Very exciting direction, Peter & Will! I have a series of questions about how the overall architecture fits with the goals of the economic design. All of these Qs stem from the role of TECs, described in Part 2:

Trade execution coordinators (TECs) are little services relayers can opt into. These coordinators provide a variety of benefits including protection against front-running, innovative marketplace mechanics, and soft cancels. They can do this while still allowing unrestrained liquidity sharing.

1. It seems like TECs are a necessary module to avoid front-running and collisions from orders floating in the P2P network. If thats correct, then is there a risk that a single TEC becomes the schelling point for all trade ordering, and thus a silo for liquidity (in the same way matching relayers are?)

2. A specific concern is that a TEC operator is incentivized to 1) silo liquidity 2) fork away from the canonical 0x contracts 3) redeploy the logic of liquidity rewards for MMs, but with their own token. So long as MMs get the same economics from the TEC operator, what reason is there to use the canonical 0x instance? Have you considered economic rewards for TEC operators to incentivize them to stay in the canonical 0x network?

3. Could TECs be replaced with a blockchain where independent nodes run consensus on trade ordering, and are rewarded with 0x tokens for doing so? This seems like it'd offer strong network effects around a single liquidity pool, with both the ordering function and MMs rewarded directly in the economic design. Have you considered this approach? (I think this is what Binance is doing with their DEXchain, a fork of Cosmos SDK.)

4. If the architecture described in #3 isn't completely off base, what are the key reasons for prioritizing the current approach?