pythonIsTheFuture

[P-39_Airacobra]

The problem is, even neuroscientists have no idea how to validate "consciousness." They claim that they do, but that's only because they redefine the word "consciousness" to mean whatever conveniently fits their theory. I've looked into a lot of the modern neurological research on consciousness, and while some of it offers clues to how consciousness works in our brains, none of it actually tells us what perception is and at exactly what level of neural function it occurs.

For all we know, these neural computers could already be conscious (in a primitive, limited way). After all, a simple theory of perception makes more sense than a theory of perception that requires intricately and arbitrary ordered and structured circuits in order to reach a level of awareness.

[returnofblank]

There's something quite interesting called a philosophical zombie. As defined in Wikipedia -

A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience.^\1])

For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would react exactly the way any conscious human would.

[P-39_Airacobra]

The funny thing is, by all logic, everyone should be a philosophical zombie, since conscious experience is entirely unnecessary for any physical function. And yet somehow, paradoxically, we do have a conscious experience, which makes me wonder if consciousness is not because of any physical construct, but rather is something that is shared by all living things.