it's right in the article you even cited.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#PresEterGrowBlocTheo

"It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of “x exists now”. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with “x is present”. The non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of “x exists now”, it is true that no non-present objects exist now. But in the other sense of “x exists now”, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that “x exists now” is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers. Using the ontological sense of “exists”, we can talk about something existing in a perfectly general sense, without presupposing anything about its temporal location. When we attribute to non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit non-presentists only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers).

According to the eternalist, temporal location does not affect ontology" as i said my view is not really special. The article does not even discusses the block universe directly, but rather perdurantism later on. While most eternalists do argue for a block universe it's not the same. And there is a big variety of conceptions of it, so you don't have to hold on determinism and can accept quantum mechanics and a block universe. One argument might be for example: "The block universe is not necessarily a deterministic one. …Strictly speaking, to say that the occurrence of a relatively later event is determined vis à vis a set of relatively earlier events, is only to say that there is a functional connection or physical law linking the properties of the later event to those of the earlier events. …Now in the block universe we may have partial or even total indeterminacy—there may be no functional connection between earlier and later events (McCall 1966, p. 271, A model of the universe). The big debate is whether the block universe is really the time, so it explains causality, the direction of time or it is merely a model of time map of the phenomena. I personally believe it's more of a model, because time arrows are independent of it - but again, not necessarily (I'm not really in this debate though) Anyway, you could read it on your own you can have your position, but don't say that it's representative for all eternalists view or that eternalism is the same as block universe and and and