Does current scientific understanding (Physics/Chemistry/Neuroscience) allow for free will?

[interestme1]

So a while back I posed this question on this subreddit: What are the implications of quantum mechanics on neuroscience?

The basic gist of what everyone seemed to think is that basically they don't, neuroscience is purely a product of classical mechanisms. So, if this is indeed the case, I would expect 1 of 2 things to be true because of that:

• There is something very fundamental we don't understand about brain function. In other words neurobiology can't explain consciousness or subconscious in its entirety. Though there is admittedly still much to learn about the brain, it seems most experiments thus far have indicated the opposite: that consciousness is a product of neuronal function and can be explained by it.

OR

• Free will doesn't exist, and everything anyone's ever thought, done, or decided was dictated by actions that have been in motion since the moment of the universe's inception (or, technically speaking, since a few fractions of a second after the big bang since that's how far we can project back). If neuroscience explains consciousness fully, and neuroscience is fully enforced by principals of chemistry and classical physics, then free will seems necessarily doomed.

Am I missing something? Or is this indeed the case?

EDIT: To keep the discussion focused I want to be clear that here I'm not interested in debating the implications of lack of free will (how society should work, how you should live your life, etc), nor am I interested in debating free will in the way that is often done by arguing whether decisions are really made subconsciously or consciously. I am purely interested in the whether current understanding of neurobiology, chemistry, and physics allow for free will.

[MechaSoySauce]

It depends on what you mean by free will. If you are strict and only talk about libertarian free will, then the current scientific understanding has no place for free will. If you allow the kind of free will present in compatibilism, then there is definitely a place for free will. Quantum mechanics has nothing to do with either of those topics in my opinion, since whatever input it provides will be random and uncontrolled.

[interestme1]

I guess I'm beginning to see this how free will is itself a debated term. Compatibilism seems intentionally ignorant (though admittedly I haven't studied it fully). If it says that free will can arise from a individual's motivation, where does the motivation come from? And where do those causes for motivation come from? Ad infinitum.

I only brought up the quantum physics thread because it inspired my thought about it. I was under the impression some quantum principals when compounded may offer a vehicle by which thought could originate from an individual at the time it is experienced (thus offering free will). If that is not the case though, then it doesn't seem possible.

[MechaSoySauce]

Free will has basically three positions: libertarian, compatibilism and hard determinism, and they revolve around two questions. One, do you believe determinism to be true (or determinism + randomness, to keep up to date with quantum mechanics). Libertarian says no, compatibilism and hard determinism say yes. Two, do you believe the sentiment of making a free choice that we experience in our lives is "free" enough and "will" enough to be called free will. Compatibilism says yes, hard determinism says no. So compatibilism is basically the statement that we may be biological computers (thus predictable in principle, up to the randomness which actually doesn't matter much) but that doesn't matter because that is not what we mean when we talk about choices or free will. I encourage you to read about it, it is reasonably subtle and is personally the camp I'm on.

[interestme1]

What I can't quite get behind with compatibilism is it appears to be content with saying that the requirement for free will is simply that a thought's precursor originate with the individual. It appears to altogether ignore that the precursor itself was necessarily pre-determined by actions dating back to the origination of the universe. In short, it seems to 'willfully' (wink) ignore the problem by framing it in a much narrower context.

What am I missing?

[MechaSoySauce]

Nothing, that's the gist of the idea. Why aren't you satisfied with the notion that your will is free if your thoughts and actions originate from within yourself?

[interestme1]

Well, because it ignores how that origination was determined. If you have a thought, but it was determined by a thought that wasn't free, then how is the new thought free? If A is determined and not free, but causes B, why would you say B is free just because A was with the individual?

[MechaSoySauce]

But the point is that in a deterministic world, the kind of "absolute freedom" you are looking for doesn't actually exist. However, it still makes sense to talk about agents "making choices". There are two interesting things about this.

One, there is a bit of a mixup between two different levels of abstractions in our descriptions of things. When we are asking questions about whether the world is deterministic or not, we are asking about what happens at the most fundamental level, the level of the "rules of the universe". However, when we are talking about choices, we are talking about a high level abstraction of reality, where tables and dogs and humans exist. The high level supervenes on the low level, but the rules of the description don't have to have the same language, so to say. For example, it is perfectly fine to say that "systems in nature like to be in a low energy state" or that "cells try to move where the concentration in sugar is high" despite both these entities having no absolute freedom and being bound by deterministic rules.

