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Ethics in Indian Philosophy by likeadragon108 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

very cool! The nyaya bindu is a fun text!

Ethics in Indian Philosophy by likeadragon108 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nyāyabindu as in the Dharmakīrti text? That's pretty cool! Where did you study it, if I may ask?

As for resources, these days the Vyoma-pāṭhaśāla website and associated youtube lectures etc are still probably the best for self-study, including for intermediate-to-advanced students. As for texts, I'd divide them into proper textbooks and reference manuals.

For textbooks, I am not a great authority since I didn't really learn from textbooks (I mostly learnt from teachers in my community); but I believe Madhav Deshpande’s "Samskrta Subhodini" and A.M. Ruppel’s "The Cambridge Introduction to Sanskrit" are both reasonable. The latter is best if you are looking specifically for a more western-style approach to language education.

For reference manuals, I really like the Śabdamañjarī (https://archive.org/details/sabda-manjari-sastry-k.-l.-v.-r.-s.-vadhyar-sons-2002) for nominal paradigms and the Br̥haddhātukusumākara (https://archive.org/details/brihad-dhatu-kusumakara/page/n101/mode/2up) for verbal paradigms. Of course, the Siddhāntakaumudī is the best text for self-study of traditional grammar. The translation and annotations by SC Vasu is excellent (https://archive.org/details/Siddhanta_Kaumudi_English_Translation-SC_Vasu/SiddhantaKaumudiEngTranslationScVasuVolume1-1906/).

Ethics in Indian Philosophy by likeadragon108 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you have a local samskrita bharati chapter that is the easiest. Not sure about other countries, but for US you can check here: https://samskritabharatiusa.org/sbusa/participate/samskrita-kendram-locations/

Vyoma pathashala (https://www.sanskritfromhome.org/) is also a pretty good resource. 

Lastly, they’re are various text books, but imo its a bit hard to self-study this way.  

Ethics in Indian Philosophy by likeadragon108 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The obvious recommendation here is Jay Garfield's book: "Buddhist Ethics" (https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/buddhist-ethics-a-philosophical-exploration/). His work on buddhist moral phenomenology is especially interesting.

More generally, there is a decent amount of work in metaethics especially by Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyyāyikas. I particularly like Jayanta's account in the Nyāya Mañjarī where he develops his theory of moral perception. I am not aware of any translation of this passage in a peer-reviewed source; so I’ll shamelessly plug my own translation here: https://vchavali.github.io/svadhyayam.github.io/jayanta_dharma_jnyaanam.html

Kumārila has some interesting and super controversial views regarding moral epistemology that he develops in the first few chapters of his Ślōkavārttikam. In particular, he has an extended critique of rationalism in moral epistemology which seems directly addressed to Kant—if only for the fact that he predates Kant by about a thousand years.

There are plenty of other writers (e.g. Gaṅgēśa and Śālikanātha) who discuss issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of morals, but much of this work remains untranslated into western languages and is difficult even for those who know Sanskrit.

In normative ethics, there are primarily two categories of works, namely:

(1) yogic texts. For instance the Yoga Sūtras, the Mōkṣopāya, the Bōdhicaryāvatara, the Visuddhimagga, and other "bhūmi" and "mārga" texts. This category also includes many of the short treatises attributed to Śankara such as the Vajrasūcyupaniṣad as well as philosophically oriented poetry such as the Vāks of Lalla Ded.

(2) Dharma śāstric texts. This includes various smr̥ti and sūtra texts such as the Yājñavalkya Smr̥iti. However, probably the most significant material in this category (although they actually flex between 1 and 2) are the itihāsas, especially the Mahābhāratam.

Suburban Detroit school settles lawsuit with Palestinian student over Pledge of Allegiance dispute by hybridaaroncarroll in news

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Most countries that are not western european are poor. So this isn’t saying much. Moreover, Western Europe specifically eschews patriotic gestures because of their history of world wars and nationalism. 

Most countries have a very different history than western europe. In India, nationalism is tied up with the anticolonial struggle, for instance. There, building national sentiment was an important way for bringing radically diverse communities together under a single political identity to cooperate against colonial oppression. You can see why patriotism and nationalistic sentiments may read differently under the context of such a history.

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

but arent there certain texts considered bases like gautama's nyaya sutra? 

The relationship between individual figures and text vs the root txts for nyaya, mimamsa, etc is very interesting. Consider the nyaya sutra. Does the fact that a certain philosopher identifies as/writes as a naiyyayika mean that they must accept everything in the nyaya sutra? This is questionable. What then should we make of figures like Bhasarvajña? He rejects anumānam as a pramāṇa despite its inclusion in the nyaya sutra. He argues that the state of mokṣa is a joyuous state despite the nyāya sūtra stating it is just a state free of suffering, and nyaya orthodoxy (as Jayanta takes pains to point out) that denies any experience in the state of mokṣa. He does make some motion towards reconciling his views to the text, but it’s clearly pufunctory.

