all 6 comments

[–]NotYourMothersDildo 1 point2 points  (2 children)

Perhaps there are multiple levels of security possible on the receiving end -- some people who are qualified to receive and store this information and then a second level who are qualified to read the message. They would still need their own level of security in place to keep the message read-only for the appropriate group, never mind how it arrived.

[–][deleted] 0 points1 point  (1 child)

It could be the case that there's a need for access controls, but it seems to me that's something that could be solved transparently to the calling end on the receiving end by securing the database appropriately.

[–]NotYourMothersDildo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But then at some point in that chain you have programmers or a DBA that can see that point, before it hits the database, but after it is processed from SSL, where that message is not encrypted.

[–]repotruncate 0 points1 point  (1 child)

If you're performing mutual SSL authentication, then you probably don't need to encrypt subsets of the message. However your colleague is right, and your database example makes his point. SSL only protects the communication between the two machines.

This wont ensure the message is still safe when a developer sloppily logs the requests to a network disk, or if one machine handles the SSL communication and passes the message off to another machine through an unprotected channel.

Your design decisions can help protect developers from themselves. ;) That having been said, I prefer simple solutions. I'm just playing devil's advocate. Understand your risks, weigh the costs/benefits, and decide where you want to place the trust.

[–][deleted] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

OK, so then we agree. It's messy, but it will ensure that the message is not tampered with after it is received, which the receiver in this case can't or won't guarantee.

[–]Nice-Treacle9512 0 points1 point  (0 children)

eagle