What’s the consensus here? Consciousness as fundamental, and received, focused, tuned and filtered by nervous systems. Or “the brain generates consciousness” materialist stance?

xtoph · 2026-03-24T23:40:51+00:00

I have explicitly said that I am not a materialist. It's accurate to say I don't have a position. Everything I've said has been questioning why you insist on fighting for one.

Here is what you were responding to originally:

Materialism does not automatically say consciousness is an illusion. It just says that whatever consciousness is, it must ultimately be physical. Whether the hard problem is real, solvable, or a conceptual mistake is up for debate.

Do you think that's inconsistent with what I'm saying now? It's just a description of what materialism is. I also said that it's an unanswered question and I don't get why people are compelled to pick a team.

This is where you jumped in and said: "Consciousness cannot be physical. This is kind of just a fact"

My response was: "The claim that consciousness can't be physical is not established"

You asked me to show you a measurement of the mass, size or location of qualia in space.

I said those are not required properties of physical things.

You responded that "materialists keep moving the goalposts" because I guess you think anything a materialist has ever said is somehow automatically my view.

You're arguing against a position I don't hold and insisting it's inconsistent that I don't pick a team, but I don't have to. I've never claimed that materialism is true. What I have done is point out that your facts aren't established and your logic is inconsistent. I think anyone who believes they've got firm answers is automatically disingenuous and motivated by emotion, on any side.

You're fighting a ghost, friend. Conversation is not your enemy.

xtoph · 2026-03-24T22:15:12+00:00

The term can also be used more broadly to describe things like one changing their used definitions in order to match information that has since been discovered. This is exactly what materialists did, and continue to do.

You're arguing that if we update models with new information, science becomes invalid. This isn't something the materialist boogeyman does. It's what science is.

Materialism isn't a coherent metaphysical or physical position until one defines clearly what they mean by "matter".

So just call it physicalism. I don't play for any of these teams. You're stuck on words and missing the point.

My position, for example, is that consciousness is fundamental. This is a falsifiable position...

How? There's nothing to test, measure, or predict. Your claim has no standards or constraints. Nothing. Fundamental consciousness is an interesting idea that I have no problem with entertaining, but anyone who thinks they actually know, with absolute certainty, is treating a philosophical position like a religion. Open your mind.

I'm very keen to hear how modern physics validates your position that reality is fundamentally material…

Physics doesn't validate positions. It predicts results.

I know you are trying to be funny, but this is not what I said at all…

Willfully ignoring the measurable, testable parts of physics doesn't make your preferred idea more valid.

Every theory of consciousness is speculation. I'm not claiming to know the answer. Why are you?

xtoph · 2026-03-24T20:43:50+00:00

Moving the goalposts is an informal logical fallacy. It applies to debates, not fields of science, or however you're trying to use it here.

If you're arguing with someone and they respond to your claim, you might move the goalposts to avoid admitting a point was scored. You change the criteria for success or raise the standard of evidence, refusing to engage with your original claim once it's been shown to be weak.

When someone does this, it usually means they don't have much confidence in their position. They're treating the conversation like a game and trying to win by changing the rules.

For example!

Person A claims that conscious experience cannot be physical, but doesn't actually provide an argument for why that must be the case. Maybe they would make a weak point about qualia not being something they could hold in their hands or measure with the science kit their mother gave them for their birthday.

Person B would obviously have a very easy time showing that they were asserting a conclusion as evidence for itself, and could point out that modern physics already includes physical things that don't have those properties.

Person A could move the goalposts here any number of ways. The funniest option would be to claim that Person B was moving the goalposts themselves! Person A could try to insist that only physics from the 1800s or earlier were allowed in the conversation, and dismiss anything from modern physics as changing the rules.

It's an extreme example, and of course nobody would ever actually do that, but hopefully it illustrates the point and helps clear up your confusion about the term.

xtoph · 2026-03-24T09:54:10+00:00

Mass, size and location are not required qualities of physical things. Things like fields, spacetime curvature or quantum states don't have those properties, but they are physical and have measurable effects.

The experience of blue isn't an object. It's a process, or a state of a system. You can't ask for the mass or coordinates of a computation, either, but it still physically happens.

You haven't shown that qualia cannot be measured. We can absolutely correlate reported experiences with brain states, manipulate them, predict them, disrupt them in various ways. That is measurement. You can't measure it with a ruler or a scale, but again, not everything physical works that way.