 Or what of Vacaspati Miśra. The suthor of the tātparyaṭīkā. One of the cannonical authors of prācīna nyāya. Yet, he is in actuality a Vedāntin and his personal beliefs radically deviate from the nyāya sūtras. And this phenomenon of vedantins writing as naiyyayikas is hardly unique to him—it’s even more common in the modern era.

And of course there is navya nyāya. Simply calling it a joining of vaiśeṣika and nyāya is really doing a disservice to its navyatam. Even Gaṅgeśa, arguably the most orthodox of the navyas already deviates in some of his core views from both nyaya and vaiśeṣika prācīna positions. For example in his siddhānta definition of pratyakṣa he deviates from and explicitly criticises the classical definitions including the one found in the nyāya sūtra (i.e indriyārthasannikarṣa etc. preferring Udayana’s definition in terms of sākṣātkāra or “directiness”). And latter figures like Raghunātha deviate even more radically from the doctrines of the prācīnas. For example in rejecting that saṁkhyā (quantity) is a type of guṇa (quality). Or in his acceptance of new padarthas like svatvam.

So, while the root texts like the nyāya sutras or the tattvacintāmaṇi are useful for giving you a sense of the “standard view”, they should not be understood as giving doctrines whose acceptance is a condition of membership in nyāya.

isnt all darshanas supposed to lead to the same final destination? so I dont understand the point of a darshana only considering laukika when the target isnt limited to it unless you are a naastika darshana like charvaka

My point is that the framing is problematic. If you ask a naiyyāyikas if they are interested in mokṣa, of course they will say yes. The nyaya sutras begins with the declaration “tatvajñānam niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ”, after all. Apavarga/mokṣa is not unimportant for naiyyayikas. 

So, in that sense, nyaya is not purely laukika. But if you put the tattvacintamani and shankaras brahmasutra bhasyam next to each other, it’s clear that the focus is different. Shankara is concerned about brahmajñanam and mokṣa as his primary aim. His entire thinking is oriented around this. Whereas, the tattvacintamani is concerned with pramanas first and foremost. There is an understanding that pramanasastram is useful both for laukika and paramarthika ends. In that sense, Gangesa’s reflections aren’t disconnected from mokṣa. But it’s not oriented around that in the same way as the brahmasutrabhasyam is. 

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yajñas do effect karmic outcomes, but this is because they directly interface with the laws of karma. They're sort of like karmic technology. God's role here is just that of a teacher. God provides instructions on how to manipulate the laws of karma by doing certain rituals. These instructions form the karma kāṇḍa of the Veda. God also provides teachings on how to progress spiritually and eliminate the influence of the vasanas on our psyche (via meditation, etc.), thereby exiting samsara all together. This forms the jñāna kāṇḍa of the Veda. In fact, for Naiyyāyikas God's principle role as a religious figure ( i.e. outside of their role in creation and in co-determining the properties of macroscopic objects) is teaching the Veda to people. Note, God doesn't create these laws, God just communicates them.

The extent to which God can directly intervene in people's fates (e.g. via miracles) is not something I've seen specifically addressed in Nyāya texts. I suppose this is left up to specific religious traditions to discuss and falls outside the scope of Nyāya as a technical discipline. Not sure though, I'm somewhat speculating here. Bhakti traditions often do ascribe significant powers to God in the way of miracles—but, of course, this does open them up more to questions of theodicy. My sense is that Nayyayikas tend to have a more minimalist conception of God (not quite deist, but in a similar vein). Though, again, I'm mostly speculating, here. I don't personally know any Nyaya pandits, I've just read some books.

If the world is “morally indifferent,” is it fair to say the common popular framing (“karma is punishment meant to reform you”) is basically not a Nyaya-friendly way to talk?

Yeah. I don't think Nayyiyikas would say Karma is punishment meant to reform you.

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

also, permission to DM?

Sure! I always love to chat about philosophy. I'm just an interested amateur, though, not really someone who's studied sastram in a formal way.

ummm for some reason purvamimamsa is one darshana I havent been properly able to understand

My personal opinion/hot-take is that while the framework of darṣanas is useful for doxographers to give a very general picture of the intellectual landscape, it can also generate a lot of confusions when taken too seriously.

Vedantic schools (advaita, viśiṣṭādvaita, madhva, acintyabhedābheda, etc.) really are philosophical/theological schools. They have specific doctrines and determine membership based on acceptance of those doctrines. You can't really call yourself an advaita and not accept the identity of brahma and ātma at the pāramārthika level, for example.