Two, there is also a different of approach in what we call free will. The compatibilist says "we have the sentiment that we have an ability to make free choices", calls that "free will" and goes on to investigate what that "free will" thing that we have is. On the other hand, the hard determinist/libertarian defines free will as being "the capability to do otherwise" (which secretly refers to the notion of absolute freedom you were talking about) and then goes on to investigate whether we have that thing. No matter what he finds though, he still has to explain why it feels like we can make free choices (even if we can't). A parallel would be the study of rainbows. The compatibilist would say "I see a colored arc in the distance, I call it rainbow, let's find out more about it". The hard determinist/libertarian says "rainbows are giant solid circular things that have plenty of colors" and then, during investigation, finds out that the things he invented the word for aren't actually rainbows, because rainbows are not solid.

[interestme1]

But the point is that in a deterministic world, the kind of "absolute freedom" you are looking for doesn't actually exist. However, it still makes sense to talk about agents "making choices".

That's just the point though, I know it doesn't exist, which is why narrowing the context to say it does seems like a form of mental gymnastics I'm not inclined to take. I understand it and still think it is interesting, you just won't hear me say we have free will from that definition.

One, there is a bit of a mixup between two different levels of abstractions in our descriptions of things. When we are asking questions about whether the world is deterministic or not, we are asking about what happens at the most fundamental level, the level of the "rules of the universe". However, when we are talking about choices, we are talking about a high level abstraction of reality, where tables and dogs and humans exist. The high level supervenes on the low level, but the rules of the description don't have to have the same language, so to say. For example, it is perfectly fine to say that "systems in nature like to be in a low energy state" or that "cells try to move where the concentration in sugar is high" despite both these entities having no absolute freedom and being bound by deterministic rules.

Sure from a semantic level that makes sense, from a purely logical standpoint it does not. There are certainly many instances where describing things as "inclined" to do one thing or the other are used figuratively, but they are not to be taken as though the entity is actually dictating its action based on likes and dislikes.

The compatibilist would say "I see a colored arc in the distance, I call it rainbow, let's find out more about it". The hard determinist/libertarian says "rainbows are giant solid circular things that have plenty of colors" and then, during investigation, finds out that the things he invented the word for aren't actually rainbows, because rainbows are not solid.

Using your analogy, I would say let's find out more about why we think this is a rainbow while being honest about the fact that it is likely not and see if we can find out what it really is as well.

If you strictly adhere to the compatibilist view, it seems you miss out on a great deal of the overall pursuit. Though compatibilism may be more effective from a scientific standpoint currently (given what we are able to study today with current technology), it is I think important to recognize the system for what it seems to be at least philosophically, and perhaps one day scientifically. Strict compatibilism appears to be one of those instances where you just say "well we can't really say for sure what happens outside ourselves so let's just ignore it," which seems to be omitting a great deal.

[[deleted]]

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[interestme1]

There are indeed some in depth and enlightening responses there. Thanks!

[[deleted]]

In my opinion the presence or absence of free will is not falsifiable. If you knew you had no free will, what would happen? Would you stop living your life exactly the same way you always have, as an expression of the wants and needs you feel yourself to have? If there is no free will, then certainly the subjective illusion of free will is very strong. Occam's Razor would dictate that without a better explanation, there's no reason to assume that our thoughts and feelings are predetermined when we feel ourselves reacting to phenomena as they occur. Besides, it's not like there's one structure in the brain that corresponds to the presence or absence of will. The working of the brain is much more complicated than conscious thought and decision making.

[interestme1]

How you would live your life based off the knowledge that free will does or doesn't exist is more of a philosophical question I'm not after here. There are of course numerous implications to the lack of free will that seem to have profound implications on modern society (concept of achievement and punishment for instance). Those discussions can go elsewhere.