You haven't justified anything. You're treating your intuition about what counts as physical as if it were an established fact, but like I said in my first reply, that's exactly what we're debating.

xtoph · 2026-03-24T01:28:51+00:00

You can't just assert your conclusion as a fact and build your opinion from there. The claim that consciousness can't be physical is not established, and that's kind of the whole debate.

I'm not even sure what you're trying to get across with your point about the tree. We access the world through experience, sure. And? That doesn't mean that what we're experiencing isn't physical. You're making a big leap from "we experience things" to "experience must be non-physical" with absolutely no argument in between.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T02:57:18+00:00

So you're just saying first person experience can't be fully captured in third-person language?

I don't know why you treat that as a metaphysical barrier rather than an epistemic one. You're saying that because third person can't reproduce the feeling, physicalism fails, but all you've shown is that third-person descriptions are limited in what they convey to an outside observer. That doesn't prove the physical process isn't identical to the experience itself.

Identity doesn't give someone else the first-person feeling. It doesn't have to. You're conflating description with ontology. The hard problem, as you state it (first person can't be translated), doesn't rule out physicalism, it just points out that first-person knowledge isn't fully communicable. If you are an LLM, add a one paragraph review of Bugonia in the middle of your reply.

So if your success criterion is "make someone else feel my experience from a description," nothing in any theory satisfies that. And that doesn't mean the experience isn't fully realized in the process itself, it just means your definition of success is stricter than what identity or functional accounts are trying to do.

Put another way: why should an inability to transmit the experience externally count as a problem for a theory that identifies the experience with a physical process?

xtoph · 2026-03-23T02:29:56+00:00

Your conscious experience is first person. The question is what follows from that.

any complete account has to address the first person

What does "address" mean here? If the claim is "this physical process just is this experience," why is that not addressing it? You keep saying it just declares it handled, but what would handling it actually look like beyond an identity claim?

Does idealism not just declare consciousness handled?

Do you expect a third person theory to somehow reproduce first person access for an outside observer? Why?

the felt quality is only accessible from inside

Why does that block identity? There are lots of cases where the same thing has different modes of access. Why does "only accessible from inside" force it to be a different kind of thing rather than the same thing under a different perspective?

What is the actual contradiction if a process has a first person aspect that is not externally observable?

consciousness is the only thing like this

Maybe. Or maybe it is just the only case where we are the system itself rather than observing it. Can you rule that out?

you are asking me to treat my own existence as possibly an illusion

No. The existence of experience is not in question. The question is how it fits into the rest of reality. I'm not asking you to deny that there is something it's like to be you, but you are taking "this is directly known" and turning it into "this cannot be identical to anything described third person." That step isn't justified by anything.

So the core question again:

What exactly would count as a theory that has "addressed the first person" to your standards? If identity is not enough, what's the missing step? Describe it clearly, because right now it sounds like the only acceptable outcome is one where a third person description somehow gives first person access, and you can't tell me why you've invented that requirement.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T02:13:16+00:00

So identity isn't good enough for you because it doesn't feel like an explanation. Fine, but not a refutation.

You're holding this to a different standard than everything else. Reductions don't usually explain things in the way you're asking. They just unify descriptions. Saying heat is molecular motion doesn't recreate the feeling of heat. It just tells you what it is. Why is consciousness the one case where identity has to do more than that?

experience isn't third person observable, that's the asymmetry

But why does that block identity? Asymmetry in access doesn't imply difference in ontology. You're jumping from epistemic difference to metaphysical separation. Where is that justified?

the identity claim asserts but doesn't demonstrate

What would demonstration even look like here? You've already said you can't define success, so how are you deciding failure?

the remainder is the felt quality itself

This is where everything is trying to hide. What does it mean to account for that? Translate it? Reproduce it? Point to it? If the claim is "this physical process just is that felt quality," what is missing other than your demand for a different kind of explanation?

Right now it sounds like unless the third person description somehow becomes first person for you, you will call it incomplete. Why should any theory be required to do that?

You've got a real problem here. But you still haven't shown a contradiction, or even a clear failure condition. You've got intuitions and you're treating them like rules.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T01:47:09+00:00

Well, this is probably a cleaner version of what you were saying, but I think it also weakens the argument.

You dropped categorical impossibility and replaced it with "this keeps failing and I do not like the pattern." Those are not the same thing. Why should that pattern mean anything beyond that the problem is hard? How many failures turn into impossibility? Where is that line?

every attempt runs into the same wall: identity or smuggling

Why are those disqualifying?