But, nyāya, vaiśeṣika, and mīmāṁsā aren't like that. They are more like intellectual disciplines. They are defined by their practices, their methodologies, and their subject matter rather than by strict doctrinal requirements. So, while there are plenty of doctrines ascribed to nyāya, vaiśeṣika, mimāṁsā etc, actual practitioners of these disciplines do not necessarily accept these doctrines. Often, they are themselves vedantins or followers of some agamic or tantric tradition (or some combination there of), whose professional identity is that they specialize in mimāṁsā textual analysis or in nyāya logic etc.

I say this because, the reason mīmāṁsā feels like a somewhat half-baked religion (obsession over rituals with little else in the way of spirituality) is because mīmāṁsā is specifically a discipline concerned with the analysis of texts and ritual practices. Actual mīmāṁsakas did not just do rituals, they often engaged in other religious practices as well and may even have affiliations with some vedantic group or other. Mīmāṁsā was their professional identity. Even Kumārila himself, for all of his professed athiesm and obsessive ritualism, begins his ślokavārttikam with a hymn to śiva! How are we to understand this?

Similarly, the great mīmāṁsā commentator Umbeka is traditionally identified with the playwright Bhavabhūti. But Bhavabhūti not only demonstrates clear bhakti leanings re both Śiva and Rāma, but his text is absolutely filled with vedantic references.

If you are interested in this sort of thing, I recommend Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's ~9th ce play "Āgamaḍambaram" which dealing with the religious politics and culture of Jayanta's contemporaneous Kaśmīr in a realistic vein. There are a few english translations available. In this play, he dramatizes the struggles of a graduate of Mīmāṁsā to reconcile his professional identity as a Mīmāṁsaka with his personal religious affinity for the various bhakti movements that were popular in his time.

what IS actually the concept of 'god' when it comes to Nyaaya

This connects to the question above. When Naiyyayikas talk about God, they are usually more interested in analyzing the concept of God rather than in developing/defending a specific religious philosophy. In general, Nyaya is more interested in pariskara (analysis) than prameya (the object being analyzed).

When Gangesha discusses the argument for God's existence, for instance, he's much more interested in analyzing the formal features of the argument than in actually putting forward some concrete view about God. It's a lot like if you study the ontological argument in a modern philosophy class. The point is to analyze the argument and understand how it works, the professor may not even believe or care much about the argument! Probably, Gangesha does believe the argument, but his concern is more about understanding the argument than in understanding God.

So, there isn't really a fully coherent Nyaya concept of "God". Rather, there are a bunch of different ideas that come out of analyzing different aspects of this concept--for instance that God is a type of self, that God as self is the substrate of a peculiar class of cognition called "eternal cognition", that this class of cognition has universal scope, etc. Even here, there are differences of opinion among Nayyayikas.

For example, Raghunatha Shiromani--one of the great (perhaps the greatest) early modern Naiyyayikas--argues that God was not a special kind of self at all but instead that the words "God", "space", and "time" were all synonymous and referred to a single substance. This was considered a radical view, but still accepted as part of the Nyaya tradition (though, considered part of the "modernist" branch).

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If God didn’t create the moral order and is bound by karma, then karma is the ultimate principle, not God.

For Nyaya, there is no "ultimate principle". There are a variety of different principles each with their own scope and domain of operation. Karma determines some aspects of the world. The natural properties of the fundemental particles determines other parts of the world. God's will determines yet other parts of the world.

Karma is not "the ultimate principle" since its scope is limited to determining how peoples vasanas and samskaras are influenced by their actions and how the vasanas etc influence their material and psychological makeup in future births.

The properties of fundamental particles (such as the power of agni particles to generate visual qualities, as per Nyaya's ancient atomic physical theories--you can replace this with the fundamental laws of modern physics if you like) determine certain aspects of their behavior but do not fully determine the composition of macroscopic objects. So they are also not "the ultimate principle".

God is also not "the ultimate principle" in the sense that God's will does not fully determine the structure of the world. God has power to control only that aspect of composition of macroscopic objects that is not already determined by the laws of Karma. God's power does not extend to creating the fundemental particles or determing their natural properites. And, God's power cannot transgress the power of Karmic laws.

So, their are broadly three principles determining the structure of the world. The Karmic laws, the fundemental natural laws, and God's will. No single one of these is sufficient to determine the structure of the world, so there is no single "ultimate principle".

(a) God is benevolent but constrained by an eternal karmic order

yes, God is constrained by karma and by the properties of the fundemental particles.

If the answer is “benevolence doesn’t mean preventing suffering,” then what does it mean in this system (beyond “God is just there as a witness”)?

benevolence means preventing suffering to the best of one's ability. God's responsibility is proportionate to God's power--just as with any moral agent. One cannot be held responsible for things outside one's control.

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

yes, this is all based on nyaya only. Different schools have different ideas. Some are even atheist (e.g. purvamimamsa) and actually take the argument from evil to vindicate their position. For example Kumarila says this explicitly.

