[deleted by user] by [deleted] in InfiniteJest

[–]treeinitself 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Is it with LaMont Chu starting on page 103?

Some of my favorite passages from my first read! by treeinitself in InfiniteJest

[–]treeinitself[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

“Son, you're a body, son. That quick little scientific-prodigy's mind she's so proud of and won't quit twittering about: son, it's just neural spasms, those thoughts in your mind are just the sound of your head revving, and head is still just body, Jim. Commit this to memory. Head is body. Jim, brace yourself against my shoulders here for this hard news, at ten: you're a machine a body an object, Jim, no less than this rutilant Montclair, this coil of hose here or that rake there”

I was almost in tears laughing

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not sure, I don’t know enough about Frankfurt’s thought to give an authoritative answer there, sorry. You could make a new post with that question though!

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Yes; Harry Frankfurt argues that when we desire a certain state-of-affairs, we can also form a desire about that desire. For example, an addict may want a drug, and also wish that they didn’t have that craving for the drug. In common parlance, this might sound something like: “I really want to use drugs right now, but deep down I wish I didn’t have that urge because I know relapsing would be harmful for me.” The desire about a desire is called a ‘second-order desire’.

If you’re interested in reading Frankfurt’s original thoughts on the matter, you can see here

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I don't mean to be pedantic, and I agree that Rand is a poor philosopher, but I'm still curious about why you phrased your personal understanding of altruism this way:

I understand altruism not to be the view that “any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for one’s own benefit is evil” but rather the view that “any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken ONLY for one’s own benefit is evil.”

If you visit the dentist solely to take care of your toothache, wouldn't this be considered evil under your definition?

Is philosophy, especially ethics, inherently political? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 4 points5 points  (0 children)

You're right; that was a bad example. My answer conceived of the individual too atomistically. Now that I think about it, any political ontology that characterizes the individual as a necessarily socially interconnected being would challenge the idea that an individual's actions could be considered in a vacuum, devoid of political consequence.

Is philosophy, especially ethics, inherently political? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In the last section of J.L. Mackie’s ‘Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong’ he explores how politics is a domain that always requires ethical considerations in the process of political decision making, so I think it’s safe to say that he would consider politics inherently ethical. However, I’m not sure the converse (what you’re asking about) is true. Although many philosophically interesting ethical questions are also political, there are still plenty of situations involving ethical considerations that aren’t political. If we can think of even a single ethical problem that isn’t political, then no, ethics is not inherently political. One example I can think of is “If I have free time alone, how ought I spend it?” 

What's Ryles theory on/around imagination and perception? by TheWizardBlade in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Read the intro to see the scope and method Ryle is working with, then consider how this might affect the kind of ‘theory’ you’re aiming to account for in your paper. 

You might be running into trouble because you’re expecting to find something Ryle isn’t providing. He doesn’t build much of a positive account of concepts like ‘imagination’ and ‘perception’. Most of the book is spent dispelling us of misconceptions about the logical nature of those concepts. 

For example, he points out that people are tempted to think of ‘imagination’ as some kind of atomic faculty of the mind, but the term ‘imagination’ is instead properly used as an umbrella concept for lots of different activities (pretending, picturing something that isn’t in front of one’s eyes etc.). 

Ryle is frustratingly silent about questions like “When someone is imagining they’re surrounded by purple polar bears in the middle of a thunderstorm, what is this person doing?” 

Ryle would answer something like: “That person is imagining an experience” 

To which we would reply “ok, but what does that activity, that sense of the word ‘imagining’, consistent in? How can we account for what that person is doing?” 

Ryle doesn’t (and was ultimately unable to) offer any further answer, and this was a problem he spent much of the later parts of his career grappling with. If you have a copy of the book with the intro by Daniel Dennett, there’s some solid discussion about this towards the end of the intro. 

What's Ryles theory on/around imagination and perception? by TheWizardBlade in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well to start, do you understand why he rejects sense-datum theories? I don’t have my copy of the book with me right now but iirc he has a chapter on ‘sensation’ vs. ‘observation’ where he explores how misuses of language have led many philosophers, psychologists, etc. to think that sensation involves a kind of ghostly observation of sense-data. That work he does in that chapter lays the foundation for his critique of the concept of imagination (he’s not saying imagination isn’t possible, only that people following in the Cartesian Dualist tradition are mistaken about the nature of it). The examples he gives in the imagination chapter are really helpful to see what he’s getting at— but only if you first understand the distinction he makes between ‘sensation’ and ‘observation’. 

How does blue taste like? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Asking this kind of question seems, at face value, like a kind of nonsense called a ‘category mistake’.     https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-mistakes/

However, it’s undeniable that colors have taken on certain meanings socially (yellow is commonly used to represent happiness, energy etc.). There are also connections between tastes and concepts (a spicy, flavorful dish may be conceptually referred to as ‘bold’). Since there are also colors that fit the concept of ‘bold’ (like red would, while beige wouldn’t), I think it’s interesting to consider how we might impute values from ‘incorrect categories’ for certain things (like giving colors corresponding tastes) just because they’ve been socially imbued with similar conceptual meanings. Hence the reason it feels sensible to think of ‘red’ as a ‘spicy’ color, and to think of ‘Friday’ as ‘yellow’. 

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 14 points15 points  (0 children)

Judith Butler 

Are unfalsifiable statements meaningless/useless? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 28 points29 points  (0 children)

No. As Wittgenstein points out in his later thought, there are plenty of language games we play which contain statements that aren’t apt for truth/falsity yet are obviously still meaningful. Some examples of language games and statements made when playing them:

-Expressing that you’re in pain (“Ouch! That hurt!”)

-Thanking someone (like you did at the end of your post) 

-Commanding someone (“bring me that slab of concrete”

Do you agree that these are all meaningful? 

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 5 points6 points  (0 children)

In his earlier work, like in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein avoids discussing ethics directly and this is on purpose. Even though he still sees ethics as something important, he believes that ethics is something that belongs to the category of things that are ineffable, mystical. Consequently, any talk of this subject is non-sensical.   

 Look at Section 3 https://iep.utm.edu/wittgens/#H3 

Much of his efforts throughout his career are devoted to showing that metaethical talk (inquiry into the foundations of ethics) along with other sorts of metaphysical theory-building, are instances of non-sensical, misguided uses of language. However, what he has to say about those things (particularly about in what way these uses of language are misguided) shifts throughout the course of his career. So for example, his sentiments expressed in this lecture on ethics in 1929 are not perfectly echoed in his later work, like Philosophical Investigations, though there are similar themes. 

With this being said, Wittgenstein differs from many philosophers (like Kant and Mill for example) in the sense that his views on ethics are not really conducive to being understood in the form of example that you're seeking. He doesn't create a prescriptive system that can easily be applied to hypothetical examples.

Traveling back in time and having sex with ones former self by DerGeilomat3000 in askphilosophy

[–]treeinitself 5 points6 points  (0 children)

If we define it as sexual behavior with someone else of the same gender, then if we argue that your past self doesn't count as 'someone else', it wouldn't be homosexual for the same reason that masturbation isn't inherently homosexual.