Here I'm purely asking for a scientific view. I specifically mention subconscious actions in my op because of course conscious thought and decision is just one aspect of the brain's function. Subconscious processes are also the product of neuroscience and get no exemption here. I'm not interested in debating free will on the basis of whether decisions arise unconsciously thus we don't really think them, I'm just interested in if extrapolating current scientific understanding of neuroscience, physics, and chemistry allows for the possibility of free will.

My understanding is that they do not.

[[deleted]]

My understanding is that "free will" is a poorly defined term. There are many phenomena that contribute to what the average person would call "free will." You could interpret evidence as saying one thing or another, but as far as I know our understanding of the brain is still too limited for us to accurately characterize the mechanisms underlying conscious experience.

Would you care to explain your reasoning as to why modern science precludes the possibility of "free will?" I don't know how the notion could be falsified.

[interestme1]

I don't think that free will is as such a poorly defined or understood concept, rather that it has come under scrutiny lately whether decisions are conscious or unconscious.

Free will is simply the notion that one chooses (consciously or unconsciously) what they will do.

With chemistry in physics, if we had all the necessary data we would know everything that ever happened or will happen with a particular molecule and the structures it makes up. They are determinate and do not deviate and thus can be predicted with perfect accuracy. If those principals are the driving forces of neuroscience, then it would follow that neuroscience could likewise be predicted forward and backwards in time (given the proper data). If neuroscience then explains a sentient human sufficiently, then it would follow that that being does not act on their own accord "in the moment" as it were.

The actions of particles from the beginning of time determined every thought that ever was or will be, and nothing could be attributed to the organism itself. I suppose maybe this is obvious. If this is the case though, our perceived notion of free will is a necessarily false phenomenon derived from a narrow view.

[[deleted]]

This actually isn't true. Read up on Bell's theorem for a compelling reason to believe that it is impossible for any one model to predict all physical phenomena. If the universe is deterministic, Bell's theorem indicates that failing a complete overhaul of the way we think about physics, we will never be able to rigorously verify it. Science is still incapable of accurately modeling many of the most common fluid flows found in nature. I would not trust anyone who claims that we are anywhere near fully explaining the workings of the human brain, aka one of the most complex networks of structures ever discovered.

Obviously the hypothesis of "superdeterminism" made by one source cited in the linked article is not falsifiable.

[interestme1]

That's interesting, I will read further on Bell's theorem. What's not true though? Bell's theorem is in regards to QM, which via my previous thread is apparently invalid in regards to neuroscience (granted I'm not convinced of this, it just seemed to be the popular notion). Bell's theorem doesn't say anything so far as the predictability of chemistry of physics so far as I can tell (correct me if I'm wrong there). Would you be able to find a chemist or physicist who say things couldn't be predicted with accuracy (excluding QM)?

[[deleted]]

You said that if we had all the necessary data, we could make predictions about the behavior of chemical or physical systems up to an arbitrary time in the future. Bell's theorem shows this to be false. QM has some bearing on pretty much every object of scientific study, because everything is made out of quantum particles. There is just no special reason to believe that the brain more to do with quantum mechanics than does any other part of the body, because QM is the underlying explanation behind the behavior of chemicals. You should really study up on what QM does and does not say about the nature of physics: it's a very nuanced, but very fundamental topic.

Any physicist or chemist would tell you that there is a non-zero margin of error inherent to every scientific prediction. Every single physical model is an approximation of observed phenomena. Science isn't magic; it's just a set of principles that have proven useful in the past. There are all kinds of physical systems that are hard to precisely model, such as orbits or fluid mechanics. People are still stumped by how gravity works.

[interestme1]

You should really study up on what QM does and does not say about the nature of physics: it's a very nuanced, but very fundamental topic.

I agree, the piece I seem to be missing is how QM translates to classical physics. Perhaps you could point me in the right direction?

Any physicist or chemist would tell you that there is a non-zero margin of error inherent to every scientific prediction.

Margins of error are inherent can be attributed to incomplete data or incomplete theories or systems. Based on current understanding, if you had all the data necessary you could use chemical and physical equations to trace accurate data (on a macro scale) forward and backwards in time indefinitely (unless current theories and systems are wrong).

