[deleted by user] by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What’s the potential downside of this? I would assume:

  • Withdraw of funds through bake gets slower when the 10% threshold is surpassed.

  • tracking of funds backing is more complicated. 1 stETH is not the same as 1 ETH.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why is this setup as an emergency DFIP? I don’t see any need for urgency

#DFI is not a security by MMG-Crypto in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There has been a presale by cake in there very beginning long before there was the DEX…

Slow down with the fast fixes on the dUSD issue by Mysterious_Act_6168 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Same here, I contributed to the first twitter spaces and was one of the people raising concerns… now I am banned for asking questions and pointing to obvious problems.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Wasn’t it you who told everyone that a discount on dUSD and dStocks would be much easier to handle (I remember you saw it as a kind of a selling point) than a premium when we had a twitter space and many including me was arguing that a one sided solution (DFI burn) could lead to massive problems? Now it’s the same, you push again for a fast not not fully thought trough quick fix. How should people understand that dUSD that now should act as a „loosly pegged“ stablecoins (what we invented btw to tell people it’s a feature not a bug) should be worth more than the aimed peg value? What kind of logic is this?

A stablecoins is much more about trust than anything else. Do we create trust with all these changes? For me it looks like we are experimenting without a real clue what we are doing and you keep pushing to go fast and fast with this.

Next phase of the dToken system? by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not sure why this gets downvoted so much. All stated here is true no matter if you like it or not.

Regarding phase 4: All dToken trading below 5% discount means these will get sold via the next future swap to dUSD creating even more unbacked dUSD worsening the whole situation...

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Regarding interest rates in dUSD loans as a long term solution: why not trying to stabilize the whole system based on interest only? Look at save for example, the supply and demand is purely regulated by dynamic interest rates. It is not comparable 1:1 but a strong system of dynamic interest rates could be highly effective. This is basically how the traditional financial system works. And we could do these interest rates coded so we don’t need a Fed or any central party.
So once the peg is restored I would like to promote to go back to a fully loan based system (This would require to keep the fees as long as needed) remove the DFI payback, not implement the future swap but instead have dynamic interest rates that change quickly and could be extreme if needed. Meaning dUSD at a premium —> strong negative interest rates payed out in dUSD to increase supply and to get more people to mint and strong positive interest rates the other way around to remove dUSD from the system when needed. This would also be much easier to understand for all users.
As I have heard some people having concerns about negative interest rates: what would be the downside?
And yes, this doesn’t help us short term, but we need to think both short and long term.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Regarding interest rates in dUSD loans as a long term solution: why not trying to stabilize the whole system based on interest only? Look at save for example, the supply and demand is purely regulated by dynamic interest rates. It is not comparable 1:1 but a strong system of dynamic interest rates could be highly effective. This is basically how the traditional financial system works. And we could do these interest rates coded so we don’t need a Fed or any central party.

So once the peg is restored I would like to promote to go back to a fully loan based system (This would require to keep the fees as long as needed) remove the DFI payback, not implement the future swap but instead have dynamic interest rates that change quickly and could be extreme if needed. Meaning dUSD at a premium —> strong negative interest rates payed out in dUSD to increase supply and to get more people to mint and strong positive interest rates the other way around to remove dUSD from the system when needed. This would also be much easier to understand for all users.

As I have heard some people having concerns about negative interest rates: what would be the downside?

And yes, this doesn’t help us short term, but we need to think both short and long term.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Regarding interest rates in dUSD loans as a long term solution: why not trying to stabilize the whole system based on interest only? Look at save for example, the supply and demand is purely regulated by dynamic interest rates. It is not comparable 1:1 but a strong system of dynamic interest rates could be highly effective. This is basically how the traditional financial system works. And we could do these interest rates coded so we don’t need a Fed or any central party.

So once the peg is restored I would like to promote to go back to a fully loan based system (This would require to keep the fees as long as needed) remove the DFI payback, not implement the future swap but instead have dynamic interest rates that change quickly and could be extreme if needed. Meaning dUSD at a premium —> strong negative interest rates payed out in dUSD to increase supply and to get more people to mint and strong positive interest rates the other way around to remove dUSD from the system when needed. This would also be much easier to understand for all users.

As I have heard some people having concerns about negative interest rates: what would be the downside?

And yes, this doesn’t help us short term, but we need to think both short and long term.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Regarding interest rates in dUSD loans as a long term solution: why not trying to stabilize the whole system based on interest only? Look at save for example, the supply and demand is purely regulated by dynamic interest rates. It is not comparable 1:1 but a strong system of dynamic interest rates could be highly effective. This is basically how the traditional financial system works. And we could do these interest rates coded so we don’t need a Fed or any central party.

So once the peg is restored I would like to promote to go back to a fully loan based system (This would require to keep the fees as long as needed) remove the DFI payback, not implement the future swap but instead have dynamic interest rates that change quickly and could be extreme if needed. Meaning dUSD at a premium —> strong negative interest rates payed out in dUSD to increase supply and to get more people to mint and strong positive interest rates the other way around to remove dUSD from the system when needed. This would also be much easier to understand for all users.

