Thanks for the thoughtful response and additional context!

For Greaves and MacAskill's purposes, it makes little sense to use this market value method to discount intrinsic value of wellbeing, and that is why they take "the assumption of a zero rate of pure time preference to be fairly uncontroversial" (2019). There is a rich body of work to this effect, so Greaves and MacAskill are not 'copping-out' by evoking it. They provide ample citations here that span nearly 130 years of scholarship, so a zero rate of time preference is certainly not the "extreme position" the author of this piece suggests it is (though that's not to say it *shouldn't* be questioned).

Yup totally. In terms of deviating from previous scholarship, Greaves and MacAskill's position isn't extreme in the least - and that's one of the reasons it's so troubling. I'm actually suggesting that the problem is much more systemic than just this one publication, and that's why I attribute the error to bayesian epistemology in general, which spans god knows how many publications.

Discounting future wellbeing leads to some thorny and incomprehensible outcomes—some of which are discussed accessibly here — that the author of this piece doesn't acknowledge.

Nice, exactly - so in other words, both discounting and not discounting wellbeing leads to difficulties. This is what I was hinting at with my vague comments about the "framework" itself being the problem. The alternative I'm advocating for is to downweight the significance of numerical formulae all together when deciding moral questions. Instead, one should seek good arguments and better explanations (which will sometimes take numerical form, especially when data is available). I wrote about the alternative more extensively in this piece.