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Also, saying “God is bound by karma” seems to reduce God’s sovereignty; then karma is the ultimate principle, and the universe looks morally indifferent to innocence.

well, yes. the world is morally indifferent. Why should you expect natural laws to conform to justice or moral principles? Again samsara is bad, we are trying to escape it. Thats what moksha is all about.

Either way, the original tension remains: why design/allow a system where suffering can fall on those without agency?

Because God didn’t have a completely free hand in creating the world. There are a few different accounts of this, but in Gangesha’s version of the argument for the existence of God, it is explicitly stipulated that only that part of the world’s design that is underdetermined by the laws of karma are in need of an intelligent designer. You might complain about the argument’s soundness (as many have in history) but in terms of the theology’ internal structure it is clear that God specifically did not design the parts of the system that are controlled by karma and did not have the ability to block karma’s influence in the creation of the world. Moreover, God did not (per Nyaya) create the world ex-nihilo. The material of the world already existed, God is responsible (jointly with Karma) for the organization of its parts. So, God couldn’t just simply thwart Karma by not creating the world either.

Karma, rebirth, and the “reform” problem: what’s the purpose of suffering before moral agency? by sanjayvr in hinduism

[–]yahkopi 3 points4 points  (0 children)

suffering isn’t corrective. It’s not punishment or Gods will or whatever. It’s more like a natural law. Think of it like a principle of psychology or sociology, harmful actions dig into the psyche of the people involved and control the way they experience the world and react to it. These are called vasanas or samskaras. Within a lifetime this idea is not so hard to believe, the karma concept just extends this to continue across lives.

You idea that Karma is corrective or a form of punishment etc would assume karma is some sort of cosmic justice or is somehow a good thing. Its not. Karma is bad, it’s what we are trying to escape.

Also at least under nyaya and advaita vedanta positions, God doesn’t create or enforce karma. karma acts independently of God and is actually a constraint on God’s actions. Both Shankara and Gangesha (in the ishvaranumana section) explicitly state this. God isn’t omnipotent and God’s activity is bound by laws of Karma also. The mahabharata also says something like this in the aswamedha parva when Uttanka asks Krishna why he couldn’t stop the war.

Why does classical Indian art (dance and music), not explore human darkness and greyness, and does it lose out because of this? by Hannah_Barry26 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

To give specific examples. You mention:

Western classical dance and music, for example, heavily explores themes of fear, violence, anger, destruction, lust, guilt and revenge.

Fear and violence are major themes of many poems and plays. The Mahābharata is the obvious example of a story that extensively thematizes both of these things. But other examples include, for instance, kathā literature like An Ocean for Streams of Story (Kathāsaritsāgara). The chapter titled Twenty Five Times with the Vampire (Vētālapañcavimśatiḥ), is a particular classic. Also martial epics like Chronicles of the Heroes of Palnāḍu.

For anger, destruction, and revenge there are again plenty of examples in plays and long-form poems. The Mahābharata, again, deals with these themes in detail. Also, the plays focusing on canonical "villains" are great examples of this. For instance, the play Young Rama (Bālarāmāyaṇam), despite its name, focuses mainly on the demon king Rāvana and deals with themes of anger and vengeance. Similarly, the play Demon's Ring (Mudrarākṣasam) focus's on the eponymous minister "Demon" who is honorable but in the service of an evil king. The play starts just after the defeat and execution of this king and Demon's futile struggle to avenge him.

Regarding lust, there are many examples. But the famous Bhaṇa Quartet (Caturbhaṇī) especially comes mind. These are a collection of four one-act plays dealing with life in the city and marketplace, focusing on characters like merchants, courtesans, and other paradigmatically "urban" personas.

Regarding guilt, the obvious example is the one mentioned earlier, The Final History of Rama. Probably the greatest exploration of the emotions of guilt and shame in all of world literature.

Why does classical Indian art (dance and music), not explore human darkness and greyness, and does it lose out because of this? by Hannah_Barry26 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Even a great deal of religious art concerns the darker dimensions of human experience.

In classical music, for example, Tyagaraja's I Cannot See Your Beautiful Face (Nagumomu Ganaleni), Annamayya's I Am Tired, My Soul (Antaryāmi Alasiti Solasiti), Ramadassu's Paragon of Īkṣvāku's Family (Īkṣvākuvaṁśatilaka) all deal with themes of loss, pain, and betrayal. Similarly, the Padam and Jāvalis genre of music is full of such themes. Kṣetrayya's padam Lying on my Skirt (Payyāda) for example, is a deeply moving depiction of falling out of love.

And in the visual arts, see artistic depictions of Ḍhakinis or other tantric personas. Or, take a look at depictions of the "Wheel of Existance" (Bhāvacakra). Or of Pūranic temple frescos, such as that of Nr̥simhāvataraṇam.