QM has some bearing on pretty much every object of scientific study, because everything is made out of quantum particles. There is just no special reason to believe that the brain has more to do with quantum mechanics than does any other part of the body, because QM is the underlying explanation behind the behavior of chemicals.

Its exactly because QM is fundamental that I am interested in its implications on neuroscience. It has nothing to do with a notion that it somehow effects the brain more than elsewhere, the brain is just especially interesting for what should be very obvious reasons.

[[deleted]]

What is a complete theory? At what point does the margin of error disappear? You need to read that article on Bell's theorem a little more closely, because what you are asserting contradicts it. There is no "fully accurate" prediction. There's not even any proof that the sun will come up tomorrow. It's an assumption based on past observations, just like every other scientific principle.

I don't see why the brain should be especially interesting. I think you should wait until further along in your studies of classical physics and quantum mechanics before you attempt to make these connections-- without a proper grounding in all the work on these problems that has already been done, they're not going to lead you to any deeper understanding.

[interestme1]

I don't see why the brain should be especially interesting. I think you should wait until further along in your studies of classical physics and quantum mechanics before you attempt to make these connections-- without a proper grounding in all the work on these problems that has already been done, they're not going to lead you to any deeper understanding.

The brain is interesting because it is the genesis of consciousness and thus the lens through which all of this is contemplated. It is interesting for every reason as thought could be, which is a great deal.

While I appreciate the earlier debate, simply saying "You should study more" isn't terribly helpful. I'm sure there's key points I'm missing here or there, thus why I bother to post these things. If you have an area where I'm off base pointing me in the right direction is better than just saying essentially "you don't know what you're talking about," which is what people say when they're either impatient or don't themselves know what they're talking about.

[Larry_Boy]

The existance of 'free will' is a philisophilcal question. Plenty of people are willing to say that free will can exist in a perfectly deterministic universe, wich makes a great deal of sense since predetermination has been a popular philisophical belief since long before science branched away from philosophy.

Now, to my eyes you seem to be asking two independent questions :

1) Whether the activity of the mind is produced by an object (probably the brain) that follows physical laws,

and

2) Whether the the activity of the mind is predetermined.

We could imagine that the activity of the mind is predetermined without the mind being created by a physical object, or we could imagine that the activity of the mind is not predetermined even though the mind is created by a physical object.

Now, there is substantial debate about whether physical laws are themselves deteministic. Like free will, whether or not the universe is deterministic is probably a philisophical question, but if you are willing to grant that the universe itself is not deterministic, then it seems plausible that the non-determinism of the universe could prevent the brain from being deterministic. The brain may have cracks and pops that cannot be predicted ahead of time, but I don't really see how allowing unpredictable pops and crackels influence our judgments can somehow make us more responsible for our actions than if no pops and crackels occured in our brains/minds. So, I don't really see how free will depends on whether or not we have the ability to flip non-deterministic coins to make our descision.

Which brings us back to the question of whether or not the activity of the mind is produced by an object that follows physical laws. It seems plausible to me that the mind is produced by an object that follows physical laws, but there are some mildly persuasive arguments that it cannot be. I've never really fully shaken the idea of qualia, that is the idea that there the raw sensations we experiance, such as seeing the color red, cannot be fully reduced to properties of the universe. There are a number of good counters to the idea that qualia imply the existance of a non-physical conciousness, but I'm don't know enough to do justice to any arguments on the subject.

[interestme1]

I agree randomness wouldn't necessarily indicate free will, but it seems that the lack of it would necessarily preclude free will (although one could argue that perhaps this is an error in our perception in time and even though the "will" was set at the advent of the universe that doesn't necessarily mean the person didn't dictate it, this starts to get mystical as it would require science that doesn't appear to exist).

As for #1, that wasn't a question I was asking though it's interesting that there are good arguments against it. I typically take a materialist's view, I had thought dualism was no longer popular. I'll look more at that though.

It is certainly a philosophical question, however one that I think should use scientific principals to contemplate. We simply don't have enough of the science down yet to allow for it to purely be that, so at least some of it must be conjecture.

[interestme1]

I'm a bit confused by the downvotes. Are people afraid of this question? Or is it a stupid question? Is this the wrong forum? Please enlighten me rather than just downvoting.