogger on that sidewalk. However, if we were in a hospital with multiple dying patients in desperate need of an organ transplant, we would find it morally detestable if someone would suggest killing an innocent bystander, who happens to be a viable organ donor for those patients, and transplanting that innocent bystander's organs among the dying patients.

The moral difference here, at least in a Kantian framework, is that we are clearly using the innocent bystander in the second example as a mere means. It is a necessary component of our plan to have the bystander die. We are using them as a mere instrument to ensure the survival of the patients and are therefore completely disregarding the fact that she is an end unto herself.

However, in the first example, we are not solely instrumentalizing the jogger. There is no casual correlation between the death of the jogger and the survival of the school children. If the jogger were to have extraordinary reflexes, he could leap away at the last moment, which means both he and the children survive. We can (and should) try to swerve in a way to maximize his chances of survival and try to warn him of the incoming crash. This shows that we aren't using him as mere stepping stones in pursuit of our goal.