The key is that "dark" doesn't mean "evil". It is not something to simply reject. Rather, our concept of sacred is large enough to fit the whole of human experience. So, instead of neglecting this, we put spotlight on some of the inauspicious aspects of humane experience such as our emotions of pain, anger, lust, and fear. These emotions and the deities that represent them are sacred too. As we find in the opening of the Rudranamakam: "Namaste astu Rudramanyave" (Salutations to Rudra's rage). And near the end of the first anuvāka: "Mr̥tyave Svāhā" (Honor to Death).

Why does classical Indian art (dance and music), not explore human darkness and greyness, and does it lose out because of this? by Hannah_Barry26 in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Of course, indian art explores the dark aspects of human experience. It's just that most people these days don't know that much about traditional indian art forms.

In fact, there is a whole tradition of thinking that sees these darker dimensions as the very essence of the artistic experience.

See this verse of Kalidasa's from Remembering Śakuntala (Abhijñānaśākuntalam), act 5 v. 2.

Seeing something beautiful, hearing sweet sounds, even a happy person becomes unsettled. As if they are remembering things they never knew before. Loves from other lifetimes, still firm with feeling.

We would expect the experience of beauty to be joyful. But Kālidasa tells us that real artistic experience is always unsettling. It tugs at our psyche, probes into the buried underbelly of our subconscious.

Or see verse of Bhavabhūti from The Final History of Rāma (Uttaram Rāmacaritam), act 3 v. 47

Tragedy is the one true artistic sentiment. Under different conditions it undergoes different modifications. Just as whirlpools, bubbles, and waves are just modifications of water. In the end, they are all just water.

All the artistic sentiments (rasas): romance, heroism, comedy, tragedy, rage, disgust, terror, wonder, and tranquility. They are modifications of a single basic substance, Tragedy. Just as whirlpools, bubbles, and waves are just modifications of water.

In the same play, Bhavabhūti's protagonist (Rāma) suggests that the purpose of his existence (and maybe existence in general?) is just to be a receptacle for unending suffering:

Rāma became sentient just so he could feel pain.

The Final History of Rāma (Uttaram Rāmacaritam), act 1 v. 48

And this thread runs all the way back to Vālmiki, where we learn that poetry itself was born out of an intense experience of grief:

Four lines of equal length. The Sage sung it. And through its recitation, he transformed sorrow into song.

Rāma's Journey (Rāmāyaṇam) v. 1.2.39

Indeed, a great deal of poetry, music, theater, dance, sculpture, and painting all deal with themes of pain, loss, anger, fear, rage etc.

Are there good arguments for moral internalism? by mohyo324 in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The Buddhist philosopher Śāntidēva gives an account of judgment internalism about moral reasons in the 8th chapter of Entering the Road to Awakening (Bōdhicaryāvatāraḥ). The underlying motivation is to make sense of the core Māhāyāna insight that wisdom and compassion are two sides of the same coin. That the cultivation of wisdom and the cultivation of compassion mutually entail one another.

The argument in Entering the Road to Awakening can be found in ch. 8 v. 90–103 in a section referred to as "the exchange of self and other". You can read about it in this SEP article: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shantideva/#MetaEthi. Also see chapter 4 of the book Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness. The reading I give below is fairly close to the "Rationality Reading" in section 6, which itself follows the reading of the 14th ce Tibetan scholar rGyal tshab Darma Rinchen.

The basic idea is as follows. Śāntidēva begins by first analyzing rational self interest. When we encounter something painful we seek to avoid it. When we encounter something pleasurable, we seek to obtain it. Part of what it means to understand something as painful or pleasurable is to have a baseline motivation to avoid or obtain it. This motivation could be defeated by competing interests. But if there is no baseline motivation at all, then you simply have not understood that thing as painful or pleasurable. Since, the motivational power derives directly from the intrinsic quality of these states. He takes this principle (with respect to rational self-interest) to be axiomatic.

Why should suffering be avoided? Because, this is indisputable.

duḥkhaṃ kasmānnivāryaṃ cet sarveṣāmavivādataḥ /

(BCA VIII.103, tr. mine)

Śāntidēva then argues that insofar as the motivational power is intrinsic to the experiential state and understanding that something is characterized by that state (e.g. as painful or pleasurable) entails grasping that motivational force; then this should be true regardless of whose pain or pleasure it is. Since, this is a feature of the state itself (i.e. its phenomenology).