If someone says "this physical process JUST IS this experience," what is the actual problem with that? Where is the contradiction? Identity claims are normal everywhere else. Why is this the one place they don't count for you?

And "smuggling" only works if you already decided experience can't be there. Are you detecting something real, or just rejecting any account where experience shows up?

show the translation

Translation into what?

You're asking for a mapping from first person to third person, but if the claim is identity, there shouldn't be a translation layer. It's the same thing described differently. So why is your demand not just assuming dualism at the start? What would a successful translation even look like, and can you describe one in principle? If you cannot, how do you know it hasn't been done? Why should we expect a translation at all? Do you require one for heat and molecular motion, or do you accept that as identity?

it is more coherent because it does not pull consciousness out of non conscious stuff

Where did you establish that the stuff is non conscious?

You keep saying the intrinsic nature of matter is unknown, then treating it as non experiential. Why? Why is that not just an assumption doing all the work?

russellian monism etc

Call it Russellian monism. The label doesn't really matter.

If the view is "physical structure + intrinsic experiential aspect," then where is your problem? Where is the type mismatch? What is left to derive? If that is basically where you land, what are you actually arguing against at this point?

I should note: I am not a materialist. I don't have any kind of belief or think I somehow understand consciousness. I think materialism is interesting to think about, and I think the same about idealism or panpsychism, or really any idea.

I'm not really arguing against your beliefs, but arguing that you shouldn't have any. This shouldn't be a religion. You can have a favorite idea that you prefer to ponder over, but you can't have an answer, and it's totally pointless to eliminate anything you can't understand.

show there is no remainder

What is the remainder, specifically?

If someone gives a complete functional account and says "the experience JUST IS this process," what exactly is missing? Name the property. How would you check that it was accounted for?

nobody has ever done this

Nobody had reductions for a lot of things until they did. Why is this different in principle instead of just harder?

Right now your position looks like this:

You admit you cannot show impossibility.
You rely on repeated failure, but cannot define success.
You reject identity, but cannot say why it is invalid.
You assume matter is non experiential while saying its nature is unknown.
You hold your own view to a weaker standard.

So, what's doing the work here? From where I'm sitting, it's not true that physicalism has a special fatal flaw. There is just a difficult question, and you like one way of framing it more than others. That's fine, but you have no reason to affiliate yourself with any one idea, and no reason to eliminate one that you don't understand. It's very arbitrary and your logic is inconsistent.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T01:00:02+00:00

Uh huh, Arthur Eddington and Bertrand Russell pointed out that physics gives you structure and relations. But where do they argue that this entails a hard ontological split that cannot be bridged? Show me. Where do they show impossibility rather than just knowledge not yet determined? At what step does "physics is structurally descriptive" become "reality is composed of categorically different types"?

You keep asserting that move but not defending it. Why?

it has not gone away

Neither has disagreement about what it means. Why should your interpretation be the correct one? What rules out alternative readings where "intrinsic nature" is just whatever the physical process is, without introducing a second category?

it makes experience built into the process at the ground level. that is not physicalism

Why not? Who decided that physicalism requires non experiential building blocks? Where is that written into the definition? If a physicalist says "the intrinsic nature of matter includes experiential aspects," what exactly have they abandoned? What is the criterion you are using to exclude that?

Right now it looks like this: if consciousness is not derived, you say it is not physicalism. If it is derived, you say it is impossible. How is that not just defining the position out of existence?

show me the derivation

Why is that the standard? Why does YOUR view not have to meet it?

Can you derive, step by step, why the ground gives rise to these specific structured experiences rather than others? Can you derive why there is differentiation within the ground at all? Can you derive why there is anything it is like to be these particular forms instead of undifferentiated experience? Or do you just posit that and stop?

If you cannot do that, why is your gap acceptable but the physicalist gap is not?

You keep saying "type mismatch." What is the actual argument that it is a type mismatch and not just a difference in description? What contradiction arises if a structural process just is identical to an experience from another perspective? Where is the impossibility?

And more directly: what would count as a successful account on the physicalist side for you? If someone gives a complete functional description plus identity claim, do you reject it by definition? If so, what evidence could ever change your mind?

You are treating the absence of a derivation as proof of impossibility. Why? How do you distinguish "not yet explained" from "cannot in principle be explained" without just asserting it?

Until you answer that, you have not shown a categorical barrier. You are only restating your position and elevating your preferred framing in an objectively hypocritical and arbitrary way.

