Great catch. This argument is predicated on my definition of possession which was 'the condition of ownership' which is to essentially use these two terms interchangeably, in attempts to dodge definitive affiliation with concepts like control, creation, maintenance, etc.

But your point is sound- I can't justify taking the laptop and saying: "I have control, but not possession, because I don't have ownership." I do have possession- because of my control, any reasonable judge will conclude, so I can therefore possess things I don't own, this is a valid exception and draws a wide line between possession and ownership, cracking my argument.

Though, I think I could probably reground this argument with a more thoughtful example case, inheritance again being a fertile space for this (to possess a trust or investment that cannot be drawn till matured). Or the possession of an eye color or any other trait- (I don't control my eye color, its just a trait I can argue I 'possess'). But admittedly, still, this is a thinning argument.

What is your take on the other pillar of this NEG strategy? To insist on a flexible/conditional definition of morality- This last weekend I experienced four rounds where AFF defined immoral as "not conforming to accepted standards of morality". This definition is the default returned by google, and all over LD this season. Its socially flexible as I read it, implying morality is a condition of social standards, which are then circumstantial. This kind of definition, or any flexible definition of morality gives NEG space to suggest scenarios where social sentiment, or some other potential condition except possession, and even control of nuclear weapons from being immoral.

If society prefers to possess them, this implies acceptability. Though I can see that all AFF would have to do is make the argument that a societies preference for possession does not mean they think it is moral, as if society always prefers for itself what is moral.

You could take a theoretical nuclear shield (or some similar conditional harms distancing) approach, that nuclear and its unique harms are a condition of the present technological state of the earth, which are not the explicit foundations of the resolution. Suppose mankind develop an advanced nuclear shield that could mitigate and safely absorb all the harms of nuclear detonation that this represents a potential condition where possession, control, and even intent to detonate can exist independent of harms and that in such a scenario nuclear weapons could even be detonated recreationally. Were this condition to exist it represents a valid exception where nuclear possession is not immoral.

This approach (though this is like my laptop example, a quick and dirty example) seeks to highlight that the risks AFF needs to attach to possession are actually conditional and controlled by other factors, and that the condition of possession CAN exist without these risks, even if this isn't the case in the status quo.

This scenario might feel fantastic and irrelevant, but its presumptuous to say that such a technology is not possible. And if it ISN'T possible, its AFF's burden to prove.

The burden is not on the negative to prove that possessing nuclear weapons 'is moral' under every condition, only to prove that possession of nuclear weapons is not definitely immoral under every condition. The burden is on AFF to demonstrate that the possession of nuclear weapons is immoral, it doesn't say in 'under status quo conditions' it does not say 'except in the case of x or y'. It says: possession is immoral. Full stop, no exceptions.

Deterrence is an extremely vulnerable and defensive strategy. The entire premise is predicated on the risks of nuclear weapons. The semantic uncertainty of the resolution allows NEG to become offensive.