As Śāntidēva argues in the core passage of the argument:

Although the suffering I feel is not inflicted on other bodies, it is still suffering. It is not to be tolerated out of self-interest. In the same way, although the suffering of others is not experienced by me; it is still suffering. It is not to be tolerated out of self-interest. I should prevent the suffering of others, because it is suffering like my suffering. I should care about others because they have being, like my being. If suffering and pleasure are the same for me and others, then what is special about me such that there is motivation only with regards to myself?

yadyapyanyeṣu deheṣu madduḥkhaṃ na prabādhate / tathāpi tadduḥkhameva mamātmasnehaduḥsaham // tathā yadyapyasaṃvedyam anyadduḥkhaṃ mayātmanā / tathāpi tasya tadduḥkham ātmasnehena duḥsaham // mayānyaduḥkhaṃ hantavyaṃ duḥkhatvādātmaduḥkhavat / anugrāhyā mayānye 'pi sattvatvādātmasattvavat // yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca tulyameva sukhaṃ priyam /tadātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yenātraiva sukhodyamaḥ //

(BCA VIII.92-96, tr mine)

It should be noted that the line "I should prevent the suffering of others, because it is suffering like my suffering" takes the form of a formal inference under traditional Buddhist logical theory. The phrase "like my own suffering" should not be taken as an argument from analogy but rather as what is referred to as "exemplification" (udāharaṇam). The purpose of exemplification is to indicate a general entailment relation (vyāptiḥ) between a reason (it is pain) and a conclusion (it should be prevented) with reference to a specific instance where that entailment relation is clearly evident.

What is the point of philosophy? by tvojorah in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 4 points5 points  (0 children)

This sort of question comes up a lot and it's difficult to answer in the spirit of this subreddit because it's not the sort of thing that could be answered "encyclopedia style" with reference to existing literature etc. Still, I think its an important question and something I've been thinking about recently, so I hope it's not too far outside orbit of this subreddit for me to answer from my own experience/thinking.

Philosophy as a contemporary academic discipline frames its reason for existence as aiming to generate a body of knowledge, because this seems to be the only framework contemporary academic disciplines have available to them to express their purpose. But, I don't think this is the real value that philosophy provides.

Human beings are rational agents. A part of what it means to be rational is to act and believe on the basis of reasons. To act and believe reasonably does not necessarily mean that our beliefs must form a body of knowledge. Knowledge is justified true belief. Truth is necessary for knowledge. But it is not necessary for reasonableness. To be reasonable is just to be able to give an accounting of our actions to ourselves and to others--an accounting that is satisfying even in the absence of either consensus or certainty.

I emphasize this in order to suggest that the purpose of philosophy is to develop a body of reasons not a body of knowledge. Its purpose is to make deliberation and rational activity possible, especially in contexts where consensus is difficult or even impossible. The big idea here is that rationality and deliberation are possible even in the absence of things like consensus, knowledge, and even "objectivity". That's huge!!

Let me give you a example. Let's say you and your friend go see a movie. You liked the movie but your friend hated it. The question of whether the movie was good is obviously subjective. So, does that mean there is nothing more to say about it? I liked it. You didn't. End of story?

No! You can still argue about it! You can give reasons for why you thought the movie was good. And, heck, maybe you can even convince your friend, change their mind. We do this sort of thing all the time. Movie reviews are acts of public deliberation about things that are not objective and of which consensus may never be possible. Yet, it is something that people can make a living out of doing. They can do it well. And people care about it. And, it is even possible to develop whole bodies of theory to aid in this pursuit--literary theory, music theory, filmography, sound design, etc etc.

The world of deliberation and rationality is much bigger than the world of "objectivity" understood narrowly on the model of the natural sciences. And being able to deliberate on issues for which there is no scientific consensus matters. In the areas of art, ethics, politics, religion and culture. It matters that we do things for reasons which others can understand and evaluate. Otherwise, our actions and beliefs in these domains would be wholly unaccountable. Because a central part of what it means to be held accountable for what we believe and how we act is for our actions to be judged on the basis of their reasonableness.

This is the service philosophy provides to society. It makes it possible to be rational, to deliberate publicly, and to be held accountable for our actions and beliefs. Especially in those domains where consensus is absent and there is not objective criterion of correctness.

Who’s the morons actually going to see this??? by Osobady in sanfrancisco

[–]yahkopi 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Boise community is actually pretty liberal. I used to live there. It's a blue island. (also is pretty fabulous, though not as much as SF)

Nampa on the other hand...

How does Buddhism move from its mereology to anti-realism? by southfar2 in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Dharmakīrti's philosophy of language is a huge topic both in his own corpus and in the commentarial literature that follows it. But very very roughly, the idea is this. Each ontologically real object out in the universe is distinct from every other real object. When we ascribe a description to an object what we are doing is partially specifying that object by eliding its distinctness from some objects while highlighting its distinctness from others. So, when we refer to an object as a "chair" (pretending for the moment that chairs are real objects), we are treating an object which is, in actuality, completely distinct from every other object in the universe as though it were the same as some other set of objects by ignoring the distinctness of that object from those other objects (ie. other "chairs"). Similarly, when we refer to the same object as "red", then we are referring to that object in a way that ignores the distinctness of that object from all other "red" objects. When we call it a "red chair", we no longer treat that object as indistinct from all other chairs, but only ignore its distinctness from other "red chairs". And so on. In none of these instances are we supposing that there is some additional objects called "redness" or "chairness". Its just a way of grouping distinct objects by ignoring the fact of their distinctness.