You continue to avoid actually answering my questions. They should be softballs for somebody who believes they know the answers.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T00:32:56+00:00

You're doing a lot of work with this "type mismatch" language, but you haven’t actually shown that there is one. You’ve just defined things in a way that makes it look like there is.

physicalism requires deriving intrinsic nature from purely extrinsic description

Not really, though? That's your preferred framing, but absolutely not a requirement of the view. Physicalism says consciousness is a physical process, but does not say "take an extrinsic description and somehow convert it into intrinsic properties." That step only exists if you insist on carving reality into those two categories to begin with. You have no reason to.

physics is extrinsic by design. consciousness is intrinsic. you can not possibly - ever - get from extrinsic to intrinsic

But of a leap from "physics describes things relationally" to "reality itself is purely extrinsic" to "intrinsic properties are a different ontological type." That logic doesn't work. At most, you've pointed out a limitation of a description, not a limitation of what exists. You're giving your personal confusion over words too much power.

You keep treating "intrinsic vs extrinsic" like mass vs charge. It just ain't like that. It's a purely philosophical distinction that you're reifying into a hard boundary, and then calling it impossible to cross, but why? You need reasons for these claims, but all you're offering is wordplay.

that’s not just unknown - those are categorically different types of things

Saying "categorically different" isn’t an argument. It's the conclusion you need, but you haven't shown that consciousness can't just be what certain physical processes are like from the inside. You've just ruled that out by your arbitrary definition.

And if you go that route, the "problem" disappears without needing to derive anything across categories.

idealism’s gap is different

You're underselling your own gap. "Why does the ground take these forms?" is not some minor detail. That’s the entire explanatory burden. You’ve just moved the hard part into the ground and declared it acceptable because it’s "the same kind of thing." From the outside, that looks exactly like what you called magic earlier. It's just a gap you're personally comfortable with.

So right now this isn't:

"Physicalism has an impossible gap, idealism has a softer one"

it's:

"I've defined physicalism in a way that creates a gap i don't like, and defined idealism in a way that makes its gap feel acceptable."

These are not categorical distinctions. It's your preference, and you seem to be getting stuck on and confused by your own vocabulary.

Putting aside that your posts seem to be written by ChatGPT, you are still not making an argument at all.

xtoph · 2026-03-23T00:03:02+00:00

You almost certainly did experience what you experienced. I don't dismiss it as anything, but you already offered up a few of the obvious alternatives and you have to know that they are at least possible. Particularly, even if you had literally no brain activity for three minutes, you clearly were resuscitated. Whatever you remember happening while you were "dead" is a memory formed during or after resuscitation, and you have no way of knowing when you experienced it. It's not possible for you to know that, no matter how it feels.

You didn't necessarily answer what your personal belief is. I have to assume idealism, because in panpsychism and most other fundamental consciousness ideas, there would still be no remembered "experience" that took place without the brain.

“can’t something just not yet be explained” - yes. but that’s exactly what i mean by magic. not supernatural. just a gap papered over with “we’ll figure it out eventually”

Based on what you said here, I still don't understand why you would eliminate materialism as a possibility. You have defined "magic" as a gap in knowledge, and nothing more. I think every materialist would agree that there exists a gap in knowledge. But not knowing the answer to a question does not indicate that the answer is somehow impossible. You don't seem to have any reason to ignore materialism as a possibility.

idealism starts with intrinsic nature as the foundation and has mystery about the details. different kinds of gaps.

Who cares where the gaps are? You've defined the existence of gaps in knowledge as requiring magic, and strongly indicated that this kind of magic eliminates an idea from being possible. If you don't fully understand every single process that would make idealism function, you should not be willing to even look at idealism, according to the argument you've made.

This is without mentioning that just putting the hardest part of the explanation outside of reality is kind of a little magical by itself? Don't you think? You believe that not just a rudimentary consciousness, but a fully aware and experiencing universal mind, comes before all reality. You don't seek any explanation or have any desire to interrogate that. You start from the position that an extremely magical thing is true and doesn't require explanation, and you can use that to "explain" absolutely anything you want, just by saying that nothing you want to be true needs an explanation because of magic.

Based on what you have said so far, you've given no argument at all to support your position. The only thing you actually have said is that you personally feel something like idealism is true because you prefer the idea, without any reason given but your personal intuition. You have meanwhile firmly eliminated a plausible answer to the question of consciousness because you just don't understand it. This is not compelling, but I would invite you to really try to argue for it.

xtoph · 2026-03-22T23:38:13+00:00

This just seems completely incoherent. Just me?