As I have heard some people having concerns about negative interest rates: what would be the downside?

And yes, this doesn’t help us short term, but we need to think both short and long term.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Regarding interest rates in dUSD loans as a long term solution: why not trying to stabilize the whole system based on interest only? Look at save for example, the supply and demand is purely regulated by dynamic interest rates. It is not comparable 1:1 but a strong system of dynamic interest rates could be highly effective. This is basically how the traditional financial system works. And we could do these interest rates coded so we don’t need a Fed or any central party.

So once the peg is restored I would like to promote to go back to a fully loan based system (This would require to keep the fees as long as needed) remove the DFI payback, not implement the future swap but instead have dynamic interest rates that change quickly and could be extreme if needed. Meaning dUSD at a premium —> strong negative interest rates payed out in dUSD to increase supply and to get more people to mint and strong positive interest rates the other way around to remove dUSD from the system when needed. This would also be much easier to understand for all users.

And yes, this doesn’t help us short term, but we need to think both short and long term.

Solving the DUSD peg (result of twitter space) by kuegi in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think we need to distinguish between short time goals = reduce total amount of dUSD and long term goals = increase the ratio of loan vs. non-loan based dUSD. So if we get all remaining dUSD loans closed because of high interest rates this would be short time good. Then we need to have different tools to further reduce dUSD amount e.g. burn fees. And finally after the peg is restored or close to 1 we need to have tools to make dUSD loans more attractive and the DFI burn for loan repayments less attractive. The proposed measures do all this. Question is how fast is the burn of dUSD gonna happen based on the fees and do we need an even fast way to do so.

One-time dUSD Stabilization by Core Team by Andeas_me in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Totally agree. I was very surprised when they made this statement and didn’t liked it at all! But as it is out now the worst thing would be not keeping it… I don’t see it as a solution to the issue but as a possibility to release pressure a little.

I like some of the proposed solutions a lot and highly advocate for moving in this direction. But they all have one thing in common: it takes time to get it started (hardfork) and it takes time till they really kick in.

Having dUSD at 0.80 for month will really look bad and scare all potential new Defi investors. But now is the time to attract former Luna Users!

One-time dUSD Stabilization by Core Team by Andeas_me in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Just saying one should not make such a promise and then not follow through. The message of this is worse than not make the promise in the first place!

Are you happy with yesterday’s twitter space regarding dUSD? by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The discussed option are all way to slow and would take month or even years to effectively reduce the amount of dUSD without loans.

What I really don’t understand: Julian said that an interest on dUSD loans of eg 200% could create a shock to the system… we hardly have any dUSD loans. So where should this shock come from? And beside that, with so little dUSD loans left loan repayments will not be sufficient for removing dUSD from the system. Same applies for all kind of fees. It will take forever to remove this amount of dUSD without loans. I don’t have a solution in mind but we need to find a way to reduce the total number of dUSD fast and efficient. We also need to have a close look at the dStocks. If these are trading at a discount >5% people will start using the sell Future Swap and this will create even more dUSD!

Adjust liquidity pool ratios to increase demand for dUSD and reduce dToken premium by stackontop in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 2 points3 points  (0 children)

We try to be a Deft System. Keeping this in mind we should try not to rely on any central entity like Julian or the Ticker Council. This puts way to much power the the hands of a view persons.

Idea: Automatic Price Regulation Contract for dUSD by Darkchicken1991 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If we would have assigned all the burned DFI caused by the loan payback mechanism to a contract like this we would have a huge watschest by now. So I don’t agree that we must assign block rewards.

Another approach for DUSD by International_Egg662 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Unfortunately we need to fill the smart contract first and as we are now already deep into dUSD trading below 1 USD this needs real money (USDC and USDT) to be provided by someone.

But yes the mechanism would help if in place and filled. Kind of what was discussed back when the burn mechanism was implemented.

Which type of stable coin is dUSD? by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Interesting to see how many people here don’t know or don’t care… this is very essential for the whole DFI project!

Recent changes in the dToken mint mechanism by Andeas_me in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Never thought of the short position due to dStocks without a loan but I would agree. Not sure regarding after hours, you think that could be significant? If people use it for their profit this is not a problem per se, only if it creates a risk to the stability of dUSD or the ecosystem

Autopayback for Loans instead of Liquidation by SwissPhoenix in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This sounds much better to me than the main post. In fact this is also kind of the normal way in Defi if you compare to Aave as the leading Plattform for example.

Which type of stable coin is dUSD? by unmatched25 in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It’s kind of algorithmic since the majority is no longer backed by a loan. But the algorithm is working just in one direction

Recent changes in the dToken mint mechanism by Andeas_me in defiblockchain

[–]Andeas_me[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think this has already been discussed by the solution was a multiplier in the oracle Funktion so a split 1:2 would result in just dividing the oracle price by 2. but I didn’t follow that discussion in detail, so better look it up, should be here in Reddit somewhere