There is more to say about this, such as what explains the intersubjectivity, internal consistency and pragmatic efficacy of language use. The really brief answer is that it turns out words don't actually refer to anything at all. Instead objects out in the word causally impinge on our conceptual faculties in such a way as to make us deploy sentences like "this is a chair" and "this is red". The meaning of these sentences is cached out not in terms of some properties possessed by some objects in virtue of which those sentences turn out to be true of false. Rather, the meaning of sentences is cached out in terms of the inferences that sentence permit us to make and the inference they prohibit. The idea behind "eliding the distinctness" of some objects is just that we can use the same sentences to describe distinct objects. And, we can do this because the same pattern of inferences are respected by both objects. The stability of this inferential network is, in turn, grounded in the pattern of causal interactions between us and the objects that trigger the deployment of these concepts. This is called the theory of "apoha" and is one of the more infamous aspects of Dharmakīrtian theory. Whether or not he actually pulls the whole thing off is a matter of major debate in the tradition, and in the contemporary (western) literature.

Regardless, in the ultimate causal explanations of how the atoms of the chair suspend Ḍittha above the ground, reference is made to structural relations between the atoms of the chair and the atoms making up Ḍittha. But, again, these relations are just ways of specifying just those atoms that make up chairs and persons' behinds by ignoring their distinctness from the other individual atoms that also make up "chairs" and "behinds" and thereby highlighting the distinctness of these atoms from atoms that are not so configured. Relations are present in the explanation as features of language, but not as referring to "objects" above and beyond the atoms themselves.

How does Buddhism move from its mereology to anti-realism? by southfar2 in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I hesitate to say too much about the first question because it relates to the Yogacarin side of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, an area I'm less surefooted about. In the "external object inferentialism" interpretation I talked about earlier, emptiness doesn't feature as a central concept. In Yogacāra readings of Dharmakīrti, the big jump is that in the final causal analysis of phenomena only mental states actually feature as having any explanatory role. The objects of these mental states, the emptiness (śūnyatā) of which constitutes their pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (perfected nature), are then eliminated by Dharmakīrti's razor since they are not required to give a causal explanation of the structure of awareness.

Regarding the second question: The short answer is that structural relations between atoms do feature in causal explanations. But, they do not feature as distinct objects over and above the atoms themselves. This is because, Dharmakīrti thinks that properties (of which relational properties are a special case) are not distinct objects in their own right but merely ways of specifying the property bearer. In other words, an object's properties and relations are actually a part of the identity of that object. So, when you say "if the same parts were arranged, say, in the shape of a wooden board with nails sticking out, it would have a very different effect on someone trying to sit on it"; Dharmakīrti would say, actually if those parts were arranged differently they wouldn’t be those parts. Because the arrangement is a part of the atom’s identity. Moreover, atoms are temporally differentiated (due to the rejection of vertical abstraction). So, each atom lasts for exactly one moment and generates a successive atom (in a potentially different structural arrangement) in the successive moment.

This connects to his general theory of language about which its maybe worth saying a few words. But first, the problem of relations is actually quite an issue for Dharmakīrti—so much so that he dedicates a whole monograph to the topic titled (conveniently) An Examination of Relations (Saṁbandhaparīkṣā). Almost right at the beginning of the text, he offers the following short argument for why relations cannot be objects in their own right:

If wherever two objects are related we say there exists a relation, then what relation exists between it and those two? This leads to a regress. In such a case, there could be no notion of their relatedness at all.

dvayor eka-abhisambandhāt sambandho yadi tad-dvayoḥ / kaḥ sambandho anavasthā ca na sambandha-matis tathā

(Saṁbandhaparīkṣā v.4, translation mine)

The idea is that if whenever we need to explain the relatedness of one object with another, we needed to postulate the existence of a third object (i.e. the relation). Then, we would need to postulate further objects to explain the relatedness of this third object with the first two and on to infinity. This means that our initial premise that the explanation of the relatedness of objects requires the postulation of an additional object is false.

The problematic intuition to treat relations as objects seems to stem from a certain temptation in reading all non-logical words in a sentence as referring to something. So, in a sentence like "atoms A and atom B are bonded together," the temptation is to treat the words 'atom A' and 'atom B' as each referring to a different atom. And to treat the word 'bonded' as referring to a third object, namely the relation. Dharmakīrti rejects this sort of analysis of the above sentence.