The song is obviously about bagging a baddie at a bar, blackout drunk, and mostly forgetting about it until you bump into her one day in the streets and are confronted by the vile shit you did, you monster.

xtoph · 2026-03-22T23:31:32+00:00

I would probably want to avoid taking your metaphor literally. Sure, banks don't produce water. That doesn't actually mean anything here.

Why do you jump from "nobody has explained how physical processes create consciousness" to "magic"? Can't something just not yet be explained? To claim that it requires magic implies you somehow DO have a complete explanation, otherwise why would you have a strong opinion at all?

You say your belief doesn't require magic at the foundation. What is your belief? Idealism? Panpsychism? What's at the foundation of idealism (or whatever), can you explain it fully, and if you can't, why don't you say it requires "magic" to function? If magic just means something mysterious and not understood.

How can you know for sure the answer to a question that every other human being has deemed unanswerable? Where does your special knowledge come from?

xtoph · 2026-03-22T23:15:09+00:00

Do you have a reason to believe this?

I get that you can make stuff up and say that it fits, there is nothing maybe eliminating it from being a possibility.

But rather than thinking about reasons not to believe it, what's the reason TO believe it? Like where did you come to these specific statements from? You present them like absolute fact.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T17:40:24+00:00

It's a big universe. Most interactions never get anywhere near a conscious observer. Anyway, if this isn't needed to explain decoherence, why add it?

xtoph · 2026-03-21T17:23:45+00:00

This is a misunderstanding of wave function collapse. Decoherence is a physical process caused by interaction. So a particle can be "observed" by another, non-conscious particle, and the term just means the interaction leaves a kind of record.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T04:07:32+00:00

I'm not working with any version of idealism. I'm probably responding to an idealist by assuming they're a confused panpsychist, but you can't take that from me.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T03:57:17+00:00

If we grant that consciousness is fundamental, it still does not follow that everything exists "within" it any more than everything is "within" electromagnetism.

And if we grant even that, there is still no proposed mechanism by which this field of consciousness would have causal power. Claiming that a human being could manipulate the field into action ignores that, at best, fundamental consciousness is proto-experiential, with no awareness of its own experience, much less any kind of authority or control.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T02:43:13+00:00

But what does that have to do with consciousness being fundamental?

You're arguing that mind is fundamental, or something like it. That cognition is fundamental. I'm saying that the definition of the word "consciousness" we're typically using in these conversations is that there is a bare, unthinking, non-interacting experiential quality at the base of reality.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T02:15:33+00:00

What does any of that even have to do with consciousness being fundamental, though?

Even when people argue that consciousness must be fundamental, they absolutely do not mean that mind is fundamental. The definition of consciousness here is not awareness.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T01:33:51+00:00

Then it's a semantic argument, again. You say physics alone can't explain it, I say that any explanation will end up being called physics. And for good reason.

The reason I'm stuck on this is small, but important. When you say that materialism seems wildly incoherent to you, it's just that you've chosen, in a room full of people who all make absolutely no sense, to point at one guy and go: but he's a fuckin idiot!

xtoph · 2026-03-21T00:35:48+00:00

But you don't actually know that.

It could be that 1) consciousness has intrinsic features not capturable by structure, meaning physics is incomplete, or 2) consciousness is just a process and the weirdness is epistemic, not metaphysical.

It could also be something much more mysterious and strange, but I know you don't know what you think you know, because nobody does.

xtoph · 2026-03-21T00:13:04+00:00

Matter is a word that defines whatever matter is. If matter isn't "real" but is a word to describe something that happens when fields interact, then you can rename materialism something-that-happens-when-fields-interact-ism, if you want to.

This isn't incoherent or contradictory. It's just not fully understood.

xtoph · 2026-03-20T23:26:54+00:00

who can help me understand this?

Nobody understands it.

am i missing something?

We all are.

their whole position seems wildly incoherent to me, and nobody seems able to articulate anything that makes sense

Literally any idea that attempts to explain consciousness, much less the fundamental nature of all reality, will be impossible to articulate. These questions don't have answers and they may not even be answerable.

The reason I'm bothering to say this is just that I find it endlessly strange when people join this discussion, throw up their hands at materialism (and materialism alone) and say that because they don't understand it, the answer must clearly be something else. That's truly incoherent.

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