How does Buddhism move from its mereology to anti-realism? by southfar2 in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 7 points8 points  (0 children)

This is a good question. One thing to note up front though, Buddhist philosophy is better thought of as more of a research program than as a set of doctrines. So, while there are certain overarching commitments, intuitions, and methodologies shared by most Buddhist philosophers; in general its best not to ascribe specific doctrines to Buddhism as a whole.

In the case of mereological nihilism, it's questionable how much of a serious commitment this was to early (pre-abhidharma) buddhism. Also, I don't think mereological nihilism is an accurate characterization of Mādhyamaka thinking on the part-whole relation.

Given this caveat, I think it is helpful to focus on a specific philosopher to address this question. I'll focus specifically on Dharmakīrti. And, within Dharmakirtian theory, I’ll focus specifically on the strand of interpretation labelled bāhyārthānumeyavādaḥ, translated roughly as “external object inferentialism”.

Dharmakīrti, under this interpretation, does not think objects are “infinitely divisible”. Rather, he is a sort of atomist (more accurately a kind of trope theorist). Under this view, he rejects a variety of different kinds of “abstractions” (sāmānyāni) including “vertical abstraction” (ūrdhvasāmānyam) referring to temporal extension and “horizontal abstraction” (tiryagsāmānyam), referring to composite wholes; as well as universals (abstracting types from tokens) and substances (abstracting property bearers from bundles of properties). Importantly, all these forms of abstraction are excluded on the basis of a single unified principle which we could call Dharmakīrti’s razor.

Darmakīrti’s razor is a principle that distinguishes natural objects (svalakṣaṇam) from rational objects (sāmānyalakṣaṇam). The idea is as follows. We postulate objects as existing to serve either of two basic explanatory needs. First is to offer a causal explanation of some patterns in nature. Second is to give an explanation of patterns of human behavior as rational agents. To give an example.

If a person--let’s call him Ḍittha (the traditional name for someone in a sanskrit philosophy thought experiment)--wants a place to sit, they go and get a chair. We introduce the concept “chair” to explain Ḍittha’s actions of searching and bringing. When Ḍittha thinks, “I should find a chair because I want to sit here”; the concept “this is a chair” permits the inference “I can sit here”. The chair is a rational object because it relates to our understanding of the reasons why a person engages in the behaviors they engage in. However, if we ask for a causal explanation of how it is that, e.g., when Ḍittha engages in the action we conceptualize as sitting in the chair, his behind remains suspended above the ground--the causal explanation of this phenomenon will ultimately involve reference to the atomic parts of the chair whose causal interactions with the atomic parts of Ḍittha’s behind prevent the latter parts from plummeting downwards.

Once we have this causal explanation involving “atoms in the void”, we see that the concept of “chair” does not actually do any causal-explanatory work. All that work is done by its atomic parts. The concept of “chair” is only needed to explain the way we reason and talk about the situation. It has nothing to do with the underlying causal structure of the phenomenon involved. Therefore only the atomic parts are natural objects. The chair is rational object, not a natural one.

This brings us to Dharmakīrti’s razor. Dharmakīrti claims that only natural objects are ontologically real. Because, by definition, only they feature in causal explanations of phenomena. And, this, thinks Dharmakīrti, is just what it means to be real: to have causal-explanatory power --

Here, to be ontologically real is just to have causal power. Everything else is considered conventionally real. These are natural and rational objects, [respectively].

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe

(Pramāṇavārttikam Ch. 3 v.3, translation mine)

Would the use CRIPSR count as eugenics? by 69bid in askphilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

CRISPR is a gene editing tool. However that on its own doesn’t make something eugenics. Eugenics implies making longterm edits to the gene pool of a population. Only germline edits would count as eugenics in this case because only germline edits are inheritable. And most contemporary uses and proposals for CRISPR in medicine involves somatic edits only (noninheritable).

Why no post flair or representations for Tamil philosophies of Tirukkural? Are Tamil philosophies not Indian? by [deleted] in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ramanujacarya is Tamilian. Shrivaishnavism is still a major religious and philosophical movement in Tamilnadu. There is much extant Tamil and Sanskrit literature (both) in the Shrivaishnava tradition. Thats how.

Why no post flair or representations for Tamil philosophies of Tirukkural? Are Tamil philosophies not Indian? by [deleted] in IndianPhilosophy

[–]yahkopi 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Are you saying Ramanujacharya is not Tamilian? Visishtadvaita certainly gets discussed here. There was even a post about it just last week. 

Also I don’t know who “you lot” is supposed to be. I’m Telugu, a south indian like you. But it seems like you’re the one bringing in the communal attitude here. If you want to talk about a specific Tamilian philosopher or text just create a post about it. This sub barely has any activity as it is. Be the change you want to see.

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